It may fairly be said that, in a sense, John Feinberg has been working on and toward *No One Like Him* for over twenty-five years. His doctoral dissertation for the University of Chicago department of philosophy, “Theologies and Evil” (subsequently published under that same title) wrestled with the question of God in the face of seemingly staggering counter evidence (cf. a later edition, *The Many Faces of Evil*). What Feinberg has at last produced is indeed a magisterial and magnificent magnum opus which purposes to restate, reformulate, or reconceptualize the doctrine of God for evangelical/Protestant orthodox theology in light of contemporary cultural, philosophical and theological trends, issues and concerns about how we are to understand God and God’s relationship to us in the world. Additionally, Feinberg’s volume is the second volume of a very significant series of theological monographs intended to engage present biblical, theological, and philosophical scholarship on the central *loci* of the Christian faith largely from a Calvinist perspective. Feinberg’s Calvinism has vast formative effect on the topics, directions and conclusions taken by Feinberg, especially in the latter half of the book.

Thus in the face of prominent contemporary criticisms of “classical” Christian theism, Feinberg is responding to this urgent need by altering, or to use Feinberg’s own oft used term, “nuancing” important aspects of the evangelical God-concept in order to answer contemporary needs and questions to make the said God-concept more coherent. In that sense, Feinberg’s book is, somewhat like Tillich’s *Systematic Theology*, an answering theology, showing how the God of evangelical orthodoxy, when properly conceptualized and restated, meets the “need” of contemporary persons who feel that God must be one to whom they can relate, who cares for them, who knows and responds interactively with their pain and concerns. For that reason Feinberg’s inclusions and exclusions make this work, again, unique. Many topics usually discussed in a “Theology Proper” text are not included here, for they are not relevant to contemporary debates. Yet Feinberg is rightly wary of the cultural demand for a “user friendly” God who only waits upon our whims and wants but who makes no demands upon us—a god who, in the words of Geddes MacGregor, “lets us be.” Rather, Feinberg wants to balance what would classically be termed God’s transcendence and immanence, or more to the point,
God’s lordly Majesty and his active personal care and concern for the world and persons therein. It is not either transcendent glory or present compassion, but both/and. This is the reason for Feinberg’s repeated theme throughout the volume, that God is “the King who cares.” While the statement may sound a bit sentimentalistic, in fact it unfolds through Feinberg’s argumentation in multiple fruitful strands to show that if we properly understand the nature of the living God in a way that “makes” (i.e. portrays?) him as relational, concerned, and caring, we are not forced as a result to affirm process theism or the “Open Theism” of God regarding how much sovereign control God has (or rather does not have) in the world. The God Feinberg thus conceives is a uniquely “nuanced” being who is simultaneously sovereign Lord who has foreordained all things, is ever temporal, is truly omniscient, possible in a sense, very relational, but not simple in any classical sense. So in contrast to these and other influential God-world-human conceptualizations, Feinberg remains emphatic in his affirmation about this “King who cares” that there is indeed No One Like Him.

The entire theological configuration requires that we clarify Feinberg’s primary dialogue partners in almost every chapter of the book. He rightly concludes, especially within the postmodern contest, that contemporary emphases on becoming over being, the processive over “static” being, has created fertile ground for process or process-like metaphysics, and process theology in particular. As a result, the Whiteheadian-Hartshornian concept of God as dipolar, as emphatically immanent, as empathetic and relational to the extent even as God “lures” the world by his loving “persuasion” to ever greater creativity, novelty, and complexity as we “prehend” the good he provides, so, too, is God enhanced as he prehends from the world, and from human beings especially. This is a democratic god, a god without demands who not only cares and guides but who, in a real sense, shares his responsibilities for the world with us. As a God-concept “King” is rejected as too aloof, too unconcerned, too transcendent to meet our current cultural-personal desire to have God as our friend alongside us in the dark journey into the unknown future. And Feinberg is clearly sensitive to these criticisms of “Classical” Christian theism’s royal God-concept. But more recently the semi-processive “Open View” of God (e.g. C. Pinnock, R. Rice, and John Sanders) has arisen as a mediating God-concept alternative to both the Classical Christian theism and Process Theology, seeking as it does the advantages of each, in light of the “plain teaching” of Scripture, without the “pitfalls.” These views, or rather their primary spokespersons, along with process thought, are constantly engaged by Feinberg as he, by his altered or “nuanced” modified Calvinist alternative, works strenuously on at least two fronts to mediate the mediation, i.e. to conceptually mediate between the variously problematic “Classical” Christian view of God and the “Open View” of God. Thus he “makes” our concept of God more relational and concerned and more faithful to Scripture and to evangelical theology, while being philosophically coherent (non-contradictory).

To this end, Feinberg seems to make certain chapters more central to his argumentation than others. This does not necessarily mean they are more
important, but, given the current philosophical-theological lines of debate, certain questions are more volatile and currently have more impact than others on how Christians understand God. For this reason, too, Feinberg’s chapters are somewhat uneven because some do require much more in-depth analysis and philosophical argument to bring the real issues to clarity and to arrive at a useful theological conclusion for our time and culture.

The first chapter, “God—the very Idea” sets the lines for the book as a whole, that is, how do we conceive of God. Properly? Improperly? After weaving this through contemporary thinking and questions about God’s “Be-ing” and his relation to the world. Feinberg begins to directly engage Process thought/Theology. But this engagement is first as a listener to Process criticisms of Classical Christian Theism as much as it is finally to be critical analyst and constructive respondent. He concludes that biblically, theologically, and philosophically, Process Theology as such is inadequate as a God (and God-world) concept for evangelical theology. This writer was somewhat surprised to find that Hartshorne’s view of God’s consequent nature is, despite much apparent “process” description otherwise pantheism not panentheism, i.e. God is identical to the world. Process thinkers like Williams, Cobb, Ford, Griffin, and others seem to portray God’s “concrete” pole as more akin to a world-soul/spirit symbiotically related to this world as interrelated but somewhat distinct. As a side note, if Feinberg is right that panentheism is actually pantheism (and I believe he is), then much of process theology crumbles into ruin. It is inherently self-contradictory. How can a pantheistic “god” lure actual occasions toward a given initial aim, an aim these are “free” to accept or reject toward greater enjoyment creativity and novelty of new possibilities. If “god” is identical with the world, no occasion—not even the “occasion” of the life of Jesus—can have any greater significance than any other (contra Ogden, Ford, Cobb, Griffin, Pittenger). Indeed, there can be no ethic (as Lervis Ford has acknowledged).

For Feinberg, the question of God’s “moral” and “non-moral” attributes is one of the absolutely central, critical elements in his alteration of historical orthodoxy’s view of God. While Feinberg seeks greater clarity regarding God’s “moral” attributes (e.g. holiness, righteousness, love, etc.) he finds the “classical package” of God’s “non-moral” attributes (e.g. aseity, infinitude, eternity, etc.) to be very problematic and at the heart of the modern/postmodern sense that the Christian God is aloof, uncaring, untouched by the world’s pain, and so not truly relational to and with human beings who now require a God with whom they can have a closely personal relationship. While this issue will be analyzed more fully below, it is enough to note initially that Feinberg’s own “package” alters (“nuances”) the notions of absolute aseity, absolute immutability, and eternity (in order to more fully reflect God’s active caring) while rejecting divine simplicity. While this writer remains in much agreement with Feinberg on these issues, questions remain.

Among Feinberg’s “nuanced” attributes, one in particular is made to stand out because of its signal influence on other doctrines—“God, Time and Eternity.” What is God’s relation to our four dimensional space-time continuum? For a number of reasons, Classical theism has espoused God’s atemporal
eternal, that God is timeless, though it has also affirmed God’s creation, providence, the incarnation, etc. But Feinberg finds divine timelessness to be a primary reason for modern rejections of the classical Christian God-concept. Such a God is said to be remote, unaffected by the needs of all my “nows.” Such a God may know that such-and-such occurs in my life but not when and as it occurs (as a temporal indexical). Therefore, in some sense, a truly relational God must be temporal. This has usually been referred to in terms of “God-everlasting,” but Feinberg opts for “temporal eternity” or “Semipernity,” possibly concluding that inclusion of the term “eternity” will be more palatable to most evangelical Christians. Again, many of Feinberg’s reasons are sound, but questions arise and some must be brought to bear on this reformulation.

While much that Feinberg teaches on the doctrine of God’s triunity, the Trinity, is in keeping with historical orthodoxy, yet his strong criticisms of “Nicene” theology and terminology, of the Cappadocian fathers, and thus of the “classical” expression of the doctrine of the Trinity (cf. Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed) as incoherent must be examined for adequacy. Feinberg’s broadly nominalistic position, which has much effect on his formulation of the attributes in relation to the Being of God, emerges prominently in his discussion of the Trinity. For the Church fathers the Nicene homoousion doctrine is the epistemological linchpin of all theology. It reflects the patristic concern for our real knowledge of God as he is (however finitely and partially) in Christ and by the Spirit (John 17:3). For these God is in himself (ontologically) as he is toward us (economically) in Christ and by the Spirit. Salvific adequacy requires real knowledge of God in Christ (thus homoousian). But Feinberg’s concern to overcome patristic “incoherency” leads him to conclude his reformulation of the Trinity by denying the eternal generation of the Son and the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit, while affirming as his core point that “underlying the divine Person that is the Father is a God, underlying the divine Person that is the Son is a God, and underlying the Divine Person that is the Holy Spirit is a God.” This is said to be the meaning of the deity of the three persons. Some of this reviewer’s serious concerns will be discussed below (including semi-modalistic possibilities).

In terms of “The Acts of God,” the third and last major section of the volume, the most crucial issues for Feinberg’s argument may initially be regarded together. These are the divine decree, the resulting specific sovereignty model of divine providence and (given the totality and specificity of the decree) the possibility and nature of human freedom. Christian Orthodoxy (certain prominent streams) has claimed that God has planned/purposed in relation to all things (the decree). While Process and Open View theisms consider divine purposes to be highly contingent upon e.g. humanity’s cooperation, Arminian theologians, holding essentially a classical view of God’s relation to the world, still see in God’s providential real conditionality in the details, though God’s general purposes are surely actualized. As a modified Calvinist, Feinberg asserts not only that there is a decree (for which, I think, he gives much excellent biblical support), but also that the decree is unconditional and relates to everything that comes to pass. Like Calvin, he
is critical of those who claim that in some cases God “allows” something to occur. Again, the extensive argumentation and dialogue are largely philosophical, representing the major schools in the current debate, but as always such careful discussions are highly informative, and of great interest. All leads finally to the reinforcement of the conclusion that Process theism is seriously inadequate (immanent relationality without sovereignty). “Open View” theism is also religiously inadequate (a relational God who merely walks with us into an unknown and unknowable future). Classical Arminian theology, while religiously adequate, has the apparently insuperable problem of claiming that God can somehow accomplish his “general” goals while being unable to guarantee the details of his will day-to-day. While sovereign, this God is said to restrict his exercise of providence for the sake of the high value of human libertarian free will. Feinberg’s lengthy presentation and analysis of the current dialogue between proponents of libertarian free will and “compatibilist” free will is ever stimulating and almost constantly illuminating, even if one does not always agree. Feinberg finds that human free will must be affirmed in light of the clear teaching of Scripture, yet God is sovereign and his decree is complete (“who works all things after the counsel of his own will,” Eph 1:11). His solution to the apparent dilemma (as noted seriously) is to espouse a form of compatibilistic freedom. Feinberg’s able defense of compatibilism/soft determinism is must reading and, again, a real contribution to the contemporary understanding of legitimate Christian options regarding the God-world-human relation. Yet, as Feinberg acknowledges, some questions cannot be answered and, probably, many libertarians will not be convinced.

Because of space considerations I will forgo much comment on Feinberg’s highly significant, insightful, and influential work on the “Problem of Evil” (cf. comments above) reflected more fully in his work The Many Faces of Evil. It is noteworthy that he again acknowledges the effectiveness of the “Free Will Defense,” but that it is not an option for a Calvinist (no doubt a reference at least to Plantinga’s own form of the argument). His own “Integrity of Human’s Defense” is said to meet the requirements of the critics regarding the consistency of the conceptual intersection of the Christian God and the presence of great evil in the world for the Calvinist position.

Again Feinberg’s clear and overriding concern is to firmly but sensitively respond to process and “processive” metaphysics and the view of God which are engendered by such views. While at times Feinberg goes to great lengths to give a fair hearing to process God-world conceptualizations and reformulates the classical package of attributes in light of process criticisms, he shows in every chapter of the book, one way or another (in addition to the chapter whose focus is process theology), the inadequacy of the Process God-concept.

A brief word also needs to be said about Feinberg’s overall methodology throughout No One Like Him. One might say initially and too briefly that despite variations, almost all of the chapters are fueled by Scripture, extensive philosophical debates, and constructive philosophico-theological argumentation. The Law of Non-Contradiction makes its formative presence felt everywhere. This can be no surprise for those who know John Feinberg’s
substantial work over the years. What methodological differences there are chapter to chapter depend on the topic and especially on the “clarity” of the biblical data and on the extent of the consequent need for philosophical-theological clarification. Yet topics of greatest constructive concern, e.g. the non-moral divine attributes, God and time/timelessness, divine sovereignty, foreknowledge, and human free will, etc., while grappling with Scripture and some pertinent passages, are mostly philosophical discussions. Given the topics and need to coherently state the doctrine of God for our current context, it could hardly be otherwise. But there are sections where it seems that the biblical data may be a bit shortchanged, and more “word studies” seem to have a bit too much prominence. Scripture is often said to be “ambiguous” on crucial issues, thus requiring philosophy to rescue it from such a “no man’s land.” Near the outset of the book, and exemplified variously in all chapters, Feinberg clearly states that his theologizing is the result of Scripture and Reason, especially, again, the Law of Non-Contradiction. But this often tends to be done in a way that seems at odds with (or a reversal of) Anselm’s fides quaerens intellectum.

By desiring to point out aspects of Feinberg’s No One Like Him which I would wish to commend and applaud, a problem is presented immediately. There are too many for a mere review article. Just as there are none to compare to Yahweh, the one triune God, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the living God who is objectively and ultimately self-disclosed in Jesus Christ, so too one might rightly say there is no textbook relating to the doctrine of God like this one. It is sui generis. Herein John Feinberg does and is doing theology at a level that gives him few, if any, peers in evangelicalism and beyond, and all of this at a time when the “Godness of God” needs reemphasizing to an evangelicalism bent on subjective self-absorption. In this way, too, Feinberg is engaged at the highest level of contemporary philosophical theology, being thus a significant constructive theological voice for evangelicalism, as well as to evangelicalism, in the contemporary cultural context. In that sense, H. Brown’s comment in the “Foreword,” that John Feinberg has done for the evangelical doctrine of God what Carl Henry did for the doctrine of divine revelation, is right on track (with an interesting parallel in the last volume of Henry’s G R and A.” The God Who Stands, Stoops and Stays”). Further, given the fact that the doctrine of God’s triunity is theologia par excellence, Feinberg, like Karl Barth’s reintroduction of the doctrine back into the highest levels of theological discussion, declares firmly the reality of the three-in-one God for twenty-first century evangelicalism, seeking therein greater coherence and conceivability, theological portrayal and declaration of it. Feinberg’s sensitivity to contemporary culture, and hence to theological and philosophical trends, as well as the inspired biblical text, allows him to see what are perhaps unbiblical and philosophically contradictory, incoherent theological expressions in the doctrine of God within historical orthodoxy, especially the “classical package” of God’s non-moral attributes, divine simplicity, God as timeless/atemporal, divine foreknowledge-human freedom, etc. This reviewer has, over time, come to hold views very similar to Feinberg’s, but as will be noted, I am not as critical of the “classical”
Christian position as he is. Emphasis, then, on “the King who cares” is not only a correct doctrine biblically, but also needful contextually in the sense that this is a time when the fullness of that biblical truth, both/and, sovereign and personal, not either/or, needs to be heralded at this time—especially as that truth was made manifest in “The Word made Flesh.” While little has been said so far about “God and creation,” Feinberg’s doctrine of Creation is a pure gem. Therein Feinberg garners, arranges, and discusses “hot button” topics about the nature of the cosmos in relation to the Creator God in a way that cannot help but be profitable to all readers. This is one of his most overtly biblical, exegetical, theological, as well as philosophical chapters. He asks good, hard questions of the different prominent views among evangelicals, and of evolution and other non-Christian cosmogonies, and thereby gives clarity to the real issues within this crucial, indeed, foundational doctrine. After careful examination of the prominent creation themes in OT and NT and a lengthy probing of the “creation days” of Genesis 1–2 in light of their near Eastern context, audience and literary form (genre), Feinberg carefully explains the pros and cons of e.g. the “Pictorial-Revelation Day Theory,” the “Gap Theory,” “Day Age” theories, Twenty-four-hour day theories and the recent significant “Literary Framework” theory (having much correct influence). Feinberg says that as a result of Scripture and Reason, he feels most comfortable with a “combination” of the “Literary Framework Theory” and the “Twenty-four Day Theory,” a modified combination he is able to develop especially with the exegetical-linguistic help of Cassuto on Genesis. Still as Feinberg formulates and explains the view it seems to become increasingly similar, in principle, to the “Day Age” View—and for some similar reasons, e.g. the placement of additional time spans.

Also, as a compatibilist, Feinberg’s two-front debate with libertarian (incompatibilist) free will on one side and fatalism and hard determinism on the other is a wonderful model of pedagogical dialectics. While he sets up the whole discussion in order to place his own “compatibilist” view of free will firmly “in the middle,” the content has consistent depth, leaving few legitimate issues regarding the reality and nature of human freedom in relation to a sovereign, omniscient (including all knowledge of future events), and caring God untouched. While this writer has some misgivings about elements of Feinberg’s own position on this question (cf. below), the exegetical, theological, and philosophical wealth, along with Feinberg’s own logical systematization, also make this an evangelical statement to be reckoned with. Further, much of the current debate about God’s nature and sovereignty, especially in evangelical circles, is hermeneutical. How are we to handle scriptural assertions, teachings, and narratives (diverse genres) reflecting God’s relation to humans? At one point he naively claims that through proper handling of Scripture all factions should come to the same conclusion. But surely this result is not possible, given the different starting points, different passages taken to be the prism through which all is to be seen, etc. Still we are reminded that, theologically, clear didactic passages have greater weight for doctrinal expression than do ambiguous anecdotal narrative portions preferred by e.g. “Open View” advocates.
A couple final positive comments from among the many commendable elements in No One Like Him must suffice. Though Feinberg regularly shortchanges the “Classical” Christian View of God, he often bends over backwards to be fair to his primary philosophical opponents, e.g. those who hold to divine atemporal eternity, libertarian/free will, general sovereignty, especially as asserted in Process and Open View theisms. And as is clear from the size of this volume (and it could have been much larger), Feinberg has shown an impressive ability to locate, mediate, incorporate, analyze, criticize, reformulate, and systematize an enormous amount of crucial conceptual, theological, and philosophical-metaphysical material. The volume is large but lean with meaty argumentation. It is a scholarly theological treasure house from which many others cannot only learn but advance in theological thinking for the kingdom of God.

While some concerns about positions taken in No One Like Him have been briefly alluded to previously, still I do have further theological concerns. First, of lesser concern is his critical handling of elements of various influential modern God-concepts. What Feinberg does with Karl Barth has little if anything to do with Barth’s mature thought (post-Anselm) in the Dogmatics. Like so many evangelicals since Van Til, Barth’s shift to theological objectivity, rooted in his Christocentricity, is missed and all is interpreted via his early more dialectical-existentialist Romans commentary. Yet, arguably, Barth is far more of an ally than an opponent. What Feinberg does with Paul Tillich is little better, even confusing Tillich’s use of “ultimate concern,” which is his definition of religion, with the Ground of our being or “God,” who as such is the answer to our ultimate concern. Yet his work with Process theology, again, is excellent. I am more concerned that Feinberg has (or appears to have) fallen for the propaganda (and it is that) of Process Theology, and with them, the Open View of God, that the Classical View portrays God as aloof, uncaring, utterly transcendent, unaffected, an absolute King far away. When I regularly read such statements in Process and more recently Open View writers, I am struck by the fact that no Christian theologian ever actually portrayed God this way—not Irenaeus, not Augustine, not Aquinas, not Luther or Calvin, not Edwards, not Hodge. This is a perversion. What these criticisms describe is Deism. There is no deist in this group. Their conclusions were the direct result of their interpretation of Scripture, not Plato’s dialogues, however mistaken they may have been as a result of philosophical influences on such (as is true of Feinberg and myself). If the “classic” Christian God-concept was as Process advocates caricatured it, then “classic” Christian theologians would not have espoused divine creation, divine providence, miracles, answer to our prayer, God’s love, above all the Incarnation and effective presence of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, for Process metaphysicians to criticize “classic” Christian Theology for the influence of philosophy on their theology is irony of the highest order. I really think Feinberg is “agreeing” with the Process “strawman” in order thereby to enter the dialogical fray. But the point stands. It should be added again that I have come in recent years to a position very similar to Feinberg’s about the alteration of the “classical package” of non-moral divine
attributes (especially Simplicity, absolute Aseity, absolute Immutability, absolute Impassibility). Yet Feinberg’s hesitation to see or understand God’s revelatory actions toward and in the world as unitarily reflective of his inmost essence/nature is a concern (see below). An element of “agnosticism” is thereby slipped into the issue of divine revelation. Is God’s active revelation, as reflected in the attributes “of God,” truly self-revelation, self-disclosure of God as he is in himself? What then of the Word made flesh? What then of redemption?

Taking this issue further and more centrally, I am seriously disturbed by Feinberg’s “nuancing” of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed and its truly classical Christian statement of God’s trinity. Rejection is far nearer to the point. Contrary to the history of the Church, Feinberg argues that the conclusions of the Nicene Fathers are incoherent and their assertions about the interrelations of the Persons inconceivable. About inconceivability of the relations of the Persons—I surely hope so if God is God! Let both biblical-theological conviction and much mystery reign here. It appears that Feinberg’s denial of the perichoretic relations of Father, Son and Spirit, and beyond, is the result of his misunderstanding of what the Fathers (and the Arians) were asserting, what is the absolutely critical epistemological-theological nature of the Nicene homoousion, the consciously soteriological nature of all such patristic hermeneutics and theological conclusions, and therefore the necessity that God be in himself (the ontological Trinity) as he is toward us (in all revelatory acts all of the economy, but above all and centrally in Jesus Christ). The negation of that principle leads back to the dualistic Gnosticism of the Modalist-Sabellian and Arian positions. It also negates salvation, which the Fathers rightly understood to be the relational, partial but real knowledge of God as he is in himself by the knowledge of God found in the Word made flesh and in the power of the Spirit (homoousion). Having denied the eternal generation of the Son and eternal procession of the Spirit, holding that these relate only to God’s activity in relation to the world, thus dualistically splitting God’s economy from God’s ontology, Feinberg somehow affirms that there are “relations” in the triune Godhead but cannot say what they are. The revelation of God is not the revelation of God? How then does he know of such relations? How can we say God is loving/Love in himself just because he is toward us? If there is no eternal generation, how is the Son the Son—only in our experience? What kind of Trinity can be espoused from this? Having largely negated the core elements of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan statement, Feinberg, following the principles of Macnamara, Reyes and Reyes, says rather “the three propositions,” “the Father is God,” “the Son is God,” and “the Holy Spirit is God,” should be understood as saying the following: “underlying the divine Person that is the Father is a God,” and “underlying the Divine Person that is the Holy Spirit is a God” (p. 498). This seems at least to draw dangerously close to Modalism, which, given the agnosticism about the “God” who lies behind the three, falls prey to Barth’s critique of Modalism, like that of the Fathers, that it may negate salvation (John 17:3). Is not this God actually less related to us, as he is in himself, than the God-concept of the “classical” view?
Rather, I would counter again that what God is toward us historically he is in the ontological, perichoretic relations of the Trinity from all eternity. No theological-epistemological dualism here.

Other concerns must be dealt with briefly. While I too tend toward divine temporality, I do not think that Feinberg has fully made his case, either for a sempiternal God or that an atemporal God cannot surely know the libertarian free acts of human beings. Passages such as 2 Pet 3:8 must at the very least tell us that God's relation to time, even if he is sempiternal, is not the same as ours. There is something distinctive about God's relation to space-time. Feinberg may agree, but this is not clear. Feinberg also seems to assert that temporality has always been true of God, even before creation. Interesting, to be sure. But what would time be measuring before creation? If, according to Einstein, time is inextricably related to space, and space is the relationship between objects (field theory), then what might this relation be to God before creation? I am also not convinced that an atemporal God cannot in some real sense know temporal indexicals or that this is Thursday evening. Only the assumption of a Newtonian universe and therefore a radical, dualistic disjunction between the “eternal” and “space-time”—which I must deny—necessitates the conclusions about an atemporal God and my own experience of space-time. As an “Einsteinian” I would assert the divinely established unitary, interactivity of the “two” realms—if there are two—and so, to borrow from the Church fathers (mutatis mutandis) their dynamic, perichoretic interactivity, their interpenetration if you will. Is that a full explanation? Surely not. But neither the Fathers, nor the Reformers, nor John Feinberg, nor anyone else can finally do so. “We know in part”—but what we know, we truly know in Christ and by the Holy Spirit.

Finally, Feinberg’s understanding of human freedom (question of specific divine sovereignty, foreknowledge, and human freedom) is a very nuanced freedom. Is it a kind of freedom? I suppose so. But Feinberg’s compatibilistic freedom still appears to leave God open to the charge of guilt for evil in the world—a charge he, unlike Calvin, wants to avoid. His soft determinism may still be a bit too firm for this compatibilist reviewer. Having been reminded (by Feinberg in his textual dialogues) of the many viable, powerful arguments for (classical Arminian) libertarian free will, and yet also of the questions and Scripture portions unsuccessfully answered by libertarians, I am in search of an even “softer” compatibilism. The recent work by Robert C. Koons in *Philosophia Christi* has much to commend it as a further mediating alternative between the two. As an addendum to this print, I find that Feinberg seriously underplays the role of “divine persuasion,” understood in rather strong terms, within the libertarian position. Much (but not all) of the incoherence Feinberg criticizes in “classical” Arminian notions of libertarian freedom are answered by such personal activity of God and could be useful for a further mediated compatibilism.

Despite these issues just mentioned, and other concerns and questions alluded to through this constructive-critical analysis (and left unmentioned), I can only give to John Feinberg’s *magnum opus No One Like Him* the absolutely highest commendation and recommendation. This work has further
solidified Feinberg’s place as a theological leader of evangelicalism. This text
must be the root and basis of the ongoing developmental unfolding of his-
torical orthodoxy’s manifold God-concept and God-talk. As mentioned, to miss
interacting with the numerous advancements and openings which Feinberg
has made in the doctrine of God is to dangerously archaize oneself and one’s
students. This should be a required text related not only to the doctrine of
God but philosophy of religion and the many other cross currents of both
with other related doctrines. Yes, it is long, an almost mammoth tome, but
it can and (again) must be generally incorporated into the evangelical theo-
logical curriculum in the English-speaking world. But again, the foundation
must be the affirmation and the realization of the God who has given him-
self to be known as he is in Christ and by the Spirit.