BOOK REVIEWS


Like Karl Barth's Romerbrief of 1918, so Hans Kung's "inquiry," titled Infallible, exploded like a bombshell upon the theological world (Bombshells, it must be admitted, do explode more frequently nowadays, and don't seem to make quite the same stir as formerly). First appearing in German in 1970, this slim volume has now been translated into English and has just begun to extend its influence to the American theological scene. Kung, of course, was not the first to defend the idea that "the Pope is not infallible even when exercising the full authority of his office...he passes judgment on a matter of faith and morals." He is not even the only voice within the Roman Catholic church. But then, neither was Barth the first nor the only one to lift his voice against liberalism half a century ago. Rather Kung epitomizes, as did Barth for his day, what many others are saying; and in Kung's case he does so having already made his reputation as one of the scintillating stars of Roman Catholic theology.

Kung begins his work with an array of statistics that penetrate immediately into the very heart of the issue. Chapter One begins with the heading: "The errors of the ecclesiastical teaching office." King cites errors in the past history of the church beginning with the ex-communication of Photius, the prohibition of interest at the beginning of the modern era, the condemnation of Galileo, the maintenance of the secular power of the Pope, the condemnations of modern critical and historical studies relating to the authorship of the books of the Bible and to the history of the text including the Vulgate, and concluding with the condemnations set forth in the encyclical Humani Generis).

These errors have been met in bungled fashion by the church through the desperate expedient of claiming in each case that the church was not in error—until such time as it became absolutely plain to everybody that, as a matter of fact, the church was in error. As a last recourse the church then switched invariably to the viewpoint that the pronouncement was, as a matter of fact, not an infallible decision but merely an opinion of church or pope.

This ridiculous procedure, so Kung avers, has been brought to an ultimate crisis in our day by the encyclical Humanae Vitae on birth control. This recent papal decision had little effect on the actual practice of birth control, but it has become a crucially significant document for the evalua-
tion and re-examination of the authority of the Roman Church and its Pope. As Kung points out, the decision touches upon an even more fundamental question than the infallibility of the Pope. Roman Catholic theologians agree that the passive infallibility of the church is fundamental. The active infallibility of ecumenical councils and popes simply brings to voice the infallible authority of the church. Just here lies the "neuralgic" point. The decision of Pope Paul the IV embedded in Humanae Vitae was obviously and unquestionably the universal doctrine of the Roman church defended "always, everywhere, by everyone."

Any other decision than that promulgated, ever so reluctantly, by Paul IV would not have been a development of the doctrine of the church but a contradiction to the doctrine of the church and thus a fatal admission that the church, as a matter of fact, is fallible. "The prohibition of contraception... belongs to the universal, infallible Catholic faith." In view of this it is comparatively unimportant whether Pope Paul's intention was to endow the papal statement with formal infallibility (as the group of authoritarian conservatives thought), against the progressives (in theory or practice), or on the other hand to avoid an ex cathedra statement (as the pastoral minded conservatives thought). Whatever may be the scholastic-like label given to this particular papal pronouncement, the teaching it set forth was unquestionably the official teaching of a church which claimed to be infallible; and it was wrong.

In Chapter Two Kung turns to the question: What is the foundation of this doctrine of infallibility? Essentially it can be very simply stated: The apostles were commissioned by Christ with the authority over the church; the apostles bequeathed their authority to bishops; and the bishops bequeathed their authority to the pope in the decrees of Vatican I. In addition there are also direct grounds for arguing that Christ commissioned the Apostle Peter, and in turn his successors in the chair of Peter at Rome, with infallible authority.

Of course this is not an absolute infallibility on the part of the Pope. Rather "The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, [only] when exercising the office of pastor and teacher of all Christians he defines with his supreme apostolic authority doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal church, through the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is possessed of... infallibility;... and, therefore, such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable..." In traditional fashion Hans Kung outlines the conditions under which the Pope may speak with infallibility. One, he must speak not as a private person or as bishop at Rome or even as Pope, but as the supreme pastor and teacher of Christendom in view of his apostolic authority inherited from Peter. Two, his authority is limited only to faith and morals, which include all divinely revealed truth and all truth logically demanded by adherence to revealed truth. Three, he receives this power not by any new revelation or by an inspiration but by a divine assistance which merely protects him from error in a negative sense. Finally, this infallibility is not his alone.
but is shared with the universal church and with bishops assembled in universal council. In spite of such qualifications, Kung points out, however, it may truthfully be said that "The teaching of Vatican One really amounts to this: if he wants, the Pope can do everything, even without the church."

In contradicting the doctrine of infallibility, promulgated officially first by Vatican I and reaffirmed by Vatican II, Kung examines its Biblical support and concludes, "There is not a word here about infallibility." The Biblical materials neither refer to the infallibility of the pope or of the councils or of the bishops, or of the church. Kung also brushes aside the time honored Roman argument from tradition and the history of the church. "Only from the fourth century onward," he asserts, "was Matthew 16:8 ff used (particularly by the Roman Pontiffs, Damasus and Leo) to support a claim to primacy and even then without any formal claim to infallibility." The greatest boost to papal infallibility came in the ninth century from the pseudo-Isidorian Decretals. Finally in the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas wove the infallibility of the church into a comprehensive dogmatic system. Even so, however, there was no real unanimity as to papal infallibility during the later middle ages, during the reformation period, and even as far down as the post-reformation period. Ultimately the resolution of the issue came in part because of political considerations relating to the Vatican state and to the defensiveness of the southern European Catholic nations. In part also the decision was influenced by pastoral concerns to defend the church against modernism and the dissolution of faith during the nineteenth century. Most of all, however, the decision of Vatican I was not so much a decision but a nearly unanimous theological viewpoint into which the church had drifted as a result of its having forgotten long ago the data of scripture and the evidence from history.

In Chapter Three Hans Kung tackles the "central problem," namely the basic idea of infallibility. "Is the church's infallibility," he asks, "dependent upon infallible propositions?" He concedes that faith is dependent on some propositions which, if Christian faith is valid, must require positive affirmation of them as true. Faith, moreover, is also dependent upon the rejection of certain false propositions which, if accepted as true, would destroy faith. It is essential, however, so Kung argues, to note that faith itself is not faith in a proposition, but it is faith in Christ; and propositional truth, though necessary, represents propositions affirmed by a faith which has as its proper object not the propositions but the person of Christ. Faith, therefore, is not dependent upon dogmatic assertions, and the certainty of faith is not dependent upon the ability of the church to provide infallible propositions. To accept the binding character of propositions which are essential to a proper faith does not mean that we have to accept their infallibility. Unfortunately, the assumption on which the Roman Church has relied is that the promises of Christ to his church demand that a set of propositions must be guaranteed by the church, the councils, or the pope to be infallible; but this does not follow.
Then Kung employs a linguistic attack on the very idea of infallible propositions:

1. Propositions fall short of reality (that is, they are analogical although this is not the way Kung puts it).

2. Propositions are open to misunderstanding (that is, without illumination they are unable to be discerned as truths though, again, Kung does not state his point in this fashion).

3. Propositions can be translated only up to a point.

4. Propositions are "in motion" (here it would seem that Kung is confusing statements or sentences or formulations of propositions with propositions themselves. Specific words and sentences by which propositions are indicated certainly do undergo change with changes in language and culture).

5. Propositions are ideology prone although this does not mean that propositions cannot correspond to the reality which they claim to express.

Kung concludes his analysis of the idea of infallibility by asserting that these linguistic factors make it seem improbable that the church's propositions of faith, which are admittedly human propositions, could possibly be freed from human weakness, inadequacy, dubiousness, and also, therefore, the capacity for error which is necessarily inherent in propositions. In short, "propositions can be true and false." The decisive thing is that "...no one—neither Vatican I nor Vatican II nor textbook theology—has substantiated what would have to be substantiated: that the church, her leadership or her theology, can produce propositions which a priori cannot be false.

Kung finally turns to his own solution of the dilemma, "Does the infallibility of the church really stand or fall with infallible propositions? ...The dilemma can only be overcome by raising the alternatives to a higher plane: the church will persist in the truths in spite of all ever possible errors!" Such a view, he immediately adds, can be defended in the light of scriptural passages which contain the promise of the maintenance of the church in truth; but these passages in no wise speak of infallible propositions. Also such a view does justice to the facts of church history, including the numerous and manifest errors of the past which sheer honesty must force us to confess. It also coincides with the actual facts of the endurance and persistence of the church in spite of these errors through her two thousand years of history. In this sense, Kung argues, we have a valid "infallibility" of the church. For clarity's sake, however, we ought really to speak, not so much of infallibility but of her indefectibility and perpetuity or, at most, of the church's indefectibility or perpetuity in the truth.

Certainty, however, is still possible with this fundamental shift from churchly infallibility to a doctrine of the indefectibility of the faith of the
church. The reason certainty is possible is because faith is in a person, Jesus Christ. This includes certain truths, but it does not include any particular doctrinal statements which must be held infallibly. Papal and churchly infallibility were never known during the first thousand years of the history of the church, and yet there was nonetheless a basic indefectibility that was possessed throughout the entire history of the church.

This new view (really old and original) opens up for Kung all sorts of ecumenical possibilities. Luther, the Anglicans, and Calvin—each of the classic branches of the protestant church—held to a kind of infallibility of the church, that is, to this more modest and defensible view of the indefectibility of faith. Therefore, ecumenical agreement is possible if only Roman Catholics will see the light on this matter of the traditional doctrine of papal, conciliar, and churchly infallibility.

The Eastern Orthodox church, too, can be brought into this ecumenical sphere if they will for once understand that the infallibility of councils (to which they adhere even though they reject infallibility of the pope) is subject to exactly the same kind of analysis as every other type of infallibility. Similarly protestants have held to an infallibility of the Bible, but it is no improvement to replace the infallibility of the church with the infallibility of the Bible. The same objections to the infallibility of Roman pontiffs or of ecumenical councils apply also to the infallibility of a paper pope. Protestants, nevertheless, have developed a doctrine of verbal inspiration, which in thoroughly unhistorical fashion eliminated the human element of scripture. The ground of faith was thereby shifted by them from Christ to the Bible. This bad idea of Biblical infallibility then was taken over by the Roman church and the popes in the nineteenth century. In spite of warnings regarding historical errors, the nineteenth-century church unfortunately adopted the erroneous protestant viewpoint, and Vatican II, although with some reservations, reasserted the doctrine of Biblical inerrancy.

In conclusion Kung calls for ecumenical unity amongst all branches of Christendom on the basis of:

1. The view that God acts through the Scripture by his Holy Spirit.

2. Scriptures are thoroughly human and therefore all sorts of errors cannot be excluded.

3. Even though it is not infallible, Scripture is still the original witness to revelation and the normative standard for the doctrine and witness of the church.

Kung reassures his readers, “This does not mean at all, however, any withdrawal of Scripture’s unique precedence in the faith of Christians.” In this “. . . relative sense, we can speak of the truth of Scripture. Not in the sense of an a priori inerrancy of its propositions, but certainly in the sense of a testimony to Jesus Christ that, through all defects in detail, is sound and faithful as a whole. And, even though there are no propositions in the Bible
which are *a priori* free from error, nevertheless there are in fact true propositions attesting the gospel.

4. Jesus Christ, rather than Holy Scripture, is the true object of faith and the ground of a truly Christian and ecumenical faith. He, in fact, is the Lord of Scripture and the one by whom we test the truth of Scripture.

In epilogue Hans Kung calls the pope not to a primacy of honor and infallibility but to one of justice and of service of the entire body of Christ throughout the entire universal church. This can be summed up as a *pastoral* primacy rather than an infallibility of teaching. The volume concludes with footnotes in which are scattered innumerable valuable bibliographical references. The work as a whole, however, would be greatly enhanced by a good index.

Every Evangelical must admire the forthright honesty and, indeed, the courage of this loyal son of the Roman church, who has dared to call a spade a spade. He will certainly appreciate also the full logical force of Kung's Biblical and historical case against the infallibility of the church, its universal councils, and its popes. Surely it will not detract from the honor due him if reference is made to the far more profound and far more thoroughly documented work dealing with the same subject, written by George P. Salmon, *The Infallibility of the Church* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1959), and distinguished by the Catholic *Encyclopedia* as "the cleverest attack upon Roman infallibility ever to be penned."

As for Kung's linguistic analysis of the concept of infallibility, this reviewer can only say that it is completely unconvincing. It is based essentially upon the confusion between a literary sentence and a proposition. The moment such a distinction is recognized, his case falls by the wayside, and with it also falls his case against the infallibility of Holy Scripture. Kung, moreover, is inconsistent in his futile endeavor, as a convinced Christian, to defend the possibility of certain truth and certain faith in Christ without admitting the possibility of infallible propositions. If the proposition "Jesus Christ is Lord and Savior" is not inerrant (not wandering from the truth) and infallibly true (in the sense that it could never be proved false), it is difficult to see how Kung can rest with certain faith in Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior. Whoever rests in confident faith in Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior must, for the sake of consistency, believe that at least some propositions are inerrant and are infallibly true. This is not to say that Christian faith is consistent only with belief in an infallible pope, universe councils, church, or even an infallible Bible. It is to say that Hans Kung, *qua* Christian, cannot consistently deny the possibility on linguistic grounds of making *any* infallible proposition. The Evangelical can appreciate the immense contribution Kung has made to current theological discussion by this fine volume while preserving the right to acknowledge infallible propositions and, in fact, to affirm that the Bible is a book setting forth only infallible propositions.

Evangelical scholars are not well known for their discourses on the methodology of theological ethics. It is therefore a pleasant surprise to find an entire book on the subject written by a competent and experienced Evangelical. The core of this work was a master’s thesis done under Gordon H. Clark on Joseph Fletcher’s situation ethics. But a perusal of the book reveals none of the all too often starchy thesis style. The scholarship remains. The content has been almost doubled. The style has become popular. And, as Clark noted in the introduction, the direction of the argumentation is “road-map” clear.

The very fact that this book is primarily about Fletcher’s system (as the subtitle suggests) is liable to hinder the book’s receiving the attention and acclaim that it deserves. Many people are unfortunately convinced by the fallacy of argument ad novitam, which in this case runs: Fletcher’s system is no longer given much attention, and therefore we should turn to newer, more contemporary matters. But, not only is it a mistake to turn to newer matters merely because they are newer, it is also a mistake in this case to assume that Fletcher has been sufficiently and adequately laid to rest. On the one hand Fletcher is still receiving scholarly attention. Gene Outka, in his new, major work: Agape: An Ethical Analysis, suggests that the oft believed to be definitive refutations of Fletcher (Evans, Mitchell, and Ramsey) may have been based upon a misunderstanding of Fletcher’s views. The same cannot be said of Lutzer’s critique. On the other hand, there is the problem of the on-going effects of Fletcher’s method. The simple fact is that the “telling blows” (if they are telling) of, for example, a Paul Ramsey or a Henlee Barnette are only effective in the end if they are read. It is further a fact that an altogether insufficient number of laymen (especially Evangelicals) have read Ramsey (and if they have read him could they understand him??). Fletcher may be passe, but you could never tell it by observing the rationalizations of the man on the street. Evangelicals, especially young Evangelicals, need to be armed with sound argumentation against the new morality. Platitudes like “the new morality is just the old immorality dressed up in modern clothes,” even if true, are insufficient apologetic weapons. Morality Gap gives just the needed sort of argument. Yea, it would not be far of the mark to say that Lutzer’s work is the most thorough, the best refutation in print of situationism by an Evangelical.

But the reader will find that this polemic function of Lutzer’s book is not its only value. Whereas most other conservatives were satisfied to remark that Fletcher’s tortured, exceptional, and hypothetical illustrations are tortured, exceptional, and hypothetical, Lutzer seeks to hammer out a Biblical and Evangelical answer to them. The answer offered is clearly within the Reformation tradition of doing ethics. (And as such it is ap-
proved by both John W. Montgomery and Gordon H. Clark. And it is said that mutually agreeable topics are scarce where these two men are concerned! Like Luther before him, Lutzer argues that when in this wicked, depraved, and fallen world we are forced to break one command of God in the obeying of some other command of God, we are to choose the lesser evil, sin bravely, and throw ourselves before the throne of a Just but loving and merciful God Who can forgive man through the blood of His Son.

Because of the importance of knowing how the Christian man should act in such moral conflict situations (assuming there are any), it would do well to bring Lutzer’s methodology under closer scrutiny in this review. First one notes, Lutzer holds that man only by (prior) sinning can create a situation in which the intentional breach of at least one commandment is unavoidable. Since the commandments are absolutely normative and universally applicable, one cannot resolve the dilemma of commands by alteration of the normativeness of the commands. This is to say that if one holds that “Thou shalt not commit adultery” is an absolute and universal commandment, then any given instance of adultery is an offence. Adultery is always wrong. Therefore, since God’s standard is absolute, rightness and wrongness is a closed issue, and in the case of moral conflict doing a wrong is unavoidable. Further, since the intentional breaking of an absolute and universal commandment is an offence, guilt is necessarily obtained. Therefore, one cannot resolve the dilemma by altering, voiding, transcending, or in any other way being exempted from obligation or the guilt of a breach. (It is important to note that “intention” does not refer to motive or desire. It refers to volition. If one intended the act which is sin one is guilty of sinning whether or not to so intend is unavoidable. Lutzer argues that God does not hold man guilty for unintentionally committing a breach of responsibility.)

But this dilemma of moral, a priori commands (such that one must do a wrong) does not exhaust the Christian’s responsibility in such cases. The Christian man still has to answer the question “How ought I to decide?” or “Which wrong is to be done?” There is still a choice to be made, and not to decide would be to decide. Lutzer’s next methodological move is intended to answer this pragmatic question. Looking especially to the Scriptures, he notes that some sins are represented as being worse than others. The best interpretation of Lutzer, at this point, seems to be that some sins involve the production of a more evil condition than do others. Lutzer does not say that the commands of God are in a hierarchy..the obligations (at least the ones in question) are all conceived to be absolutely and universally obliging. Therefore it would be nonsense to speak of a “hierarchy of absolute and universal obligations.” But Lutzer does affirm a hierarchy of evil consequences (based upon a hierarchy of value). The Christian, he then argues, is to calculate which command entails the least evil consequences if broken and is to break that commandment. This is a teleological “safety-valve” for the determination of the “good” pragmatic decision,” when the usual way to determine such a thing
(viz., deontologically) is blocked by dilemma. Hence, the lesser evil is promoted not because it is not evil, nor because it is an evil, but rather because it is a lesser of evils when at least some evil is inevitable. It is improper and unfair to say that this view wishes to promote evil. Further, since one is, in such a conflict situation, expected by God to make the best decision as well as to uphold God’s absolute standard, it is improper and unfair to say that in Lutzer’s method God would hold a man guilty for doing his best under the circumstances. God may in point of fact commend the man for doing his best while condemning him for breaking a norm (he is guilty in doing his best). The commendation is for the maximal limitation of evil. The condemnation is for the doing of an evil.

Lutzer’s methodology is also more complicated than it at first appears with reference to the question of how responsibility implies ability (“ought implies can”). On the one hand a man with a moral dilemma ought to obey each command, and, indeed, he can obey either (and therefore each). On the other hand, one ought to do one’s best under the circumstances. And, indeed, one can do one’s best, viz., prevent the occurrence of the greatest amount of evil while allowing (though without wishing it to be the case that any evil be allowed) only the necessary, minimal amount of evil to occur. The problem comes in phrasing the question: “Ought one to obey both commands (at once)?” Now if this question is merely pragmatic, then it is quite the same as asking if one can do both. The answer is No. If this question refers to the obligation in a more normative albeit consequential respect (that is, with regard to the greater and lesser evil consequences of obedience), the answer is still No. One ought not to obey both because even if this were possible, one would be producing the greatest amount of evil possible. If this question refers to the more deontological aspect of the commands (viz., are the commandments obliging since they reflect God’s absolute standard) then one can see that both are obligatory, that one can obey both in the sense of each, but that one cannot obey both in the sense of “at the same time,” which this reviewer takes to be a pragmatic consideration (and therefore not involved with the normative-ought-can discussion). One is not obliged to do the impossible (the situation pragmatically considered), but one ought to revere God’s standard (the situation normatively considered).

Hence, Lutzer’s moral counsel in cases of moral conflict of absolute norms is that while one must do a wrong one can at least make a good decision...good in that it brings about the least evil consequences. This is the best this reviewer can make of Lutzer’s alternative.

The final substantive chapter of Morality Gap involves more polemics. This time Lutzer is attempting to confute what he feels is an Evangelical form of situationism. This form he notes is sometimes referred to as “hierarchicalism.” (Lately the view has been referring to itself as the “greater-good view.”) In this chapter Lutzer argues that hierarchicalism is similar to situationism in at least four respects: 1) they are both utilitarian, 2) they both result in the same decisions and produce the same results, 3)
the moral obligation of both is determined by human evaluation of the context (the concrete situation), and 4) they both rest on a vague theory of moral value.

The judicious and prudent reader must evaluate these conclusions for himself. One thing, however is sure. The greater-good view employs some form of teleological theory of obligation. Decisions are reached by promoting non-moral values. The reason that this teleology is not more pronounced (and obvious) is because consequence considerations are done prior to the occurrence of the consequences. The hierarchialist anticipates the consequences by consideration of the consequence-features of a situation and the consequence-probabilities of the proposed actions. The values implicit in the consequence consideration are then mistakenly referred to as intrinsic to certain moral laws. These moral laws, in turn are mistakenly called absolute and universal (apparently just because God included them in Scripture and God made them available to intuition). Analysis such as Lutzner's shows them to actually be neither absolute nor universal in the proper sense of the terms. Instead they function like the general rules of the rule utilitarian. Hierarchicalism then appears to be some form of absolutistic rule utilitarianism. If this is not Outka's reconsidered Fletcher it might be something akin to Robinson's summary rule-agapism or perhaps Paul Lehman's contextualism. More analysis is needed at this point.

In any regard, Morality Gap, for its attack on the methodologies of both situationism and hierarchicalism and for its presentation of a Biblical methodology to deal with moral conflict situations, is highly recommended. It is not without its perplexities. (Some other reviewers have mistakenly thought them to be inconsistencies!) But careful exegesis will yield profitable material for any Evangelical interested in the complexities of a comprehensive and Evangelical theological ethics.


Josh McDowell, staff member and traveling student evangelist for Campus Crusade, has produced a much needed manual for Christian workers of all sorts but especially for those who must carry the gospel to high school and college age youth. The result is a veritable mine of information upon which to build defences of the historical gospel, Christ's bodily resurrection, supernatural miracles and deity, the inspiration and authority of the Bible and the validity and desirability of Christian experience. The volume is replete with hints for effective witnessing, innumerable fully documented quotations from many authors both evangelical and non-evangelical, bibliographies, biographical sketches of some of the most frequently cited authors, an author index, a subject index, and, of course, last but not least, the Four Spiritual Laws.
McDowell employs an outline format and warns his readers in his preface that "this is not a book" but "a compilation of my notes." The book is obviously intended as a ready tool or manual of information with documented quotations for the assistance of Campus Crusade Staff in their messages prepared for student audiences.

In the volume there is no real discussion of the role of apologetics and certainly no serious attempt to defend the view of apologetics on which the author depends. Warnings are included to caution the reader (or user) against the idea that rational arguments of any kind will necessarily convince the unbeliever that Christianity is true let alone that by rational arguments we can make a man into a Christian. Still from brief indications set forth in the introductory pages as well as from the tenor of the volume as a whole, it is not difficult to ascertain the apologetic theory which McDowell adopts. He accepts a common ground of the basic laws of human thought and of the ability of the human mind to surmount absolute skepticism. On this basis he endeavors to show by inductive argumentation that Christian faith is coherent (non-contradictory) and fits the facts of the world of historical data and human experience. By this method he arrives at the conclusion of the high probability that Christianity is true and desirable. He then challenges the unbeliever to act in accordance with right reason knowing full well that the unbeliever will never see the "sweet reasonableness" of Christianity, and he will never act to exercise saving faith unless the Spirit of God creates in him such a faith. The basic and essential apology for Christianity is a clear coherent presentation of the gospel facts and revealed truth. Since there are good reasons for believing in Christ and since God sees fit to create faith in such a way as to terminate partly on evidence, it makes sense for the Christian to present the gospel with an accompanying defense of Biblical truth.

Professional theologians whose minds have been corroded by too much exclusive contact with other theologians and professors of philosophy of religion will do well to peruse this volume carefully not only to see what sort of Christianity is being promulgated on our university campuses of the world but also what sort of apologetics is actually being employed in ways that are obviously effective.


This work is a manual of bibliographical references covering the principal theological disciplines: Old Testament, New Testament, Church History, History of Religions, Philosophy of Religion, Dogmatics, Ecumenism, Ethics, Practical Theology, and Sociology of Religion. Each major section is further subdivided to facilitate consultation.

The _Bibliographie_ is selective and the single criterion of selection is
the scholarly worth and educational value of the items included. Approximately 3,000 titles are listed, most of them recent, but also including older works where no modern counterpart is available. The listings include works in French, German, and English (in that order of frequency), and existing translations are in every case specified.

For each discipline, a brief introduction is provided so as to put the citations in the perspective of contemporary scholarship. A General Preface by Edmund Jacob, author of the well-known *Theology of the Old Testament*, offers an impressionistic panorama of the theological field during the last thirty years.

This *Bibliographie*, in common with virtually all new reference publications, will doubtless be even more useful in subsequent editions. Its editors will certainly want to enlarge the number of English language titles, and will want to make sure that critics of current modern theological positions are given as full representation as the positions themselves.

The dearth of references in the first edition to the great modern evangelical theologians (Machen, Carnell, C. F. H. Henry, Packer, etc.) is a lacuna which certainly needs to be filled. How strange, for example, to find J. K. S. Reid's *The Authority of Scripture* included, but no citation of Warfield or other thorough treatments of this question by contemporary scholars maintaining the classical view of biblical inspiration! Certainly, subsequent editions of the *Bibliographie* should be provided with an author index, to facilitate reference.

In spite of these—perhaps inevitable—difficulties, this *Bibliographie* is indispensable for every theological library and of unquestionable value to individual scholars. At a price of twelve francs, even in the light of the current devaluation of the dollar, the *Bibliographie* is irresistible.


Oswald T. Allis undoubtedly ranked among the most influential of Old Testament scholars. Allis recently went to be with the Lord, but his influence will continue to be felt in his several works. This volume is the last major work to come from his hand and reflects his continuing interest in Old Testament critical issues. This work is a greatly expanded version of the Peyton lectures delivered by Allis at Fuller Theological Seminary in 1952, and represents the end result of a life-time devoted to the study and evaluation of the higher critical approach to the Old Testament.

If one is looking for an introduction typical of those published by conservatives in recent years, he will not find it in this volume. Allis, for example, deals with the history of Pentateuchal criticism from Astruc to
Wellhausen in only one paragraph and Special Introduction, as it relates to the integrity, date and authorship of the individual books of the Old Testament, is given no consideration. Instead Allis attempts to allow the Old Testament to speak for itself against the attacks of the critics.

A basic tenet of the book is that the Bible is its own best interpreter. If this is accepted, Allis asserts, one must have a clear understanding of its factual content and literary forms. The first chapter is a survey of the content of the Old Testament. The reader will find nothing profound in this section. It serves as a concise survey; and while it is not out of keeping with the purpose of the book, it is not its strongest contribution.

Allis’ discussion of the literary aspect of the Old Testament begins with a defense of the literal interpretation of Scripture. It abounds with illustrations from Scripture of the various figures of speech. Allis rejects the possibility that the Hebrews borrowed their poetic forms from the Canaanites pointing to the fact that parallelism characterizes Semitic poetry in general notably the Egyptian pyramid texts from the fourth millennium B.C. and argues that Moses could have been the architect of classical Hebrew. Critics probably will not accept Allis’ argumentation, however, for much of it is based on the assumption of the veracity of biblical statements that attribute Mosaic authorship to certain passages such as the superscription of Psalm 90.

In chapter III Allis turns to a discussion of the “Old Testament From Without” and deals primarily with archaeology and its relation to the Old Testament. He argues that the constant revision and updating of archaeological data point to uncertainty among scholars, hence critics have no right to use archaeology as a basis for countering the claims of the Old Testament. One must be wary of this position for to criticize archaeology on the basis of the evaluations of earlier archaeologists like Macalister who did not have the advantage of modern methods may be like rejecting the findings of modern scientists because of the erroneous conclusions of earlier scientists. Allis’ position is not agnostic, however, for he does sees positive contributions made by archaeology; and his discussion of the contribution of archaeology to the knowledge of the development of writing, to geography, ancient customs, etc. is quite valuable.

In his discussion of the Old Testament and its critics Allis’ profound sense of biblical exegesis and his knowledge of current trends in Old Testament criticism manifest themselves. A brief but helpful discussion of current schools of Old Testament criticism is included. Allis touches on Hooke’s understanding of the Cain and Abel account as a fertility ritual, the problem of the sacrifice of Isaac, Alt’s thesis in *The God of the Fathers*, tribal censuses, and many other crucial Old Testament problems and presents an adequate alternative to each critical contention.

His discussion of recent attempts to interpret the religion of Israel against the background of other religions of the ancient world is a strong
point of the book; and the final chapter, a discussion of problems of biblical chronology, is an heroic effort to deal with some knotty problems. He deals with the problems fairly and with a lack of dogmatism that is refreshing.

The conservative biblical scholar will find the volume a helpful tool with interesting insights. It represents an encyclopedia of critical Old Testament problems and conservative alternatives. Much of Allis' argumentation is based on the actual claims of the Old Testament and the one who accepts these claims as true will see the fallacies of critical reasoning. The critic, to whom much of Scripture is secondary and hence untrustworthy, will probably not be impressed by this approach; but much of Allis' argumentation, particularly in chapter V, is directed to the heart of Old Testament criticism and deserves more attention than critics will probably give it.


In this volume the former principal of Tyndale Hall, Bristol, and present warden of Latimer House, Oxford, England, provides for the many appreciative users of his former volume, *Our Lord's View of the Old Testament*, an updated and greatly amplified treatment of the thesis that Christ's view of the Scripture can and ought to be the Christian view and that Christ held to the verbal and plenary inspiration of the Bible as the word of God and, therefore, innerrant and infallible truth binding upon the conscience of all Christians loyal to Christ.

The first of a projected four-volume work, the present monograph deals explicitly with the question of Christ's view. The author sets forth briefly the evidence for Christ's view of Scripture. He sees this view to be so crystal clear that anyone who takes seriously the New Testament documents and the divine Lordship of Christ can scarcely deny that the evidence is overwhelmingly on the side of the traditional doctrine of inspiration.

Next Wenham turns to a consideration of various objections to receiving Christ's testimony at its face value. He deals with the issues at somewhat greater length than he did in his earlier work including especially the possibility of Christ's accommodation to the ignorance of his ancient contemporaries and also the possibility of a non-literal interpretation of many of Christ's references to Scripture. Throughout he is careful to safeguard the full humanity of the authors of Scripture as well as their divine inspiration. The term "verbal inspiration," he warns, must be carefully defined so as to avoid the implication of a mechanical dictation or any view that would eliminate the human personality of the Biblical author from the documents of Scripture. With proper precautions, none the less, he defends vigorously the traditional doctrine of verbal inspiration.

Problem passages, in which Christ seems to set aside the Old Testa-
ment law, he does not avoid but seeks in each case to show the nature of the problem and then in a temperate and cautious analysis of the passage shows how impossible it is to set Christ against the complete authority of the Old Testament. In most cases his treatment is excellent, but in the opinion of this reviewer he could have strengthened his handling of the "but I say unto you" passages through an inductive study of the various formulas by which Christ introduces Old Testament citations.

A considerable section of the volume deals with the harmonization of Christ's teaching and Christ's divine authority. Wenham handles the passages deftly and with a caution that does well to enhance his reputation for Biblical scholarship. Students will find specially interesting his exegesis of Matthew 24 and the "signs of the times" referring to the fall of Jerusalem or to the second coming of Christ.

An historical caution might have strengthened Wenham's case just a bit if he had pointed out that it is really quite unnecessary for the believer in the verbal inerrancy of the Bible (or in the divine truth and authority of the sayings of Jesus) to show in every case a reasonable harmonization of alternate passages. Modern man lives two thousand years too late to expect to be able to pull this trick; and oftentimes we do the evangelical cause more good by stressing that it is unreasonable to demand such a harmonization than by engaging in long, elaborate and more or less implausible theories as to how various difficulties can be fitted with the facts and brought into harmony with the truth.

The most valuable and interesting part of the volume for this reviewer was the author's treatment of apostolic authority and how this relates to the problem of the canon. Although the witness of Christ is not so direct to the New Testament as it is to the Old, a proper understanding of the difference between inspiration and canonicity immediately shows how Christ in actuality serves as the ultimate defense of the divine authority of both testaments.

Wenham sees clearly the problem of William Henry Green in making a neat distinction between the apostolic office and the apostolic function. He also points out the obvious fact, but frequently overlooked fact, that the traditional Jewish three-fold division of the Old Testament was either unknown before the time of Christ or, if used at all, certainly was not the universal way of referring to the separate parts of the Old Testament. The idea of a three-fold canonization of the books of the Old Testament and correspondingly of three levels of authority just will not fit the facts.

Evangelicals will delight in this further sturdy defense of the Biblical doctrine of inspiration. Liberals and others who seek to acknowledge the Lordship of Jesus Christ owe it to themselves to give serious consideration to the thesis of this volume for this is the unanswered and, indeed, unanswered argument for the verbal inspiration and innerrant authority of Holy Scripture.

The volume concludes with a helpful index of Biblical references as well as an author and subject index.

In this short commentary on Ephesians the dean of Grace Theological Seminary provides a well polished though simple analysis of this important epistle on the doctrine of the church. The book is not intended for advanced students, but for lay Christians. The Bible teacher or pastor will also find it useful as a model of limpid clarity and neatly plotted organization for his own instruction of others.


This volume by Jesuit, Father Prudencio Damboriena, began with a series of Latin lectures in the Pontifical University at Rome and was completed with research in the archives of “Pentecostal” Oral Roberts University at Tulsa, Oklahoma. On the basis of wide reading and detailed observation supplemented by extensive discussions with contemporary Pentecostalists and Neo-Pentecostalists (those practicing the charismatic gifts of speaking in tongues and related supernatural manifestations within the framework of main-line denominations), the author has produced the most thorough historical analysis of Pentecostalism available in English.

The volume opens with a history of individuals, sects, and movements claiming to exercise miraculous gifts and particularly the gift of tongues. This section of the volume is least valuable, depending largely on secondary sources and failing to distinguish in any clear way those who claimed the continuity of post-apostolic miracles either from those who practiced the gift of tongues or from those who simply stressed highly emotional and extraordinary conduct as accompanying the ideal Christian life. Apparently Damboriena is unaware of the major protestant work on this topic by the Princeton theologian, B. B. Warfield (Counterfeit Miracles).

Damboriena rightly discovers the historical roots of modern Pentecostalism in the holiness movements of the 19th century. He then provides a world-wide coverage of the Pentecostal movement from its origin in the Azusa Street Mission to the present day. Some use is made of the monumental analysis by the Swiss historian Hollenweger (now professor at Birmingham University, England) in his nine volume magnum opus: Handbuch der Pfingstbewegung (9 vols. Geneva, photocopy print, 1965) although for the most part Damboriena depends upon works of lesser scholarship but available in English. Occasional lacuna are evident such as the failure to note the Russian Union of Baptist and Pentecostal churches and the large element of charismatic teaching found in most of the free churches throughout Europe.

It is in the doctrinal analysis of Pentecostalism where Damboriena is weakest. For the most part he is accurate in presenting the broad viewpoints and many of the finer nuances within the various Pentecostal
groups. As a Roman Catholic he can certainly be excused for minor slips in dealing with protestant history of doctrine (but his mis-spelling of the name of C. I. Scofield is unforgivable!). More serious is his failure to see sharply the distinction made by the Pentecostalists between the doctrine of justification or salvation and sanctification or the second work of grace evidenced by speaking in tongues. Although occasionally he betrays a more accurate understanding of Pentecostal distinctions between these two cardinal doctrines, he charges Pentecostalists with referring to baptism of the Holy Spirit in their oft-quoted challenge, "Brother, have you been saved?" Pentecostal insistence that the church must be composed only of born again believers, he interprets in the same narrow way. He does not point out in any clear way that some Pentecostal bodies are distinctly nor holiness in doctrine even though they may believe that the baptism of the Holy Spirit is a second work subsequent to regeneration and justification. In his biblical analysis he was unable, of course, to make use of the brilliant study by Frederick Dale Brunner, A Theology The Holy Spirit (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970).

In betrayal of his Roman Catholic attachments Damboriena dwells upon the Pentecostal doctrine of the church and sacraments. The latter he finds set forth in the weakest sort of Protestant symbolism. A failure to develop a firm doctrine of the church together with repudiation of the history of the church past is largely responsible, so he feels, for the Pentecostal tendency to splinter into minute groups. In spite of recent amelioration of their militant anti-ecumenical stand, Damboriena charges them forthrightly with direct proselytizing rather than witnessing to their Christian faith. He readily admits that this has brought great success for the movement in Roman Catholic countries, particularly in South America. Nothing is said by him of Pentecostal martyrs to official Roman Catholic bigotry in these same countries.

This volume is neither a polemic against Pentecostalism nor an apologetic in defense of Pentecostal doctrine. It is undoubtedly still the best general introduction to the Pentecostal movement currently available in English (and, hence, the excuse for publishing this belated review). The attitude of the author is conciliatory, sympathetic, even admiring. As a general introduction, the volume will prove useful to the lay Pentecostal as well as to the average evangelical protestant or, in fact, to anyone in the English-speaking world. Its greatest lack is its failure to deal seriously with the biblical arguments either pro or con Pentecostal experience. Perhaps the author wishes to leave this for a later volume.