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BOOK NOTES
BOOKS RECEIVED
OLD TESTAMENT


In this attractive volume the story of Genesis is retold, illuminated by mention of archaeological evidence, clarified by discussion of difficult points and defended from all attacks of liberals. There are good illustrations, detailed indexes and a substantial bibliography.

After a brief discussion of "Evidence for Mosaic Authorship," the theological themes of Genesis are summarized as ethical monotheism, anthropology, covenant and cosmology. The characteristic literary style of Genesis is stated to be narrative; but in general, although a few later additions to the Mosaic text are conceded, the results of literary criticism are studiously ignored (chaps. 1-2, for example, are interpreted as scientific prose describing the origin of the world, 1:1-5; life, 1:6-25; and man, 1:26-2:25). Davis' enthusiastic conservatism is rather uncritical and often leads him to accept "conservative" views and reject "liberal" views without real examination or discussion. For example, the "canopy theory" of Whitcomb and Morris is adopted with no more than a brief mention of alternative interpretations of "firmament" (pp. 60-61), while two influential scholarly views of the nature of the Joseph story are rejected without comment in favor of Mosaic authorship (p. 262).

Davis has a simplistic understanding of the relationship between the Bible and science, often in terms of a conflict which is resolved by asserting that the Bible is right (e.g., trees were created before marine organisms, pp. 62-63; though occasionally science is preferred, e.g., the sun rather than the earth is at the center of the solar system, pp. 64-65). He scarcely considers the possibility that the Biblical and scientific accounts of the origin of the world are complementary and should not be set in opposition to each other (e.g., he advocates the "literal-day theory" in preference to the "day-age theory" and "revelatory-day theory," without even mentioning the view that Genesis 1 is not a scientific account but a theological statement in dramatic form).

In spite of its inadequacy from a scholarly point of view, Paradise to Prison contains helpful insights into the book of Genesis. I suspect, however, that few serious students will be satisfied with this work; there are better conservative defenses of Genesis (e.g. Kidner), and more illuminating theological interpretations (e.g. von Rad).

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As the title indicates, Thompson's work is divided into two sections. In the seventy-one pages of introduction, the reviewer particularly appreciated the following subjects; the analysis of Deuteronomy as an example of the ancient Near Eastern treaty form (pp. 17-19), the general discussion of the literary characteristics of Deuteronomy and the discussion of the dating and authorship of the book (in which Thompson adopts the view that Deuteronomy is a later presentation of essentially Mosaic materials [pp. 8, 68]). The remainder of the book is verse-by-verse commentary.

The reviewer's comments must be selective and may serve best by considering three general features: (1) Thompson's careful, positive use of the data, tools and insights of critical scholarship; (2) his willingness to consider new interpretations somewhat off the beaten exegetical track while remaining within the evan-
gelical camp; and (3) his frank, nondefensive manner of dealing with problem issues. Comment is appropriate also concerning the implications of the author's views for the present-day discussion of the doctrine of Biblical inerrancy.

Among Thompson's positive usages of critical scholarship are the following. First, in some circles it is almost a canonical doctrine that the omission of Sinai from the "small historical credo" (Deut 26:5-10) and other passages demonstrates that Sinai is part of a different religious tradition blended into the other only at a later date. Thompson replies not with a religious a priori concerning the accuracy of Scripture but with a scholarly critical observation, viz., that the Near Eastern treaty form provides a literary form of apparently early date that organically links the Exodus event with the covenant at Sinai (pp. 126, 254; cf. footnote on p. 126).

Similarly, extensively utilizing earlier scholarship, the author successfully analyzes Deuteronomy as an example of the OT covenant form, particularly as modeled after the Near Eastern treaty form. The latter typically defined the privileges and responsibilities of a lord and his vassals and thus served as an appropriate model for the privileges and responsibilities of the covenant between God and his people (pp. 19 ff). Deuteronomy's debt to the Near Eastern treaty form extended even to such details as sharing in that form's standard curse formulae (p. 273). Even chap. 27, often considered as a late editorial addition, has a place in the book thus analyzed (pp. 261-262), and the conclusion is stated that Deuteronomy "can no longer be considered as the end product of a series of redactions" (p. 51).

Several times chiasmus appears as a unifying literary device, as in the following examples; Deut 11:26-28:68 (p. 159); 4:34-5:6 (p. 160); 28:7-14 (p. 270); and 28:25-37 (p. 273).

British evangelical scholarship has been characterized by a willingness to leave the beaten path for new interpretations as suggested by new perspectives in scholarship. Thompson shows such a spirit in several areas. He suggests that the language of Moses' vigil when receiving the law was not meant for "literalist and materialist interpretations" (p. 140). "Forty days" may have designated an indefinite period, perhaps serving as an idiom for a solemn vigil (p. 140). He suggests that "finger of God" (Deut 9:10) does not rule out Moses' writing as God's amanuensis (p. 140; cf. p. 119). He suggests that the term "Hittites" in Deuteronomy (e. g. 7:1) may follow the loose usage of that term in Assyrian and Babylonian documents as an alternate possibility to the specific usage in Genesis 10:15 (p. 128). Whether one agrees with all these suggestions (the present reviewer prefers the more "literalist and materialist" interpretations for Moses), the openness to new interpretations can be appreciated.

For the present reviewer, who is more accustomed to a defensive or even hostile reaction toward any suggestion of discrepancy, real or alleged, in Scripture, Thompson's frank, nondefensive treatment of apparent discrepancies was new and appreciated. For example Thompson notes, without fanfare or defensive-ness, the surface differences between the provisions for releasing a slave in Exod 21:2-11 and those of Deut 15:12-18 (p. 190). Differences in sacrificial ritual are also noted (Lev 7:28-36; Num 18:8-19; Deut 18:3-4; p. 208), as well as differences in the law of tithing (pp. 183-184).

Turning to his dating of Deuteronomy and the resulting implications for the doctrine of Biblical inerrancy, several observations are in order. Much of Deuteronomy unequivocally claims to be the very words, ipsissima verba, of Moses. Thompson, however, takes the position that Deuteronomy, in its present form, cannot be as old as Moses (pp. 53, 163-164). Two hypotheses may proceed from this position: (1) that the so-called Mosaic content was itself significantly em-
bellished and altered in the process of transmission and composition, or (2) that the content claiming to be Mosaic is essentially and accurately Mosaic but restated in the idiom or rhetorical style of a later age. The reviewer considers Job to be a good example of such a development.

Some portions of Thompson’s commentary seem to indicate that he holds the former view. For example, his suggestion that Deut 33:11 appears to be “old” while vv 8-10 appear to be later (p. 310; cf. also the updating of “great principles” on p. 163) would seem to support the former hypothesis. It would appear that this hypothesis, presupposing a widespread embellishment of Moses’ ideas, contradicts any concept of Scriptural inerrancy.

However, there are places where Thompson seems to lean to the latter of the two hypotheses. He speaks of the possibility that “a sympathetic collector and editor . . . might well have actualized Moses’ words” (p. 306) and he seems to mean that the “sympathetic collector” might have done so with a degree of accuracy in harmony with the doctrine of inerrancy. Though Thompson does not explicitly say so, this raises the possibility that an inspired later writer might have accurately, even inerrantly, recorded the ideas of Moses in the idiom of his own day. Such a hypothesis could do justice both to the accuracy of the materials recorded and to the evidences of later composition to which scholars frequently refer. In view of the timeliness of this discussion, a fuller expression of the author’s views would have been appreciated.

Taken as a whole, Thompson’s commentary is thoroughly scholarly, challenging, and committed to the essentials of the historic Christian faith. While no one will agree with all of the author’s suggestions, the general spirit and methodology shown in this work are those necessary for future evangelical biblical scholarship.

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NEW TESTAMENT


This collection of essays is a reprint of that first published in 1971 by Geoffrey Chapman Ltd. of London. It is a pleasure to find at the moderate prices of Scholars’ Press works by an author of Fitzmyer’s quality. The essays, varying in length from four to eighty pages, were originally published between 1955 and 1967 in six journals and two Festschriften. The present work, therefore, has value not as a source of fresh ideas but as a handy compendium on the recently discovered Semitic background on the NT from one of the most significant scholars in that field.

In the foreword, Fitzmyer divides NT study into the hermeneutical part and the Hellenistic and Semitic background part and characterizes his essays as contributing to the Semitic background element of the field. Not all would share the author’s pessimism about hermeneutics, but most would agree with the importance he gives to the bearing of recent Semitic discoveries, especially from the Dead Sea Scrolls and Aramaic studies, on NT interpretation.

The essays are arranged in five groups by point of contact with the NT: the use of the OT, the Semitic background of various gospel passages, Pauline passages, the epistle to the Hebrews, and early Christianity. The only significant area of NT studies not considered is the Johannine material, which omission is indeed unfortunate in view of that area’s present popularity.
Perhaps the adjective for Fitzmyer's contribution is "judicious" rather than "daring." From his admirable utilization of more than half a dozen languages in careful examination of primary sources and recent scholarship the author contributes sensible and sometimes new ideas on a wide range of NT topics. He does not propose broad, new theories with finality. He offers some new suggestions (e.g., that the Aramaic 'Elect of God' text refers to Noah), but he is careful not to go beyond his evidence. He more often modifies speculative proposals (e.g., Stendahl on Matthew, Milik on qorbân, Roth on Simon, and Teicher on Ebionites) or lends support in a careful manner to previously tentative theories (e.g., of "Testimonia," of "men of his good will," and of angelology in 1 Cor 11:10). At a time when controversy continues on Acts history and Lukian theology, Fitzmyer's essay on Jewish Christianity in Acts from the now well-known Festschrift edited by Keck and Martyn will be welcomed as a constructive and moderate contribution.

The book has two shortcomings. Besides a greater than reasonable number of errors missed in proofreading, the format does not include the pagination the essays had in the journals in which they originally appeared. Such pagination could facilitate reference work. (Indeed, Fitzmyer makes note of this benefit of original pagination in a volume of essays he reviews in JBL 95 [1976] 328.) Second, the essays are dated; they are from nine to twenty-one years old. The author provides comments bringing four of the articles (nos. 5, 9, 10, 15) more up to date, but the book is generally without comment (cf. p. xviii) on the responses to Fitzmyer's insights in these essays or on subsequent contributions to the topics. What this means is that the book is more valuable as a reference volume to articles about which one knows but to which he lacks access than as an up-to-date reference book on Semitic background of the NT.

These weaknesses do not minimize the book's value for NT studies. If the Catholic scholar has offered no "seminal" essays here, he has provided the serious student of NT studies a series of essays he will probably need for teaching or research. At a price of about a penny per page he gains access to considerable amounts of Semitic materials carefully sifted for their bearing on the NT.

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CHURCH HISTORY


The title of Stephen Berk's book may strike some evangelicals as odd if not downright contradictory. Francis Schaeffer, among others, has positively linked the freedom enjoyed in the United States and northern Europe with Reformation principles (The Church at the End of the Twentieth Century, pp. 22-23). How then can one speak of Calvinism versus democracy?

The subtitle of the book under review, "Timothy Dwight and the Origins of American Evangelical Orthodoxy," locates the parameters of the discussion, which critically evaluates New England Puritan Calvinism and Jeffersonian democracy as these ideologies clashed head-on during the early formative years of the United States.

It is Berk's thesis that the American Calvinistic tradition, long established in colonial Massachusetts and Connecticut, felt uncomfortable with popular self-government and a pluralistic society. Opposition to the Jeffersonians was rooted in a somber view of human nature and a consequent necessity for magistrates and ministers to cooperate as guardians of public morals. The excesses of the
French revolution provided conservatives with illustrations aplenty of the disastrous consequences ensuing from the wedding of Enlightenment principles with practical politics.

Divines loyal to the Standing Order—Congregational control of the socio-political system—saw New England first and then America as God's instruments to stem the rising tide of iniquity and unbelief let loose upon the earth. Fueling this vision was a strong millennial faith that saw America as God's New Israel which, under special divine favor and protection, was the beginning of an unprecedented era of peace and righteousness eventually filling the whole earth.

At the center of this apocalyptic vision stood Timothy Dwight, president of Yale College and Congregationalist leader. In contrast to the "New Divinity" with its emphasis on human inability, Dwight developed and honed a "moderate Calvinism" that he considered a far more effective instrument to revive a flagging evangelicalism and thereby stabilize existing social institutions and reverse the tide of unbelief engulfing not only New England but the whole world. In sketching this development, the author provides a valuable survey of New England theology from Jonathan Edwards to Hopkins and finally to Dwight.

Although Dwight's best efforts could not save the Standing Order, which collapsed a few years after his death, he did succeed in bequeathing to following generations the development of interdenominational societies for the improvement of general morality among the American people. Outstanding among these were anti-slavery and temperance societies.

This survey of Dwight's views, culled from his sermons and other literary productions, has arrived on the scene at a most opportune time. Modern America reflects many of the moods of Puritan times. Calls for America to repent and again take up her God-given role as Christian nation and world leader are heard amid warnings against a civil religion blending Christianity with the cultural landscape and blunting the evangelical message. Those identifying with the former stance might seek increased effectiveness through adapting certain of Dwight's stratagems. Opponents of civil religion have here a classic paradigm of what happens when well-intentioned evangelicals use religion to bolster entrenched social and political institutions including class privilege and established religion.

This reviewer concluded from the evidence presented in the book that Dwight was more wrong than right in his attempt to weld Biblical Christianity to the fortunes of Federalist politics. Today's evangelicals should be doubly warned, since the Puritan Standing Order of Dwight's day was probably far more Biblically oriented than is the American way of life in the 1970s.

Of particular interest to evangelicals is a footnote appended to the volume: "The author wrote this work from the point of view of a non-Christian. However, after having submitted it for publication, he experienced conversion to evangelical Christianity, the culmination of a long search for inner peace. While remaining critical of certain human failings in American revivalistic Protestantism, the author wishes here to affirm its overall spiritual basis. The Awakening which Timothy Dwight led was an honest, though sometimes overheated, Christian response to growing secularism. Orthodoxy's problems have stemmed not from the practices of evangelism and scriptural morality, but from an overly close connection with narrow cultural norms" (p. xii).

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HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY


Montgomery’s book, republished unchanged except for a new subtitle and the addition of an essay by P. Feinberg trenchantly defending the author’s conclusions against a critical review, provides a good starting point for the student seeking an introduction to the philosophy of history from a conservative Christian viewpoint. The author presents a tough-minded if brief (Hegel is dismissed in two paragraphs) negative critique of all major attempts to find ultimate explanations and meaning for history, whether grounded in philosophy, science or art. This does not mean, however, that ultimate interpretations of history are impossible or unnecessary, as modern secular “relativistic” historians and philosophers have argued. Instead, having shown the inadequacies, contradictions and fallacies of the secular quest for a true interpretation of history, Montgomery points to the only viable alternative—a Christian philosophy of history.

But not just any Christian philosophy of history. Christian theologians and philosophers of history are subjected to an equally rigorous critique and, where they fail to ground their systems on an acceptance of absolute Biblical authority, they too are shown to manifest inadequacies and faulty presuppositions similar to their secular contemporaries, often indeed because they consciously or unconsciously have borrowed too much from prevailing secular world views. Generally, Montgomery’s handling of Christian philosophies of history is more thorough and carries more conviction than his analysis of secular thought, perhaps because the author’s real strengths and interests appear to be primarily theological. The demonstration of the solipsism to which Bultmannian existential subjectivism logically leads perhaps constitutes the most valuable portion of his critique.

When one leaves Montgomery’s negative critique and turns to his positive proposals for an historical apologetic, and a Christian philosophy of history based on this apologetic, serious problems arise. The core of Montgomery’s argument is that by using historical techniques and objective empirical methods (which do not exclude the miraculous on a priori philosophical grounds), the gospels can be demonstrated to provide reliable historical evidence, Jesus’s self-predicted resurrection can be verified, and his claim to divinity can be established on this basis. And since Jesus, speaking the truth as God, endorsed the absolute divine authority of the OT and soon-to-be written NT, it follows that “all Biblical assertions bearing on philosophy of history are to be regarded as revealed truth, and that all attempts at historical interpretation are to be judged for truth-value on the basis of harmony with Scriptural revelation” (p. 139).

Already Montgomery’s arguments, elaborated and repeated in many articles and in his book *Where Is History Going?* (1969), have sparked a heated and largely negative response from his reviewers. (For reviews and rejoinders by Montgomeryites see *Fides et Historia*, Fall 1970, Spring 1972, Spring 1973; *Christian Scholar’s Review*, Spring 1971, Summer 1971.) What follows is an attempt to address briefly some of the issues that seem to lie at the center of this debate, in light of what I conceive to be the legitimate functions of the historian.

Montgomery is anxious to locate events like Christ’s resurrection squarely within temporal history and also to make a radical distinction between subject
and object in historical investigation. In this he is reacting to those who, like Bultmann especially, deny the historicity of the NT events and the possibility of any separation between the historian as subject and the events or sources he investigates as object. Montgomery rightly insists on the subjectivism and solipsism that such a methodology leads to. But is he right in arguing, as he does elsewhere, that the events of salvation history must be historical in the full sense or, alternatively, transhistorical in the Bultmannian sense, with no intermediate position possible? (Where, pp. 116-117). And is he right in insisting that subject and object can be completely separate in historical inquiry?

We might begin to answer these questions by suggesting that while the events of salvation history occur in history (and here I am at one with Montgomery in agreeing that the whole of the Christian faith rests on this), they are not fully of history. They are partly transhistorical in that their causes do not lie in temporal history—as Montgomery seems to acknowledge. Now the historian, functioning as a technical historian and synthesizing reliable evidence, can deal with the occurrence and description of such events. He cannot, however, explain them according to any logic of explanation available to technical history. This does not mean that such events are impossible, and Montgomery brings in Einsteinian relativity theory to rebut an erroneous "scientism" basing itself on a closed system of natural causation. Nevertheless, since for technical historians there is a direct link between explicable and plausibility, events which are inexplicable, while not necessarily impossible, remain improbable, and the quantity and quality of evidence as to their occurrence would have to be correspondingly strong.

Beyond the problems of describing and explaining the events of salvation history there is the final question of interpreting their meaning and significance. Here Montgomery, in attempting to keep subject and object separate in historical inquiry and thereby avoid charges of inevitable subjectivism, argues that events in history carry their own meanings or at least provide adequate criteria for distinguishing correctly as between true and false interpretations (Where, pp. 203, 375). I agree with Montgomery's critics who find this approach insupportable. The historian can discover and interpret context-bound meanings for ordinary historical events. He cannot assign ultimate meaning to events unless he speaks from within an ultimate context of absolute values to an audience also accepting those absolutes. This is clearly impossible within technical history. But the ultimate meaning of the events of salvation history is not left to the historian to discover in the events themselves, in the value-context of their occurrence, nor in the value-context within which the historian operates; rather, the true meaning of these events is revealed by God through prophetic interpretation.

It follows from this that technical history has but limited competence in dealing with the events of salvation history and that an historical apologetic is correspondingly limited. I would agree with Montgomery as to the great importance of this limited apologetic, particularly in defense of the historicity of the events of salvation history against those who would deny their occurrence or assign them fully to the realm of myth, symbol or transhistory. In this carefully qualified sense I would agree that the Christian world view is "accessible to science" and "rests upon an objective foundation which will stand up under the most exacting criticism" (Shape, p. 138). However, in explaining and interpreting these events, much is left necessarily to the realm of faith.

Finally, a few comments on the principles of Christian historiography that Montgomery derives from Scripture. These appear for the most part to be helpful only in addressing such ultimate levels of interpretation as the origins, nature, redemption and destiny of man. In analyzing the events of mundane history,
however (where most historians earn their daily bread), Montgomery’s principles seem to be of limited use—a conclusion only confirmed by the author’s attempts to illustrate his principles with reference to interpreting the French Revolution. In fact the Christian should have no quarrel with analytic philosophers of history who have demonstrated the impossibility of assigning ultimate meaning to particular events in mundane history, so long as we are left free to apprehend in faith the meaning revealed by God for his mighty acts in history and to offer a legitimate historical apologetic for the historicity of these acts. That the Christian historian should attempt to place all the people of time past in “universal perspective” (Shape, p. 151) seems impossible, as indeed the author admits in assigning “the final evaluation of all historical events” to God. Perhaps this is why the new edition of Montgomery’s book no longer promises readers that this volume represents but the first in a series by the author entitled “History in Christian Perspective.”

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THEOLOGY


John Cobb here presents his tentative conclusions concerning the implications of process philosophy for Christology. Although his work shows careful thought and care in writing, its radically new approach to Christology will have limited appeal in evangelical circles. (I might note in passing that the author assumes that his reader is already familiar with process philosophy and theology; for the reader who is not, I would recommend beginning with Process Theology: Basic Writings, ed. by E. H. Cousins.) And since all philosophical theology is complex and difficult reading, few pastors will be able to devote the time required to grasp the argument. So Cobb’s primary audience will be (1) students who are currently in liberal seminaries and (2) professional theologians who want to be au courant.

But for those readers who do follow contemporary American theology, let me introduce Cobb’s book. In Part I he asserts that the Logos is “the cosmic principle of order, the ground of meaning, and the source of purpose” (p. 71), and that when the Logos is incarnate it becomes the principle of creative transformation. Wherever creative change occurs, wherever relevant novelty appears, there, at that point, the Logos is at work. “The Logos in its transcendence is timeless and infinite, but in its incarnation or immanence it is always a specific force for just that creative transformation which is possible and optimal in each situation” (p. 72). And it is this immanent Logos, Cobb asserts, that we properly call Christ. So Christology is not primarily a study of the God-Man, but a study of God’s ongoing immanent work in history by which he continually and creatively transforms our reality. Given this formulation of the doctrine of the Christ, it is not surprising that Cobb has trouble dealing with what is truly historical. If God is at work in history always and everywhere in the way Cobb claims, then it is unclear how he is at work at any particular place in specific. As the traditional concept of the incarnation is extended to cover all of God’s immanent work in history, Heilsgeschichte and history coalesce.

In Part II Cobb interprets Jesus of Nazareth in the light of the Christology developed in the first section. Now it should already be clear that Cobb’s Christology does not flow out of his understanding of Jesus. Nevertheless, he does admit that his work would be hopelessly inadequate if it could not deal with Jesus.
But in the end the Nazarene is, for Cobb, merely the decisive test case.

Cobb does see Jesus as the perfect embodiment of the Logos, and this fact clearly does have religious significance for the author. But like previous immanental theologians in the past, e.g. Schleiermacher, he is hard pressed to defend the uniqueness of Jesus. Cobb asserts, for example, that "in Jesus there is a distinctive incarnation because his very selfhood was constituted by the Logos" (p. 139). Yet several pages later he admits that "there is no a priori basis for determining whether others have participated in this structure of existence. That remains an open question. . . . There might be someone of whom history has left no record who was constituted much as Jesus was, but that is an idle speculation. So far as we know, Jesus is unique" (p. 142). The problem is this: His presuppositions force him to admit "the possibility that Gautama [Buddha] might also have incarnated the Logos in a redemptive manner"
(p. 206). Cobb is acutely aware that he is writing a Christology for a "pluralistic age"; hence, he is very sensitive to the issues of tolerance and intolerance. But his failure to affirm clearly the centrality of Jesus of Nazareth in God's redemptive work is, to my mind, a serious flaw in his work.

In Part III he struggles with the fact that traditional Christian images of hope no longer speak to him personally. He suggests that for images of hope we look at the architectural ecology of P. Soleri, the possibility of a synthesis of Buddhism and Christianity, Whitehead's idea of the kingdom of God, and the concept of the resurrection and of hope as articulated in the Pannenberg circle. In common with most liberal theologians he seems unaware that the traditional images are still vibrant and alive for vast numbers of American Christians.

I confess that my primary response to the book reflects my evangelical biases. Although Cobb occasionally refers in extremely general terms to the content of the gospels, at no point does he actually confront—or even mention—a specific Biblical text. I am not suggesting, of course, that the Christian theologian should ignore philosophy and "stick to the Bible"; and there is no a priori reason to assume that process philosophy cannot help us to understand certain aspects of the Christian faith. But to subjugate the Bible to a particular philosophy is methodologically suspect, and to ignore the text, as Cobb does, is almost perverse.

Finally, I must mention that I was disturbed by the lack of any clear discussion of the problem of norms. When Cobb spoke of the Logos as producing "relevant novelty," I wondered, "Relevant to what?" He obviously approves of transformations that are creative, but he provides no criteria for distinguishing between those transformations that are creative and those that are reactionary. Cobb is convinced that the Logos is "the principle of novelty, spontaneity, growth, and self-transcendence. It is that element in experience by which a continuing restlessness is introduced into the human race, a refusal of mere acquiescence in the given" (pp. 69-70). I think that I know what Cobb is driving at. Biblical values are visible behind his "images of hope." But without continued, methodical reference to the Biblical norm, there is nothing that will permanently exclude the demonic from his vision of the future.

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We have here a reader in Puritan theology, complete with antique spellings and a foldout chart in the best scholastic style by W. Perkins. By 'Puritan'
Hindson has in mind writers, though they be Anglicans or Baptists, who represent the strictest developments of Calvinistic orthodoxy in the English-speaking world. To him, Puritanism signifies a theological school or movement operating out of the Reformed and Augustinian assumptions. J. I. Packer helps to clarify all this for the reader in his excellent foreword.

In the selections recorded by authors such as Charnock, Jewel, Owen, Baxter and Edwards, we are given a most pleasing taste in an abbreviated space both of the exalted concerns of these great believers and of their shortcomings as well. We see the theological Puritans at their best here: in their scholarship and intellectual power, in the deep reverence and flaming zeal they had for God, and in their pastoral concern for the practical outworkings of the truths of faith. We also see them at their worst: in the post-Bezan supralapsarian chart of Perkins, and in the infamous argument of Owen, in which he deliberately denies the plain Scriptural truth of the universal intention of Christ’s atonement. Little better is the treatment of justification which omits the ethical, and of eschatology which suggests God plans to torture people forever. Hindson honestly spreads before the reader a broad sample of the themes in their thought and has done him a service.

My reaction on reading the book was to feel that we need the help of these Puritans in some respects but not in all. The benefit they offer is real, but not as unqualified as the editor believes. The volume closes with a good bibliography of the primary sources for Puritan writing, though it is limited by the fact that the original dates are given but not the present publishers (if any).

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I am not the only evangelical who is concerned to learn what he can from Bonhoeffer but who has felt frustrated by an inability to sort out his thought. Hopper makes a fine contribution in surveying the interpretations that have been made of it. But he goes further. Though not wishing in the least to diminish our proper esteem for Bonhoeffer as a Christian martyr, he argues forcefully that excessive claims have been made on behalf of the continuity and stature of his theological thought. Bonhoeffer’s theology is not the masterpiece it is often made out to be.

There is no doubt that Bonhoeffer has had a significant impact on numerous Christians. Can we still recall the sensation caused by Honest to God in 1963 when the maverick Bishop of Woolwich served up a radical version of Bonhoeffer for us all to consume? But what kind of impact has he had? Hopper believes it is Bonhoeffer’s biography rather than his theology that has determined his posthumous influence. He notes that though there are scholars such as Godsey, Ott and Ebeling who see continuity in Bonhoeffer’s thought and strive to expound the central motif they see that binds the whole together, it is striking how much difference there is in the alleged motifs chosen and even in the interpretation of the motifs themselves. Whether it be ecclesiology, Christology or reality, the three major motifs isolated and proposed, there is simply no agreement either on their centrality or their content. Hopper therefore concludes that far more has been claimed for Bonhoeffer’s theology than critical analysis justifies.

What then is the alternative? It is simply a question of the deep involvements of Bonhoeffer’s life working against his developing a fully coherent theological position. His life story is the key to understanding what he said, not
some scholarly program of research. The impulsive shifting and adjustment in his work is simply due to the press of circumstances on him. Bonhoeffer, like all of us, was engaged in a quest. He did not grasp all the answers ahead of time, and patiently unfold them after the fashion of his friend Barth. There is something almost inhuman about a theology unfolding above biography. We were not created with fixed natures in which change and growth should be seen as weakness. On the contrary, Bonhoeffer’s theology is important to us because it is not a summa theologica, but rather the sensitive reflection of a believer who sought to carry the cross in the world and shared his Master’s fate. I am grateful to Hopper for making Bonhoeffer available to us again.

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The purpose of this symposium is to provide a scholarly exposition of what the contributors hold to be a Biblical position in the debate between Calvinistic and Arminian evangelism. I use all three terms advisedly: Each essay is consciously written against Calvinism, often explicitly called that; each essay supports one variety or another of the Wesley-Arminian tradition; and the book has been written by evangelicals and for evangelicals.

After an introduction by the editor, who has recently moved from Regent College to McMaster Divinity College, Vernon Grounds writes the first chapter, “God’s Universal Salvific Grace.” He argues that grace is universal but, halting at universalism, concludes that grace “depends for its actualization on a believing response.” In the second chapter Donald M. Lake, under the title “He Died for All: The Universal Dimensions of the Atonement,” argues that Christ has paid for every man’s sins by his atonement. Therefore no one is condemned because of his sins, but only for the individual sin of rejecting the Lord Jesus Christ as Savior. Of course, to discuss the extent (thoughtful Calvinists might well prefer “intent”) of the atonement raises the question of election. Jack W. Cottrell discusses this in chapter three, and his well-known view is adequately summed up by the title, “Conditional Election.” William G. MacDonald and Pinnock follow that up with two chapters that stress, in different ways, the personhood of God: The former is primarily concerned with the significance of the coming of the Spirit into an individual and the latter with the manifestation of responsible freedom in the flow of Biblical history. David Clines and I. Howard Marshall survey predestination in the OT and NT respectively; and then Grant Osborne writes two chapters, the first dealing with “Soteriology in the Epistle to the Hebrews” and the second providing some “Exegetical Notes on Calvinist Texts.” The tenth chapter is an attempt by James D. Strauss to deal with Romans 9. The final three chapters (11-13), written by A. Skevington Wood, Donald M. Lake and James D. Strauss, deal respectively with aspects of the theology of John Wesley, Jacob Arminius and Jonathan Edwards.

This book will be widely read and influential. It presents much thoughtful material in an informed way. However, restricting my comments to the first ten chapters, I think that several criticisms should be raised.

First, the fact that the symposium is out to present a particular viewpoint has meant that some of the essays are very slanted. Of course, there is a place for strongly held positions and powerfully worded debate. But this means scoring points without ever convincing thoughtful opponents. The reader does not sense, in most of these essays, an effort to be as careful and as scrupulously
open to the force of opposing arguments as one might wish. That is not necessarily a fault, but it does describe the book as it is. The essay by Pinnock himself, for instance, is no doubt accurate in what it describes of human responsibility in the ebb and flow of Biblical history; but its conclusions may be premature. Methodologically it is similar to G. H. Clark's *Biblical Predestination*, even if the conclusions are radically different: Clark begins with all the passages that support divine sovereignty, constructs his system, and filters other evidence through the system, while Pinnock begins by describing the give and take of Biblical history, erects certain propositions, and then filters other evidence through his newly established network.

Second, whereas the contributors demonstrate that Reformed theologians are frequently guilty of explaining away various texts, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the same procedure is utilized by the contributors themselves, especially when they try to deal with election. "It takes an exegetical ingenuity which is something other than a learned virtuosity to evacuate these texts of their obvious meaning," one contributor writes, referring to Reformed attempts to deal with such passages as Jn 3:16; 2 Pet 3:9; 1 Jn 2:2. But perhaps I may be pardoned for detecting the same ingenuity when Cottrell deals with Eph 1:2 ff. or Strauss wrestles with Rom 9. Does election really refer to God's purposes for those who have become believers by their own volition? Do Eph 1:5 and Jn 6:37 actually say that? If men are condemned only for the single sin of rejecting Jesus, why the lengthy Pauline lists of sins that exclude a man from the kingdom?

Third, Karl Barth's view of election is really not defensible, despite its popularity. Barth holds that Eph 1:4 is the kernel of the Biblical presentation of election: God has chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world. Because Christ is both God and man, he is simultaneously the subject and the object of election. The election is self-election, self-determination, on the part of God: God has chosen for men. All men are chosen in Christ, and therefore tremendous issues hinge on their belief. This either means absolute universalism or the hesitant admission that some may opt out. By way of rebuttal, I note first of all that the "us" of Eph 1:4 refers to believers, not to all men: Cf. 1:1; 2:3 ff.; 4:7, 17. Nor does the NT conceive of judgment only in the way of which Barth writes. Over and above the judgment Christ received there is the judgment of all individuals not in Christ. For further criticism, cf. K. Stendahl, *The Root of the Vine*, pp. 67 ff.; G. C. Berkouwer, *Divine Election*, pp. 154-162. The authors in this symposium do not espouse Barth's view, but at least two argue that his approach is a viable alternative to traditional Reformed structures.

Fourth, the repeated claim that grace is not weakened by the Arminian position will not stand close scrutiny. Lake offers us the model of a judge who condemns a man and offers him a pardon. The man must accept it but, Lake argues, accepting it can scarcely be thought of as meritorious work, a work that makes the man deserving of salvation. "Calvin and later Calvinists," he writes, "never seem to be able to see this fundamental distinction unfortunately!" But his model, to be precise, needs to picture the judge offering pardon to all people, all of whom are guilty but only some of whom accept the proffered pardon. These may then legitimately boast that the only distinction between themselves and their condemned peers is that they accepted the pardon. This may or may not be an accurate reflection of the Biblical pattern; but it certainly affects the concept of grace, for it is a legitimate boast.

Fifth, several of the writers are more aware of the weakness in the logic of their Reformed brothers than in their own. It is true that distinctions between God's prescriptive will and God's decreed will are dangerous, because it appears that God is playing games.
But distinctions between God's prescriptive will and his permissive will, favored by Arminians, are no less dangerous. If a sovereign God permits something evil that his foreknowledge tells him will come to pass, how does this permission differ from decree? If the answer is in terms of preserving the freedom of his creatures so that their love for him may be genuine, then how will God's people be infallibly preserved in the new heavens and the new earth? Will they be able to sin there? The Scriptures seem to answer negatively. But if men are preserved there, is their freedom so eliminated that they do not really love God? And if instead they are preserved, and the genuineness of their love is also preserved, then why could not God have established the universe like that in the first place? I ask these questions, not because I have easy answers, but simply to demonstrate that rigorous cross-examination makes some of the contributors appear less convincing. A lot of old ground is churned up in this book, but it will not be clear to all readers that new (or true!) solutions are being propounded.

Sixth, I confess to disappointment that no attempt was made to survey the intertestamental literature. My own study has prompted me to arrive at conclusions that initially surprised me (and which I hope to publish in due course). In general God becomes increasingly sovereign and transcendent, but at the expense of full-orbed personality. Nevertheless, with the exception of the Dead Sea covenanters, there is a tendency toward merit theology and a formulated doctrine of free will. I am persuaded that this observation is important and that at least some of the NT is reacting against this strange mixture.

Having said so many negative things, I nevertheless welcome this book. I learned much by it and was refreshed by the emphasis on God's personality, defended in particular by MacDonald and Pinnock. Certainly decrateral theology has become too rigid and scholastic in many quarters. And, of course, not all of my criticisms apply to each author. I think the best three essays, in terms of precision, are those by Clines, Marshall, and the first essay by Osborne, even if I cannot share all their conclusions. And I am sure that Marshall is right when he insists that at least part of the problem in trying to understand the relation between divine sovereignty and human responsibility is traceable to the limitations of human language and comprehension when it comes to describing a personal, infinite, transcendent God.

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*More Than Man,* the title of his study in Christology, indicates the basic premise that guides Aldwinckle's thinking at every stage. If Jesus were only a man, even an eminent man, then we would have no problem—and no Christology. The problem arises whenever we choose to see Jesus as in some sense a unique revelation of God. The early Church concluded that Jesus Christ was "true God and true man." But many contemporary thinkers are uncomfortable with that classic expression of Christ's person. Still it is impossible, in Aldwinckle's opinion, to speak of Jesus of Nazareth in any significant sense without some kind of Christological dogma. If we choose to discard the expression adopted by the early Church, we must seek an alternative way of articulating our basic religious intuition that Jesus is, in fact, more than man. The effort to speak of the uniqueness of Jesus without that premise is, he argues, a dead-end road.

Aldwinckle is willing to recognize that our twentieth-century context may demand that we take a different approach than the early Church did. Their presup-
positions about God and perhaps about a pre-existent Logos led them to ask, "How can God become man?"—a Christology from above. Many today, even within the Church, assume that Jesus was a man but ask, "How is it possible for a man to be God?" Consequently we must develop a Christology from below, a Christology that begins with the humanity of Christ and gives that concept its full due. Baillie's phrase, "no more docetism," recurs throughout the book like a chorus to remind the reader of that premise.

The Bible uses three models to speak of Christ: pre-existence, descent and ascent, and kenosis or divine self-limitation. Aldwinckle argues that we must retain all three of these models. His comments regarding the third model may be of special interest to readers of this Journal: "If the direct and immediate activity and presence of God is asserted to be in Jesus in a manner absolutely unique and without parallel, it is still difficult to see how this could be without some kind of kenosis or self-limitation on the part of God. . . . Whatever the logical and semantic problems involved in the various doctrines of kenosis elaborated from Thomasius in the nineteenth century to Mackintosh, Quick, and, at the radical extreme, Altizer, in the twentieth century, we must frankly confess that some self-limitation of God in His act of incarnation in Jesus Christ seems to be required both by Scripture and reason. The difficulties of ascribing omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence to Jesus of Nazareth are so enormous that no satisfactory doctrine of the Incarnation can be built on this basis. Fortunately, Scripture itself does not lend it any convincing support" (pp. 87-88).

The last two sentences are a bit problematic. They do not, presumably, refer to Jesus' life prior to the resurrection; Jesus was certainly not omnipresent at that time. But if Aldwinckle was thinking of the broader questions raised by Lutheran theology, then the point needed a more thorough development and defense. Furthermore, although Aldwinckle utilizes an extensive literature in his book, Berkouwer's study on The Person of Christ is not mentioned in the text. Given Berkouwer's repudiation of any variety of kenosis Christology, I find that omission serious.

In his chapter entitled "Jesus or Gotama?" Aldwinckle continues his argument that Jesus, rightly understood, is unique. He points out that the thinking of these two teachers regarding the nature of the ultimate, the concept of salvation, and the nature and cause of evil cannot be reconciled. This is not to denigrate the Buddha; it is merely a recognition that the thought worlds of these two persons are logically incompatible.

Aldwinckle's book is, from a literary point of view, unsuccessful. It contains long, rambling sections that review and interact with much of the recent literature on the Christological issue. The author has obviously done a tremendous amount of reading and thought on the subject, but his material is not usefully presented here. For example, the first chapter concludes with six pages in reply to an article by Maurice Wiles. His comments may be relevant in a general sort of way, but they were certainly not integrated into the argument of the book. At the end of chap. 6, Aldwinckle mentions that he did not see Robinson's The Human Face of God until after that particular chapter had been written. But then he devotes eight pages to reviewing Robinson's book in chap. 8. If the book deserved that kind of attention, then one must wonder why the author did not redraft the earlier chapter. On p. 152, the author mentions a subject that is not worth pursuing and then devotes a page to pursuing it. These examples are, unfortunately, typical of the book. The unassimilated and extraneous material made the book difficult reading and tended to eclipse the author's argument.

Aldwinckle is committed to articulating a Christology that takes seriously both the deity and the humanity of Jesus Christ and that will also be intelligible
to a twentieth-century reader. It is unfortunate that literary problems obscured his arguments and ideas.

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HISTORICAL THEOLOGY


Bauch, a Protestant pastor in Oberentfelden/Aargau, Switzerland, approaches his subject with typical Teutonic thoroughness. Having pared down his doctoral dissertation (Mainz) to the bare bones, the author creates an immediate impression of complex organization and abundant documentation.

In discussing the pneumatology of early Pietism, Bauch considers in each chapter both the general work of the Holy Spirit in providential control over history and also the specific role of the Spirit in the Church. The author's primary focus falls on Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687-1752), the Württemberg Bible commentator who is remembered for his Gnomon novi testamenti (1742) and somewhat risky eschatology. The scholarly monograph under consideration contains four sections. The first two trace the influence of C. Vitrinia (1659-1722) and P. Spener (1635-1705) on the thought and theology of Bengel. Following an extensive discussion of Bengel, Bauch develops the historical and philosophical connections between Bengel and G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831).

Reaching back into seventeenth-century Dutch Pietism, Bauch discerns the roots of Bengel's thought in the pneumatology of Vitrinia. Vitrinia stood firmly in the line of federal theology as exemplified by J. Cocceius (1603-1669) and H. Witsius, who both taught Vitrinia and preceded him as professor of theology at Franeker. Vitrinia stressed the work of the Holy Spirit throughout human history. Although Cocceius had divided history into seven periods, Vitrinia reduced the number to four: (1) Diluvium (creation to flood), (2) Exodus (flood to exodus), (3) Incarnation (capture of Canaan to first advent of Christ), and (4) Parousia (earthly ministry of Christ to second advent).

Moving on to Spener, Bauch dwells on the connection between him and the Reformed thinkers. During his student years young Spener read "with enthusiasm" the writings of H. Grotius. Spener's thinking embraced two prominent concepts: justification and chiliast. The Holy Spirit is, in his view, the initiator of both repentance and faith, which lead to justification. The millennium is the goal toward which the history of Israel and the Church inexorably moves. Spener sought to rehabilitate the concept of a millennial hope, a teaching that had been brought into disrepute during the Reformation by association with left-wing radicals.

In Bengel's thought Vitrinia's concept of divine providence in history and Spener's emphasis on justification are wed together. The Holy Spirit reveals God in the pages of Holy Writ, but he also continues to provide revelation beyond the close of the canon. This refers not to any extra-biblical development of doctrine, but solely to exegetical enlightenment. Bengel was also preoccupied with the providential working of God in human history and calculated that the second advent would dawn in 1836. The Holy Spirit was the active, governing force by which God steers human history. The visible Church was simply an "interim church," out of which will emerge the "pure church" of true believers during the millennium. In his ecclesiology Bengel seemed to concur with the collegia pietatis of Spener. In private, however, Bengel was infected by a
universalistic view of soteriology, a chronic ailment in the Pietism of Württemberg. This was to him the logical implication of the Holy Spirit’s work in history. His view of inspiration was close to verbal inspiration, although he hastened to add that the Holy Spirit allowed for differences in the style of Biblical penmen. True to Lutheran orthodoxy, Bengel held that the living Lord was present “in, with and under” the sacramental elements (i.e., consubstantiation).

In a final section Bauch refers to the elements Hegel drew from Württemberg Pietism. The link between Bengel and Hegel is found in the Tübingen Stift school, where Hegel was a student (1788-93) and studied the writings of C. G. Storr, whose father had learned at the feet of Bengel. From the pietists Hegel absorbed the idea of reconciliation. It is the dynamic of the Spirit that reconciles cold, hard realism and subjective idealism. In one absolute Spirit there is thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In fact, God is identified with the dialectic method. The absolute Spirit, however, finds complete realization within history. Gone is the eschatological hope of Vitrinja, Spener and Bengel.

On balance, Bauch’s book commends itself to both theologians and ecclesiastical historians. The excellent example of German scholarship is precise both in its scope and expression. Bibliographical documentation includes both the pertinent primary sources and complementary secondary material. Its contribution to historiography lies in the exposure of Calvinistic roots for south German Pietism. While emphasizing the cosmology of the pietists, there is ample attention devoted to the element of personal piety that Spener, Franke and Bengel introduced into German Protestantism. Any serious student of continental Pietism will wish to add Bauch’s work to his library.

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APOLOGETICS


Morris sets forth the primary assumptions of Schaeffer’s methodology: (1) Everyone has presuppositions, defined as assumed ideas or concepts that are the foundation of one’s view of the world and of his criterion of meaningfulness or judgment; (2) Christian presuppositions correspond with the internal world of man’s complexity; (3) no non-Christian can be consistent with the logic of his presuppositions or, if he is consistent, he must be an atheist in religion (metaphysics), an irrationalist in philosophy (epistemology), and completely amoral (ethics). Schaeffer then uses what Morris claims is a form of the teleological argument to show both the truthfulness of the Christian claims and to challenge presuppositions alien to the Christian world-and-life view. He does this by calling attention to the way the universe is and the structures of human life within it, and that the hypothesis or presupposition with the greatest explanatory power is the truth.

Morris takes exception to Schaeffer on two counts. First, the reductio ad absurdum argument form frequently used by Schaeffer is inadequate unless Schaeffer is sure there are no other alternatives. Secondly, by failing to distinguish between contraries and contradictories Schaeffer does not succeed in demonstrating the necessity of Christianity as he claims, though he does move in the direction of establishing its possibility.

Morris demonstrates his contentions by examining Schaeffer’s argument in regard to metaphysics. He shows that Schaeffer uses an argument to establish a theism basic to Islam and Judaism as well as Christianity, but goes beyond
his argument to claim only the truthfulness of the latter. Schaeffer does not end there, however, but seems to imply the necessity of such a personal God from an inductive argument, as well as the doctrines of infinity and Trinity, which may be functional postulates for a Christian but are not the logical extension of the teleological argument. Morris concludes, therefore, that "the force with which he presents the orthodox Christian presupposition of a personal-infinite God as exclusively adequate in providing 'the only answer to the metaphysical problem of existence' is clearly unwarranted by his arguments" (p. 39).

Morris treats Schaeffer's epistemological and ethical arguments extensively and thoroughly, as well as honestly. He succinctly points out Schaeffer's danger, as well as that of perhaps all presuppositionalists, of attacking the presence of non-logical moves in a reasoning process that provokes problems of differentiating between fantasy and reality, since faith starting-points of all epistemologies have a non-logical element; thus, if present in all knowledge frameworks, such a criticism is not damaging to any one in particular. In similar fashion to his metaphysical argument, Schaeffer is found jumping the logical gap between possibility to necessary actuality. That is, Schaeffer commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent when he argues that "if Christianity is true, there are answers; there are answers; therefore Christianity is true." Schaeffer could avoid this criticism, however, by inverting the first premise, which in fact may be his actual methodology. But Morris is correct when he claims Schaeffer moves too easily from "Christianity is reasonable" to "Christianity is the only true world-view." Morris believes Schaeffer is particularly guilty of this in regard to the moral argument. In fact, this argument is seen as the weakest of the three (pp. 66, 72, 74).

Perhaps the key criticism of Schaeffer is found in Morris' claim that Schaeffer is cold and impersonal, that he expects the law of non-contradiction to move man from unbelief to belief in a rather mechanical manner. Or, as Morris states it: "The weakness of his apologetic is that he fails to recognize that predispositions as well as presuppositions must be taken into account; that the transition from one basic interpretative framework or set of presuppositions to another involves an irreversible process composed of personal, as well as propositional or formal elements." While this may seem to be the case from the form of argumentation in some if not all of Schaeffer's writings, I doubt that many who have been to L'Abri would agree.

Morris offers a helpful analysis of apologetic justification in the final three chapters. He does not differ greatly from Schaeffer, except that he is fully aware that possibility does not equal actuality and that inductive arguments do not provide necessity but probability. In Morris' own words, "Christian faith can be described in the language of confirmation theory by a model of cumulative probabilities" (p. 95). In a rather Carnellian fashion, Morris sees apologetic endeavor as pre-evangelism much like Schaeffer, except that belief is the result of a logically and evidentially justified process that culminates in the nonlogical step that goes beyond the evidence, justified however by the direction of the evidence and the witnessing to truth by the Holy Spirit that leads to saving knowledge. Perhaps ultimately the debate between Morris and Schaeffer is similar to, if not as distinctive as, the one between Carnell and Van Til. Whether this be the case or not, Morris has very constructively analyzed the apologetics of Francis Schaeffer and has succinctly elucidated the philosophical problems related to it. Schaeffer may still be regarded as being a valuable contributor to Christian apologetics, both polemically and constructively, but Morris' corrections must also be taken into consideration if we are to be truly honest before a "crooked and perverse generation."

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Lewis has done a masterful job in presenting the various apologetic approaches and frameworks of contemporary evangelical apologists. Each is examined as to his logical starting point, common ground or points of contact with non-Christians, the criterion of truth, the role of reason, and the basis of faith in God as revealed in Christ and the Bible. Five of the six approaches thus outlined and evaluated are the pure empiricism of J. Oliver Buswell, the rationalistic deductivism of Gordon Clark, the mediating rational empiricism à la Kant of Stuart Hackett, the revelational authoritarianism/pre-suppositionalism of Cornelius Van Til, and the experiential mysticism of Earl E. Barrett. While each of these systems seems to prefer an either/or in methodology, Lewis prefers the both/and evident in the verification approach (hypothesis testing) of Edward Carnell, to whom he devotes four chapters, covering Carnell's orientation to facts, values, psychology and ethics—that is, both inner and outer experience is most adequately and consistently explained on the basis of Christianity. (It is interesting to note that Carnell was Lewis' teacher in his first exposure to philosophical apologetics.)

Lewis' analysis and critiques are very helpful to a budding apologist. His elucidation and exposition is always clear and insightful. The introductory chapter distinctively delineates that the primary task of apologetics is the presentation and defense of the historical/revelatory truth claims of Christianity. The summary chapter interrelates the various approaches sharply, making one choose one or the other, or draw rather eclectically from any number of possible combinations. The appendix synoptically presents other less systematic or exhaustive apologists such as Schaeffer, Montgomery, Ramm, Pinnock, Geisler, Mavrodes, Holmes, McDowell, and the ever-popular C. S. Lewis.

All in all, the reading and studying of this book has been very helpful to this reviewer. While not perhaps ideal as a textbook, it is indispensable for all evangelicals interested in defending, integrating and communicating their faith in the living Lord of history.

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PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION


Ludwig Wittgenstein's name has been associated with the Vienna Circle, and even his later philosophy has been dubbed by some as "therapeutic positivism." One might wonder if, given this reputation, he said anything significant about religious belief at all. Recently, however, a new picture of Wittgenstein has emerged that shows that the positivistic anti-metaphysical interpretation is a misunderstanding. Hudson's book makes full use of this new material to provide external evidence for Wittgenstein's favorable attitude toward religious belief. Indeed, one of the values of the book is that it contains a wealth of useful biographical detail about Wittgenstein and his relation to religion.

Hudson has a competent exposition of Wittgenstein's earlier and later philosophy along with a valuable chapter on his relation to verificationism. Wittgenstein's philosophy is of interest to contemporary philosophers of religion, however, because it has been used to protect religious language from the charge that it is meaningless or unintelligible. The tack has been to construe religious language
as a "language game" with its own internal criteria for truth, coherence and justification. This position has been called "Wittgensteinian fideism." Hudson himself has held this position, yet here he seems anxious to avoid it. But does he?

Hudson makes a number of moves away from fideism. He argues that religious language is not so logically distinct from ordinary discourse that it is unintelligible. And he further argues that "belief in" implies "belief that," i.e., that it is propositional and in some sense constative. But on the crucial question of whether a believer can contradict an unbeliever, he says the "unbeliever is someone who rejects the whole religious 'form of life' rather than someone who can participate in it to the extent of calling a believer's assertions false" (p. 193). This remark constitutes a reinstatement of fideism because it makes it impossible for an unbeliever to contradict a believer's assertions. On this account, an unbeliever can contradict a believer only if he shares his "form of life"; but if he shares his "form of life" he would not (perhaps could not) declare its constitutive propositions to be false. This "Catch-22" clause vitiates an otherwise worthwhile attempt to employ Wittgenstein’s philosophy in a non-fideistic approach to religious belief.

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Professor Herman Dooyeweerd, who taught legal philosophy, encyclopedia of law and medieval Dutch law at the Free University of Amsterdam from 1926 until his retirement in 1965, is generally regarded as the most representative figure of the so-called Amsterdam philosophy or "philosophy of the cosmonomic idea." In fact, he has contributed to modern philosophy a radically critical Christian philosophy developed in the line of Calvin’s religious starting-point, characterized by his idea of the divine order of the world or Christian cosmonomic idea. At the beginning of his four-volume major work *(A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* [Amsterdam: H. J. Paris; Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1953]) he warned concerning the difficulty of his own philosophy, and everyone who has undertaken "to follow step by step its turns of thought" *(op. cit., p. ix)* has experienced how relevant and true this warning is and cannot look at a popularization of his philosophy without a great deal of suspicion and bias. Nevertheless, those who appreciate Dooyeweerd and would like to see his main insights available to non-philosophers have looked forward to an adequate popularization.

For far too long, indeed, this Christian holistic philosophy has remained enigmatic to those who do not read Dutch and lack adequate philosophical knowledge. Even the above-mentioned translation of Dooyeweerd’s work into English (which leaves a good deal to be desired) and the introductions to his thought written by J. M. Spier *(An Introduction to Christian Philosophy* [Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1954]), William Young *(Toward a Reformed Philosophy* [Grand Rapids: Piet Hein, 1952]), and Ronald H. Nash *(Dooyeweerd and the Amsterdam Philosophy* [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962]), although valuable, have not overcome the unintentional quarantine of this philosophy.

In my judgment, Kalsbeek has succeeded in presenting a popular, clear and lucid presentation of the "philosophy of the cosmonomic idea." The author, a retired schoolteacher, has used his pedagogical experience to present in a pro-
gressive order the contours of this Christian philosophy. Through thirty-eight brief chapters he makes intelligible Dooyeweerd’s main notions, from the simplest to the most complex—religious ground motives, immanence and transcendence, modal aspects and sphere-sovereignty, analogies and antinomies, individuality structures, and enkapis. In a very simple fashion, all these categories are related to epistemology, anthropology, and sociology, with many cross references.

Kalsbeek, obviously, cannot cover all of the problems discussed by this philosophy. Thus some important distinctions which Dooyeweerd makes, e.g. between idea and concept, are not discussed. Furthermore, he presents only the position Dooyeweerd reached at a certain stage of his evolution without tracing fully the development of his thought. Finally, the author makes some superficial and disappointing references to important thinkers and events. For example, concerning Karl Barth he says only that he denied “God’s revelation in creation” (p. 235)—but what about Barth’s later work?—and he argues that United States military forces attempted to defend “human freedom . . . in the Vietnam conflict” (p. 267).

To the original edition, which appeared in the Netherlands in 1970, the editors have added some valuable features. First of all Bernard Zylstra, professor of political theory at the Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto, has provided an introduction (pp. 14-33) which locates Dooyeweerd’s work in the context of the Dutch political, theological and philosophical situation and indicates how he has influenced contemporary Christian scholarship in different fields. Secondly, a very full bibliography (pp. 307-345) of English, French and German titles by Dooyeweerd and those sympathetic with his viewpoint gives an impressive idea of that influence. The bibliography covers also Dooyeweerd’s most important precursors: Groen van Prinsterer, Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck. And last but not least, Albert M. Wolters, another professor at the Toronto ICS, has prepared a very useful glossary of terms (pp. 346-354).

Kalsbeek’s work could help the philosophia christiana of Dooyeweerd to attain a wider public and thus to stimulate and fructify scholarship in every aspect of study. Those of us who learn from Dooyeweerd today will have to keep on working philosophically, trying to relate our thought to the most relevant issues of our time as Dooyeweerd did to those of his time (i.e., phenomenology and neo-Kantianism), bearing in mind that to be really Christian every Christian philosophy semper reformanda est.

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CHRISTIAN ETHICS


Evangelicals have recently re-awakened to the issue of social ethics. Each of these books contributes to this discussion, but each approaches different areas of the field from differing viewpoints.

Jim Wallis, the editor of *Sojourners,* and Bob Goudzwaard, professor of economics at the Free University in Amsterdam, provide two evangelical contributions from differing perspectives. Wallis writes from an Anabaptist point
of view. He makes a perceptive analysis of the moral chaos in the present American economic and political system, pointing out why secular "isms" provide no answer. Yet because he sees all political systems dominated by demonic "principalities and powers" (here his debt to J. H. Yoder and H. Berkhof is clearly acknowledged), he has little hope for any ultimate righteousness in those systems, although the Church through its prophetic utterance may influence the State toward righteousness in some limited cases. Wallis' hope, however, is that the Church will live as the seed of the new order within the old, as the place where the whole world can see the righteousness of Christ demonstrated in a new, radically-Christian, socially-concerned, suffering community.

Goudzwaard writes from a Reformed perspective. He focuses on the economic system, drawing examples freely from American as well as European institutions and studies. Thus he has a more limited aim than Wallis, who analyzes the whole Church-State interface. Goudzwaard also differs from Wallis in that he looks to the Church to take an active role in influencing political structures toward Christian forms. This is needed because his moral analysis of the present economic order indicates its bankruptcy. As a contribution toward a new Christian economic order, he discusses a Christian view of income distribution. While he does not have an over-optimistic concept of what Christians can accomplish, he does believe that some Christianization of the social order is not only desirable but also necessary to avoid catastrophe.

Bennett, formerly professor at Union Theological Seminary of New York and presently visiting professor at the Pacific School of Religion, adds a "mainline" contribution to this ethical discussion in the tradition of Niebuhr and his successors. He, like Wallis (whose journal he admires but whose evangelicalism he does not understand), tries to give a relatively complete overview of Christian social ethics. In doing so he gives helpful, moderate responses on a number of issues, including theologies of liberation. He is clearly not given to wild theorizing or to spouting rhetoric. Yet while his depth of coverage and his sober analysis will be challenging to evangelicals, the latter will be uncomfortable with some of his statements about Scripture, despite the fact that he gives some useful perspectives on its application.

In contrast to Bennett, *Lifeboat Ethics* is a symposium aimed at the specific issue of world hunger. The first seven essays (by G. R. Lucas, Jr., S. W. Hinds, J. Fletcher, H. T. Engelhardt, Jr., W. Harrelson, J. Sellers and G. Hardin) address the issue of how food and aid policy should be shaped. Given a growing population and limited food resources, how should it be distributed? Should relief be tied to control of population growth? How do the concepts of triage and "lifeboat ethics" apply? Who are the hopeless cases to be sacrificed for the good of the whole? Can relief ever be unkind and even immoral by allowing the population to grow artificially large? These issues are discussed from a variety of perspectives. D. W. Schriver, Jr., and P. Verghese add two responses to the discussion to put it into perspective by questioning some basic presuppositions of the authors: Could not a really new social order save everyone? Is it not incongruous for super-well-fed Americans to be talking about "lifeboat ethics"? Thus the book is certainly significant, although only Harrelson's "Famine in the Perspective of Biblical Judgments and Promises" deals specifically with Biblical material. It ought to be well studied by thoughtful evangelicals.

Each of these books has its own audience and purposes. Wallis adds little to what he has already published in *Sojourners*, although despite the book's lack of specifics and detailed discussion it is helpful to have his thought gathered into one volume. Bennett also suffers like Wallis in having to reduce detail to cover a large field, but despite his failure to be bound by Scripture he gives many valuable insights into ethical problems. Goudzwaard gets away with his
few pages because he focuses on only one issue, economics, a field he knows very well. The work is the most readable of the four, but because it is an adaptation of radio talks it lacks the detail and unity (especially in the first two essays) that a book written from scratch would have. Still it is a "must" for thinking businessmen and pastors. Finally Lifeboat Ethics, centering as it does on a specific issue of immediate contemporary concern, will be basic reading for classes in ethics and foreign policy. It is only regrettable that no evangelicals were involved in this dialogue.

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BOOK NOTES

C. S. Lewis once remarked that one should read two old books for every one new book. If this is interpreted as a general principle rather than an ironclad rule it is very good advice, especially in theology. And it is interesting to note that many of the best theological books that have been written down through the centuries continue to stay in print. Recent reprints of older theological writings include The Works of Jonathan Edwards (2 vols., Banner of Truth, 1894 pp., $37.95; first published in 1834), who is often regarded as the most original mind in colonial America; Finney's Systematic Theology (Bethany Fellowship, 455 pp., $4.95 paper abridged edition of work originally published in 1846-47) and The Heart of Truth (Bethany Fellowship, 248 pp., $3.50 paper reprint of Skeletons of a Course of Theological Lectures, 1840) by Charles G. Finney, one of the great evangelical leaders in America during the last century; and Studies in Theology (Baker, 302 pp., $3.95 paper) by James Denney, the famous Scottish theologian of the generation following Finney. Each of these men of God has done much to influence the evangelical Church, and each still has much to teach it. As David Wells points out in his preface to the Denney volume, the republication of ancient volumes is no substitute for the hard theological work that contemporary evangelicals ought to be doing; however, these theologians represent our heritage and may even provide models for the present day.

W. W. G.


This is a reprint of the 1910 edition of Swete's famous work, enhanced by an introduction from the pen of R. Nicole on Swete's life and writings. Though scholarly research on the Holy Spirit has advanced markedly since Swete's day, this book is still a useful survey of the NT references to the Holy Spirit.

For those not familiar with the book, Parts I and II form a "running commentary" on the NT references to the Spirit. Part III is a "Survey of the New Testament Doctrine of the Holy Spirit": The Spirit of God, the Spirit of
Jesus Christ, the Spirit in the Church, the Spirit and the Ministry, the Spirit and the Written Word, the Spirit and the Personal Life, and the Spirit and the Life to Come. There follows an appendix with nineteen "Additional Notes" on subjects familiar and not so familiar, such as "The Dove as a Symbol of the Holy Spirit," "The Holy Spirit in Jewish Apocalyptic Writings," and "The Holy Spirit in Some Early Christian Uncanonical Gospels, Acts and Apocalypses." Indices complete the volume, dealing with NT references, Greek words, and subjects treated in the book.

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One word, continuity, could well summarize what Schaeffer says concerning the Book of Joshua. The importance of Joshua is that "it stands as a bridge, a link between the Pentateuch (the writings of Moses) and the rest of the Scripture" (p. 9). "The rest of the Bible, beginning with Joshua, stands in total continuity with the Pentateuch" (p. 156). Joshua regarded the Pentateuch as normative and acted on the basis of it in the conquest of the land.

This continuity is based on what Schaeffer calls "Three Changeless Factors": the written Book (pp. 31-36), the power of God (pp. 37-40), and the supernatural leader (pp. 40-42). "These continuities flow from the Pentateuch through the rest of the Old Testament into the New Testament and down through history to us" (p. 43).

Joshua is used as the springboard for modern applications. Each chapter draws lessons from major events and characters in Joshua that can be applied today. This is possible because there is continuity between then and now; the God who acted then is the same God now and has not changed his ways of dealing with man.

Schaeffer's extensive use of Scriptural quotations facilitates reading because it puts at hand the passages that he is discussing. It is surprising that the KJV is used when a good modern translation could have been employed, but then maybe that has something to do with continuity!

Amidst the sound of other voices, Schaeffer sounds a refreshing change. The concept of continuity, although not popular in OT critical studies, deserves further consideration. This study will be of interest to students, pastors and laymen alike.

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This study by the Boldreys first appeared in 1972 in a periodical called Trinity Studies and is now available in book form augmented by an annotated bibliography provided by Donald Dayton. I have always regarded it as the best scholarly defense of Biblical feminism that exists. So much of the literature on both sides of the question is simple and practical, too little of it grapples with scholarly exegesis. Here is a defense of feminism that is neither light nor liberal. By its not being liberal, I mean to say that the Boldreys do not believe they have to eliminate anything of what the apostle wrote to make their case. That is part of what makes it so fine. The Boldreys offer us feminism under the infallibility
of the Bible. Since I am one of the many who demand their feminism on these terms, I am delighted and grateful to them. Several years ago I urged the authors to make the work available in book form, and now I am pleased to see it produced for the wider readership it deserves. Having read widely in the field of the Bible and the role of women, I would put this down as one of the very best studies there is.

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This slight paperback is not to be compared with Ned B. Stonehouse's great biography on Machen. The writer sets down for us in brief chapters whatever he can remember about the life and thought of that great Princetonian scholar and warrior. The anecdotes range all the way from the important to the trivial. Not many readers will care much for the route Machen took on the way to class, the stunts he pulled, or his proficiency at checkers. The zeal to perpetuate knowledge of such details borders on hagiography. Still, there are some interesting tidbits to be gained about Machen's relationships with people like B. B. Warfield and even Henry P. Van Dusen.

The book is characterized by strong nostalgia, remembering the good old days in old Princeton when Turretin's theology was king. I suppose the book will only appeal to a narrow stream of readers since only a few evangelicals today are likely to regret the passing of that era. For some reason Woolley takes the occasion of this booklet to announce many views of his own, not even disguised as Machen's, but presumably (who can say?) in the Machen spirit and tradition. I cannot say it is a book that inspires me much about the good things God has for his Church in the future. Machen's brand of theological polemic petered out in the petty schisms of the 1930's and 1940's—not a pretty picture—and that suggests to me that we should strike out in some new and better directions. For Machen, admiration and respect; but uncritical reverence—never.

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BOOKS RECEIVED


Bloesch, Donald G. Jesus Is Victor! Nashville: Abingdon, 1976, 176 pp., $5.95 paper.


Van der Hoeven, Johan. *Karl Marx, the Roots of His Thought*. Toronto: Wedge, 1976, 110 pp., $6.95 paper.


Wakatama, Pius. *Independence for the Third World Church*. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1976, 120 pp., $2.95 paper.
