BOOK REVIEWS


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Ten years have passed since the revolution called Vatican II shook the old Catholic church, time enough to begin to assess the significance of its impact. It is therefore not surprising that in 1972, the tenth anniversary of the beginning of Vatican II, a number of books appeared on the market that endeavored to chronicle the changes that have occurred. Among them are The Renewal of American Catholicism, Revolution in Rome, and Bare Ruined Choirs: Doubt, Prophecy and Radical Religion. Each nevertheless has its own distinctive contribution and perspective. O’Brien writes as a professional Catholic historian, methodical and at times pedestrian, concerned with theology largely in terms of a theology of history. Wells is the irrefutable evangelical Protestant historian sincerely interested in describing recent changes in Catholic doctrine. And Wills is the brilliant Catholic homme de lettres who examines his church with a critical and frequently scathing eye and discovers philosophical insights which his fertile mind translates into an intricate mosaic of delightful prose. An unevenness is apparent at times in the works of both O’Brien and Wills. Several of their chapters originally appeared as independent articles and still reflect their alien birth through more than a trace of foreign accent. In a book on American Catholicism, for example, it is jarringly incongruous to find lengthy discussions of Saul Alinsky (a secular Jew) and Paulo Freire (a Brazilian Catholic). Wells’ book marks a major advance in the quality of American evangelical-Catholic dialogue, but his training as a historian rather than as a theologian is embarrassingly evident in some of his conclusions on theological questions.

Although the jacket of The Renewal of American Catholicism suggests that it is concerned with the past fifty years of American Catholic experience, in actual fact O’Brien’s vision ranges back to the American revolution. A more accurate title for the book might have been An Intellectual History of American Catholicism. The emphasis here as in Wills’ book is on Catholicism not as a system of beliefs but as a religiously motivated and sociological entity in American life. Underlying the ten rather heavily academic chapters is a Social Gospel view of the church: “The church, the local com-
munity of the faithful, might, then, take shape around politics...that is to say, the desire of groups of Christians to work effectively against war, racism and injustice, might lead them to form collectives, and they might end by calling these collectives churches” (275). The author, associate professor of history at the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Mass., states as his thesis that “American Catholics are passing through a period of crisis...more profound than most commentators have suspected... American Catholics are for the first time in their history aware of theological controversies that touch the most basic doctrines of Roman Catholicism and explode cherished notions of the church and the faith” (xii). Pope John XXIII and President John F. Kennedy provided the fulcrum for this radical shift in outlook, a shift Wills also describes in his far more sprightly chapter “The Two-Johns.” With the election of Kennedy American Catholics, long outcasts whose Americanism was questioned by WASPs, felt that at last they had “arrived,” but the sweet taste of victory immediately turned sour with the addition of the Vietnam War. The intellectual hero of the Kennedy years was John Courtney Murray of Woodstock College, the important Jesuit seminary in Maryland that saw him in his later years as already antiquated as it turned increasingly radical.

The book is marred by numerous errors, most of them merely typographical. But in speaking of the increasing academic respectability of American Catholic historical scholarship he seems to include Nazarene historian Timothy L. Smith among the notable American Catholic historians! And it is hard to justify the fact that Garry Wills' name is spelled four or five different ways, with two different spellings actually occurring on the very same page!

Most Protestants are unaware of how different pre-Vatican II American Catholicism was from its European counterpart. It was in fact “the most thriving branch of the church universal” (92). The decision to adopt the goal of a universal Catholic education in 1884 had not a little to do with the numerical success of American Catholicism. Furthermore its immigrant status and its minority position led it to band together for mutual support. In the last decade this need has disappeared and the result has been that Catholicism is having great difficulty retaining any semblance of unity. American Catholics, in other words, are experiencing many of the strains Jews experienced thirty years ago.

The most interesting chapters of O'Brien's book are those that deal with events resulting from Vatican II, “the climax of American Catholic history.” Although Catholic growth during the 1950s was an unprecedented 44%, the Council underlined the ambiguity of success, especially of the numerical kind. But since 1965 and the Vietnam war, American Catholic optimism has vanished. More than anything else, O'Brien feels, it is the failure of American bishops to provide Christian leadership which has perpetuated the crisis Catholicism is still experiencing. Sharp conflicts exist between the three most significant groups of Catholics, conservative, liberal and radical. For O'Brien as for Wills it is Daniel and Philip Berrigan, activists, scholars, men of faith and courage, who, by their words and their lives, personified the new vision of Christian responsibility that generated
the upsurge of Catholic radicalism in the 1960s” (194). Both agree with the Berrigans that in American Catholicism “Always genuine concern for the poor and oppressed was subordinate to the presumed welfare and influence of the church” (201).

O'Brien nevertheless admits that the Berrigans leave many questions unanswered. But their central idea that revolution begins with conversion is seen as a parallel to the message of evangelical Protestants that conversion leads to good works and a perfectionist ethic. The Catholic church of the future will share the prophetic openness incarnated by the Berrigans, the author concludes.

*Revolution in Rome* is quite a different book. Not only is it by a Protestant (Wells is associate professor of church history and the history of Christian thought at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School), but the author is concerned about contemporary Catholic faith. This volume is lightweight compared with the other two, and Wells admits that the necessity of writing a brief book proved frustrating and occasionally led him to overgeneralize and oversimplify. But the author is so delightfully fair that I don’t believe there is more than a trace of polemic. Where it does occur, it is not anti-Catholic but anti-liberal! You’ve come a long way, baby, since the days of Loraine Boettner and his harsh anti-Catholicism.

Wells' methodological decision to use the documents of the Second Vatican Council to decide what Catholics believe about God, Christianity, the church and authority has a kind of validity, but ultimately it is, I believe, a bad methodology because today in Catholicism as in Protestantism you really have to ask what the theologians are saying. Vatican II was a beginning, not an end, they all insist. Wells contends that the agreements of progressives will be ultimately important and that there are assumptions they all share. But many Catholic authors will insist that there is very little, if any, unity in present-day Catholicism, and my experience would support such a conclusion. The author himself observes that the Council endorsed two very different theologies, one conservative and one progressive. He correctly notes that “Present-day Catholicism, on its progressive side, is teaching many of the ideas which the liberal Protestants espoused in the last century” (8). Such a statement however leaves out the strongly biblical strain in most progressive Catholicism which helps it transcend Thomistic thought patterns, distinguishes it from much of liberal Protestantism, and gives it a flavor all its own. Personally I find it useful to distinguish between the progressive and the liberal Catholic, although perhaps Dr. A. Berkeley Mickelsen’s preference for the image of a spectrum rather than camps is most helpful of all. Terms used to describe Protestant positions are not really appropriate because the Catholic parallel is usually quite distinct in many ways.

In an interesting chapter on authority, Wells suggests that both Catholic Pentecostals and progressive Catholics are unwittingly united in their “profound concern with subjective experience” (39). But Catholic Pentecostalism is more biblically based and more critical than its Protestant counterpart, and the role of experience is not far removed in many cases from the one its plays in evangelical circles. And is it really theo-
logically wise to speak of the Holy Spirit only as "inner" and subjective?"

A number of theologically questionable or even erroneous conclusions
must be mentioned. Newman spoke of doctrinal development, not doctrinal
"addition," as Wells states. The author also seems to confuse Anabaptist
with Spiritualist in ways that Reformation scholars like George Williams
have criticized. When he speaks of "political theology" he mentions Metz
and Illich only in passing, then refers only to Protestant works in the field.
Surely reference should also have been made to such authors as Paulo
Freire, Gustavo Gutierrez, Dom Helder Camara, Camilo Torres and Joseph
Petulla. Wells also misses the central point of "political theology," that God
would not identify with a revolution of the extreme right because in the
Bible he is concerned with the liberation of the oppressed. To say that the
supernatural is now merged into the natural and that "God and the world,
as biblically conceived, are no longer at odds with one another" (89) is
infelicitous at best. To identify the worldly man of the Bible with today's
"secular man" surely is a gross over-simplification, and could not be de-
defended exegetically. For the political theologian the "world" consists of
those forces of evil that oppress and prevent human liberation, a biblically
defensible position. Wells also so emphasizes the authority of Scripture that
almost no references are made to faith in Christ as Savior, nor to the won-
derful fact that in the charismatic movement it is faith in the biblical Christ
that is central (see for example Ralph Martin's Unless the Lord Build the
House). Given the repeated references throughout the book to authority,
a better title for Well's little book might have been Authority in the New
Catholicism. Wells says, "A new religious vision is in the making, one in
which the presence of God is no longer exclusively contained within the
Church" (79). I think the reader will know what he means, but was God
really ever "exclusively contained within the church?" Pope John is er-
roneously seen as a relativist and existentialist; he was a conservative whose
pastoral orientation charmed the world. Wells seems to be unaware of dis-
cussions of historical relativism and relative infallibility in recent Catholic
thinking. His analysis of Kung is wide of the mark, and it would be impos-
sible to defend his statement that Butler's understanding of salvation is "an
abrupt innovation." It is also misleading to say that Vatican II "was trying
to minimize the differences between Protestantism and Catholicism" (129);
the primary concern of Catholics was rather to rethink their own theology.
Nor was ecumenical harmony the reason Mary was included as part of the
document on the church, although it may admittedly have been a sec-
ondary factor.

The annotated bibliography at the end is excellent. But Wells knows
better than to say the New Catholic Encyclopedia represents "the most
recent scholarship on almost every conceivable religious subject" (144)!

Wills' Bare Ruined Choirs, like O'Brien's book, is already dated be-
cause it is written in the mood of the 1960s rather than the 1970s. The "bare
ruined choirs" of Shakespeare's Sonnet 73 seem to be a symbol of a deserted
Catholic church, shaking in the cold of modern thought. Some conserva-
tive nuns I have spoken to about the symbolism saw the charismatic move-
ment as bringing the "sweet birds" back again, but I don't think there's
anyone alive today who can even guess what the Catholic Church will look like by the turn of the century. All that can be said is that the Catholic church of our childhood days will be preserved only in our memories.

The chapters of Wills' book tell the story of a church that, though it once gave the impression of being changeless, is now changing, doubting, dying, and yet hoping. Before the Council, priests were forced to preach what they had ceased to believe, and laymen were forced to accept what they refused to obey, but the 1960s and Vatican II "came as a breath of release, a chance to stop pretending" (9). But then belief weakened, and Catholics ironically turned to politics at the very moment when American belief in the political process was being weakened by Vietnam and Watergate! Because of the decision of the 1884 Third Plenary Council of Baltimore that a Catholic education was to be required for every Catholic child, the old Catholic church in America had been forced to be a business enterprise—immigrants making sacrifices, nuns non-contemplative, and priests advanced not because of their scholarship but their business skills. "The worst course taught in a Catholic school was invariably its theology course" because of the lack of time and the anti-intellectualism of the priests who usually taught it.

To escape "the cloddish present," the liberal Catholic intellectual of the 1950s turned to Europe, especially France. "The American Church looked to him like a mass of Irish pastors truckling to Italian cardinals" (41). He was also drawn to the liberal social encyclicals: "The liberal was far more apt to quote encyclicals than to quote the Bible." (49). But the movement lacked depth—"a surface flurry of distinctions, but little deep questioning" (61).

The change began with the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and liturgical reforms imposed on a reluctant laity. The symbolic leaders of this period were "the two Johns"—Pope John XXIII and President John F. Kennedy. Pope John was "a very religious man on the chair of Peter, restoring an air of saintly love to an office that had looked too harsh—authoritarian, doctrinally imperialist—under Pius XII" (81). "Under one John, professors went to Washington and created the New Frontier. Under another, enlightened young theologians went to Rome and created Vatican II" (82). The chapters on Teilhard de Chardin and "The Two Jackie's" (Jacqueline Kennedy, who is not discussed at all, and Sr. Jacqueline Grennan, "the New Frontier's favorite nun") seem totally out of place; the first seems to have been prepared for another occasion, and the latter serves only as a vehicle for Wills' tasteless male chauvinism.

The optimism and joy of the years following the Council were evanescent, and the church quickly entered a period of doubt and dying which has still not ended and probably will not for at least another decade, "Pope Paul and President Lyndon" were "the two demon successors" of the two Johns. Catholic radicals saw Vatican II liberalism and Kennedy's New Frontier as totally inadequate responses to the needs of the day, the "left wing of the Establishment" that produced Vietnam and _Humanae Vitae_.
They argued that the church was following, aping, the spirit of the times rather than leading the world to a deeper, more responsive humanism. Paul VI failed to meet the need for a pope who would make changes without equivocation and admit mistakes with intellectual honesty; instead he seemed to be an ecclesiastical Louis XIV: "L'Eglise, c'est Moi," one who made decisions on his own without the approval of the whole church. Only a "prisoner of sex," only a person advocating celibacy within marriage as the marital ideal, could have gone against the recommendations of his own commission and still argue that the immorality of birth control is "perspicuous to human reason" (176). Or, as Wills put it, "he considers marriage a second-class form of monasticism" (186). Radicalism among seminarians led to the demise of Woodstock College. Celibacy came under increasing attack, with observers noting that most priests were anything but more accessible and able to give themselves wholly to others because they had not family responsibilities. Wills argues that celibacy is really the substitution of the biblical tradition that "it is not good for man to be alone" for "a classical tradition insistent on the body-soul dualism, treating the body as enemy and encumbrance" (255).

But what most outraged Catholics, famed and accepted in the Kennedy years, was the radical priest. The appeal of authority attracted young Catholics to both the seminary and the FBI, and produced the strange phenomenon of Catholic FBI agents pursuing or spying on priests and nuns: "as the overworked joke put it, Fordham graduates were hired to check on Harvard graduates" (233). One of the important conclusions of one-time-conservative-now-radical Wills is that today "one part of Catholicism is a captive of the state; and the other part is trying to free it" (248). He makes a convincing case for the Berrigan brothers as moving toward a gospel conservatism: "Much serious religion tends, today, to be politically radical and theologically conservative" (250). The state, he argues, will leave the church alone so long as the church never criticizes the state, but this is idolatry according to the Bible—though Americans quaintly call it "freedom of religion." The acceptable church of the Kennedy era, he insists, is a captive church—God serving Caesar. Such a church is not able to perform its prophetic role of judgment.

The Roman Catholic church since the Second Vatican Council has certainly changed. Many of those changes, as Martin Marty has pointed out even more clearly in The Fire We Can Light, have mirrored the political mood of succeeding American presidencies—moderate under Eisenhower, liberal under Kennedy, radical under Johnson, and now conservative under Nixon. None of these three books does more than react negatively to the first signs of "religion in a suddenly different world"—the turn to religious experience in the 1970s as expressed in the Jesus people or Catholic Pentecostalism. The next chapter in the history of Catholicism will certainly have to take account of the charismatic movement. Meanwhile we have three excellent chroniclers of the decade following the Council—O'Brien the capable but humorless historian, Wells the polite, hesitant pilgrim in a foreign land, and Wills the highly intelligent, informed and very opinionated savant.

Among the spate of popular evangelical books on the occult (running second only to popular volumes on eschatology) John Warwick Montgomery's Principalities and Powers merits special attention.

The author's interest in arcana antedates the current revival of occult practice by several decades, going back to a boyhood fascination with pulp editions on black magic, astrology and witchcraft. He brings to his task an energy and erudition that circles the globe. And a respectable personal collection of rare grimoires, many in Latin, French and German, ferreted out of second-hand book stores during frequent visits to Europe, adds substance to his labors.

More importantly, Montgomery evaluates the occult scene from well-defined presuppositions. Characteristically he identifies himself as an evangelical committed to the inerrancy of Scripture and, hence, to the reality of supernatural "principalities and powers" functioning beyond and within the world of ordinary experience. Also, predictably, he conducts his investigation from the avowed standpoint of an empirical historiography spelled out more fully in his History and Christianity. This precision of procedure, missing from less scholarly treatises, makes Principalities worthy and capable of serious analysis.

At the outset, Montgomery divides the occult or hidden kingdom into two areas: the paranormal and the supernatural. The latter comprises the domain of deity, angels and demons and the former includes ESP, telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and psychokinesis. Despite their seemingly mysterious nature, Montgomery observes, paranormal phenomena are slowly yielding their secrets to scientific observation and have nothing more to do with supernatural forces—good or evil—than the ability to do calculus or compose a sonata. This is a legitimate distinction which needs to be emphasized in light of a current evangelical trend to relegate every strange or unexplained occurrence to the direct intervention of demons or the Holy Spirit.

If Principalities handled the supernatural aspects of the occult as well as it does the paranormal, we might agree with Christianity Today's evaluation of it as one of the most significant evangelical books of 1973. Unfortunately this is not the case.

As an evangelical apologist, Montgomery does ably defend the reality of the supernatural by showing that "the Humean refutation of supernatural events cannot be sustained." He also points out that materialists are compelled to reject the spiritual realm more by the force of their self-imposed logic than by a paucity of evidence.

3. Principalities, p. 44.
The ultimate reason behind materialistic or rationalistic reductionism appears to be the same: an anti-miraculous bias which would limit explanatory constructs to familiar terms.⁴

But to the coat-tails of this generally acknowledged evangelical position, Montgomery tries to pin a wide variety of other beliefs. His chart on page 43 suggests that a supernaturalist is obliged to buy the entire occult package of "angels, wee-folk, poltergeists, and devils." This is strange procedure for an evangelical. While there is substantial biblical evidence for angels and devils, Scripture is silent about the others. All Montgomery has left to substantiate "wee-folk and poltergeists" is his historical-empirical approach.

Is this sufficient to compel supernaturalists to accept as genuine "innumerable instances of occult phenomena"⁵ recorded in ancient and modern times? We don't think so. It seems that despite his erudition Montgomery has been snared in the same trap with other evangelical writers on occult themes: confusion of the supernatural with the superstitious.⁶

What is the cause of this confusion? Why does Montgomery accept many, if not most, alleged activities recorded in the literature? The answer lies with his philosophical method and depends in part upon autobiographical experience. Montgomery was a professional historian before he became a confessed Christian. While reading the Gospel accounts of the death and resurrection of Jesus, his historical sensibilities were struck by the fact that these documents exhibit the same marks of historical trustworthiness he was willing to attribute to others dealing with the Caesars and the Napoleonic wars. If he accepted the latter as sober reconstructions of the past, why not the former? On this basis he was led to affirm the salvific events as genuine history and to exercise faith in Christ.

Since that time, Montgomery has exhibited extraordinary skills as a theologian and an apologist for the Christian faith. For this we give thanks to God and his grace. However, it is questionable whether anyone (JWM not excluded) can validate the claims of revelation solely on the basis of empirical analysis.⁷ At best, historical analysis can provide a negative check. Historical inaccuracies can hardly be squared with divine revelation. But historical accuracy in itself does not create nor substantiate revelation. The local phone book at my elbow may be inerrant but it does not, on that account, become supernatural revelation.

Even a successful finale to the search for Noah's ark (another area of Montgomery's omnicompetency)⁸ will not prove that Genesis chapter 7 is

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⁴ Ibid., p. 43.
⁵ Twice he refers to "innumerable" instances or cases of genuine occult (p. 30) and poltergeist (p. 37) activities. Allowing for rhetorical rather than literal intention, these statements still indicate a substantial acceptance of arcane reporting.
⁶ For other examples see W. S. Sailer, "Are We Giving the Devil More Than His Due?" Eternity, January 1973, pp. 48ff.
⁷ See Gordon H. Clark, Three Types of Religious Philosophy (Nutley, New Jersey: Craig Press, 1973), pp. 52ff. If not a refutation, Clark's discussion is at least a carefully argued critique which Montgomery and other empiricists, religious and secular, must consider seriously.
special revelation. It will simply mean that the record contains more reliable historical material than was formerly thought. The same is true of the Gospels. Their apparent historical reliability by itself proves nothing more than that a man rose from the dead in A.D. 33. And this could be classed as paranormal rather than supernatural.

Of immediate interest, however, are the side effects of this empirical approach to Christian revelation. One of these is a readiness, almost an eagerness, on Montgomery's part to accept reports of arcane activity as genuine. Just as the Gospels appear as convincing as Napoleonic history, so reports of occult events seem to be as reliable—or almost as reliable—as the Gospels.

The evidence is seldom as good for psychical and for occult happenings as for the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, but it is sufficiently good in many instances to warrant our closest attention.¹⁰

If the evidence is "seldom as good" we may assume that sometimes it is as good. In order to sort out the genuine reports, Montgomery explains, we must "suspend disbelief," check out the evidence with the care demanded for events in general, attempt to formulate explanatory constructs that best "fit the facts," and at the same time be willing always to accept facts even if our best attempts to explain them prove inadequate.¹²

He further contends that no greater evidence may be demanded for supernatural events than is needed to compel belief in ordinary events.

To require "greater proof" of supernatural events is to introduce the Humean fallacy under another guise: common experience of the non-supernatural is supposed to reduce the probability of the supernatural to such a point that tremendously greater (infinite?) evidence would be needed to establish an allegedly supernormal event. . . . Not knowing the universe as a whole, we have no way of calculating the probabilities for or against particular events, so each event must be investigated ad hoc, without initial prejudice. How much evidence do you need to determine if Jesus was killed and rose again? The same amount you need to determine if John the Baptist was killed and if Peter was alive on resurrection morning. How much evidence do you need to determine if poltergeistic crockery flies across a room and smashes? The same amount you need to determine if a wife throws crockery across a room at her husband and it smashes.¹³

10. Ibid., p. 46.
11. Ibid., pp. 103-94, n. 41. It seems to this reviewer that Montgomery's assertion here finishes him as a historian. He insists that common experience counts for nothing in evaluating the past and that every event must be "investigated ad hoc." Then, when he states that "not knowing the universe as a whole, we have no way of calculating the probabilities for or against particular events," does he not inadvertently require an infinite amount of proof for every past event including the death of John the Baptist and that Peter was alive on resurrection morning? According to Montgomery's formula, we have no way of calculating the probabilities of these events either. Therefore only an infinite amount of proof could render them probable.
It is of course true that one rejecting the possibility of supernatural events on the basis of naturalistic bias would require an infinite amount of proof for such events. But Montgomery apparently wants to edge toward the Humean camp anyone who is skeptical of alleged supernatural events or who requires additional proof. This is unfair. The evangelical Christian theist—on the basis of divine revelation and not naturalistic bias—has grown accustomed to living in a dependable universe created and sustained by the triune God. It is the advocate of a womb-of-chance type existence who ought to accept occult claims as a matter of course. If chance is ultimate, anything can happen. And Montgomery himself observes that “rationalism and superstition are two sides of the same coin.”

As a rational (not rationalistic!) person who believes that God has created a dependable universe, I must first seek a natural explanation for events. If a report seems out of harmony with my experience, I will automatically question it and seek further information and clarification. For example, if I meet two strangers (who appear to be normal humans and not fugitives from justice or custodial care) and the first tells me he is from Milwaukee, I would be inclined to accept his answer at face value. If the second claims he comes from Mars—my reaction would be slightly different. I would immediately ask questions. Really? How did you get here? Where did you park your space ship? He might ultimately convince me, but not nearly so easily as the first stranger did.

And I am not alone in this. Numerous examples from Scripture point in the same direction. Contrary to Montgomery’s theory, saintly men and women did demand more evidence for supernormal events. Abraham questioned the possibility of having an heir because his wife Sarah (who laughed at the idea!) was beyond child-bearing age. Moses, amazed by the unconsumed burning bush, felt constrained to demand from God a sign whereby he could prove to the Israelites that he was indeed a recipient of divine revelation.

Mary the virgin, confronted with impending motherhood, asked, “How can this be, seeing I have no husband?” At the tomb of Lazarus, Martha could conjure up faith only in the end-time resurrection and cautioned against opening the sepulcher because natural putrefaction had already been at work for three days.

The most outstanding examples surround the resurrection of Jesus. After months of hearing Jesus teach regarding his coming death and resurrection the disciples feared the former but did not expect the latter.

The women went to the tomb fully expecting to find a corpse in need of additional embalming. When Jesus appeared to Mary, she mistook him for the gardner and complained that her Lord’s body had been stolen. The story related by the women was scarcely convincing to the eleven, and Peter and John set out to ascertain the facts (apparently more ready to accept the report of the missing body than the tale about angels and resurrection). Only when every possible natural explanation proved inadequate and Jesus showed himself to the ten in the upper room and to the two at Emmaus, did their incredulity give way to faith. And, as is well known,

12. Ibid., p. 76.
Thomas insisted upon still more evidence. He did not question the gathering of the disciples, but he did doubt that Jesus attended the meeting.

Does this place Abraham, Moses, Mary, Martha and the disciples in the Humane camp? Hardly. But it does clearly demonstrate that even supernaturalists seek additional evidence for supernatural events. They do not, however, demand an infinite amount of proof as would the disciples of Hume. In light of this, must we not forgive an evangelist who subjects to greater critical examination a report of poltergeist activity than, say, the accounts of the domestic rantings of a Mrs. John Wesley?

To personal and biblical experience can be added the testimony of the church which, throughout much of its history, took a cautious attitude toward alleged witchcraft and magic. Up to the 15th century, one strand of tradition, at least, declared belief in actual witchcraft to be heretical. The often quoted Canon Episcopi, referred to in the 10th century by Regino of Prum (but undoubtedly of more ancient origin), warns bishops against pagan delusions that transvection and other magical feats actually occur. This text, which became part of canon law in the 12th century, reads in part:

Bishops and their officials must labor with all their strength to uproot thoroughly from their parishes the pernicious art of sorcery and maleficience invented by the devil, and if they find a man or woman follower of this wickedness to eject them foully disgraced from their parishes.

...Those are held captive by the devil who, leaving their creator, seek the aid of the devil. And so Holy Church must be cleansed of this pest.

It is also not to be omitted that certain abandoned women perverted by Satan seduced by illusions and phantasms of demons, believe and openly profess that, in the dead of night, they ride upon certain beasts with the pagan goddess Diana, with a countless horde of women, and in the silence of the dead of night fly over vast tracts of country, and obey her commands as their mistress, while they are summoned to her service on other nights....

Wherefore the priests throughout their churches should preach with all insistence to the people that they may know this to be in every way false, and that such phantasms are sent by the devil who deludes them in dreams.

Who is so stupid and foolish as to think that all these things which are done only in spirit happen in the body....

It is therefore to be publicly proclaimed to all, that whoever believes such things or similar things loses the faith, and he who has not the right faith in God is not of God, but of him in whom he believes, that is, the devil. For of our Lord it is written, “All things were made by him.” Whoever therefore believes that anything can be made, or that any creature can be changed to better or worse or be transformed into another species or likeness, except by God himself who

made everything and through whom all things were made, is beyond
doubt an infidel.\textsuperscript{14}

Gradually, however, the force of the canon was undermined until in
the 15th century the inquisitor Jacquier maintained that those who believed
in corporeal transvection had the true and catholic faith\textsuperscript{15} and the demonol-
ologists Kramer and Sprenger suggested that “people who hold that witches
do not exist are to be regarded as notorious heretics.”\textsuperscript{16} Others argued
that the Canon’s statements applied only to the day in which it was written
and that since then a new type of witch has appeared who could perform
all the supernatural feats ascribed to them.\textsuperscript{17}

With the examples from Scripture and the directives of the Canon
Episcopi in mind, an evaluation of Montgomery’s method will be under-
taken. As an empiricist, he begins with particulars rather than universals.
“Positive or negative judgment must always be applied to particular pheno-
mena, never to the entire field as if it were a monolithic entity.”\textsuperscript{18} In
Aristotelian-Thomistic fashion, then, Montgomery hopes to discern recurring
patterns and arrive at conclusions regarding the reality of universal con-
cepts such as alchemy, lycanthropy, and levitation. And he is quite optimis-
tic about the results. “The problem involved in determining whether
demon possession occurs and whether witchcraft works is absurdly simple.
The documentation is overwhelming.”\textsuperscript{19}

Strict empirical requirements motivate Montgomery to reject speci-
fically the apriorism of B. B. Warfield’s view of alleged post-apostolic
miracles. “We must avoid the orthodox presupposition that supernatural
events ‘must’ be limited to biblical times.”\textsuperscript{20} Perhaps we must. But should
we not first evaluate Warfield’s contention in the light of scriptural data
before embarking upon an empirical investigation?

It is not our intention to deny the supernatural order. There are
“principalities and powers” both good and evil according to Scripture. What
is being questioned is the extrapolation of medieval excesses from the
subdued biblical references.

With the occult being touted in secular and religious communications
media, 20th—as well as first-century believers are well advised to heed
Paul’s caveat against myths and “old wives fables” (1 Tim. 1:4; 4:7). In
this way, the Apostle, who was certainly no atheistic naturalist, distin-
guished clearly between the supernatural and the superstitious. And evan-
gegelical writers analyzing the occult scene would do well to follow suit.

To confuse superstition with genuine Christian supernaturalism is to
risk tragic results. Emotionally unstable persons, exposed to bizarre ac-
counts of the nature and extent of witch and demon activity, often diagnose

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 75-77.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 75.
\textsuperscript{16} Heinrich Kramer and James Sprenger, The Malleus Maleficarum, tr., Montague
\textsuperscript{17} Robins, Encyclopedia, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{18} Principalities, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 146.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 46.
\textsuperscript{21} Time, March 4, 1974, p. 66.
their physical, psychological or spiritual problems as occult oppression or possession.

A recent *Time* essay, "The Psychics," notes mathematician Martin Gardner's observation that few scientists "are aware of the controls necessary in a field in which deception, conscious or unconscious, is all too familiar." According to the same essay, the severest critics of the occult are professional conjurers whose business it is to deceive. "They feel that they are better qualified to spot chicanery than scientists, who can be woefully naive about the gimmicks and techniques that charlatans may use for mystical effects."

That must go double for evangelical theologians and historians. It seems their zeal to find "solid" empirical proof for supernatural powers—and indirectly for the existence of God—often outpaces their critical judgment and common sense. This can ultimately lead only to embarrassment and disillusionment. Serious consequences are at stake and must be considered.


Reviewed by J. Barton Payne, Covenant Theological Seminary, St. Louis, Missouri.

Published last year, this volume by Westmont College's Professor Gundry is the most significant study that has yet appeared on the subject of the church, the tribulation, and the "blessed hope" of our Lord's return. Whether one's concern is with painstaking Greek exegesis or with relentless logic on the probabilities of alternative interpretations, the blurb on the book's jacket seems incontrovertible when it asserts that this volume will become the standard text on the posttributional viewpoint—or on almost any other viewpoint, as far as that goes. Take for example the author's definitive treatment of the Day of the Lord as not including the tribulation period (ch. 6) or his discussion of the probable unity of Scripture's eschatological, legal judgments (ch. 14). So any criticisms that follow must not be allowed to detract from the basic fact that the Christian world is deeply indebted to Robert Gundry for a masterful production.

From the outset, moreover, it is clear that the Westmont professor is occupying a position of reaction. He opposes dispensational pretribulationism; but his thought is still in transition and leaves the impression of striving to retain as much as possible of the Scofield heritage. He thus argues, on the one hand, for "the unity of Abraham's seed: ... all believers, regardless of dispensation" (p. 22), and yet, on the other, grieves over Dwight Pentecost's charge that "posttribulationism must be based on a denial of dispensationalism." His attitude, in essence, is this: You can hold to "a scripturally measured dispensationalism" and still be a posttribulationist (pp. 28, 179). It might remind some of us of our friend G. Douglas Young saying, in *his* (Israeli oriented) personal circumstances, you can be a covenant theologian and still be a pretribulationist. And maybe you can! But all this does invite further reaction, to Dr. Gundry's reaction; and the following paragraphs suggest at least four major areas of investigation.
(1) Hermeneutics. Perhaps the most visible exception to Professor Gundry's usual, closely-argued, grammatico-historical exegesis is the allowance for what he entitles "precurseful fulfillment," or a double accomplishment for predictions (pp. 129, 195). This, moreover, corresponds to the regular dispensational concept of "dual meaning." Gundry argues, for example, that Jerusalem's fall in A.D. 70 suggests "a larger and final fulfillment" during a still future tribulation period just prior to the appearing of Christ (pp. 129, 133); cf. his similar approach to Joel's prophecy of the outpouring of the Spirit (p. 194) or even to the theory of an eschatologically "revived Roman empire" (p. 195). It is true that such an approach enables Gundry to apply Matthew 24, from verse 4 right down through verse 28, to the great tribulation, immediately after which occurs the second advent (p. 199). Liberal critics, however, are quick to pounce on such double talk; and they rightly accuse us of "trying to have your cake and eat it too." Indeed, Beasley-Murray's conclusion that Jesus expected His parousia during the 1st century, and was mistaken, appears to be more hermeneutically straight-forward than this; and, despite the difficulties, it may still be preferable to follow the standard harmonies of the Gospels and recognize that between verses 22 and 23 there occurs a shift in perspective from A.D. 70 to the future, with one and only one meaning in each section. More ultimately serious, methodologically, is the issue raised by our hermeneutical manuals that, "To put two interpretations on one passage of Scripture breaks the force of the literal meaning and obscures the word of God."  

(2) Ancient Fulfillment. At times, however, Dr. Gundry may seem to find, not too much fulfillment, but too little, especially in ancient (Biblical)

1. Gundry's substantiation for such a principle from Isa. 13:10, 27:13, and 34:4, as if these passages were Isaiah's description of "the impending invasion of Babylon" (p. 195), which were then utilized by Jesus to describe His own return (Mt. 24:29-31), fails to do justice to the originally eschatological character of each of the passages in question. Yet his claim that Jer. 31:27-37 and Amos 9:11-15 "have clearly millennial settings" in the OT (p. 196) but are applied to the church age in the NT disregards the fact that the clearly millennial portions of these passages, i.e., Jer. 31:35-37 and Amos 9:13-15, are precisely those parts which the NT does not quote as fulfilled (whether precursively or any other way) in its own days. Even Joel 2:30-31 appears to be quoted in Acts 2:16-21 only as a part of its total OT passage, without claim to its fulfillment at that first Pentecost. Gundry's two remaining citations of millennial passages, namely Isa. 11:10 and Joel 2:32, appear to be quoted in the NT, not as if being an early "fulfillment" in NT times, but simply as exhibiting language—"as it is written"—that is capable of application to the NT scene, though not originally predicting it, this which is a common phenomenon within NT writing. cf. Payne, Encyclopedia of Biblical Prediction (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 76-77.

2. "Few laws are more important to observe in the interpretation of prophetic Scriptures that the law of double reference." J. Dwight Pentecost, Things to Come (Findlay, Ohio: Dunham, 1958), pp. 46-47.


4. Similarly, when Gundry suggests an "unequivocal" affirmation of double fulfillment, by the present writer, in respect to Daniel's predicted abomination of desolation (p. 196), he seems inadequately to have grasped the possibility of an Antichristian abomination in Dan. 8 (Payne, The Imminent Appearing of Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964, p. 146) and a separate abomination in ch. 9 (pp. 146, 153).

times. The dispensational postponement into eschatological, tribulationary days of prophecies usually associated with the NT church hardly requires documentation. But it is surprising to discover Gundry’s unquestioning loyalty to a futuristic interpretation of passages such as Daniel’s 70th week. While recognizing that his field of specialization is NT rather than OT, one would still have expected him to have at least mentioned (if only to have refuted) the naturalness of the 70th week following immediately upon the 69th, the likelihood of Daniel 9:27’s being a recapitulation (cf. Gundry, p. 75) of 9:26 just as vv. 25-26 are of v. 24, or the possible equation of “the prince who is to come” in v. 26 (reading, with Theodotion, will be destroyed) with Messiah the Prince in v. 25. Gundry’s actual assertions, moreover, fail to display his normal perceptiveness into the thinking of those with whom he differs. Otherwise how could he assert without equivocation that to accept the ancient fulfillment of the 70th week forces one to “spiritualize the phrase ‘your people’ (v. 24) into a spiritual Israel inclusive of the Gentiles” (p. 189)—[Christ preached to the literal nation of Israel for 3½ years (Mt. 15:24), as did also His followers (Acts 2:36) for a similar period (up until 8:1), which occurred before the baptism of Cornelius (10:45-48)]—or that “the only adequate explanation” for the Messiah’s being cut off after the 69 (7 plus 62) weeks (Dan. 9:26) must be to assume an interval between the 69th and the 70th weeks (p. 190) [the death might have taken place in the midst of the 70th week, as elaborated in the next verse], or that “Christ did not confirm a covenant for one week” (p. 190) [He did accomplish the Abrahamic covenant of grace and “confirm the promise given to the fathers (Rom. 15:8)]? Gundry never seems to acknowledge the difference between the Bibliically unprecedented concept of the Antichrist making a covenant with Jews during the tribulation and the pervasively Biblical concept of Christ making a covenant for His people during His incarnation. Our author’s argument that the latter was a “new” covenant, and that both situations are non-existent until inaugurated (p. 191) fails to come to grips with and to answer the more basic contention that Christ’s covenant is known through earlier revelation and does form part of the already existing “first covenant” (Heb. 9:15).

Gundry proceeds to associate the historical view (as opposed to his own futurist view) with a theory that would date the start of the 70 weeks at the time of Haggai, with the rebuilding of private houses and then of the temple in Jerusalem, 60 years before the decrees of Artaxerxes; and on this basis he accuses non-futurist interpreters of holding to “years half-literal and half-symbolic” (p. 192). Such a misleading approach just is not up to the usual Gundry standards. Finally, for him to discredit the literal-year count-


7. Even liberal interpreters cite Ezra 4:11-23, Neb. 1:3, as evidence of the beginning of the construction of Jerusalem’s walls at this time, IB, III:155; cf. the decree of Artaxerxes I to Ezra (Ezra 7:11-26, esp. vv. 18 and 25).
ing of the 69 weeks up to Christ’s anointing as “abstruse mathematical and astronomical calculations” and in its place to praise the 360 day (the so-called “prophetic year”) system which is “best and fully set forth” by the dispensationally oriented Sir Robert Anderson (eighty years ago) as “exact and accurate” (p. 192), is simply to minimize current scholarly achievement. Anderson’s final choice of A.D. 32 for our Lord’s crucifixion is by modern standards improbable; and normal year counting from Ezra in 458 B.C. works out to a date of A.D. 26 for His baptism that definitely is probable. Any interpreter may occasionally “hitch his wagon” to the wrong star; Gundry’s partiality to Anderson does, however, shed light on the present stage of his “reaction-ing.”

Our author’s retentiveness toward futuristic fulfillment spills over from his OT exegesis into the NT. He states, for example, that to place the fulfillment of Daniel’s 70th week in the time of our Lord “severs the obvious connection between Daniel 9…and Revelation; and then refers to such passages as the 1,260 days and the time, times, and half a time of Revelation 12 (vv. 6, 14). Gundry objects to an identification of the Johannine references with Daniel 9 as historically understood, since this would render the Revelation passage “history instead of the prophecy it purports to be” (p. 191). But does the Revelation passage purport to be so? Dr. Gundry elsewhere acknowledges that “the vision of chapter 12 takes us back to the birth of Christ” (p. 76); and if verse 5 is past, on the ascension of Christ, how he “was caught up to God,” why should not the next verse be past too? The verb is aorist: “…and the woman fled into…a place prepared by God.” Gundry would even introduce futuristic fulfillments where the NT explicitly affirms past ones. He quotes, for example, Matthew 17:11, “Elijah is coming and will restore all things”; but be neglects to continue the sentence, as our Lord went on to say in verse 12, “But I say to you that Elijah already came, and they did to him whatever they wished” (see p. 94). In insisting on another, yet future coming of Elijah (John the Baptist), Gundry seems to miss the possibility that verse 11 could be simply a quote of the future as it appeared in the original OT prophecy (Mal. 4:5), while what follows goes on both to explain the historical fulfillment and to correct the futuristic misapprehension that had been stated in verse 10.

(3) Imminence. When an interpreter ceases to hold to a coming of Christ in two stages separated by the great tribulation and instead holds only to the Lord’s final coming to rule (Gundry’s posttribulationism), if he yet continues to hold to some 7 years of unfulfilled tribulation (Gundry’s futurism), then he must give up his hope in an imminent return. The Church and the Tribulation thus presents the case against imminence, and it does it as effectively as possible. Yet while Gundry does dispose of a number of the arguments often adduced, though improperly so, in support

8. Though it is granted that the 36 year time notice in 11:2 is predictive, probably anticipating the Jewish wars with Rome, A.D. 66-70 (as in 13:5). Gundry would criticize such a “forced” pre-70 dating of Rev. (p. 191); but this kind of material within the Apocalypse is demonstrable elsewhere, e.g., in 17:10; cf. Payne, Encyclopedia, p. 592.

of the imminent hope (e.g., those based on careless exegesis of I Thess. 5:6 or Rev. 3:3), he seems to have missed several of the more basic issues. In his pre-Passion Week teaching recorded in Luke 12:35-48, for example, Jesus says, "Be like men who are waiting for their lord...so that they may immediately open the door to him when he comes and knocks...Be ready, for the Son of Man is coming at an hour that you do not expect." But Gundry avoids the force of the passage, saying simply that "we are probably to understand these exhortations in the same fashion as those...in the Olivet discourse" (p. 33).10 On His Passion Week teaching (the Olivet discourse), Gundry then rests his case on the fact that Christ's admonitions to watch attach themselves to the posttributational advent (true), which he claims "is not imminent" (p. 34). But that begs the very question being argued. For if the precursive signs—sun darkened, stars falling, etc. (Mk. 13:24-25)—occur as quickly as seems to be indicated, then Christ's concluding admonition, "Keep on the alert, for you do not know when the appointed time is" (v. 32), would seem to suggest that His coming could be at any time, maybe right now. As might be expected Gundry makes much of the NT's indications of events that must intervene before the parousia, e.g., apostolic preaching (Acts 1:8), the death of Peter (John 21:19), or the removal of restraint on lawlessness (II Thess. 2:7), pp. 37-40. But again, he never really faces the possibility that the Peter who knew he had to die first could, in his epistles, teach the reality of imminency for those to whom the day of the Lord would be at hand after he was gone (I Pet. 4:7, II Pet. 1:15).

(4) History. The last chapter in The Church and the Tribulation argues with telling effect that the ante-Nicene fathers were posttributational in their eschatology. It also argues that the early church did not hold to a doctrine of Christ's imminent return. Yet the fathers do contain the teaching: "Soon and suddenly...will He come" (I Clement xxiii). When Gundry replies, "This passage can hardly be claimed for imminence...when it clearly pertains to the posttributational advent" (p. 173), he again seems to be begging the question.11 Gundry has, however, taken a number of us to task—and here I must plead guilty personally—for not sufficiently recognizing the futurity with which others among the fathers describe the Antichrist: many felt that a man of sin would yet have to come before Christ could. My response to Gundry's reaction, however, involves two qualifications. First, he tends to minimize the patristic belief in the contemporaneity of the tribulation. On the quotation, "Now in this wicked time we withstand coming sources of danger" (Barnabas, iv), is it not one-sided to stress one phrase—that the word 'coming' rules out any thought that the tribulation might have already been fulfilled" (p. 181)—but to neglect the others: "'Now' in 'this' time 'we withstand'..."? Only in an addendum does he acknowledge "the feeling that the church had entered into the beginning of the tribulation" (p. 193). Second, he deals inadequately with the patristic attitude toward the brevity of the tribulation. His dispensationally-colored assertion, "That the seventieth week will be fulfilled immediately before Jesus' return was held by the early church" (p. 193), creates the unwarranted impression that the fathers as a whole anticipated years
of delay before the advent, Gundry seems oblivious to the fact that

The 70 weeks were accepted by the early church as a period of
years fulfilled in connection with Christ’s first advent. Hippolytus
[early 3rd century] is believed to be the first... to begin the seventieth
week just before Christ’s second coming, after a gap. Most early ex-
positors explain Daniel’s hebdomads as having their full accomplish-
ment in Christ’s death,12 or the consequent destruction of Jerusalem
by Roman armies, and having no reference to the future Antichrist.13

So when the fathers say, “Soon and suddenly,” they suggest a practical
imminence, that Christ could come, at the least, after a relatively brief
interval. We conclude that much of the patristic evidence isn’t quite what
either Payne or Gundry might wish to it have been: it’s too delayed in its
hope for the one, but not delayed enough for the other!

As indicated above, the present reviewer’s impression of “Gundry in
transition” is that certain of his dispensational ties remain unbroken. Yet it
seems fair to predict that his monumental research will not, yes, cannot be
ignored by those who may fear that he has broken far too many dispensa-
tional ties, not to say dispensationalism itself. More “reactions to reaction”
should follow in this Journal and in a host of others. One wonders what,
eventually, Professor Gundry’s own will be.

10. Gundry suggests that the words in 12:38, “Whether He comes in the second
watch, or even in the third...” give a hint of delay in His return. But is this a
necessary delay, or only a possible one? Those who would deny imminency must
demonstrate the former, because all that the advocates of the doctrine plead for
is that His coming might be today.

11. Gundry pleads for a protracted intervening tribulation and makes appeal to
Clement’s illustration that “in a little time the fruit of a tree comes to maturity.”
But in context this picture of a slowly budding tree seems to be intended to
answer the criticism made against the advent hope because of protracted time
already past. The scoffers asserted, “These things we have heard even in the time
of our fathers, but behold we have grown old and none of them have happened
to us.”

12. Cf. the extreme case of how Eusebius postulates an interval of 3½ years between
the resurrection of Christ and His ascension, to perform the 70th week (The
Proof of the Gospel, viii, 2).

Herald, 1950), 1:278, 380, a fact which remains unaffected by Gundry’s
claim that Hippolytus and his single known follower in this interpretation (up
until the days of J. N. Darby), the 4th century author Lactantius, “had the most
to say about eschatology” (p. 193).

The Old Testament and The Proclamation of The Gospel. By Elizabeth
Achtsemeier.

Phila.: Westminster Press, 1973. 197 pp. plus notes and Scriptural in-
dex, pp. 199-223. $7.50. Reviewed by Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., Professor of
Semitic languages and Old Testament, Trinity Evangelical Divinity
School, Deerfield, Illinois.

With an incisive description of the Church’s present dilemma, the
Visiting Professor of Homiletics at Union Theological Seminary in Richmond, Virginia, inveighs against mainstream American Protestantism for its removal and wholesale replacement of the Biblical text from the center of the life of the Church with all sorts of “contemporary” and “relevant” excuses. The problem has become “a crisis of most serious proportions.”

If Protestantism is ever going to recover this Biblical heritage again, argues Professor Achtemeier in Deborah-like tones, it will have to recognize that: 1) there are no substitutes for the Bible’s own distinctive witness, 2) the “Biblical Theology Movement” must be given a fairer change to write its own commentaries and the educational policies of the Church before it is prematurely pronounced dead (B. C. Childs et. al) since the Movement was unfairly saddled with materials held over from the era of Wellhausian developmentalism, 3) a new set of principles for interpreting the Bible along the lines of the Biblical Theology Movement must be formulated, and 4) valid methodologies for preaching and teaching this Biblical Word growing out of the nature of the Scripture with which one is dealing must be developed and utilized. Accordingly, she adopts her own program as the format for her book.

Part II is a veritable brief Old Testament Theology which is confessedly indebted to von Rad for its organization and general approach, but distinctively different in much of its content. While the O.T. is divided into three principal tradition histories, viz., the Hexateuch, the Monarchical Materials (Judges—Nehemiah: including the succession narrative, the Deuteronomic history, the Chronicler, and the Royal Psalms), and the Classical Prophets; the flow of the material still bears the continuity theme of “The Promise” which she and her husband set forth with brilliant simplicity and a potential profundity in The Old Testament Roots of Our Faith, (Abingdon, 1962).

This type of theologizing suggests a new method for the actual preparation of sermons: always pair an O.T. text with the N.T. text for “no sermon can become the word of God for the Christian Church if it deals only with the O.T. apart from the New” (p. 142). Further, the “then” of the texts must be brought over to the “now” of the congregation without utilizing the hermeneutical errors of a defunct Wellhausian developmentalism, an allegorical de-historicizing of the text, or a mere talking about the text without proclaiming it. Indeed, these last points must be stressed! Four sample sermons follow illustrating the method and results.

By all standards this work is a pioneering statement of major proportions. Its candor, self-examination, and programmatic procedures are all keyed to lead a recrudescence in the ebbing fortunes of neo-orthodox theology and its chief brain-child: the Biblical Theology Movement.

No doubt about it, as James Smart also complained, there is a Strange Silence of the Bible in the Church, (Westminster 1970) and that silence is invading traditional Evangelical Churches as well, tell it not in Cath!

Neither is it to be denied that a Biblical theology which uses the historical categories taught by the text itself (rather than imposed from any theological, philosophical or reconstructed historical grid) must play a key role in rescuing especially O.T. sermons from pure descriptive preaching by
informing” the text under consideration with all the previous revelation of God on that topic. (Can we call this “the Analogy of [Antecedent] Scripture”? Not to be confused with Systematic’s “Analogy of Faith!!!). But all potential Marcionite undertones must be resisted, viz., those which would deny the use of an O.T. passage by itself as the basis for the proclamation of God’s Word to our generation. Here this reviewer would differ strongly with the suggested necessity of always pairing O.T. texts with N.T. ones.

Sermons of “analogy” (pp 165ff.) if based on a valid “analogy of [antecedent] Scripture” can result in authoritative preaching, again, whether Old and New Testament texts are linked, or a single text from either testament is considered. This may even be true of messages grounded in a “promise and fulfillment” (pp 172ff., however, see my disclaimer in JESt, 13(1970), p. 98. But those that employ a “common motif” (pp 181ff) are simply repeating the mistakes of “developmentalism,” topical sermons “about” the text, and subjective projections on the text of my own wishes and ideas.

We highly recommend this book to the total community of Biblical academicians and proclaimers. Evangelicals would do well to set forth a similar program by way of interaction, appreciation, and criticism. Dare we work and pray for a total restoration of our Biblical foundations in all of Christendom as a result of the ensuing discussions and spirit led reproaches?

Reviewed by J. Barton Payne, Professor of OT, Covenant Theological Seminary, St. Louis, Missouri.

Here’s the evidence. But do not be deceived by the title. This is not a study of the OT concept of the b’rith, or covenant, except for allusions that appear in connection with Hosea and Jeremiah. More seriously, it is hardly a study conducive to hope, because the prophets whose teachings it surveys are so consistently subjected to the dictates of negative criticism that the hopes they are said to express cannot but have a hollow ring, to readers seeking genuine words of God. The evidence provided by this volume relates more to one’s understanding of theological conditions in current institutionalized evangelicalism in America.

Eric Rust first discusses Israel’s prophetic movement. Then come six chapters that outline the lives and teachings of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah of Jerusalem, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and what he identifies as Deutero-Isaiah. A concluding chapter lumps together such “postexilic” books as Trito-Isaiah, Joel, and Obadiah and such “Hellenistic” books as Deutero-Zechariah and “last of all, we have the Book of Daniel.” An epilogue seeks to summarize how “the divine revelation through the prophets... is confirmed in Christ.” It is true that “the early Christian attempts to find support here [in the ‘cultic cry to the wife of Ahaz in Isa. 7:14] for the virgin birth must be left on one side” (p. 88) and that the hope of Yahweh’s transforming nature as He binds up the heart of His people (in 30:25-26) represents a “mingling of the historical and the suprahistorical” (p. 87); but the author still feels
it "fitting that we should consider the permanent contribution of this testimon
tomy to the movement of Christian thought" (p. 183).

Despite Rust's reiterated commitment to Wellhausen's JEDP (pp. 14,
39), to the ecstatic character of early Hebrew prophecy (at least of the
nāvī, contrast the hōzē, p. 23), or to Hosea's existential and "not rational"
knowledge of God (pp. 66-67), and despite the unoriginal nature of most
of his discussion (conceded, p. 11), his study does come up with helpful
comments, e.g., on the status of Hosea's wife Gomer (pp. 56-57, though he
will not grant her harlotry from the first, p. 58), on the richness of the
holiness of God in Isaiah (pp. 78-81), or on the reality of Jeremiah's call
during the Scythian raids of 627-626 and his "itinerating" for Josiah's
reformation in 622 (pp. 96-97). By and large, however, Covenant and Hope
constitutes discouraging evidence on Professor Rust's "final contribution to
nearly three decades of teaching the theology of the OT...in the theologica
education which Southern Baptist Theological Seminary now enjoys"
(p. 12) and of Word Book's theological indiscrimination in publishing the
same.

Eerdmans, 1974. 152 pp. $2.95.
Reviewed by Ronald B. Mayers, Asst. Professor of Philosophy and
Religion, Grand Rapids Baptist College, Grand Rapids, Michigan.

Mitton's intent in this book is to aid the "ministers and school teachers
with special responsibility for Christian education" who have felt the dis
turbing influence of historical scepticism and do not know how to meet the
questions put to them by young and old, learned and unlearned, concerning
what we can know about the life and ministry of Jesus Christ. As fine as
this intention may be, one is not sure whether the Jesus of history, the
Christ, is any better known, with any degree of certainty, after the book has
been read.

The reason for this sad state of affairs is the critical and theological
premises from which the book is written. The possibility that the Bible may
be more than an historical document is never raised. While no doubt the
period of oral transmission needs to be seriously evaluated by conservative
New Testament scholars, the writer never mentions even the possibility of
Spirit-directed men being guided in their research and writing of the in
dividual accounts in the four gospels. Rather the typical form critical ap
proach is advocated and practiced, leaving only a knothole perspective of
the man Jesus—a dead Christ.

Though this book does not claim to contribute anything to the scholar
ly discussion of the "quest for the historical Jesus," it is a profitable intro
duction to one not familiar with the problem, or to one who desires a brief,
up-to-date, synopsis of the current state of the problem. But there is no
answer to the historical problem here for the "minister and school teacher"
who believe that "if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in
your sins."