BOOK REVIEWS


Calvin’s previously unpublished treatise, Concerning Scandals (dated July 10, 1550, Calvin’s forty-first birthday), is dedicated with love to his friend Laurent de Normandie, “that estimable man of many gifts.” A comprehensive argument is set forth to combat a variety of polemical obstacles to the new faith they were facing. Overall, readers are enjoined to plant firm roots in Christ and elude the snares of the ungodly. Their main help will be to rely on the grace of Christ (a sacred anchor), on their faith (a heavenly treasure) and on the secret virtue and wisdom of the Spirit. Nevertheless a handbook of argument interwoven with exhortation was necessary to complement activities of the Spirit in reviving the godly in the midst of strife. Perhaps his exhortations therein could be captured in the choice of two representatives: “Let us remember the precept of the Lord’s, that we must possess our souls in patience (Luke 21:19), until he himself perfects his power in our weakness (2 Cor 12:9),” and “unless our own softness hinders us, Christ alone suffices for overcoming any scandals whatever, since he lifts us above the world by his heavenly power” (50, 117).

He subdivides the scandals to be endured because of faith into three categories of practical problems. First, he observes that since the gospel declares the Son of God became mortal man, that we obtain life by his death, righteousness by his condemnation, and salvation by the curse he bore, the gospel will be greatly out of step with the outlook of men. Indeed, “because the gospel deprives men of all credit for wisdom, virtue, righteousness and leaves us with nothing but the utmost ignominy, it is of course inevitable that it causes offense” (13). This first category of scandals then is “intrinsic” to the very preaching of the gospel itself, which is foolishness to the wise, for even Christ can be a stone of stumbling and a rock of offense. Yet the gospel must continue to be preached with no exceptions placed in its way. In particular, “no disasters are to be feared so much as what I call a highly triumphal gospel, which would transport us to a state of elation” (48).

In his second category Calvin discusses troubles of various kinds. He scores the point that “it is difficult for men who are supremely confident in their own wisdom to allow themselves to be taught by Christ” (55). Therefore it should not be too unnatural for such to try to escape by means of long and labyrinthine ways from a serious awareness of God, perhaps through a showiness of religion or a vast chaos of ceremonies. Closer to home, the faults of men should not hold any back from acquiring steadfastness in Christ or cause weak souls to wander. But troubles are many: errors rooted in personal faults, the spread of atheistic views, sects and heresies, or the effects of pride, since “if the slightest opportunity of liberty presents itself the flesh always runs riot at once” (68). A wise warning in these matters is that faith will be exceedingly unstable if it gives way immediately at the downfall of men. When facing such faults, “we are disciplined in patience, the zeal of prayer is kindled, the pricks of difficulties cause us to walk cautiously and prudently, contempt for the world arises, and, along with the desire to depart, meditation on the life of heaven grows” (75). Rather than be disenchanted by dissections, like the great eucharistic divide, let the believer recover his courage because in the real world there is no trouble-free gospel.

The third category of scandals is “extrinsic”—i. e., they arise from insults that men unjustly turn against the gospel. Such insults work toward the subversion of ministers in the form of deviant teaching, and several teachers who are pamphleteering in areas in which they are not qualified are named so that “in the future no one may be deceived knowingly or willingly” (90). He challenges those who would preserve absurdities and unscriptural practice with Augustine’s dictum: “Christ does not give Himself the name Custom but Truth.” When some adversaries impudently pressed for miracles to confirm the new gospel they were “reduced to astonishment by them, that they may be forced at last to yield to God
speaking through us” (112). If such critics had forgotten the ancient miracles they can “gape at new ones” and be “dumbfounded at the open power of God” (113).

In the estimate of this reviewer, who reviews the work of the great man with some humility, Calvin’s tract of analysis and exhortation serves to provide a valuable insight into the various experiences with human nature that arose in his day from the proclamation of an uncompromised renascent gospel and its encounter with the powers of darkness. Here are the results of confrontation and resistance to change. Here is Calvin the pastoral warrior on behalf of God’s people, penetrating and persuasive. While only midway through his lifetime’s experiences of faith, the Reformer was able to provide a keen sketch of the underlying reasons for the persecution of believers and the misunderstanding of believers from those who pretend to believe. With sympathy for the weakness of the faithful he tries to show how this very weakness will be seized upon as a cause of offense by those who would rather not offend the world with a genuine commitment to Christ.

The book is a must for all students of Christian apologetics, and a debt of gratitude is due John Fraser for making this translation available. In that a culturally unadorned gospel will engender similar “scandals” today and in that arguments and excuses deployed by those outside of Christ today have not entirely vanished, Calvin’s defense of his faith and circumstances speaks to likeminded pilgrims four and a half centuries removed. That small gap of time is easily bridged—not by cultural relativism, but by some similar experience with God and men.

Paul Elbert
132 Holgate Drive, Leagrave, Luton, Beds., LU4 0XD, England


It is a delight to see the new generation of evangelical historians beginning to produce scholarly works, and if this is any indication of the quality we may expect, we have good reason to be encouraged. In it the three authors consciously strive to provide laypeople with enlightenment and instruction about the historical development of American Christianity and to show what the past has to say about the present role of evangelicalism. It is a timely subject since evangelicals have now become recognized as a distinct force in American life, and more and more demands are being placed upon them to provide answers for the pressing spiritual needs of individuals and the impending crises in society.

To do what they have attempted here involves considerable risk, because the topic is a vast one and the synthesis required to bring it into manageable proportions for the ordinary reader is inevitably vulnerable to scholarly attack at one point or another. Nevertheless they have defined their approach carefully and informed the reader as to what they chose to omit. Considering the breadth of the topic and the vast amount of material the authors had to sift through, the flaws in this fine book are remarkably few and quite inconsequential—listing Judge Harrold Carswell as a Southern Baptist leader when W. A. Criswell was obviously the person intended (p. 13), an incomplete sentence (p. 59), a slip-up in a book title (p. 244). Their command of the literature on American evangelicalism is impressive, although any reviewer could point out titles that fail to appear in their footnotes or bibliography. The book’s index is especially helpful.

The first section deals with evangelical theology and the life of the mind, focusing on such topics as the Puritan concept of covenant, the Great Awakening, the American Revolution, common views within the nineteenth-century theological mainstream, the challenges of modernity, the great flowering of systematic theology, fundamentalism, dispensationalism, holiness and pentecostal movements, the “new” evangelicalism, and the controversies over Biblical inspiration and inerrancy. The second part examines how revivalism, Americanization and separatism shaped the Church. Finally, the relationship of evangelicals to the American nation and their role in confronting societal ills are assessed.

The authors show that American evangelicals have been generally orthodox, professedly
Biblical and eagerly evangelistic, but the influence of their environment has made them activist, individualistic and down-to-earth. Each of these three distinctly American traits has had a positive and negative impact on evangelicalism. Activism was reflected in church growth, social reforms and the founding of innumerable schools and eleemosynary institutions, but this was at the cost of the virtues of contemplation, calm and reflective study, and long-term stability. Individualism fostered a high level of personal evangelism and piety, but it left institutionalized evil largely untouched. The down-to-earthness of evangelicalism enabled the spread of the simple gospel message, but theological profundity was sacrificed. Believers here have been tempted to replace faith in God with faith in country, but at the same time they have had almost unparalleled freedom to organize and worship as they please and to preach the gospel. America has not been utopia, but its contributions have been helpful as well as harmful. Every thoughtful Christian needs to be aware of the tensions that exist, and this book will be of real assistance to those who are trying to sort out the connections and develop a truly Biblical understanding of the place of Christianity in America.

Richard V. Pierard
Indiana State University, Terre Haute, IN 47809


Earle Cairns has made an important contribution to a discipline somewhat neglected by evangelical scholars. Subtitled “A Christian Approach to Historiography,” this volume is a condensation of the author’s course in historiography offered for many years at Wheaton College. To be sure, volumes have appeared in recent years highlighting the relationship between Christianity and history from the evangelical perspective (e.g., John W. Montgomery’s *The Shape of the Past* and the collection of essays edited by George Marsden and Frank Roberts under the title *A Christian View of History*?), but the significance of Cairns’ book lies in its comprehensiveness and simplicity of style. It will serve as an ideal introductory text for Christian students who want an aid in writing history as well as interpreting it.

Cairns divides his treatment into three basic parts. The first deals with history as science and emphasizes methodology. Employing Luke’s prologue to his gospel as a paradigm for accurate historical narration, he notes the classification of materials used in historical research and the character of the criticism the historian will apply to them. The second part of the book, and the most substantial, concerns history as philosophy. Here Cairns surveys the more prominent historians (ancient, medieval and modern) and approaches to the philosophy of history. It is in this context that the author proposes a “contemporary and Christian” view of history. While stressing the Christian historian’s commitment to honest, objective assessment of data, Cairns reminds us that history is ultimately under the control of God—that it is, in point of fact, linear rather than cyclical, and that this line has been subject to God’s intervention and will continue to be drawn according to his purposes. The concluding segment of the book focuses on history as art, and it is here that the student can take advantage of some helpful “tips” on the study of history.

The only real lacuna in Cairns’ effort is his failure to take into account the views and challenges of philosophers of history in the analytic tradition. It is certainly appropriate to inventory those speculative theories that dealt on a grand scale with the development of society and that produced pretentious tomes on the laws of civilization and its decay. There was a time when idealists debated with materialists and monists with pluralists as they acted out their metaphysical differences in the studies of the past. That approach to the philosophy of history, however, changed dramatically when philosophers—especially British and American thinkers—put so much of their attention on the logic of language and the analysis of concepts. For better or worse, the speculative philosophy of history has not endured as a serious intellectual enterprise in our age of analysis. Among philosophers its place has been taken by an approach that is more closely allied with the philosophy of science and the theory of knowledge than it is with metaphysics. Instead of seeking to chart
the development of epochs and cultures, the contemporary philosopher of history is more attuned to the analysis of historical language and the prospect of “explanation” in historical discourse. It is unfortunate that Cairns does not sufficiently note this shift and incorporate a critique of it in his thoughts on a Christian approach to historiography. The work of philosophers like M. White, C. G. Hempel and K. Popper would make such an enterprise both challenging and fruitful. Indeed, it may be that these men and others will set the agenda for future Christian response in the area of historical interpretation and not the schemes of Spengler, Hegel and Vico. If this is the case, Cairns has missed an exceptional opportunity to apprise students of this possibility and to indicate informed ways of dealing with it.

These comments are not to judge Cairns’ book negatively, however. The author evinces a belief in the authority of Scripture and a conviction that Biblical revelation must be the focal point for the Christian student of history. As a result, God and Man in Time must now be considered the best introduction to historical study available to the evangelical student.

John Franklin Johnson

Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, MO


This informative and challenging work by Beckwith and Stott grows out of a Tyndale Fellowship study group. The authors argue that Sunday, the Christian “Lord’s day,” is the functional equivalent of Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, and therefore should be set aside as a whole day of worship and rest. Their distinctive contribution to the Sabbath issue lies in their richly detailed investigation of the historical backgrounds of first-century Judaism and of the ante-Nicene and Syrian fathers.

The first part of the book, “The Biblical and Jewish Evidence,” is authored by Beckwith. In chap. 1 he argues that the Sabbath is a memorial of the world’s creation. The commandment in Exodus 20 (as well as the reference to the Sabbath in Exodus 16) does not refer to the first institution of the festival but presupposes its existence and explicitly commands what was already observed. Basing his argument on Exod 20:11, Beckwith contends that the Sabbath commandment in Exodus 20 is grounded in “the creation ordinance of the Sabbath” and, as such, “stands on a different plane from the ordinances which originated in the Mosaic law” (p. 6). Therefore by virtue of its pre-Mosaic creation origin the Sabbath ordinance is still binding, as are the other three so-called “creation ordinances”: parenthood, marriage and work. Thus it is a Christian’s duty to keep one day a week as a Sabbath day of rest and worship. The Hellenistic Jewish literature of the first century supports this “creation ordinance” view of the Sabbath. Glancing at the NT evidence, he argues that Mark 2:27 likewise categorizes the Sabbath as a “creation ordinance.” Turning to Heb 3:7-4:11, he recognizes the note of inaugurated eschatology and argues that Christians currently experience the promise of God’s Sabbath rest (Heb 4:1, 3, 10) but must nevertheless keep the weekly Sabbath as well.

In chap. 2 Beckwith examines the Sabbath as a memorial of Israel’s redemption. Even though the Sabbath, like circumcision, was a sign of a particular covenant (circumcision of the Abrahamic—Gen 17:11, the Sabbath of the Mosaic—Exod 31:13, 17; Isa 56:4, 6; Ezek 20:12, 20), and even though the sign of circumcision is spiritually fulfilled in the new covenant in Christ, Beckwith refuses to extend this logic to include seeing the Sabbath as fulfilled spiritually in the new covenant in Christ. As one of the ten commandments it is eternally valid and obligatory, he argues. Interestingly, while Hellenistic Judaism regarded the Sabbath as a creation ordinance for all men, Palestinian Judaism regarded it as a Mosaic ordinance for Israel alone. Rabbinical literature supports the Palestinian understanding of the Sabbath. (This should have significance for understanding Paul’s view of the Sabbath.)
Beckwith argues that Jesus’ Sabbath disputes with the Pharisees focused on how to keep the Sabbath, not whether to keep it. Christ reformed its observance; he did not abolish its status.

But Paul abolished the Mosaic form of Sabbath-keeping and the link that the Sabbath had with the seventh day of the week. Most of us would assume that Paul therefore abolished Sabbath-keeping in any sense of the word, especially in the light of texts such as Col 2:16-17. But Beckwith weakly argues to the contrary. He says: “But since Paul retains the framework of the Jewish week, and accepts the Christian festival on its ‘first day,’ and since the link which the Sabbath had with a particular day of the week was again one of its ceremonial features, comparable to the Sabbath sacrifices and the detailed regulations about the sabbath activities, it is possible that Paul means to preserve the substance of the sabbath in the Lord’s Day” (p. 27). Supposedly “the substance of the sabbath would not be altered by a change of day, unless that change destroyed the signification of the sabbath, as a weekly memorial of creation and redemption” (p. 27). So Beckwith is saying that the significance of the Sabbath as a sign is not a function of whether it is the first or the last day of the week, a position I think refuted by the eschatological signification of Sabbath-keeping in the OT. More tellingly, Paul explicitly states in Col 2:16-17 that the Jewish Sabbath was a “shadow” whose reality has come in Christ. So, then, it seems that just as circumcision is spiritually fulfilled in what Christ does to our hearts as well as being symbolized in baptism, likewise the Sabbath commandment is spiritually fulfilled in the Christian’s experience of realized eschatology in Christ but is not symbolized by a rite or observance. Since Paul never argues for a symbolic rite or observance, neither should we.

In chap. 3 Beckwith focuses on the alleged NT memorial of Christ’s resurrection, the “Lord’s day.” (References to this day or to something similar occur only in the following texts: Acts 20:7; 1 Cor 16:2; Rev 1:10.) Although the earliest reference to the “Lord’s day” is 1 Cor 16:2 (ca. A. D. 54), Beckwith argues that the commemoration of the first day of the Jewish week as the “Lord’s day” began with the twelve apostles and their circle immediately following the resurrection of Christ and that observance of this day gradually displaced observance of the Jewish Sabbath. To argue for continuity of form between the Christian “Lord’s day” and the Jewish Sabbath, Beckwith attempts to show three things: that the “Lord’s day” was a memorial observance, that it was a day of worship, and that it was a day of rest. And so he argues that the form of the Christian “Lord’s day” was modeled upon the Jewish Sabbath, although he realizes that the paucity of references (three) means that much of his argument is inferential and based “partly on the general teaching of the New Testament, and partly on its Old Testament and Jewish background” (p. 35).

In chap. 4 Beckwith more explicitly develops his argument for continuity between the Sabbath and the “Lord’s day,” listing significant points of similarity such as commemoration of creation, worship, rest, and the cycle of seven days.

Epistemologically speaking, the first part of this book is the most important. For if the Biblical evidence fails to confirm our authors’ thesis, then no amount of agreement from the fathers can establish it. Therefore I will restrict my remarks to part two, Stott’s excellent presentation of “The Evidence of the Fathers.”

In chap. 5 he traces the attitude toward the Sabbath in patristic thought and concludes that the fathers believed that the Jewish Sabbath of the seventh day was fulfilled in Christ and, therefore, was no longer sacred for Christians. In chap. 6 he investigates the fathers’ attitude to Sunday and concludes that they thought in terms of a whole day (not just a meal) set apart from all others as a holy, festal day of rest, not work, a day called the “Lord’s day.” Eusebius of Caesarea (chap. 8) indicates that Constantine did not initiate a new attitude toward Sunday but confirmed one handed down from earlier tradition and practice. So chaps. 5-8 indicate that the “Lord’s day” is the functional equivalent of the Jewish Sabbath.

In chap. 9 Stott marshals NT and other early evidence to explain how Christians spent the “Lord’s day.” He concludes that it was a day for corporate worship and festal celebration with morning eucharist and an agape meal later in the day, a day characterized by the
joy of Christ’s resurrection and by loving concern for God, fellow Christians and the poor. It was a day for fellowship, initiation and ordination, and the exercise of Church discipline.

Chapters 10-12 deal with the theology of the Christian Sunday. It was seen as the “first day,” the day of Christ’s resurrection, which inaugurated a new creation. It was seen as the “Lord’s day,” the day chosen by Christ as his own. He was its central figure and the one upon whom the Church concentrated their thoughts and whose presence they experienced in fellowship. It was seen as the “eighth day,” the sign of the final age, the new covenant.

Chapter 13 presents the attitude of the early Church to the ten commandments. Stott argues that from “the earliest days” they were considered “a valid law for Christians,” with the exception that the Sabbath commandment was linked with ceremonial law and circumcision and thereby seen as “dissolved” for Christians. But the fathers were hesitant to say either that the Sabbath commandment was abolished or that it should be applied directly to the Christian Sunday. Thus inspiration for celebrating the “Lord’s day” came only indirectly from the Sabbath commandment.

Chapter 14 lists ten conclusions and applies them to the Church’s current situation.

John J. Hughes

Westmont College, Santa Barbara, CA


Bacchiocchi, a Seventh-Day Adventist and the first non-Catholic to graduate from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, in a richly detailed, clearly written work, directly challenges the sabbatarian position as typified by Beckwith and Stott, advocating instead the sabbatarian observance of Saturday. By examining the Biblical basis and historical genesis of Sunday observance, Bacchiocchi argues that Sunday replaced Saturday as the Sabbath day of rest and worship not by Biblical or apostolic authority but as a result of political, social, pagan and Christian factors. It arose in the Church at Rome, not Jerusalem. He argues for the inappropriateness of applying the Sabbath commandment to the first day of the week, maintaining that Saturday, the seventh day, is the only day to which this command properly can and should be applied.

Chapter 1 is introductory. Chapter 2, “Christ and the Lord’s Day,” concludes that Jesus gave a new meaning to and taught a new manner of observance of the Jewish Sabbath. The Sabbath symbolizes salvation, according to Bacchiocchi, and therefore is a day not only for worship but also for expressing the redemptive love of God in acts of mercy. It is a day to experience God’s salvation accomplished through Jesus Christ.

Chapter 3, “The Resurrection-Appearances and the Origin of Sunday Observance,” maintains that the early Church did not celebrate Christ’s resurrection weekly on the first day. Chapter 4, “Three New Testament Texts and the Origin of Sunday” (1 Cor 16:1-3; Acts 20:7-11; Rev 1:10), concludes that none of these texts supports understanding Sunday to have been venerated in apostolic times as a special day. In 1 Cor 16:1-3 and Acts 20:7-12 Sunday is mentioned in conjunction with a private fund-raising plan and an extraordinary gathering of the Troas Christians with Paul. In Rev 1:10 the “Lord’s day” does not refer to Sunday but to Christ’s parousia and the day of judgment, a position defended by Hort, Deissmann, Lightfoot, Milligan and others (p. 113, n. 70). John, having been transported by the Spirit to the circumstances of “the day of the Lord,” speaks from the vantage point of that time.

Chapter 5, “Jerusalem and the Origin of Sunday,” shows that prior to A. D. 135 the Jerusalem Church neither practiced nor championed “liturgical innovations” such as Sunday worship. In chap. 6, “Rome and the Origin of Sunday,” Bacchiocchi maintains that due to its anti-Judaism the Church of Rome caused “the abandonment of the Sabbath and the adoption of Sunday” (p. 211) as a means of conscious opposition to the Jews. Chapter 7, “Anti-Judaism in The Fathers and the Origin of Sunday,” demonstrates the presence of
strong anti-Judaic feelings in the churches at Antioch, Alexandria and Rome which, “augmented by social tensions and theological convictions, created the necessity of avoiding any semblance of Judaism” (p. 233). Chapter 8, “Sun-Worship and the Origin of Sunday,” presents evidence that suggests that “all the necessary ingredients for the day of the Sun to influence the origin of Sunday observance were already present when the latter made its appearance” (p. 268).

In chapter 9, “The Theology of Sunday,” Bacchiocchi argues that the introduction of Sunday as a day of worship “was introduced in a climate of controversy and uncertainty” (p. 301). The memory of the resurrection was initially only a secondary reason for Sunday observance. The need for Christians to break with Judaism was the primary motivating factor. Sunday was seen as the eschatological and temporal continuation and fulfillment of and supplement to the Sabbath. Chapter 10, “Retrospect and Prospect,” answers practical and theological questions raised in the introduction and strongly advocates Bacchiocchi’s seventh-day sabbatarianism.

Most tellingly, Paul, the author whose writings and theology seem explicitly to preclude any form of sabbatarianism, is relegated to an appendix (“Paul and the Sabbath”) that follows the bibliography! And of the three key Pauline texts on this issue (Gal 4:8-11; Rom 14:5-6; Col 2:14-17), Bacchiocchi concentrates on the last, giving scant mention to the first two. He sees “the Colossian heresy” fundamentally as a pagan syncretistic philosophy that incorporated Jewish and pagan elements. Paul’s condemnation of the observation of holy days is interpreted as a condemnation of a perverted use of such days, not of their observance per se. The form or manner of observance is a matter of the individual’s conscience. Paul also condemned a perverted understanding of the purpose of Sabbath-keeping: It was neither intended to assist in salvation nor as the occasion for the veneration of angels. He interprets the eschatological promise-fulfillment language of Col 2:17 (“shadow”/“body”) to indicate the present post-incarnation value of the practices listed in v 16: They point one to Christ. But he then makes the unwarranted and scantily argued inference that therefore such practices are still to be observed in a proper fashion because they can prepare Christians “for the realities of the world to come” (p. 357). Thus Bacchiocchi understands Paul’s eschatology to be less realized than Col 1:13 and 3:1-3 suggest when they say that “he delivered us from the domain of darkness and transferred us to the kingdom of his beloved Son” and that “you have been raised up with Christ, keep seeking the things above. . . . for you have died and your life is hidden with Christ in God.” Indeed, if Christians “have been made complete” in Christ (Col 2:10) in terms of knowledge, wisdom (1:28; 2:6-9) and freedom from the observance of the religious rules and practices of this world (2:16-23), including the observance of holy days (2:16), then it is difficult to imagine celebrating the Sabbath as an anticipatory sign of future membership in and experience of the eschatological life of the kingdom of God. Certainly Paul eagerly anticipated the future full experience of salvation (3:4). But he saw it as the extension, intensification, and perfection of the Christian’s present eschatological experience of the new-creation, resurrection life possessed in Christ by those in his kingdom (1:13-20; 2:9-12, 20; 3:1-4, 10).

And, finally, since the “heretics” decreed some form of Sabbath observance (2:16-23), and since Paul categorized their decrees as a function of “the traditions of men” based on the concept of angelic mediation and command (2:8; 18, 20) rather than on a command that is in accordance with Christ and apostolic teaching (1:24-29; 2:2-7; 3:16), it seems inconceivable that Paul simply condemned a perverted observation of such worldly religious traditions. Rather, he seems categorically to have denied the necessity of obeying any this-worldly religious regulation (2:23). For Torah and the Mosaic covenant belong to the old order of creation, but the Christian belongs to the new (1:13; 2:12-13; 3:1-3, 10). 

John J. Hughes

Westmont College, Santa Barbara, CA
Two things always seem to characterize John White's books: (1) They are well written (although some would say his literary style is too "cute"), and (2) they are well timed. In writing *The Golden Cow*, White addresses the problem of materialism (or perhaps secularism) as it encroaches upon the Biblical mandates of the Church. As a keen and witty observer of human and ecclesiastical behavior, White concludes that secular desires and ambitions have indeed replaced the sacred. Religion has become big business. Evangelism has become a game of numbers instead of a reverent mission of redemption. The games churches play have evoked an apathetic response to those actions and toward those needs that have been proclaimed necessary by both Scripture and tradition. They have been made insensitive, White says, by conformity to an age of gimmicks, whose pressures have reduced and dehumanized many churches and Christians to an amoral, aspiritual machine, incapable of redeeming and resistant to being a pneumatie people. These are well-timed observations although certainly not original. They ought to be heard by God's people today. *The Golden Cow* functions as an exhortation to a more simple, more Biblical existence.

However timely this book is, it will surely have its critics. White's case would have been helped had he read and learned from those secular prophets such as Lasch and Marcuse who have been saying the same kinds of things or at least noticing the same kinds of problems within the nexus of the profane. Indeed, more interaction with Wallis or Sider or Ellul would have made White's Biblical response more insightful and precise. As Ellul points out, it might well be the legalism of conservative ("western") Christianity that promotes conformity to cultural values. This interesting insight is not pursued enough by White. It is true that legalism, as developed by the Biblical writers, prevents a transcendent life style and promotes a life style grounded in planet earth.

While White stands squarely within the establishment Church (and to a large extent that will be his audience), the book would have profited by a greater concern for community instead of for Church. The Biblical response to materialism seems always to be given in terms of the community of believers. To prevent materialism means to share in the material needs of other believers. It means to give materials to the poor and to aid the oppressed. To transcend personal desires to meet the needs of others shapes what it means to be God's people and is the means of escaping a materialistic life style.

Ron Sider in his powerful book, *Rich Christians in an Age of Hunger*, builds his case around the Biblical thesis that God is on the side of the poor. White should have asked and answered the correlative thesis: Why is God not on the side of the materialist? This is the fundamental theological concern, and White only touches on it in his final chapter. Certainly he is no theologian; one guesses that he leaves that task to others. But *The Golden Cow* suffers from that omission. Future discussions must take seriously the theological-Biblical agenda against materialism.

Lastly, I was somewhat disappointed that White, who is a psychiatrist, did not deal more fully with the psychical and with the destruction to personal relationships caused by a materialistic orientation. Materialism, as Christopher Lasch points out in his *The Culture of Narcissism*, necessarily leads to an overt and destructive concern for personal well-being rather than for personal or public redemption. This selfhoodness thwarts relationships with others and with society in general. It dehumanizes and demystifies not only the institution but the individual as well. There is no transcendence in a materialistic culture—a point Herbert Marcuse makes also in his *One-Dimensional Man*.

Yet the book succeeds overall. It succeeds primarily because it draws our attention to those very things in our life of faith that once destroyed Israel's. It succeeds because it begins to offer evangelicals a grid for more sophisticated theological discussions. It succeeds
because White has assumed the responsibility as the prophets and apostles did of calling us to a transcendent agenda here on planet earth.

Robert W. Wall

Seattle Pacific University, Seattle, WA 98119


This useful symposium consists of nine theological reflections related to service and witness in an increasingly urbanized society. While each of the writers shares a commitment to the Reformed faith, the extent and quality of their contributions vary considerably. Some present a brief homily and others folksy recollections on the theme of urban mission. The volume, however, does include several solid essays designed to challenge and encourage all who are concerned to disciple the city today.

Harvie Conn contributes two fascinating chapters: “The Kingdom of God and the City of Man” (a history of the city/Church dialogue) and “Christ and the City” (Biblical themes for building urban theology models). Tertullian, Augustine, Plato, Aquinas, Calvin, Niebuhr, Kuyper, Ellul and Barth are among the cited as Conn develops his presentation.

Editor Greenway writes about offering the whole Christ for the whole city in a chapter entitled “Content and Context.” Some quotations should suffice to indicate the nature of his contribution: “Power for urban mission does not come either from muffled proclamation or a truncated gospel, but from unabashed acceptance of God’s way of redeeming sinners as revealed in the Scriptures and fervent commitment to the life of discipleship in obedience and gratitude” (p. 91). “The Bible speaks to the city and to all human conditions in the city” (p. 95). “The Church has a twofold task in the city, for the Scriptures contain both the words of the prophets denouncing the sins of the city and the words of the evangelists calling to repentance and salvation. These . . . cannot be separated without doing serious damage to either one or the other” (p. 96). Greenway presents several valued suggestions for improving urban mission and also highlights basic Biblical principles for the development of a Christian urbanology.

Carl Kromminga’s paper on “The Role of the Laity in Urban Evangelization,” Timothy Monsma’s on “Family, Clan, and Tribe in the City,” and Sidney Rooy’s on “Theological Education for Urban Mission” also add to the worth of the volume. Although the book does not contain a comprehensive index, it is replete with footnotes and includes a selected bibliography for further study. I would certainly recommend _Discipling the City_ to anyone interested in doing just that.

Mariano Di Gangi

Ontario Theological Seminary, Willowdale, Ontario M2M 4B3


At first sight it appears that rhetoricians do not find much direct endorsement for their craft in Holy Scripture. The word _rhetor_ occurs only once in the NT, in Acts 24:1, where it is used to describe a lawyer the Jews hired to prosecute the apostle Paul. Despite that fact, McLaughlin’s book shows that rhetoric does not have to be a dirty word. Though certainly open to misuse, as are many good things, persuasive appeals may be ethically used to great benefit in Christian preaching. McLaughlin attempts to come to grips with the major ethical problems Christian persuaders face in proclaiming the gospel.

The author is familiar with most of the standard works on rhetoric and persuasion theory. Preachers with little or no background in those fields would do well to acquaint themselves with the works cited in the book. The first half of the book introduces the reader to every major standard of rhetorical ethics from Aristotle to Joseph Fletcher. Though perhaps useful to homileticians, the reader seeking practical advice may find this portion of
the book a bit tedious to wade through. There is little original material there and too many quotations, much of which could have been condensed or left out. The book also suffers from a common malady of speech books: too many general principles and too few illustrations from real speeches demonstrating those principles in action.

The latter chapters are more useful. McLaughlin hews out a Biblical standard for persuasive preaching from the teaching of Jesus and Paul’s advice to Timothy and the Thessalonians. He also offers a good set of practical suggestions on how the Christian persuader may discharge his ethical obligations. The use and abuse of such legitimate rhetorical devices as testimonials, audience analysis and adaptation, appeals to authority, emotion and tradition are discussed, along with warnings against manipulative propaganda devices like crowd pressure, use of decoys (a popular technique of large crusades), and misuse of the invitation. There are ideas here that no conscientious preacher can afford to ignore.

Especially interesting is the chapter on the ethical responsibilities of the congregation. One of the most frustrating experiences of any speaker is an encounter with the slothful listener who listlessly settles into his seat thinking, “Well, here I am, do what you will.” McLaughlin emphasizes the double-edged responsibility of preaching and listening and offers some excellent advice on the matter.

Though no landmark in either rhetoric or homiletics, on the whole this book is a good introduction to an area that rightly deserves attention not only from those of us with academic interests in the field but from anyone actually engaged in the practice of Christian persuasion.

C. Barry McCarty
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260


This is the first book in the new CAPS (Christian Association for Psychological Studies) series for Christian perspectives on counseling and the behavioral sciences. Myers has produced one of the better books to emerge in the growing number of volumes seeking to integrate psychology and Christianity. Any limitations it has must be weighed in the scale opposite Myers’ clear writing style and the extensive amount of research he has gathered in supporting his major points. The Human Puzzle also helps the Christian reader to realize that much about human nature can be learned from psychology.

If a major theme emerges from the pages of this book, it is that psychology and Christianity are in basic agreement in their assessments of human nature. Myers is telling Christians that psychology is OK, and he is telling psychologists that theology really supports their findings.

The major drawback to The Human Puzzle, though, is its unguarded acceptance of a nearly perfect harmony between psychology and theology while, in fact, there is much legitimate disagreement between the two fields. Myers uncritically accepts the theory of evolution and says that it is not in disagreement with the religious perspective of origins. He also supports “levels of explanation” as a reason why psychology and theology often seem to disagree. This viewpoint says that each field has an accurate, though different, perspective on human nature. Myers in one chapter tells us of the Biblical view of the intimate union of the mind and the body (Hebraic holism). But he discusses this union in ways that make the two elements of human nature identical and leaves us believing that the brain is the mind or produces it. His view, then, seems indistinguishable from materialistic monism. Myers seems content to call this difference between the Christian view of the mind and the materialism of the psychologist two accurate levels of explanation.

Saying, however, that the Christian view of the unity of mind and body and psychology’s teachings on materialism are both accurate does not agree with theological discussions of Hebraic holism or with psychological brain research. For example, it is well known that electrical stimulation of the brain can produce muscle movements and basic emotional
states in humans, but it is often overlooked that these stimulations never produce human thoughts, the will prior to a movement, or the rich emotional nature we experience—all of which are key elements of our mental nature. Therefore materialism has not been shown to be an adequate explanation for all that a man is.

The book suffers the same problem on the question of determinism and free will. Myers' explanation makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the theologian's teachings on divine sovereignty are really saying the same thing as the biological mechanism of the psychologist.

The Human Puzzle would have been a better book if Myers had developed the possibility that psychology and theology often disagree because psychology is wrong. The science of psychology does not proceed in an unbiased fashion but has been negatively affected by many presuppositions on reality and man that are not shared by Christian theism.

Mark P. Cosgrove
Taylor University, Upland, IN 46989


Lectures on Counseling contains four of Jay Adams' recently published smaller works. In "Your Place in the Counseling Revolution" Adams wants to convince Christian men to consider a ministry of pastoral counseling and to inform the average church member about pastoral counseling. In "Counseling and the Sovereignty of God" Adams discusses an important topic that every Christian counselor should consider. Many counseling cases involve the client struggling with the problem of evil—e.g., "How could a loving God let this happen to me?" Adams offers some good thoughts here. "Coping with Counseling Crises" is a study of Biblical principles and practices pertinent to counseling crisis situations. Ten sample cases are included with blank spaces left for the reader to fill in an approach to problems such as: A deformed child is born; my wife is leaving me; someone has terminal cancer; a pregnant teen and angry parents; two homosexuals in your church. "The Use of the Scriptures in Counseling" is intended as a stimulus and as a guide in using the Scriptures in counseling. In general Lectures on Counseling is well worth reading.

What About Nouthetic Counseling? makes excellent reading for any theologian, pastor or psychologist who has been following Jay Adams and his critics. Adams asks and answers twenty-five common questions on nouthetic counseling to inform his critics and the general public concerning what he really believes about counseling. His answers are brief but helpful.

Questions include those drawn from obvious attacks on nouthetic counseling: Are feelings unimportant? Do you not believe in any kind of mental illness? Are all problems due to sin? Can we not learn something from psychologists? Why be so critical of others? Some questions are informative: What is confrontation? Why do you use a desk in counseling? How do you counsel the unsaved? How long does it take to become effective as a nouthetic counselor?

Several questions relate to Adams' rejection of secular counseling methods. Adams explains clearly that counseling is not unbiased science but by its very nature requires a theological position on human nature, human problems, and goals for life. The "theology" of secular psychology is often very non-Christian.

This book makes excellent reading whether you are a student of Jay Adams or one of his critics. Read it after Adams' Competent to Counsel and The Christian Counselor's Manual and you will have a good understanding of the nouthetic counseling of Jay Adams.

Mark P. Cosgrove
Taylor University, Upland, IN 46989

This book is part of the Christian Free University Curriculum, a series of studies on topics relevant to the university campus. The stated audience of this series is the unconvinced college student who has questions about the Christian faith and the Christian who wishes to dialogue with the secular academic world.

The author organizes his discussion of the nature of man around three major questions, each of which forms the basis of a chapter. These three issues are: (1) Is man’s nature only material, or is there a nonmaterial part of his personality? (2) Is man’s behavior determined? (3) Is man just an animal? In each of these areas he discusses some of the contemporary research that supports his contention of a dualistic, voluntaristic, creationistic view of man.

This book raises important questions that Christian psychology students must wrestle with. It shows them that there are leading figures in the world of experimental psychology whose views of human nature are compatible with Christian views even though they themselves are not Christians. It also discusses the questionable validity of some of the basic presuppositions of secular experimental psychology. The writing style is clear, concise and eminently readable.

I have two major criticisms of the book. First, the discussions of various topics are so brief that they are hardly likely to convince skeptical college students. They are also too brief to give Christian students a solid apologetical basis for dialogue with the secular academic world. More thorough discussions would definitely increase the value of this book.

Second, throughout the book the author posits a dualistic or partitive view of human nature. Personality is composed of two parts, a nonmaterial mind and a material brain. He seems unaware that increasing numbers of evangelical Biblical scholars believe that the Hebrews used the words “body,” “mind” and “soul” in a holistic or aspective sense rather than the partitive sense of our Greek-influenced culture. At one point Cosgrove even argues for an interactional dualism (p. 66) without seeming to realize that a holistic view would serve his argument better and be more consistent with a Biblical understanding of human nature.

With these considerations in mind, this book may be useful as a supplementary text in introductory Christian undergraduate courses in experimental psychology, personality theory or integration.

Henry A. Virkler
Psychological Studies Institute, Atlanta, GA


This book is part of the Christian Free University Curriculum, a series designed for university students. In it the authors attempt to identify the central elements of a Christian approach to mental health and psychotherapy.

Chapter topics include a Christian model of personality, a discussion of the various sources of emotional problems, various views of healthy human functioning, and application of these ideas to a model of Christian psychotherapy.

The discussions are clear and interestingly written, brief and simple without being simplistic. They present a framework that the interested student or instructor can fill in with further detail as desired. This book could be a valuable supplementary text in undergraduate courses in either personality theory or psychopathology. It would also be helpful to the Christian undergraduate student at a secular university who must do his own integration.

Henry A. Virkler
Psychological Studies Institute, Atlanta, GA

How would you like a model of the atonement that arises out of the twentieth-century experience of forgiveness, does not require the presuppositions, framework or categories of the OT, and appeals to ideas and experiences common to Christian and non-Christian alike? Such is Humphreys’ offering in this book.

The NT understanding of the atonement in eschatological, judicial and ritualistic categories fails to communicate to the modern man whose world view is not defined in terms of God’s revelation. And so Humphreys proposes the “theory of costly forgiveness” as the best model with which to explain the relation between Christ’s death and our experience of forgiveness.

According to the theory of costly forgiveness, Christ’s suffering was neither judicially nor theologically necessary for the forgiveness of sins. But God accepted Christ’s suffering as his way of forgiving sinners, for forgiveness in all interpersonal relationships means accepting the suffering inflicted by those one accepts. Therefore forgiveness is always costly, since it means the acceptance of suffering. So for God to forgive us means for God to accept us and the suffering we cause him. Thus the sufferings of Christ are the measure of God’s costly forgiveness and the form it takes.

This model, taken from the sphere of interpersonal relationships, presents the cross as the event that objectively caused God to experience suffering. In Christ God experienced the cost of forgiveness by suffering the following consequences of our sins. As one who suffered because he was good and righteous, God experienced disgust and the frustration of his purposes. This resulted in his disapproval and rejection of the sinner on moral grounds. And this resulted in an inner tension in that God was both for and against the sinner at the same time. As one who suffered because he loved sinners, God experienced a sense of shame, loss, betrayal and sadness. He suffered vicariously as one rejected by those he came to save. Here too there is an inner tension between being for and against the sinner. Finally, as one who suffered voluntarily as a victim of sin, God experienced victimization in order to recall sinners to himself.

God forgives us by withdrawing punishment and accepting those he loves. But this forgiveness can be experienced only when the sinner repents and turns to God in faith. By paying the price involved in suffering the consequences of sin to one who loves, God hopes to shame us to repentance and trust. And so in the final analysis the cross is seen as God’s way of morally influencing sinners to turn to him.

Unfortunately, the model of costly forgiveness is theoretically problematic. Humphreys has a moral-influence view of the atonement. The cross is the supreme display of God’s love and as such is designed to elicit our repentance and trust. Humphreys believes that the traditional understanding of the cross as a necessary part of God’s plan of redemption is wrong. Thus he rejects the insights of Anselm and Calvin on this issue. In doing so he divorces the cross from the moral character of God while at the same time removing it from its Biblical context of judicial sacrifice (that is, sin offering). Apparently an all-loving heavenly Father allowed his only Son to suffer the agonies of the cross when our sins could have been forgiven without such suffering. For according to the model, the shedding of blood is not a necessary condition for the forgiveness of sins (cf. Heb 9:22). And so this implication of the model casts aspersions on the goodness of God in relation to his Son.

And since punishment of sins is not a necessary condition for their forgiveness, the theory brings God’s righteousness into question. It implies that God did not punish Christ in our place and for our sakes. It implies that God forgives sins without anyone paying what sin deserves: death. How can this be true and God still be the just Judge of creation?

By separating the cross from the moral character of God on the one hand and its Biblical context of sacrifice on the other, Humphreys is not able to answer two very important questions that are answered in the NT: “Why did Jesus teach that it was necessary for him to go to the cross and that God had sent him for that very purpose?” and “Why did Jesus con-
stantly categorize his impending death as a substitutionary sacrificial offering for sins?"

According to the NT authors, God so loved the world that he sent his Son to die for sins (John 3:14-17; Rom 4:25; 5:6-8; 8:32), for he is a just God who can only forgive sins justly by punishing a substitute for us in our place (Rom 3:21-26; Gal 2:21; 3:21-22). Since death is God’s just and necessary punishment for sin (Gen 2:17), God’s decision to save us necessitated the death of his Son. Jesus’ death was a necessary historical event (cf. Luke 24:7, 26, 44, 46), and God was its ultimate cause (cf. Acts 2:23; 4:27-28). God’s plan of redemption came to its final expression at the cross because of God’s character. He is both loving and just. He loved us so much that he sent his Son to suffer death, the penalty of sin. Only by doing this could he be just in forgiving us without punishing us (Rom 3:21-26).

"Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins” (1 John 4:10).

Jesus and the NT authors consistently categorize his death judicially and theoretically. To explain it in terms of other categories is to give it a meaning different from that which it has in the NT. According to the NT the objectivity of the atonement resides in the fact that it changed God’s relation from wrath and rejection to acceptance and forgiveness toward all who by faith identify with his Son. It is not the case that the objectivity of the cross has to do with a subjective experience of suffering on the part of God.

Two further points demand attention. Paul’s and John’s theology of the cross as God’s act of divine judgment on sin has “costly forgiveness” as an integral but not controlling dimension. The “only begotten Son” Christology of John vividly recalls Abraham’s costly sacrifice of Isaac both in terminology and content (cf. Genesis 22), as does Paul’s statement that God spared not his own Son but delivered him up for us all (Rom 8:32). Because the sacrifice of Isaac typifies sinful man’s need for a substitute, it foreshadows the cost to God of sending his only begotten Son to be that sacrifice. Thus it typifies the cost of divine forgiveness.

Finally, in the NT the resurrection of Christ is a necessary condition for the forgiveness of sins, a point overlooked by Humphreys. As Paul says, Jesus “was delivered up (by God) because of our transgressions and was raised (by God) for the sake of our justification” (Rom 4:25). Elsewhere he says, “If Christ has not been raised, your faith is worthless; you are still in your sins” (1 Cor 15:17). Christ’s resurrection is God’s vindication of his Son as sinless, his acceptance of his sacrifice as perfect, and the beginning of his exaltation as our priestly intercessor. But it is more. It is the climax of redemptive history and divine promise in the eschatological salvation of the Second Adam. His resurrection makes eschatological salvation and life available to all who believe, for it is as the Second Adam raised to eschatological life with God that Christ can give sinful sons of Adam that same life in the new kingdom (whose rightful Lord he is).

John J. Hughes

Westmont College, Santa Barbara, CA


The late Samuel Sandmel was the leading Jewish scholar specializing in the NT. He was eminently qualified to prepare this introduction to Philo not only as the student of the Philonic scholar, Erwin Goodenough, but as one who taught courses on Philo annually for 25 years.

For those interested in the background of the NT, Philo ranks second only to Josephus in value as a contemporary Jewish witness. Whereas Josephus’ historical narratives are easily understood, Philo’s interpretations of Scripture and theological abstractions require some basic philosophical orientation, which this work now happily provides.

Philo was a contemporary of Jesus, living from c. 25–20 B.C. to c. A.D. 50 in Alexandria, Egypt. His wealthy brother Alexander provided costly doors for the temple at Jerusalem.
Philo’s nephew, the renegade Jew Tiberius Alexander, served both as the governor of Palestine and of Egypt.

In his attempt to interpret the Scriptures in a relevant way to his Hellenized audience, Philo relied mainly on Greek authors, 54 of whom he cites by name. Whether he knew Hebrew and Aramaic has been contested. He differed sharply from the rabbis of Palestine and of Mesopotamia in viewing the Torah not as an end in itself but rather as a means to mystic communion with God. For Philo the nomos (“law”) of Moses was important as the best possible imitation of physis (“the unwritten law of nature”).

In recasting the God of the OT as the nameless, indefinable God of Greek philosophy, Philo explained away the anthropomorphic imagery and the historical data of Scripture by allegory. Adam represents “mind,” Eve “sense perception,” Noah “tranquillity,” Abraham “the capacity to be instructed,” Isaac “intuition,” Jacob “practice,” Sarah “true philosophy,” and so forth.

Circumcision is significant to Philo because it “prunes passion from the body.” Philo accepted the Hellenistic dualism of the soul and the body and viewed salvation in terms of the liberation of the former from the bondage of the latter. He wrote almost nothing about future rewards or punishments. He was uncertain about the ultimate fate of the soul: “Perhaps the soul is resorbed into the universal soul; perhaps it enters a star” (p. 100).

In his zeal to seek relevant interpretations of such figures as Sarah and Hagar, Philo was willing to dispense with their objectivity as historical individuals. His complete lack of concern for the historicity of events is also betrayed in his failure to mention any of the Maccabean or Herodian rulers of Palestine.

There are some interesting but superficial resemblances between Philo’s thoughts and the NT. Like the book of Hebrews Philo looked beyond the sacrificial rituals. As in the prologue of John, the Logos figures prominently in his system. But for Philo the Logos is “Divine Reason,” not the incarnate expression of the Godhead. Sandmel observes, “The Gospel of John owes no direct debt to Philo, only to the milieu of Philo” (p. 154).

Philo’s writings are so complex that they have called forth contrasting interpretations from the two leading interpreters. H. A. Wolfson hailed Philo as a great philosophical synthesizer, whose Judaism was a “collateral form of Pharisaism.” On the other hand, Goodenough emphasized Philo’s mystical interests and even sought to establish the existence of a Jewish mystery religion. Sandmel rejects both extremes: “I believe that those who regard Philo as thoroughly Hellenized are right, and that Wolfson is wrong. But I believe also that Goodenough represents a viewpoint that is guilty of excess and that fascinating as his views are, they are all too often insubstantial” (p. 147).

Sandmel himself regards Philo as faithful to Judaism in his own way, though thoroughly influenced by Hellenism. It is ironic that his learned attempt to make Judaism relevant to his contemporaries, which had almost no impact on Jews, was preserved for posterity by Christians.

Later Christian thinkers like Origen and Clement of Alexandria followed Philo in their allegorical interpretations of Scripture—a practice that though well intentioned failed to do justice to the historical dimensions of God’s revelation.

Sandmel has written a splendidly lucid synthesis that will appeal to educated laymen and students of the Scriptures. His notes and an appendix on “Tools and Current Research” (pp. 165-170) will also serve as a useful reference to scholars.

Edwin Yamauchi

Miami University, Oxford, OH


This volume is the first English translation in which John Eck, the most formidable Roman Catholic theologian of the sixteenth century, attacks the Protestant theology of Martin Luther and other Protestant theologians as being heretical, stupid and demonic.
Eck defends a whole list of basic Roman Catholic doctrines, both academic and practical. Some of the most important and typical are the final authority of the Roman Church, the primacy of the office of the papacy, the mass as a sacrifice, the celibacy of the clergy, the propriety of indulgences, the justification of the burning of heretics, the doctrine of transubstantiation with reference to the Lord's supper, and that masses should be said in Latin rather than German or any other language.

Eck states his position on particular points of doctrine in the form of propositions. To illustrate: In the chapter on "The Church and Her Authority," his first proposition is: The Church is the body of Christ, the bride of Christ, the kingdom of heaven. Proposition 2: The Church does not err, not only because she always has Christ as her bridegroom, but also because she is ruled by the teaching authority of the Holy Spirit who never forsakes her. Proposition 3: Even as the Church is one, so is there unity in the Church. Proposition 4: It is clear that, representatively, the Church is her prelates and leaders gathered together. Then he lists the objections of the heretics to these propositions. Finally he disposes of these objections by the use of selected Scriptural passages as interpreted by the Church and its recognized theologians. When Eck refers to the Church he clearly refers to the Church as the organized and institutionalized Church: the Roman Church.

Students of Church history and historical theology are well aware of the fact that Eck was Luther's thorn in his theological flesh. Luther recognized him as an astute logician and a brilliant scholar who routed many of the other Protestant reformers and theologians. The fundamental difference between these men, however, is not to be found in intellectual ability but in their basic presuppositions.

1. Both used the Bible to support their points of view. Luther assumed that the Bible was the final authority in all matters of Christian faith and practice, whereas Eck assumed that the Bible as interpreted by the Church fathers, Church councils, Roman scholars and papal pronouncements was the final authority.

2. Luther set aside or refused to accept the pronouncements of the papacy and Church councils because he believed they contradicted each other. He accepted only what he believed to be the teachings of the Bible and, in particular, the NT, whereas Eck was convinced that Luther ignored the established and tested interpretations of the best minds of the Church over a period that exceeded a millennium and placed himself as the final authority and arbiter of Christian teaching.

3. The basic difference and point of departure therefore was not that one scholar used the Bible and the other did not but rather the way in which the Bible was applied and interpreted. Eck believed that the Word of God consisted in the Bible plus all the official theological and practical pronouncements of the Roman Church, whereas Luther believed that the Bible and the Bible only was the Word of God, to be interpreted not by the scholastics of the Roman Church but by the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

The value of this volume is not in outlining the general position of the Roman Catholic Church and of John Eck in particular as its defender during the sixteenth-century Reformation. Its value lies in making accessible to English and American students of Church history and historical theology the dialogue between Eck and Luther and other reformers in their own language. A second value lies in the format. Eck's views are given in propositional form, clearly stated, logically developed on the basis of his presuppositions. One needs to remember, however, that the counter-positions of Luther and other reformers are outlined by Eck. Their views are stated, but as Eck sees them. The translator has performed a valuable service in making this volume available to students of Church history and historical theology.

Nobel V. Sack

Western Evangelical Seminary, Portland, OR 97222


"This book attempts in part to reassess the assumption that Calvin's soteriology was
faithfully upheld by the venerable divines who drew up the Westminster Confession and the Shorter and Larger catechisms” (p. 2). “Calvin’s thought, save for the decrees of predestination, is hardly to be found in Westminster theology; only the notion of assurance itself seems traceable to Calvin. The Westminster divines retained the experimental way of thinking, which is more complicated than Calvin’s simple idea, that ‘Christ is better than a thousand testimonies to me.’ . . . The Westminster divines seemed determined to produce a creed that left no room for Antinomianism or Arminianism. And they almost succeeded. But not quite; Arminius’s doctrine of faith and assurance is so much like their own that it is remarkable that they seem not to have noticed it. . . . The time is surely overdue that historical theology present a more accurate picture of what really happened between Calvin’s era and that which witnessed the emergence of Westminster theology” (pp. 211, 213).

Defending the position outlined above is no small order. But Kendall presents an admirable case—both as a literary accomplishment and as a theological statement.

The book itself belies its origin as a Ph.D. dissertation at Oxford. It presents an exceptionally clear survey of Calvinist thought from Calvin and Beza through Perkins to the Westminster Assembly, and in spite of its rather technical subject matter it is in fact delightful reading. At the same time the extensive documentation that has been retained in its published form should force readers to take the argument of the book seriously.

As a theological statement Kendall’s book is intriguing. Classically, Reformed theology has been divided into an “orthodox” Calvinist wing and a “heretical” Arminian wing. At least that is the Calvinist position on the issue—and, after all, the Calvinist wing does in fact have the Synod of Dort on its side.

Kendall’s study effectively destroys that dichotomy, offering in its place a triangle. He sees a Calvinist position, an Arminian position, and a third position that he designates the “experimental predestinarian” tradition. This third position, he argues, reigned virtually unchallenged among English Calvinists from the time of Perkins (c. 1600) to the period of the Westminster Assembly.

According to Kendall, Calvin and Arminius agreed in affirming universal atonement over against the English experimental tradition. Arminius and the experimentalists together held a voluntaristic conception of faith over against Calvin. And finally, Calvin and the English experimental tradition together affirmed the doctrine of unconditional election over against the Arminians.

The upshot is that the early-seventeenth-century theological milieu begins to appear more complex than it previously had, and Arminius appears a bit less like the theological heretic that he is sometimes made out to be.

If it were not for the price, Kendall’s study could be an excellent text for graduate-level courses in historical theology. It certainly belongs in all theological libraries, and it will undoubtedly call forth a spirited response from some quarters.

William W. Wells

Wheaton College Graduate School


American Christians differed sharply in their attitudes toward the series of hostilities over a fifty-year period that culminated in the Revolutionary War. Firebrands promoted armed conflicts as righteous crusades, others merely accepted military service as a just duty, and some condemned all violence as contrary to the teachings of Jesus. The authors have limited their study to the reactions of the peace churches, but the book should be of interest to anyone concerned with a Christian response to war, especially those who suspect that the concept of a just war may prove inadequate. John Keegan, who writes from the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, suggests as much in The Face of Battle (New York: Viking, 1976) 60: “Any objective study quickly reveals, however, that most wars are begun
for reasons which have nothing to do with justice, have results quite different from those proclaimed as their objects, if indeed they have any clear-cut result at all, and visit during their course a great deal of casual suffering on the innocent.”

Scholars such as Roland H. Bainton have shown that the early Church was largely pacifist. But by the time Christians became a dominant factor in the Roman empire many were willing to bear arms, an outlook that would generally prevail down through the history of the Church. Thus the experience of peace churches in Pennsylvania during the middle of the eighteenth century is nearly unique, for the majority of citizens, including those in the state assembly, were committed to a policy of nonresistance. “Caesar wore a broad-brimmed hat and used plain speech” (p. 31). Even in colonies where members of peace churches were a minority, the question raised by John Churchman became an issue. “How could Christians support war in the name of obedience to civil government when, in some measure, they were themselves the government?” (p. 70). Conscience in Crisis examines the pressures and struggles that forced Quakers from power in Pennsylvania and tested the convictions of pacifists in every colony.

The peace churches included the Mennonites (Dutch, Swiss Brethren, German and Amish Mennonites), the Society of Friends or Quakers, a few Methodists and many Pietists—the Church of the Brethren (commonly known as Tunkers, Dunkers or German Baptists, including both Sabbatarians and First-Day Baptists), Moravians, Schwenkfelders and the Brethren in Christ (River Brethren). Although each group maintained its distinctive doctrines and ethnic identity the peace churches cooperated long before the crisis brought by war. For example, a protest against slavery was issued by Mennonites and Quakers from Germantown in 1688, though individuals lapsed in their stand until reformers such as John Woolman awakened churches to the plight of blacks over a half-century later (p. 530). At the same time the authors review the record of Free Quakers, Funkites (a Mennonite offshoot) and others who either dissented from their fellow believers or simply surrendered their scruples, causing divisions among the churches. While Pennsylvania was the only colony where peace churches constituted the majority of the populace, substantial concentrations could also be found in Virginia (especially the Shenandoah valley), Maryland, North Carolina, New York and New Jersey.

Conscience in Crisis is a carefully edited, annotated and indexed sourcebook of original documents by anabaptists, their opponents, government officials and casual observers. Most of the records are simultaneously clustered together by theme and presented in chronological order, an arrangement that is possible since different questions and issues came to the fore with successive political developments. However, the book also stands as a full-fledged history with ten thoughtful essays (including an introduction, epilogue and a note on sources) that go beyond the sample documents to offer a coherent interpretation of the peace churches as they tried to prevent, avoid supporting and bring to an end the fighting that erupted intermittently over five decades.

Numerous questions confronted members of peace churches. At first they included the proper use of political power. Could a state assembly of Quakers refuse to collect taxes, raise a militia or otherwise support the efforts of the king, governor or surrounding colonies against attacks by French soldiers or marauding Indians? How should those citizens be represented who were quick to bear arms in self-defense? How should those prone to take the offensive be restrained, as in the case of the Paxton boys who massacred peaceful Delawares converted through the witness of Moravian missionaries? Later questions became those of a minority eager to show its loyal citizenship without in any way condoning war. Could war taxes be paid? Could any taxes be rendered to a government engaged in war? Did one dare offer money in lieu of answering a call to muster? Could fines be distinguished from taxes as a proper means of submitting to civil authority without approving of its actions (p. 356)? If one rejected taxes, could one accept paper money that was designed by Congress as a means of sustaining the revolution (p. 363)? Could aid be given to soldiers—not just the sick, the wounded, deserters or the enemy, but also those going to battle? Could payment be re-
ceived for services rendered to an army? In view of traditional strictures against swearing, could an oath of allegiance be taken? And by no means the least of the matters in question: Which government was that ordained by God?

At times the narrative moves a little slowly, and reading the documents can become tedious in spite of their intrinsic value as primary source materials. Still the book bristles with interesting facts and accounts. Fourteen Quakers from Virginia would not serve in a militia, so they were marched under threat of a drawn sword some 200 miles to an American camp in Philadelphia. To avoid the charge of hypocrisy—namely, of taking food or water from men they would not join or defend—they did not eat or drink along the way. Only seven completed the journey (p. 293). A Mennonite gunsmith invented the famous "Pennsylvania rifle," though he left his trade when people began to buy his guns to hunt human prey (p. 299). People who objected to taking an oath of allegiance to Congress faced harsh fines, loss of material goods and property in dead of winter, and social abuse (pp. 399-400). In extreme cases Amish were hanged for "treason" (pp. 456-466). But at least one group of Mennonite farmers became so riled by the military that they seized "guns, pitch forks, axes, and other implements of destruction" to redress a wrong done to a brother (p. 480).

Two additional matters may be worth noting. Though a number of documents appeared to be translations, there was no discussion of the principles behind their rendition into English. Also, readers with a special interest in the Society of Friends should consider an excellent new monograph by A. J. Mekeel, The Relations of the Quakers to the American Revolution (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979).

Despite certain tensions and a variety of responses to specific questions raised by war, the witness of the peace churches was more uniform during the Revolution than in any other American conflict (p. 523). Among Mennonites and Amish, 95 percent or more refused to cooperate with the war effort (p. 300). Indeed, the crisis caused by war was not nearly so deep or divisive as that brought by the Great Awakening, and not nearly so many members were lost over the Revolution as to the evangelical revival—that is, to Methodist and Reformed churches (pp. 525-528). Another more profound effect of the war was to reinforce older patterns of separation and cultural isolation that had diminished for a time in Pennsylvania but that social ostracism and open persecution firmly re-established. The peace churches were once more a minority pitted against a world that often misunderstood and occasionally abused them.

Tim Erdel
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Deerfield, IL 60015


Several introductions to Barth's theology are currently in print and easily available, but until now studies have always approached the expository task topically. Bromiley, one of the major translators of the Church Dogmatics, has here provided the reader with an introduction of a different sort. His Introduction is a précis of the Dogmatics. Bromiley's long and careful study of Barth's major work is clearly evident in this book that few others could have written. It is an excellent contribution to the literature on Barth's thought.

An introduction of this sort could have easily become bogged down in the sheer bulk of the Dogmatics and been impressively detailed but useless. Bromiley has managed to avoid that pitfall. The results are an easily read and faithful map through the 8000-plus-page labyrinth that Barth left.

The titles of Bromiley's précis follow the Dogmatics, and Barth's structure is adhered to throughout. Consequently his Introduction can be read straight through to gain an overview of the Dogmatics that cannot be obtained in any other way. Furthermore, because Bromiley follows Barth's structure so closely his Introduction can be used as an entree to any particular chapter or section of the Dogmatics. In fact even the subsections are referred to in the text, although the subsection titles are omitted. Personally I wish that those additional
titles had been included, even though they might have cluttered the text a bit. (I ended up numbering the subsections in the margin of my copy for further reference.)

The work as a whole intends to focus on Barth's thought and thus to perform the service of exposition. However, Bromiley also clearly intends to commend a more careful and sympathetic reading of the Dogmatics to the theological public. So he occasionally notes places where Barth has been misread or even ignored (pp. 16, 32, 58, 76, 114) and pleads for a more careful reading of the text. On the doctrine of Scripture, for example, he notes briefly that Barth's understanding of inspiration may leave something to be desired, but he goes on to note with appreciation Barth's strong statement of Biblical authority (pp. 43-44). He is clearly concerned when commentators become so engrossed in their critique of one doctrine that they miss what Barth has to say on a related topic.

The book concludes with a brief but thoughtful evaluation and critique. Bromiley's Introduction to the text of the Dogmatics will be widely useful to those who are interested in understanding Barth's major statement of Christian theology. I commend it to the thoughtful reader who would give Barth an honest hearing.

William W. Wells

Wheaton College Graduate School


Hauerwas' further investigations in Christian ethics attempts "to show how the hegemony of the standard account in ethics has in fact ignored or distorted significant aspects of moral experience" (p. 26). By the "standard account" the author means contemporary ethical theory "whether in a Kantian or utilitarian mode" that frees "moral behavior from the arbitrary and contingent nature of the agent's beliefs, dispositions and character" (p. 16). "What I am morally obligated to do is not what derives from being a father, or a son, or an American, or a teacher, or a doctor, or a Christian, but what follows from my being a person constituted by reason" (p. 17).

Hauerwas and his fellow authors find the difficulty lying "with the way the standard account attempts to express and to ground . . . concerns in a manner of accounting which is narrative-free. So we are given the impression that moral principles offer the actual ground for conduct, while in fact they present abstractions whose significance continues to depend on original narrative contexts" (p. 26). They contend that failure to recognize abstractions as abstractions makes the standard account's concern for rationality degenerate into a form of rationalism.

This book is an extension and clarification of the author's position set forth in his earlier works, Character and the Christian Life and Vision and Virtue. In all of these Hauerwas as theologian and ethicist finds himself held by Christian convictions about the nature of God, Christ and human existence. No theology, he contends, can be done apart from a tradition. "We must constantly relearn the lesson that truth does not come through trying to assume a universal or neutral point of view, but through the struggle to live truthfully in relation to a particular tradition" (p. x).

Moral truthfulness cannot be narrative-free. "If truthfulness (and the selflessness characteristic of moral behavior) is to be found, it will have to occur in and through the stories that tie the contingencies of our life together" (p. 24). The first section of the book is devoted to showing how rationality, objectivity (or at least the lack of individualism) and truthfulness are contingent on narrative (and since Hauerwas' primary interests are theological his aim is to show that they are contingent on the Christian story or narrative). He uses Aristotle's discriminations as a point of reference. Aristotle settles for "a true and reasoned . . . capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man" (N. Ethics, 114065) (p. 27). The idea embraced here is that the moral life must be grounded in the na-
ture of man. Human nature is not rationality itself, "but the necessity of having a narrative to give our life coherence. The truthfulness of our moral life . . . [is] secured . . . by the narrative" (pp. 27,28).

There are two more sections. In the second section as substantive issues such as suicide, euthanasia, the value of survival, the moral limits of population growth, the definition of "person" for medical purposes, and social involvement and Christian ethics, are dealt with, much attention is given to the "necessary connection" between truthfulness and community. For example, in treating suicide and euthanasia Hauerwas (with Bondi) argues that these notions "are incompatible with and subversive of some fundamental elements of the Christian story" (p. 102), which keeps alive the language of the gift of life.

The final section draws out the implications of Hauerwas' ethical position in caring for retarded children. He discusses the assumptions underlying the willingness to have children, criteria for humaneness, medical ethics, and how truthful communities deal with suffering. It is here that the author shows how to understand the nature of Christian existence. It is an aspect of his project separate from but dependent on the methodological arguments presented earlier in the book. This is the part of his work that illuminates the title Truthfulness and Tragedy. "A truthful narrative is one that gives us the means to accept the tragic without succumbing to self-deceptive explanations" (p. 12). Hauerwas argues elaborately and carefully to show that medicine as a tragic profession (i.e., "medicine necessarily involves a sense of tragedy, since inherent to its practise is the commitment to sustain life under less happy conditions" (p. 202)) needs a moral community—a story sufficient to guide and sustain its activities.

My criticism of Hauerwas' position on the place of story in ethics is not the one he anticipates—that he fails to define tragedy with more exactness. It is rather that he fails to give a more adequate account of criteria for judging among stories. If he is correct that "criteria for judging among stories, then, will most probably not pass an impartial inspection" (p. 35), then any story (and conceivably many may) that satisfies "(1) the power to release us from destructive alternatives; (2) ways of seeing through current distortions; (3) room to keep us from having to resort to violence; (4) a sense for the tragic: how meaning transcends power" (p. 35) will be an acceptable story. This seems to allow stories that may in some of their claims contradict the Christian story to be equally acceptable with the Christian story.

Nonetheless, this book is a work worthy of careful study. The elaborate notes at the back enrich the text.

William J. Kinnaman
Community College of Rhode Island, Warwick


Harvard philosopher George Santayana said that "to be an American is of itself almost . . . an education." The same can be said of reading Stroh's treatment of the history of American ethics. It has long been charged that American philosophers have abandoned ethics as a practical guide to the moralists while contenting themselves with the more abstract problems of metaethics, such as the meaning and justification of ethical statements. This trend has been dramatically arrested in recent years, however, as a demand for ethical guidance has arisen from medicine, law, business and politics. In recognition of the widespread popular interest in ethics, Stroh has presented the historical context of today's moral ideas to enable the student and intelligent layman to assess our moral options in light of our collective ethical history.

In the introduction the central ethical issues of each period are previewed. Stroh then devotes one chapter each to the ethical thinking of the Puritan, enlightenment, transcendentalist, pragmatist, idealist and naturalist periods, and in the final chapter he discusses recent directions in ethical analysis from the analytical movement in philosophy. Stroh discusses each of the main schools of American ethical thinking by focusing on the major
spokesman of the period, presenting an overview of the period, an exposition of the principal thinker and an assessment of the thinker's ideas and influence.

Philosophers may be surprised that Stroh does not discuss American ethics strictly in terms of trained philosophers or those who worked out clearly formulated positions. True to the nature of the development of ethics in this country, Stroh constructs the working ethics of influential thinkers and men of action, who for all their lack of philosophical sophistication have earned a place in American ethics. In this category is Thomas Jefferson, the principal thinker of enlightenment ethics, who contributed so much to natural rights theory, the secularization of ethics and the outworking of ethical grounding for liberal democracy. Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau represent the transcendentalist movement as those "who presented their ethical insights and reflections in order to stimulate others to do the same" (p. 65). More formally philosophical are the contributions of Puritan Jonathan Edwards, pragmatist William James, idealist Josiah Royce and naturalists George Santayana and John Dewey, as well as the contemporary philosophical academicians.

Of special interest to evangelical readers, in my judgment, are the presentations of Edwards and of the contemporary scene. Edwards is treated with great fairness and respect, although Stroh ultimately rejects Edwards' attempt to base ethics on religion. Evangelicals will be heartened to read that any "fair appraisal of Puritan ethics must consider the high intellectual level of articulateness it achieved so early in our history. . . . Edwards stands above many, if not most, later American thinkers in the ability of his philosophical argumentation, which is indeed no small accomplishment" (p. 22).

Also refreshing to evangelicals used to hearing their Puritan forebears parodied as cruel and superstitious in the light of witch trials, persecutions and gleeful hellfire sermons, Stroh insists that such events "cannot be considered representative of Puritanism as a whole" (p. 22). Such even-handedness has been all too rare.

Christians interested in moral thinking may be surprised to learn how philosophical in tone Edwards' ethics were, how far from the cheap and ready moralizing sometimes seen today. Edwards expounded and applied the thought of John Calvin in the light of then-current philosophical ideas of John Locke and founded his ethical philosophy on the metaphysical underpinnings of idealism. "True virtue" and "apparent virtue" comprise the essential distinction in Edwards' thought. True virtue is based on a perfect love of "being in general," the most universal form of being, which Edwards identified with God.

Edwards' ethics is perhaps most famous for attempting to establish that human actions are predetermined and yet that people are justly held responsible for their actions. Edwards held that every event is uniquely made necessary by its cause, and this includes human actions and decisions. People are still to be held morally responsible for their acts because they can be said to have acted out of their strongest desire at the moment of decision and so did as they pleased. Edwards' view is essentially shared by present-day philosophers taking the compatibilist or soft-determinist alternative to the free-will-determinism debate. As Bertrand Russell explained the position, "We can do as we please, but we cannot please as we please." (Ironically, compatibilism is the mainstay of ethically-inclined atheistic naturalists today.) Stroh's own view, however, is that "ought implies can" and "if an agent or person is unable to do what ought to be done, the whole idea of moral responsibility vanishes. . . . It is not enough that an agent be able to do what it chooses to do; an agent must be able to do what it morally ought to do" even to qualify as a moral agent at all (p. 24).

Also of interest to evangelical readers is an extremely helpful discussion of the major figures in ethics in the analytical perspective. The work of C. L. Stevenson, along with British philosophers G. E. Moore and A. J. Ayer, is rightly credited with turning the attention of contemporary English-speaking philosophy to such metaethical concerns as the nature and justification of statements expressing ethical judgments. Ayer's belief is that ethical statements are merely disguised expressions of emotion: "Killing is wrong" becomes "Killing, boo!" The more sophisticated emotivism of Stevenson holds that ethical statements are used to endorse and recommend courses of action we approve. C. I. Lewis' emphasis on the
objective nature of ethical judgments represents a "return to normative ethics by making use of metaethics" (p. 243), a move seconded by Marcus Singer and John Rawls. Rawls has been enormously influential in the discussion of the nature of law and justice. John Searle and James Feibleman have attempted to derive "ought" from "is," defying a philosophical cliché and re-establishing a basis for ethical naturalism. Theological ethicist Joseph Fletcher represents current American religious thinkers who have turned to ethical pursuits. He is also credited with fostering the current emphasis on biomedical ethics. Fletcher repudiates Christian ethics as traditionally conceived, charging that it is overly legalistic and subordinates human welfare to rule-keeping. Fletcher attempts to base morality on a utilitarian conception of agapē, interpreted as a caring for persons as ends in themselves. While he does not consider himself an antinomian, he denies that general moral rules can be applied to varied situations. Stroh charges Fletcher with "endorsing rather simple solutions to complex moral issues," with inconsistently affirming that a situational decision can be supported by reasons while not allowing the same reasons to count in similar situations, and with confusing "moral judgments with efficiency ratings."

Stroh concludes his discussion of contemporary American ethical philosophy by pointing to recent work in political philosophy and medical ethics that has "clearly faced, identified, and in some measure clarified" contemporary ethical problems. Stroh is correct in this, the reservations of many nonphilosophers to the contrary.

In level of difficulty the book stands between a technical treatment and a popularization. The style is admirably clear, and the discussions of the ethicists are so well-organized and concise that they can serve as quick, accurate references for those who would like to gain some familiarity with the thinkers. The book would well serve as a text for American studies, intellectual history, and history of philosophy courses in American philosophy. On the negative side from a Christian standpoint the book is secular in outlook. The move away from a religious basis for ethics is applauded as liberating, and little is said of religious ethicists besides Edwards, Fletcher and Martin Luther King, Jr. Since being a formally trained philosopher is not a necessary qualification for being included, the lack of mention of religious social ethics as exemplified by nineteenth-century evangelical social reformers is unfortunate. Ignoring these ethicists lends a note of imbalance to the discussion of slavery, since enlightenment and transcendentalist thinkers receive their share of credit for abolition. Also unfortunate is the slighting of the important influence on American ethics by Europeans such as J. S. Mill, Karl Marx and the existentialists. Nevertheless, evangelical religious ethicists who desire exposure to the methods and contributions of secular philosophical ethics will do well to consult this excellent book, as will all interested in the intellectual context of today's public moral debates.

David Bruce Fletcher

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign


Antagonists and "defenders of the faith" in the British debate over the incarnation are brought together under the covers of one volume. The eruption began in 1977 with The Myth of God Incarnate and God Incarnate. Now published are the essays from a 1978 summer symposium with both groups present. To bring order out of the primordial chaos, the editor chose seven questions to organize the essays. The colloquy essays all were opened to immediate challenge. Uniforms should have been provided the players, since at times it is difficult to determine for which team some participants are playing. Some defenders have so redefined incarnation that perhaps a third team should have been organized.

A gentlemanly but regrettably compromising tone is set in the introductory question: "Are the authors of the myth still Christian?" with Brian Hebblethwaite's affirmative answer that the Anglican Church should not retreat from its official doctrinal stand but should nevertheless receive the myth theologians with their explicit denials of Trinity and
incarnation as brothers, Christian theologians, and members of the body of Christ. But can anyone seriously believe in the incarnation and still answer like this? Assessment of personal faith has no place in scholarly symposium.

The defenders of the traditional view are hardly committed to the Chalcedonian Christology, and thus there is no uniformity in the defense of the incarnation. For example Hebblethwaite, a defender, defines incarnation as "God himself in one of the modes of his own eternal being." Don Cupitt, a myth theologian, correctly diagnoses this opinion as nothing less than the kenosis of God, the belief that deity itself is subject to humiliation. Cupitt's own answer to avoid what he considers Hebblethwaite's subordinationism is a modern neo-orthodox version of the ancient heresy of modalistic monachism. "He (Jesus) revealed God not positively by being so great as to be God-made-flesh, but negatively, by being so little that in him God is all in all. . . . The triad, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, symbolizes the way he introduced God."

As a rule the antagonists represent a more traditional rejection of the incarnation than the defenders represent a traditional defense. John Hick acknowledges the necessary connection between incarnation and atonement and then accordingly dismantles the substitutionary concept to remove any necessity for incarnation. Charles Moule supports Hick's rejection of propitiation but defends incarnation as God's changing man's relationship to the world. But as with other moral theories of the atonement, is an incarnation really necessary? A perfect man could have filled the bill. Supporting the incarnation within the system of Anglican theology is Leslie Houlden, who sees the Church's faith as the launching pad into the question. Any hope to discover something near the traditional view is destroyed with Houlden's assertion that the question of its origin in Hellenistic or Hebraic thought, in the teachings of the apostles or Jesus, is not consequential. Without denying the uniqueness of Jesus' incarnation a continuing incarnation is offered.

The Biblical basis is handled under the question: "Is the NT evidence clear or ambiguous?" Charles Moule, a defender, sees the Biblical evidence as pointing to Jesus as someone significant but can come no further than recognizing that "the transcendent Person . . . was continuous with Jesus of Nazareth." Graham Stanton, the champion among defenders, sees the incarnation as having wide NT support. Cupitt takes exception to Stanton's high Christology and claims that any attempt to see Nicene Christology in the NT is but a failure to recognize the use of metaphorical language. Attached as appendix is Stanton's critique of Goulder's theory that Paul took over from Samaritan Christians the concept of incarnation. Goulder is allowed the last word.

Incarnation sits at the base of Christian theology, but with such a wide opinion, agreement on the nature of Christianity is hardly possible. The debate has clarified a thoroughly diverse situation.

David P. Scaer

Concordia Theological Seminary, Fort Wayne, IN 46825


Webber has detected that "many evangelicals are still confused about how they are to be responsible Christians in the world" (p. 13). To help remedy this he has written The Secular Saint, which is both an examination of various historical models of Christian social concern and a contemporary perspective on evangelical social responsibility.

This well-organized book begins with two chapters that define the terms and problems associated with the Christian's responsibility of living "in two realms." Those readers not familiar with the terminology of the subject will appreciate these.

Webber then turns to the Biblical mandates for man's cultural activity as given in the first eleven chapters of Genesis. This section, entitled "Man as Cultural Agent," is a brief yet beneficial survey of the cultural mandates in creation (a topic often overlooked in evangelical churches today) and the radical effects of the fall in rendering man incapable of
building a culture based on the will of God.

Another chapter is devoted to the kingdom of God and the cultural calling of God’s redeemed people. The author’s views of the kingdom are given here and are based largely on George E. Ladd’s many fine works in this area. Webber rejects those views that compartmentalize life into areas of “sacred” and “secular” and argues correctly that “both in the Old Testament and in the New, God calls forth a people to be obedient to Him in all areas of life” (p. 65).

Though suffering from some unevenness the largest section of the book, dealing with the historical background, is still a valuable and much-needed review of how some Christians in the past viewed their social responsibilities. In a time when the average church member’s knowledge of Church history dates back to the calling of his last pastor, this refreshing survey is welcome. As the author isolates three models of Christian involvement in culture (the separational, identificational and transformational models), the reader is introduced to numerous quotations from primary source materials ranging from the early patriarchs to the medieval theologians, anabaptists and reformers.

The problem of unevenness is exemplified by the contrast between the thorough and well-documented study of Luther and the interpretation of Calvin, which is far too dependent on secondary sources. The works of Andre Bieler (The Social Humanism of Calvin) and W. Fred Graham (The Constructive Revolutionary) are relied upon too heavily, with three times as many references to their works as to Calvin himself. This leads to what we think is a partial misinterpretation of the Genevan reformer’s social convictions.

Webber’s own case for evangelical social responsibility is presented in the last chapter in which he analyzes the historical and theological origins of present-day evangelicalism and proposes an “incarnational model” for social involvement. This model is an attempt to bring together the best points of the three aforementioned models into “a single and coherent whole” (p. 188). The result is a mixed success. While he argues that “no one model is the correct model for all times and all places” (p. 198) he seemingly avoids the issue that some aspects of each model, being partial truths, are on a collision course with aspects of other models. His “incarnational model” centering on the life of Jesus Christ is a good starting point, but more work is needed in isolating the specific implications of it in various contexts. For example, how should evangelicals in the United States effect social change? Webber laments that “evangelicalism appears to be aligned not only with conservative theology but also with conservative politics, and it is certainly not (as a whole) in the forefront of social reform” (p. 174). Should we infer that evangelicals should be aligning themselves with liberal politics? We believe that some of the liberal contributions to social reform have hardly been constructive. Witness the decline in the work ethic, the rise of abortion on demand, the decline in emphasis on the sanctity of marriage and family life.

The value of the book would be enhanced with a closer look at how views of eschatology affect views of social responsibility and with a more pointed application of the incarnational model. On the other hand, one of the book’s strengths is that it resists simplistic answers and sees the tension and struggle inherent in being “in the world and not of it.”

Both a Scripture index and a general index are included at the end of the book for easy reference. Each chapter ends with a summary, questions for discussion and a list of books for further reading, all of which increase the book’s value for group study or discussion. However, some of the bibliographical references are of marginal value to the lay reader and, in the last chapter especially, seem skewed toward the anabaptist perspective.

Pastors will find The Secular Saint stimulating reading. We hope that informed laymen, college and seminary classes will make use of it as well, since there is much valuable historical material in this highly readable format.

A few minor blemishes were detected, including some typos (as on pages 131, 142 and 177). The translators of some works cited are not credited for their work as is the case with some of Augustine’s, Calvin’s and Luther’s works.

Notwithstanding these minor faults, we recommend The Secular Saint with hopes that it will call evangelicals in our day to a wider social involvement and responsibility. Those
who are asking whether they should be involved in social concerns should read this book. Those who are asking "How?" will find less specific help here.

Daniel E. Deaton

Edgefield Presbyterian Church, Edgefield, SC 29824


The title under review has significance for several reasons. It represents one of the first book-length critical examinations of part of liberation theology's program for change by a North American white theologian. And it is, to my knowledge, the first by a white process theologian. In writing, he aims for what he describes as "the largest audience I could expect to reach among both laypersons and clergy" (p. 13).

One should not expect in reading this book to find either a comprehensive or descriptive work. For that, the most useful tool remains Robert M. Brown's _Theology in a New Key: Responding to Liberation Themes_ (Westminster, 1978). Ogden's work is almost completely shorn of footnotes and of interaction with individual thinkers and specific arguments. His approach is dictated not by questions raised in liberation theology but by one raised by Ogden himself. It is the issue of God. "Can Christian faith in God be so understood that it positively includes the concern for human liberation in this world?" (p. 13). This issue he isolates from our understanding of the Christian mission, though both he considers the two major theological questions his denomination (the United Methodist Church) will struggle with in the next fifty years.

In view of the strongly critical nature of Ogden's analysis, the evangelical may be tempted to read the work as a put-down of liberation thinking with which he may identify. It is not. Ogden is serious when he speaks in the opening chapter of "the challenge of the theologies of liberation." They are a challenge "both because of what they have already succeeded in doing over against our own failures, and because of what they have as yet failed to do" (p. 31). On the positive side is their attention to "the basic human question" to which the Christian witness to God "must be presented as the answer... the question of liberation" (p. 17). With all their limitations, these theologies, argues Ogden, "are among the more forward-looking and hopeful expressions of theology on the present scene" (p. 25). They are intensely preoccupied "with practical issues of action and justice, as distinct from theoretical questions of belief and truth" (p. 32).

The vast bulk of Ogden's remarks, however, flow from his effort to work out what he feels to be a still more adequate theology of liberation than yet achieved. He cites four points of failure and spends the remainder of the book on the second and third points in particular: (1) The theologies are said to be not so much theology as witness, tending more to rationalize positions already taken rather than critically reflect on these positions; (2) they tend to focus on the existential meaning of God for us without dealing adequately with the metaphysical being of God in himself; (3) they tend to confuse two essentially different though closely related forms of liberation—namely, redemption and emancipation; and (4) their understanding of the forms of human bondage is too restricted: "Each of the theologies of liberation characteristically orients itself to one form or another of human bondage—political, economic, cultural, racial or sexual—as though freedom from it were the whole of emancipation" (p. 38).

Ogden's argument is not whether there is a single process of liberation but how theology is to properly understand that one process. His second chapter focuses on the existential meaning of God for us—that is, faith as existence in freedom and for freedom. "Because faith is utter trust in God's love as well as utter loyalty to him and his cause, it is both the negative freedom from all things and the positive freedom for all things—to love and serve them and to speak and act as to respond to all their creaturely needs" (p. 64). As existence in freedom, it is liberated. As existence for freedom, it is liberating. It seeks to optimize the limits of the freedom of others in whatever way this can be done.
How will we optimize the limits of others' freedom? By participating in God's own liberating work. And here Ogden levels his sharpest attack on liberation theologies. "They tend to be far more successful in explicated the meaning of God for us . . . than in explicated the being of God in himself" (p. 71). Why do they so fail? Apart from exceptions like Juan Luis Segundo, they build their concepts of God as the ground of freedom on classical metaphysics and its conception of deity as the Absolute. On such a foundation they cannot be consistent with what they themselves take to be the existential meaning of faith in God. Ogden's substitute is the concept of God developed through process theology, a concept where the notion of freedom is applied literally to "everything that can be actual at all," from particles to God (p. 75).

Using this process perspective, God must be understood as Redeemer and Emancipator. As Redeemer, God-talk becomes a reference "to the ever-new event of God's own self-creation in response to the free self-creations of all his creatures" (p. 83), the unique process of God's self-actualization. By it he creatively synthesizes all other things into his own actual being as God. Our language about God as Emancipator becomes an expression of omnipotence, God's only aim or intention being the fullest possible self-creation of all his creatures. And our place in this? "Even as God will not save us without ourselves, so he will not emancipate us without ourselves—nor will he emancipate others without our participation in his emancipating work of establishing the optimal conditions of their freedom" (p. 92).

Ultimately, then, for Ogden current liberation theologies leave us enslaved to "subtler forms of bondage" (chap. 4). And from these theology must also be liberated "if anything like an adequate theology of liberation is to be achieved" (p. 101). One he cites as homocentrism. By it he means something different than the humanism customarily feared by the evangelical. In keeping with his process approach to the world he defines it in terms of western culture's presupposed dualism of history and nature, the claim that "man is emancipated from nature for history" (p. 108). Homocentrism for Ogden in its attitude toward nature as "hostile territory" is both theoretically false and practically vicious.

Until theology is released from this process of rationalization it cannot itself be emancipated from ideological misuse. Unlike the liberation theologies' perspective on theology as a reflection of commitment with the oppressed, Ogden sees its service as "only the indirect service of critically reflecting on the positions that such praxis implies" (p. 123). He has amplified this judgment in the Autumn 1979 issue of *Theological Education* (pp. 48-49).

A number of minor criticisms might be quickly mentioned in our analysis of Ogden's argument. How many laypersons and clergymen, white or black, will make full use of this title is questionable. Though small and less hefty than Ogden's 1966 book, *The Reality of God*, it still remains in the heavyweight class. Not having benefited from a recent rereading of Ogden's earlier work, I felt also on several occasions we were reading conclusions supported more fully in other writing. This, in fact, may go far in explaining my sense of having eaten a heavy meal billed as a light lunch.

As I see it, deeper criticism must ask two questions. Is Ogden accurate and fair in his analysis of liberation theologies? And what must we think of his own proposed groundwork for any more solid basis to liberation patterns of thinking? In one sense, we ask not two questions but one. For Ogden himself sees his own proposals as a form of liberation theology. And the direction of the book is not simply negative or even in a technical sense one of academic dialogue. The absence of specific interaction only places greater weight on our response to Ogden's positive counterproposals. It makes it difficult to say "yes" to our first question and "no" to our second.

I cannot feel yet that Ogden has looked at liberation theologies from the "inside." To use the categories of Kenneth Pike, his perspective is "etic," not "emic." James Cone in a review of Ogden's book has drawn attention to this on the phenomenological level. "How," he asks, "can one write a book on *Faith and Freedom* in the historical context of North America and speak about common experience but fail to even mention the distinctive expression of black faith and freedom? . . . There is almost nothing in this book that seeks to speak to
and out of the context of black culture and history” (Perkins Journal 33/1 [Fall 1979] 53, 55). And how, we add also, can one write of liberation theologies and fail to agonize out loud over the exploitive patterns of Latin America’s social and economic context? One does not sense the bitter taste in Ogden’s mouth when he writes. This is not to say that Ogden has not tasted this wormwood. He obviously has. It is simply to ask: “Why is it absent in his verbalization?”

As a beginning, we suspect his initial decision to approach liberation theologies through the issue of God in isolation from the issue of Christian mission. How can the two ultimately be separated, even for literary purposes, without reducing even a designedly process metaphysics into the classic model of static ontologizing Ogden wishes to avoid? The issue of Christian mission, as Ogden has formulated it, asks: “Can we understand our special calling as Christians as a new responsibility that we bear for the sake of the world, instead of as a new privilege that only Christians can enjoy?” (p. 13). Is this not simply the missiological dimension of the theological question? Can even an understanding of theology as “critical reflection,” without mission perspective, become so indirect that it has no border-crossing direction at all? Does not Ogden, as a matter of fact, share this weakness with even classic evangelical models of theology that presume, as he seems to, that “theology,” unlike “witness,” is done at a safe enough distance from the battlefront to be rational (in a nonpejorative sense)? Is part of the difference between “etic” and “emic” theologizing a commitment close enough to the oppressed to produce a confession of faith bruised by more than a mere contemplation of raised fists?

Could that be also why we found ourselves wondering if he fully catches the difference between speaking of “freedom” (Bultmannian categories used before by Ogden) and “liberation”? The former is a European verbalization coined against the existential search for the luxury of meaningfulness. The latter is a southern-hemisphere term reflecting the hardship of those who must do their searching in the chains of self-images imposed by poverty and racism. The former is a state, the latter is a process of struggle. Could Hugo Assmann’s assault on Europe’s armchair “political theology” become an assault also on “process theology” for many of the same reasons?

One of the most challenging parts of Ogden’s book to me was his questioning of classical patterns of metaphysics as they operate in theology. I find myself increasingly sensitive to those who question the adequacy of purely essentialistic Greek categories to describe the character and work of God. Yet at the same time I fear that process theology asks us ultimately to substitute one Greek’s (Parmenides) focus on becoming for another’s (Plato) on being. I struggle then not simply with the subject of theology as “critical reflection” but with the reality of its object—God as more than simply ground of freedom. I wonder what Ogden means when he speaks of Jesus Christ as “the event in our common human history that is both the origin and the principle of our own faith in God and witness to him” (p. 54). What is a witness to Christ if it is only a witness to Christ as “the decisive re-presentation, or presenting again through concepts and symbols, of the same gift and demand of faith in God that never cease to be present in our actual existence as long as we exist and act humanly at all” (p. 55)? Is not sin far more than “just this rejection of ourselves as the creatures we know ourselves to be” (p. 86)? And the grace of the redeeming God much more than simply “God’s redeeming acceptance of our lives into his” (p. 87)? Has Ogden’s process theology, built out of his deep indebtedness to Bultmann, taken us further than even Bultmann dared go? And now we demythologize God himself.

Even if we should accept Ogden’s distinction between “theology” and “witness” (and I am not yet prepared to do so), we are left with a subtler form of bondage than even the homocentrism Ogden contemplates. It is a cosmo-centricism, a “panentheism” where all things occur “within God.” What then shall theology reflect on? To what will we give witness? I find this to be an even more slippery basis for building a theology that truly liberates.

Harvie M. Conn

Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, PA 19118

*Hearing and Doing* is a *Festschrift* of 16 philosophical essays written in honor of H. Evan Runner, professor of philosophy at Calvin College, by his former students. The editors indicate that Runner impressed his students with the view that life is religion, that life “derives its meaning from the creational situation of God speaking and man responding” (p. x). Given this perspective on life, religion must have implications for all areas of life. This line of reasoning provides the rationale for the book’s title and content. The essays are on widely divergent philosophical topics, intending to show the importance of hearing and doing for all areas of life. Runner introduced his students to the Calvinistic philosophy of the Netherlands as expounded in the works of such thinkers as Vollenhaven and Dooyeweerd, and the articles in this volume reflect that philosophy. For someone versed in that school of philosophy this volume will prove to be of special interest.

The essays are divided into five categories. First there are those dealing with current political and social approaches to problems (Hart, Zylstra, Langerak). A second group is concerned with matters directly pertaining to Scripture (Oltius, Cook, De Graaff). The third and fourth groups are historically oriented, focusing respectively on medieval scholasticism (Helleman, Steen, Van Dyk, Vander Stelt) and on post-Kantian and post-Hegelian German philosophical thought (Vander Goot, Plantinga, Kraay). A final section focuses on topics of scientific foundational import (Wolters, Seerveld, Tol). The volume also includes an interview with Runner.

While I enjoyed all the essays, I found those on post-Kantian and post-Hegelian German thought to be the most helpful. In particular, Vander Goot has given a very thorough and clear exposition of the relation of religion and culture in the early thought of Schleiermacher. Some of the articles will probably prove to be unobjectionable to most, but they also seem to be of little philosophical value and relevance. Articles that fall into this category are Cook’s work on “Thoreau and the King James Bible” and Helleman’s “Augustine’s Early Writings on a Liberal Arts Education.” There are, on the other hand, several articles that will prove to be of philosophical interest and to serve as a basis for debate. I should like to comment on a few of them.

Hart (“Struggle for a New Direction”) discusses the relation of positivism to the political order. Some have argued that positivism and totalitarianism fit hand in glove. Hart agrees and argues further that the North American commitment to democracy tends toward totalitarianism itself, for it excludes plurality of political convictions. Hart suggests that the answer is to maintain a critical mind toward existing political orders in light of the message of the gospel and the truth of the coming kingdom of God. In relation to Hart’s treatment I find several difficulties. First, Hart presents much theory about the relation of positivism and totalitarianism, but not much evidence is offered to support the theory. Second, throughout the article the impression is given that any form of order (democracy or whatever) leads to totalitarianism and that only self-criticism of one’s institutions to the point of overturning such institutions avoids totalitarianism. One has to ask, however, whether such an approach is not itself totalitarian since it suggests that one’s relation to political order should always be of the sort described. Third, after much discussion on the need for pluralism to avoid totalitarianism Hart introduces Christianity and the kingdom of God as the answer. But is this not a totalitarian answer itself? Moreover, are we to take a posture of criticism toward this totalitarian answer? It seems that Hart needs to think out more carefully the implications of what he is suggesting. Finally, throughout the article there is an underlying assumption that totalitarian situations are always undesirable. But is it true that all such situations are negative? I would argue that it is false in view of the coming kingdom of God. When Hart opts for the Christian answer, a totalitarian answer, he seems to contradict the basic thrust of his article. Certainly it would help to have some of these issues clarified.

Langerak (“Freedom: Idea and Ideal”) suggests that it is hard to define “freedom.”
Moreover, he distinguishes between the idea or meaning of freedom and the most ideal form of freedom. He argues that the idea of freedom is so broad that the really interesting issue is the matter of which freedoms are ideal. In all of this, the fundamental problem seems to be that Langerak suggests and evaluates various ideas of freedom but never actually states which definition(s) he holds. From this problem stems the other main difficulty—that is, we are told that the ideal of freedom is the key issue, but in trying to determine which is ideal he has to incorporate some idea of what freedom is. Since he does not tell us exactly what it is, however, it is hard to judge whether his evaluation of which freedom is ideal is accurate.

Othuis ("Towards a Ceritudinal Hermeneutic") claims in relation to the Bible that "the overriding, pre-eminent concern of this type of literature is the terminal matter of certainty" (p. 71). The result is that "since neither the political, economic, psychic, or linguistic are independent themes in Scripture, they can only rightly be treated when their ceritudinal coloring is acknowledged" (pp. 71-72). Any reading of Scripture that ignores the ceritudinal focus of the Bible is illegitimate (p. 72). I think that Othuis' discussion, while generally helpful, has some serious difficulties. First, Othuis nowhere proves that the Bible's focus is ceritudinal. He merely assumes and asserts it. In fact, he does not even offer a hermeneutic for proving that Scripture's focus is ceritudinal. Second, when one reflects on Othuis' ceritudinal focus he recognizes that this is a tool to tell us the use of Biblical statements, whatever they mean, but it does not help us know what they mean. If Othuis is right about ceritude he has helped us greatly in the overall task of understanding the purpose of Scripture, but I do not see that what he is claiming turns out to be the kind of key that he suggests to unlocking the meaning of any given passage of Scripture. Put differently, his emphasis may be helpful in understanding the illocutionary force of Scripture's statements but not their locutionary force.

De Graaff ("Towards a New Anthropological Model") proposes a model for man that views man in functional terms. De Graaff expresses displeasure with various forms of dualism and monism and then suggests that Scripture always pictures man's functioning in the world as a result of his relatedness to God. He writes: "We need to learn to trace more fully the functional expression of man's religious nature—his unity, his centeredness, his religious motivation, and his knowing and doing as religious service unto God or a pseudo-god" (p. 108). Even man's bodily functioning is said to be expressive of man's spirituality or God-relatedness. Though I appreciate De Graaff's emphasis I find his analysis to be too reductive. This theory is problematic in that it does not properly distinguish between function and ontology. Man indeed functions as a whole person, but there is much that needs to be said about man. The functional views cannot be an answer to the ontological question of what man is. Moreover, while I would agree that the purpose of Biblical writers is not primarily to set forth an ontology of man, Scriptural statements nonetheless do have ontological import and implications. For example, it would be hard to deny the ontological implications of such statements as the Lord's in Luke 24:39. Furthermore, even if one looks at man totally from a functional perspective, De Graaff's suggestion that man's God-relatedness is what constitutes his functionality (even bodily functioning) will be hard to accept for some. For example, I find it difficult to understand how the body's functioning in digesting food is expressive of man's spirituality.

Finally, Seerveld has written on aesthetics ("Modal Aesthetics: Preliminary Questions with an Opening Hypothesis"). His purpose is to specify what constitutes an artistic work as art. As his analysis indicates, this is not an easy question to answer. According to Seerveld, what differentiates the ordinary from the artistic is the quality of allusiveness. Initially the suggestion is attractive, especially after reading Seerveld's rejection of other candidates. Upon further reflection, however, one realizes that the implications of this suggestion would make everything art. What is there that does not in some way or other allude to something else? Seerveld may indeed be on the right track, but I think his theory needs some modification to avoid the problem mentioned.
All in all, *Hearing and Doing* contains some helpful articles and many thought-provoking ones. I would certainly not make it a priority item for my reading in philosophy, but it should not be ignored.

John S. Feinberg

Western Conservative Baptist Seminary, Portland, OR


This book contains the documentation of the recent meetings of the Third Conference of Catholic Bishops of Latin America (Conferencia General del Episcopado Latinoamericano), usually known as CELAM. This time the conference had the tremendous publicity boost of a visit of such a popular pope as John Paul II to the city of Puebla, Mexico, where the meetings were held.

An article by P. Lernoux, “The Long Road to Puebla,” provides the reader with background information, not only about the meetings but also about the most important developments of Latin American Catholicism since the historic conference of Medellin in 1968. The Medellin conference—a landmark in Latin American Church history—was scheduled to coincide with Pope Paul's visit to the Colombian capital, Bogota, to participate in the International Eucharistic Congress.

The Roman Catholic Church, for centuries an ally of the upper classes and the military, turned in the direction of the less privileged classes, probably because of the powerful leftist revolutionary movement that threatened the traditional hold that Church has had in most of the Latin American nations.

Lernoux and others make it clear that concern for the poor was present among many Catholic priests and laymen even in the days of the Spanish conquest. The role of the new theology of liberation is now openly emphasized, especially as to the contributions of Father Gustavo Gutierrez.

A “Report from the Conference” by M. Sandoval is to some extent the key to understanding the workings of the conference. It is clear, though, that Sandoval leans openly to the more progressive side (as they prefer to be called) or “leftists” (as the conservative elements call them). He expresses his regret: “Missing among the experts were all of Latin America’s best known theologians: Gustavo Gutierrez, Juan Luis Segundo, Leonardo Boff, Hugo Assmann, Jon Sobrino, Ignacio Ellacuria, Raul Videses, Enrique Dussel, Segundo Galilea, Pablo Richard and Jose Comblin.” Situations like this indicate that the conference tried to work out a compromise to avoid control by the progressives, so influential in Medellin. Sandoval was also concerned by what he called “harrassment from the right.”

The role of Archbishop Marcos McGrath of Paname seems to have been decisive in the whole process. His introduction to the “Puebla Final Document” is one of the most important parts of the book. The archbishop mentions the “evangelicos” (Latin American evangelical Protestants) and their contribution in the area of Biblical translations. The “Final Document” itself reflects the attitude of many Catholic leaders in Latin America. Even though they maintain a reasonably open attitude toward the Protestant minority they try to ignore as much as possible the fact that Protestant numbers are growing faster than Catholics all over the continent and that eventually Protestantism, especially its dominant evangelical branch, will be a mighty force in Latin America, numerically and also politically. The document, however, contains valuable positions toward problems like evangelization (the Catholic way, of course) and social concern.

It is at the same time a theological reflection in many ways and also a document filled with concern for the pastoral ministry of the Roman Catholic Church that has not always reflected the best tradition of the care of souls. Part Two, “God's Saving Plan for Latin America,” indicates a serious interest in the subject but is not acceptable in some aspects for the average evangelical and even for the more ecumenically-oriented liberal Protestants.
Like the opening address at the Puebla Conference delivered in the Palafoxiano Seminary of Puebla by Pope John Paul II, the documents reflect above everything else the consciousness of the Roman Church about the political and social developments that now affect Latin America in a way more dramatically apparent than ever before. Jesuit priest Jon Sobrino makes this clear in one of the articles: "We must note that Puebla talks repeatedly of the option of the poor. A special document was devoted to this topic. This option was also made the theoretical backdrop for the mission of the whole Church and an integral part of all its various missions. The fact that the bishops are bringing up this theme 'in season and out of season' proves that a focus on the poor and a preferential option for them can no longer be renounced today in the Latin American Church."

Two important contributions, designed especially for the "Anglo" reader, are the article of J. Greimillon about the significance of Puebla for the Catholic Church in North America and that of R. M. Brown that addresses their Protestant counterparts in that region of the hemisphere. Among Greimillon's interesting remarks is this: "The Puebla document does not condemn all ideologies. The innate problem is that every ideology is partial, in the double sense that it embraces only some fraction of human experience and society and life's meaning, and that it tends to absolutize its own partial aspirations to the detriment and often to the exclusion of others."

Brown provides a scholarly liberal Protestant perspective as he points out the differences between North American and Latin American churches and between Catholicism and Protestantism. He is critical of the limited interest shown in the documents toward Protestantism. His criticism is extremely valuable. He goes so far as to say that "a Protestant will look for evidences of ecumenical concern. There are almost none." He is, however, quite convinced of the usefulness of the conference and appreciates its concerns, although for him the best thing that can be said about it is that "it could have been a lot worse."

The reviewer would have appreciated it if opinions of certain theologians of the evangelical branch of Protestantism in Latin America such as Ruben Lores, Victorio Araya, Rene Padilla, Samuel Escobar, Orlando Costas, Emilio Nuñez or Evis Carballosa had been included. But whatever disagreement we may have with the Catholic position and with the participants (progressive, moderate or conservative), Puebla and Beyond can be an indispensable source of information about that historic conference.

Evangelicals, even with the most open-minded attitude, would never agree with the words of V. Elizondo in his brilliant introduction and commentary about the pope's opening address: "Throughout his stay in Mexico, he spoke about fidelity to the whole and integral truth about God, Jesus Christ, the Church." Regardless of the intentions of the pontiff, Latin American evangelicals must continue even with greater zeal their work of over a century: preaching to the Latin American masses the full message of Jesus Christ.

Marcos Antonio Ramos

Miami Christian College
THEOLOGICAL REPRINTS

Anyone involved in historical theology knows the importance of primary sources. And for those of us whose Latin, Greek and old, theological German is rusty, we must add that we know the importance of good, up-to-date translations. Unfortunately, when we find such treasures they often are so costly that we must be satisfied with innumerable trips to the library. One of the outstanding series that we found there in the 1950s was Westminster Press' "Library of Christian Classics." How I wished that I could get a set of those blue-jacketed tomes into my home library without breaking either the family budget or God's commandments. Well, there is hope at last. Westminster is now well into reprinting these favorites in a paperback series called the "Ichthus Edition." For $7.96 each you can get these 1979 offerings: Western Asceticism (ed. O. Chadwick); Augustine: Earlier Writings (ed. J. H. S. Burleigh); Zwingli and Bullinger (ed. G. W. Bromiley); and Calvin: Commentaries (ed. J. Haroutunian). Each one is reprinted with exactly the same contents as the original hardbound edition.

Other reprints or new editions that have come across the desk: Zondervan has put out a revised edition (1978, $24.95) of their International Dictionary of the Christian Church. It is much the same as the first edition (1974) though there are several lesser additions by three scholars. The only major addition is an article on "Revivalism" by D. W. Dayton. Moody has a paper edition (1980, $6.95) of René Pache's The Future Life (hardback, 1962), a rather good book which emphasizes personal eschatology, a branch of eschatology often lost in more corporate studies that seem to be the common fare. Moody has also put W. Smith's fine work Biblical Doctrine of Heaven (1966) into paper (1980, $5.95). I. Robertson's What the Cults Believe (1966) has been newly revised by him for Moody. Several contemporary cults such as the Unification Church and the Way International have been included in the 1979 edition ($6.95). There have been format changes as well. It still remains a good, short (154 pp.) treatment of the major cults. In somewhat the same vein, Regal Books has revised (1979, $3.50) Fritz Ridgenour's So What's the Difference? (1967). Slightly shorter than Robertson, this latter work is more ambitious (he covers Roman Catholicism and the four major non-Christian religions) but less inclusive of contemporary, eastern-oriented cults.

Oxford has reissued (1979, $3.95) N. Smart's important Philosophy of Religion (1970). They have also issued Handy's A History of the Churches in the United States and Canada (1976) as a paperback (1979). At $5.95 this highly acclaimed work is a bargain. (Oxford consistently prices their books so that the seeking reader can afford them. Most evangelical publishing houses seem to price theirs so that only the heathen can afford them but produce books that only believers can understand.) Abingdon has republished S. Hiltner's important Preface to Pastoral Theology (1968).

W.F.L.

RECENT REPRINTS

Once again Baker has sent us several important reprints. All are bound in paper. Pride of place goes to the detailed, devotional work by J. Brown, An Exposition of Our Lord's Intercessory Prayer (1850, pp. xvi + 256, $6.95). Five more volumes have been released in the "Thornapple Commentaries" series, two of which are from the pen of J. A. Alexander: The Gospel According to Mark (1858, pp. xxiii + 444, $8.95) and The Gospel According to Matthew (1860, pp. 456, $8.95). Little known but still useful is the work by E. Henderson, The Twelve Minor Prophets (1858, 463 pp., $8.95). Rich in theological insight is the classic by W. G. T. Shedd, Commentary on Romans (1879, 439 pp., $8.95). C. Hodge, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians (pp. xx + 398, $7.95), completes the set.

Three of Baker's reprints deal with some aspect of Church history or historical theology. Useful source material is compiled in D. J. Theron, Evidence of Tradition: Selected Source Material for the Study of the History of the Early Church, the New Testament Books, and

In a class by itself is the reprint of G. H. Clark, Thales to Dewey: A History of Philosophy (1957, pp. xii + 548, $9.95).

Three books of particular interest to the student of the OT are: W. H. Green, General Introduction to the Old Testament: The Canon (1898, pp. xvii + 209, $6.85); J. D. Davis, Genesis and Semitic Tradition (1894, pp. xiv + 150, $4.95), a useful if dated discussion of Genesis 1-11 against its ancient Near East background; and M. F. Unger, Israel and the Arameans of Damascus (1957, 189 pp., $5.95). The introduction by K. L. Barker points to the most useful bibliography to bring the work up to date.

Baker offers two more reprints, neither of which is easily grouped with others. The first is the work by W. M. Alexander, Demonic Possession in the New Testament: Its Historical, Medical, and Theological Aspects (1902, pp. xii + 291, $6.95). Very thought-provoking is the book by A. Edersheim, Prophecy and History in Relation to the Messiah (1901, pp. xxiv + 391, $7.95), the Warburton Lectures of 1880-1884. Edersheim, it is now known, is capable of embarrassing anachronisms, but he offers many stimulating suggestions concerning the relations between the Testaments.

Finally, Baker has also sent us the attractive exposition of Psalm 23 written by J. J. Davis, The Perfect Shepherd (1979, 155 pp., $4.50), with its carefully chosen pictures and sound exposition it would make someone a fine gift.

D.A.C.