BOOK REVIEWS


In 1972 Augsburg published a work by Jervell entitled Luke and the People of God. It very much lived up to its subtitle, "A New Look at Luke-Acts," and argued consistently that Luke's writings evinced a very Jewish-Christian ecclesiology focused on the Church as renewed Israel (not "true" or "new" Israel, replacing the old) joined by Gentiles (for an extended summary and critique see D. A. Carson, ed., From Sabbath to Lord's Day, pp. 114-119). Part of that work examined the picture of Paul in Acts and argued that, for Luke, Paul was first and foremost a Jewish Christian: a Pharisee, a loyal nomist, and ultimately "the teacher of Israel." It seemed that Jervell was deepening the gulf between Luke's Paul and the Paul of the epistles and that the result would be a further depreciation of Luke's work, which some have already jostled to the sidelines of canonical significance and labelled "early Catholicism."

But Jervell's new work provides a thoroughly provocative step in the other direction. The position on Luke is maintained and developed; what is new—and somewhat breathtaking—is his attempt to argue that the conservative Jewish-Christian Paul of Acts is as much the real Paul as the Paul of Galatians. We are invited to nothing less than a major rereading of early Christian history.

The first essay, "The History of Early Christianity and the Acts of the Apostles," is one of the two in the volume that have not been published elsewhere. If Luke is a Gentile, writing at a time when Jewish Christianity has collapsed (after A.D. 70), then why, asks Jervell, is he so insistent that the accusations against Stephen and Paul (of breaking the law, the traditions of Judaism, and [in Paul's case] with circumcision) were false (even when there was a grain of truth in them) and that the Church is nomist? Why does Luke concentrate on the success of the Jewish mission and tell us nothing of a purely Gentile one—except the collapse of the attempt at Athens? And why does Acts so emphatically underscore the importance of Jerusalem? The answer to these riddles, suggests Jervell, is that Stephen was actually more liberal than the Church of Luke's day, which was positively Jewish-Christian (if not in numbers, at least in theological clout). That thesis requires a rewriting of N.T. history as it is normally understood.

The second essay, "The Mighty Minority," offers the skeleton of such a rewrite. Jervell argues as follows: (1) Gentiles were fully and freely accepted by the Jerusalem Church, and Paul's mission as uncontroversial, before the council in 48. (2) The council, far from being a victory for Gentile Christianity, represented a tightening up of the previous free admission of Gentiles and a victory for Jewish Christianity, which was only now beginning to emerge as a self-conscious entity. (3) From the council to A.D. 70 the nascent movement began to impose circumcision on the Gentiles, at first coming into conflict with Paul's policy but eventually even bringing Paul to recognize the future salvation and privilege of Israel (Rom 11:25) and to recast his theological understanding of the law (Romans versus Galatians). (4) Beyond 70 the Jewish-Christian movement continued to flourish as a theological force, and its views dominated the literature of the third generation of the first century (fourth gospel, Revelation, James, Matthew, Hebrews and Luke-Acts!). Only well into the second century did the movement wither.

Jervell's third essay, "The Unknown Paul," is perhaps his most provocative and original piece. Luke, working with far more traditions about Paul than he needed, success-
fully brings into the sunshine aspects of Paul that can be seen in the shadows in the epistles and to which scholars have paid scant attention because they have concentrated only on the polemical statements of the occasional letters, not on the uncontroversial and traditional Paul that we can also detect. That Paul, argues Jervell, had more freedom in theology than in practice and lived by and large as a Pharisaic Jew (cf. 1 Cor 7:18; 9:20–21; Gal 5:11) — even finally resolving his antithesis of nomos and pneuma (Rom 8:4) and accepting that God would justify ungodly Israel (11:25). It is not that Jervell thinks we can harmonize the Paul of Galatians and the Paul of Acts (or Romans), but that both are part of the multiplicity and variety of Paul’s personality and history.

Chapter 4, “Paul in the Acts of the Apostles: Tradition, History, Theology,” adds little to the previous essays other than detail, while chap. 5, “The Signs of an Apostle: Paul’s Miracles,” shows that Luke’s portrayal of Paul as a powerful charismatic (who nevertheless refrains from speaking of his charismata) is right (pace Käsemann and Haenchen on 2 Corinthians 12) and that Luke fully portrays Paul as a suffering apostle too, even if he does not capture every nuance of Paul’s paradox.

These five essays the reviewer judges to represent the heart of the book. They are fresh, untechnical, and reveal Jervell as an astute observer of early Christianity. Not that all is plain sailing. There are nearly as many tensions in Jervell as he purports to find in Paul. His reconstruction of the “real Paul” is not always convincing, while his reconstruction of Christian history creates as many riddles as it solves — such as how the majority of the very earliest Church freely accepted Gentiles as God’s people, participating in the promises to Israel, without circumcision and the law, and how later they came to regard the apostolic decree as all the OT demanded of Gentiles as an associate people of God alongside an “Israel” more thoroughly than ever (on Jervell’s hypothesis) committed to nomism (see From Sabbath to Lord’s Day on this) and, indeed, how Jewish Christians were able at all to characterize themselves as such out-and-out nomists when they freely dispensed with the ritual food laws that had previously rendered the Gentiles “unclean” (cf. Acts 10). These and other questions need answering, but we must be grateful for Jervell’s stimulating suggestions, and he has certainly pointed to features in Luke—Acts and other early Christian writings that cry out for further study.

The remaining four essays vary from the merely less significant to the downright contrived. In the former category chap. 8, “The Circumcised Messiah,” argues that Luke 2:21 is important: As the Church is centered on the rebuilt Israel and on renewal of the covenant of circumcision given to Abraham (Acts 7:8), it was as theologically necessary that the Christ be circumcised and keep the law as it was that he suffer and enter his glory. And chap. 7 offers a nuanced essay on Luke’s view of the center of Scripture (essentially its prophetic aspect). Chapter 6, “The Sons of the Prophets: The Holy Spirit in the Acts of the Apostles,” evinces flashes of brilliance but is marred by a fundamental failure to understand the Jewish, and Jewish-Christian, concept of the Spirit of prophecy (which certainly was not confined to giving prophecy) and by uncharacteristic artificiality of argument. Contrived too is the last essay, “The Daughters of Abraham: Women in Acts,” arguing that Luke is not really interested in women as such, but only Jewesses (or those connected with the synagogue) as examples of the pious daughters of Abraham — and that this, together with his ruthless subordination of them in Acts, reveals Luke’s Jewish Christian proclivities. And when Jervell tells us that pure Gentile women are totally absent from the scene in Acts he not only betrays his tendentious approach but is simply wrong: At very least he overlooks Damaris in Acts 17:34 (or is the D reading beyond question?). So the finale is disappointing. But thanks are due to Roy Harrisville (who translated some of the essays) to Augsburg, and most of all to Jervell for what is otherwise a stimulating book that will provoke discussion for years to come.

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This revealing little book, the German edition of which first appeared in 1981, reflects a dialogue that took place at a conference of pastors and theologians held by the regional church of Pforzheim. It is far better than the average book of its kind because, in this case, the views of the Jewish scholar Lapide and the Christian scholar Stuhlmacher are in fact markedly different. In light of the content of the book one wonders how F. Allgeier can attempt in the preface to summarize the dialogue in words that seem to imply happy agreement: “Although, or better yet, because, Paul sees in Christ the ‘new creation’, he never tires of proclaiming ‘peace and mercy’ on all his believers, as well as on ‘the Israel of God’ (Gal. 6:15f.).” This is the view articulated by Lapide, but it is decidedly not the conclusion of Stuhlmacher.

Stuhlmacher’s fine essay, “Paul: Apostate or Apostle?” unhesitatingly affirms the Jewishness of Paul but then shows how Paul’s law-free gospel alienated him from the Jews. Stuhlmacher then reviews Paul’s defense of his gospel as found in Romans against a variety of Jewish objections Paul had to answer. He shows that Paul regarded his gospel as rooted in the OT, that he held to a continuing salvation-historical distinction between Jews and Gentiles, that Paul was not an antinomian, and that Paul, regarding the mission to the Gentiles as temporary, still expects the salvation of Israel. It is extremely important on this last point, however, to note that Stuhlmacher says explicitly that the salvation of “all Israel” will occur “through faith in the Messiah Jesus” (p. 25). The work of Christ in Paul’s understanding is for Israel as well as for the nations. “The gospel concerning the righteousness of God in Christ is meant for the Jews first and above all” (p. 22).

Lapide’s essay, “The Rabbi from Tarsus,” portrays Paul as a man in search of truth who never fully arrived at it. Lapide agrees with Stuhlmacher that Paul was not an antinomian but, in a way reminiscent of E. P. Sanders, he faults Paul for the view that the Jews displaced grace with works-righteousness. But the most important and forceful point made by Lapide here and again in the discussion section that follows the essays is that Paul meant his gospel only for the Gentiles and not for Israel. Lapide argues that Paul continued to regard the Jews as the people of God, acceptable to God as they are, apart from the gospel.

This last point is a familiar one in contemporary Jewish-Christian dialogue (e.g. M. Barth, K. Stendahl), often taking the form of a “two-covenant” theory, where the old covenant continues in force for the Jews while the new covenant concerns only Gentiles. This is the modern analysis of a relativistic age, however, that flies in the face of the NT evidence. Lapide’s hypothesis, indeed, sounds plausible only because of his selective use of passages and his ignoring of others that go against his hypothesis (e.g. Rom 10:1; 1 Cor 9:20). Given the glory of Paul’s Christ and the centrality of Christ to his entire theology, it would seem impossible to accept any conclusion that regards Christ’s work as significant only for the Gentiles and not for the Jews. Lapide has in fact made no attempt to understand Paul’s perspective as a coherent whole, and thus he misses the complexity of Paul’s thought. Certain points that are true within a larger viewpoint are often taken by Lapide and emphasized in disregard of other things Paul says, and they are accordingly blown out of all proportion.

The weakness of this book, as with so many such products of Jewish-Christian dialogue, is that for the amount of actual point-for-point interchange that takes place the two authors may as well have been appearing at separate conferences. Fortunately each knows to some extent the views of the other and can speak to them. Lapide has contributed to something like half a dozen books of the genre of the present one—i.e., in dialogue with Christian scholars. As much as anything, these books are used by Lapide as a
platform for the expression of his particular views. These books, including the present one, nevertheless have their value even if, as is the case here, the "Jewish" view presented is decidedly a modern one. Apart from the occasionally helpful insight, the Jewish perspective here is not one that finally enables us to understand the historical Paul better.

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I read this book after I had virtually finished my preparation for a series of lectures on 1 Corinthians 12—14 and had therefore canvassed hundreds of articles and scores of books on these difficult and disputed chapters. As far as book-length studies go, only a handful of works stand out as treatments that merit serious study. Martin's is among them.

The book is by and large understandable without any knowledge of the original language. The notes are reasonably full and offer some insight into the secondary literature, and the "Points to Ponder" at the end of each section of Martin's translation of the text raise questions for the Greek student. I mean that quite literally: These "Points" ask questions of the Greek student, which are for the most part answered only in the exposition itself.

Martin argues that there is an underlying theological error behind these chapters. Some substantial part of this Hellenistic church came to hold the view that baptism constituted their resurrection to new life. This experience gave them an entrance to an exalted life in the here and now, an exalted life whose genius was a sensible experience of "spirit" of which "speaking in tongues" was the sign and proof. Their eschatology was over-realized, and their future hope of a new bodily existence of the resurrection was collapsed into a kind of spiritual ecstasy of the present. That is one of the reasons why Martin links chap. 15 to chaps. 12—14; the question of the resurrection is utterly bound up with the eschatological error that underlies the problem of ecstatic utterance. In that sense, of course, one could argue that what is really required is an exposition of the entire epistle—but I suppose one has to stop somewhere.

This is not the place to raise detailed objections to exegetical points, but perhaps I may indicate my hesitations on at least two points. First, Martin detects several "quotations" from the Corinthian church in the material that Paul writes, but I remain unpersuaded that he provides controls adequate for the justification of this position. They are quite unlike the undisputed instances (e.g. 6:12, etc.). Second, Martin offers his own modification of the now common view that in 1 Cor 14:34–36 Paul is dealing with charismatic women who so wish to usurp authority that they have tumbled into doctrinal error. The silence he enjoins is therefore limited by this theological deviation. I confess I have never been able to understand an exegesis of this passage that makes Paul so chauvinistic that the only heretics he is prepared to silence are the female ones. Or does Martin seriously think that the only Corinthians who espoused these deviant theories in Corinth were women?

Martin interacts with the most important works of scholarship, but he purposely does not deal with popular books. In writing an exposition at a semi-popular level, however, that can prove a serious oversight. There may not be many international-class scholars who hold that the tongues in 1 Corinthians 12—14 were real languages and the gift of interpretation merely the ability to translate them into the Greek of Corinth, or that the middle voice of 13:8 means that tongues will cease of themselves; but there are many
people around who believe precisely those points and who justify their interpretation on the basis of popular or semi-popular expositions. It is to be regretted that Martin does not respond, in his own semi-popular work, to such concerns.

D. A. Carson

_The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon and to the Ephesians_. By F. F. Bruce. NICNT. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984, xxviii + 442 pp., $18.95.

Bruce is well known as a scholarly and popular commentator. Having written commentaries on most of the Pauline epistles, he has now revised his work on Colossians (the first Pauline letter he commented on) and included with it in the one volume new works on Philemon and Ephesians. The original NICNT volume on Ephesians (and Colossians) was written by E. K. Simpson (and Bruce) in 1957, while Philemon was somewhat surprisingly grouped with Philippians in J. J. Müller's 1955 volume in the series.

The current work on Colossians invites comparison with the earlier exposition. The more recent introduction is much longer than its predecessor (thirty-one pages against eleven) and is more detailed in its treatment of the cities of the Lycus valley, the Jewish settlement there, and the arrival of the gospel at Colosse. Particularly helpful was the clear assessment of the "Colossian" heresy together with several possible Jewish backgrounds, including that of _merkabah_ mysticism.

One would not expect a careful and judicious commentator such as Bruce to have to retract much of his exegesis of Colossians. When we come to compare the two expositions we find this to be the case—refinement yes, but very little that has been overturned by recent scholarship. On the whole the expositions are fuller, and certainly the bibliographical details in the footnotes have been expanded and updated (to 1983). Issues such as Christ's preexistence (Col 1:15), "universal reconciliation" (1:20), filling up whatever is lacking in the sufferings of Christ (1:24) as well as other cruxes were all handled carefully and in the light of current problems of interpretation. Again and again it was clear that Bruce was aware of the contemporary literature on the issues, but he has not allowed his interaction with such literature to turn him aside from commenting on the text of Paul's letter. It is a pity that W. Grudem's linguistic researches into the meaning of _kephalē_ as "head" signifying authority rather than source or origin were not available to Bruce for his remarks on Col 1:18.

Some of the author's views about the letter to Philemon were known from his book on _Paul_ (chap. 34; see also his earlier article, "St. Paul in Rome: 2," _BJRL_ [Autumn 1965]). It is a great blessing to Bible students, however, to have available his detailed exegesis of the text of this epistle, especially as Bruce's vast skills and sensitivity as a commentator are clearly evident in handling a document that is filled with allusions, hints or suggestions. A good instance of this sensitivity is evident in determining the nature of Paul's request of Philemon. Clearly, Paul specifically asks that Philemon will receive his slave Onesimus on a new footing—i.e., as a fellow Christian and a partner in the gospel (v 16). But Bruce is right when he adds that Paul "is delicately letting Philemon know that what he would really like him to do is to send Onesimus back to him to continue the personal service that he has already begun to render Paul" (p. 199). The only qualification regarding the exegetical comments on the letter concerns the meaning of "obedience" in v 21. In our judgment this has to do with Philemon's obedience to the will of God (a deeper understanding of which Paul has already prayed for, v 6). Since there has been clear evidence of Philemon's obedience in the past, demonstrated so con-
cretely in his continuous generosity, Paul can now write with confidence (cf. Stuhl-
macher).

Although Bruce produced a verse-by-verse exposition of The Epistle to the Ephesians
(1961), the commentary on Ephesians in this volume is not a revision of that earlier
work. An introduction of eighteen pages precedes the exposition, in which Bruce claims
Ephesians continues the line of thought followed in Colossians, particularly as it draws
out the implications of Christ’s cosmic role for the Church. Ephesians is the crown of
Paulinism and gathers up the main themes of the apostle’s teaching into a unified presen-
tation. This (possibly circular) letter was “written to encourage Gentile Christians to
appreciate the dignity of their calling, with its implication not only for their heavenly
origin and destiny but also for their present conduct on earth, as those who were heirs
of God, sealed with his Spirit” (p. 245).

In the space of a brief review it is not possible to draw attention to all the features of
this careful commentary of 170 pages on Ephesians. However, the following points are
worthy of note. First, Ephesians is notoriously difficult to divide because of its lengthy
sentences, additional clauses, phrases and genitival constructions, etc. Without imposing
a structure on the text Bruce has broken it into clear sectional divisions, thus making
it easier to read and understand.

Second, while recognizing that the letter may contain hymnic pieces in it the author
is cautious in his comments, although for many others dogmatism seems to be the order
of the day. Most importantly Bruce deals with the text as we have it and does not engage
in lengthy or doubtful discussions about nuanced Pauline treatments of already existing
material. At the same time an extremely helpful feature is the way the writer draws
attention to parallel expressions elsewhere in Paul (or the rest of the NT, for that matter),
but where marginally different points are being made (e.g. pp. 286–287). The exegesis
is thus precise.

Third, the bibliographical material presented in the footnotes was full, enabling the
student to follow up references. However, there was no reference to any of M. Turner’s
writings on the Holy Spirit.

Fourth, the following discussions and exegetical points were clearly and helpfully
made: the treatment of how Gentiles were now in the people of God on an equal footing
with Jews (and what was new about the mystery: pp. 313–316); the handling of 4:7 ff.
with its unusual quotation of Psalm 68 and the different (or contradictory?) wording (pp.
338 ff.); the description of the armor in Ephesians 6 against the background of Isaiah 59
and in relation to the contemporary Roman soldier (pp. 403 ff.; note the proper critique
of Carr’s view on p. 405); the description of the heavenly realm with its succession of
levels (p. 406); and the exposition of Christ’s filling the universe and his body (e.g. p.
344).

On the other side, the case for identifying the apostles with the prophets (p. 304)
might have been explored further. Likewise, Hurley’s arguments on “submission” at 5:21
and the following verses of the household table could have been explored. Finally, I
consider that ekklēśia in Col 1:18 and the Ephesians references points to a heavenly
gathering rather than some worldwide or universal Church.

This is a fine commentary and is all that we have come to expect from the pen of
Bruce, the doyen of evangelical scholars: clear, accurate, easy to read, and giving evidence
of the author’s breadth of learning and charity when disagreeing with the viewpoints of
others. It undoubtedly enhances this highly successful series, of which Bruce is the editor.

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According to the author, this volume is not intended to be a commentary but rather an exposition of the contemporary message of Revelation through a series of thematic studies. Goldsworthy advocates that the gospel, portrayed in the Lamb-Lion tension, is the key to understanding the Apocalypse. In the first chapter he points out that John illuminates the central paradox of the gospel through the apocalyptic images of lion and lamb (Revelation 5). He concludes that "the victory of God was the humiliation and death of His Son. The Lion assumes the meekness of the Lamb and dies in order to overcome" (p. 22). Hence Goldsworthy's thesis is that Revelation is an exposition of the gospel and its various implications. He develops this thesis by evaluating a variety of subjects such as the seven letters (chap. 5), the apocalyptic and prophetic texts (chap. 6), the hymnic passages (chap. 7), and conflict and Armageddon (chap. 8).

He assumes two interpretive principles throughout his discussion. The most important interpretive principle, according to Goldsworthy, is the "centrality of the gospel." Also coupled with this is his understanding of the "end." He argues that the OT concept of the end has been radically modified by the gospel so that there exists an overlap between the present age and the age to come. Hence the Apocalypse describes the end as inaugurated by the death and resurrection of Christ. Thus the apocalyptic imagery does not refer to the future specifically but portrays the present struggle that believers undergo by virtue of their identification with the Lamb, a struggle that ultimately will be resolved when the Lamb is revealed as the Lion to consummate the believers' salvation at the end (cf. p. 98). Furthermore, Goldsworthy argues that according to the NT writers the day of the Lord reaches its fulfillment in the giving of the Spirit coupled with the ascension of Jesus (p. 69). Thus the day of the Lord is now present. Consequently he interprets the judgment imagery throughout the Apocalypse as symbolic of spiritual conflict in the present age (pp. 123–127). Although Goldsworthy cites several NT passages outside the Apocalypse in this discussion, it is interesting that he fails to consider such texts as 1 Thess 5:1–2 and 2 Thess 2:1–2 in which the day of the Lord is described as a future event in which judgment will be poured out on the earth.

Because of this "present" perspective of the Apocalypse, Goldsworthy's interpretation of various apocalyptic images is almost predictable. For example, the 144,000 in Revelation 7 is not interpreted as a reference to a literal number from the literal nation of Israel but instead is a perfect number that speaks of the security of the believer in light of present suffering (p. 43). Also, Armageddon is interpreted as a reference to Calvary as well as every conquest of the gospel as it is presented in the present age (p. 127). A major problem, however, with Goldsworthy's interpretation of Revelation as a "present" drama is that he has not demonstrated from the Apocalypse that the "end" includes both the present and the future (with an emphasis on the present). He does not show that John understood the "end" in any other way than a future (though perhaps imminent) event. He appears to have read a Pauline eschatological perspective (with its emphasis on a "realized" aspect of the kingdom) into the Apocalypse. In fact, a discussion of Pauline texts forms the background for his discussion of the day of the Lord in Revelation (pp. 70–71).

A second interpretive principle involves an understanding of the nature of the literary idiom of apocalyptic. Goldsworthy correctly states that "we must allow the author to use the literary conventions that exist for him in his time and culture, and to use them in a way that will suit his purpose" (p. 15). He criticizes those who view apocalyptic imagery in a strictly literal fashion and thus advocates a "symbolic" approach to such imagery (p. 16). Although many will not agree with all his interpretations, one must admit that the attempt to capture the purpose of apocalyptic genre is refreshing. Nevertheless, this
reviewer wishes that Goldsworthy had treated the issue in a little more detail. The discussion is quite simplistic, and there is no documentation from other apocalyptic works of the period to validate his conclusions regarding the "symbolic" nature of the genre.

The most controversial discussion, particularly for premillenarians, is Goldsworthy's treatment of the millennium. He interprets Rev 20:1–10 in a typical amillennial fashion. He states that the millennium is the present reign of Christ with all those who are made a kingdom of priests (p. 130). Hence the thousand years is, as to quantity, an unknown but perfect period of time. Furthermore the binding of Satan is the "affirmation that the kingdom of God has come in Jesus Christ and now permeates the world through the church as it preaches the gospel" (p. 130). This is a case where Goldsworthy's amillennial theological structure (rather than the nature of apocalyptic genre) seems to be responsible for his conclusion (p. 127). He argues that one must allow apocalyptic "symbolism" to be what it is. He then says that one cannot establish a gigantic doctrinal system—i.e., premillennialism—on one symbolic passage (p. 128). We would, however, question Goldsworthy's understanding of "apocalyptic symbolism" at this point. For example, in contemporary Jewish apocalyptic material there is the belief in a temporal kingdom, though limits assigned to its duration are various (e.g. 4 Ezra 7:28; 2 Enoch 32:2—33:2; Barn. 15:2–8). Thus simply to dismiss the text as symbolic of the present age without any reference to contemporary apocalyptic texts is questionable. Furthermore, he offers no contextual validation from Rev 20:1–10 for his position.

Much of Goldsworthy's discussion of texts in the Apocalypse (like Rev 20:1–10) is done in summary fashion without giving any serious exegetical treatment of them. Also the volume is not very well documented and contains no bibliography.

The value of the work is found in Goldsworthy's effort to link eschatology to Christology (particularly the cross and resurrection), a connection that I personally feel is often overlooked in literal, futuristic approaches to Revelation. Furthermore it is important, as Goldsworthy points out, to look at John's own situation and attempt to view the apocalyptic imagery not only as references to the future but also as informed by historical circumstances. The volume also is quite easy to follow since Goldsworthy gives helpful summary and thesis statements at the conclusion of each chapter. Nevertheless, the extreme "realized" eschatological interpretation he offers is unconvincing.

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The main burden of this strange book is to argue for a particular order and numbering of the books of the Old and New Testaments. The "correct" number of Biblical books, we are told, is 49 (22 OT, 27 NT), the fundamental number symbolizing completion or finalization. The author finds various other ways in which the number seven appears in the canonical structure. The order of the books is also taken to be hermeneutically significant. For example, Martin wishes Bible publishers to return to earlier (patristic) ordering of the NT, which placed the general epistles before the letters of Paul. The proper order for teaching is to place these simpler letters first and follow them by the more complex instructions of Paul. On the same principle of simple-to-complex, Martin maintains the traditional ordering within the Pauline corpus, the only exception being that he places Hebrews between 2 Thessalonians and 1 Timothy. The first place given to Romans, therefore, is not based on its length (Martin never even considers the possibility) but on its simplicity. Many of my NT colleagues will be surprised to learn that Romans "clearly
represents the ABC’s of Christian doctrine” (p. 26), but such insights are dispersed routinely in this work.

One of the major methodological problems with the book is its failure to distinguish adequately the inspiration of the Biblical books, the growth of canonical consciousness among the people of God, and the process of collection and ordering of the particular books. All of these get lumped together in such a way that the last contributors to each Testament—Ezra for the OT and Peter and John for the NT—are also the ones who collect and order the books. If this position could be sustained, then we would probably agree that the concern for a correct order and number of the books is important—although we might still disagree on what the order and number means and whether it is historically feasible to reestablish this “original” sequence. Martin, of course, is quite confident that he knows the original sequence and its meaning, but at this point we encounter a whole series of other problems. I note just a few items.

There is first the selective and arbitrary use of historical evidence. Often the author fails to document his evidence, and even when he does the reader is seldom given any indication of opposing views or of evidence that could counter the author’s position. So, for example, Martin states: “There were only 22 books to the standard Old Testament. This numbering can be traced back at least two hundred years before the time of Christ. It is found in the Book of Jubilees” (p. 36). The alternative numbering of 24 books is held to be a later (second- or third-century A.D.) innovation of Babylonian Jewry to counter the mystical implications that came from adding the traditional number of OT books with those of the newly formed NT canon: “When the New Testament books were being accepted as divine literature by great numbers of people within the Roman world, all could see that the 27 New Testament books added to the original 22 of the Old Testament reached the significant number 49” (p. 45).

Here we are given no indication of the textual problems connected with the quotation from Jubilees (2:23)—the citation given is based on the Ethiopic version translated by R. H. Charles. Martin is cavalier in his dismissal of the first-century evidence of 2 Esdras for a Jewish reckoning of 24 books. Indeed, a fair case can be made that the more ancient numbering among the Jews was 24 and that this was modified by some to bring agreement between the number of Biblical books and the number of letters in the Hebrew alphabet (see the much more careful discussion in R. Beckwith, The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985) 235–273). One senses that with Martin historical argument has really only a secondary role in confirming positions previously established on the basis of Biblical numerology.

Second, in dealing with the Biblical materials themselves Martin finds much more evidence for the formation of the canon than other scholars, whether liberal or conservative. 2 Peter in particular is understood to be “the key to the first canonization of the New Testament. It is an official statement to show how he and John (not long before Peter’s death) gathered together some written records which the apostles themselves either wrote, had authorized to be written, or sanctioned already existing works into a position of canonicity” (p. 180). 2 Pet 1:19–21 is taken to refer to apostolic writings: “Peter was plainly trying to show that he and John were given ‘the word of prophecy more confirmed’ in order to canonize more writings into the sacred library of books, as had Ezra and Nehemiah in their day” (p. 189). Previous to writing his second letter, in the summer of A.D. 66, Peter journeyed to Rome to consult with Paul on the subject of canonization. What Peter began was subsequently completed by Jewish Christians in Asia Minor under the direction of John the apostle. Beyond the specific questions of exegesis here, most readers will question the confidence with which Martin reconstructs these and many more specific details of the canonical process.

Another problem with this book is that it seems like a waste of energy. How important is it to establish a “correct” canonical ordering of the Biblical books—assuming that this
could be done? Beyond providing the reader with a supposed development from simple to complex, Martin himself has relatively little to suggest. The particular writings of the third section of the OT "were selected to show leaders, among other things, that godly women were proper to marry and evil women were to be shunned. In one way or another the eleven books of the Third Division are designed to show this" (p. 69). The placement of the catholic epistles before the Pauline corpus "would tend to exalt the Jewish apostles over the apostle Paul and the Gentile section of the Christian Church. This is clearly the proper thing to do" (p. 14). Even if one were to accept such strange conclusions, are they worth a book?

In spite of some interesting information and intriguing hypotheses, this work is tendentious and idiosyncratic. It cannot be recommended as a reliable guide to the study of the development of the canon.

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This truly great work is an appropriate _opus magnum_ of a distinguished scholar whose earlier books are well known to Church historians. It is in many ways the culmination of a lifetime of study in early Christianity. The result is a very readable and balanced presentation that may well become the standard reference work for this period. Evangelical professors may also find it a very useful seminary-level text.

In scope it covers the period from 140 B.C. to Pope Gregory the Great, approximately 750 years. In breadth it deals with the most recent findings and theories in archaeology, NT studies and Church history, as well as the time-honored standard texts and literary sources in these areas. The author did not design it as a Church history textbook, deferring in this respect to the works of Duchesne, Kidd and Lietzmann. But more recent scholarship and archaeological finds shed new light on certain questions that Frend seeks to answer: How and why did Christianity become the religion of the Roman world? How did Christian civilization lead to divergent traditions and permanent divisions within the Church? How did the Church in east and west come to influence so profoundly the world in which we live?

The four parts of the work are divided chronologically. The first part, Jews and Christians (A.D. 30–193), begins by showing the Jewish environment in which Jesus and Paul lived and taught. The Jews in Palestine as well as in the dispersion are for Frend the strongest outside influence on the development of the Church. Frend shows how the Church outlasted the waning influence of Judaism, gradually becoming a "third race" within the empire, and by 190 was a well-organized federation of communities surrounding the Mediterranean. He also shows how variations were appearing even at this time in the form of Gnostics, Montanists and Latin-speaking Christians.

In part 2, Christianity and the Roman empire (A.D. 193–330), Frend shows the beginnings of Christian doctrine in Origen and others and the transformation of the Church at Rome from a cultic community of Greeks and Jews into a Latin Church at the forefront of Christianity. He focuses a good deal of attention on the persecutions in this period and how the Church dealt with their aftermath. He shows how by the end of this period Christianity had become "the most important single religious force in many parts of the empire."

Part 3, from Constantine to Chalcedon (330–451), covers the period from the Council of Nicaea to the Council of Chalcedon. He deals with the great theologians of this period,
showing how east and west were going their own ways in theology as in other matters. He does a good job of explaining why the provincials around the empire were so ready to accept Christianity and how the new religion was often combined with aspects of the lingering paganism. He demonstrates how at Chalcedon the differing east-west views on theology and authority came to a head: The west rejected the authority of Constantinople, and parts of the east rejected the Chalcedonian Christological definition.

In part 4, the parting of the ways (451–604), he traces the consequences of Chalcedon and shows how the avoidance of outright schism between Constantinople and Rome in the sixth century could not hide "the gradual distancing of two incompatible systems of doctrine and discipline."

Within each section he considers historical and theological developments in alternating chapters. Following each chapter are bibliographies of sources and secondary works, and footnotes. The appendices include a helpful 73-page synopsis of events, seven unimaginative maps, and very adequate name and subject indices.

Many readers will appreciate the fact that Frend has no theoretical axe to grind. However, he is not an empiricist; he respects theory and makes use of it, particularly social history theory. By and large he accepts the majority opinion on a given issue (or that of a strong minority). Occasionally he puts forward his own unique views, particularly on a topic that he has studied intensively (such as persecution and martyrdom).

This work should be highly valued for its survey of all the new evidence from archaeology: Qumran, Nag Hammadi, Toura, Faras in Nubia, Carthage, and the Via Latina in Rome. In the early period its special value may be in how it demonstrates the importance of Judaism and Jewish Christianity for the development of the churches in Palestine, Egypt and Carthage. Students of the Constantinian era will find Frend masterfully grappling with the significance and implications of the Constantinian revolution for Christianity and later world history.

However, the work is not without its drawbacks for evangelicals and its errors. Frend holds to a deuto-Isaiah hypothesis (p. 15), and he accepts the "Q" source hypothesis (p. 131). He believes one can reconstruct the personality and work of Jesus from the canonical gospels alone, though individual sayings may be in doubt (p. 56). Following R. M. Grant, he accepts ten epistles as genuinely Pauline (p. 114). He is in error in suggesting the existence of an Iranian Saved Savior myth (p. 202). He is inconsistent in calling both Catholicism (p. 56) and Christianity itself (p. 569) the opponent of Manichaeism. It is perhaps best seen as a rival to Catholic Christianity. Frend throughout his work neglects to deal with the topic of mysticism. When one considers the significant impact it has had and still has on the Church, this is a rather surprising omission in such an otherwise complete work. For example, he does not mention the use made by Gregory of Nyssa (Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381) of the mystic Macarius.

Those interested in using this work as a springboard for serious study will find that Frend often does not discuss the scholarly debates surrounding his topics, but his notes demonstrate that he is aware of the debates. While the notes are more representative than thorough, as befitting a survey work, they can be considered as a trusted train conductor who will lead one to the right car. Some of the final editing and notes were completed posthumously by the publisher. This book would work best in graduate-level courses, although the typical seminary Church history course devotes far too little attention to the first six centuries of Christianity for a thousand-page book to be practical. Frend's writing style is straightforward enough to be understood by college students and could be used with success in an upper-division course on early Christianity.

James S. Jeffers

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Students of religion usually encounter Christianity’s ancient critics via the safety of one of the apologists. Often they are extant nowhere else. Wilken has attempted to extract this material in order to allow the pagan observers to speak for themselves. The attempt is successful to this extent: Some of the criticisms still sting.

The author introduces the reader to five representative figures from the second, third and fourth centuries. Whereas Pliny adjudged Christianity to be a degenerate “cult” carried to extravagant lengths, Galen elevated the movement to the status of a philosophical school—deficient by Greek standards, to be sure. Celsus, the object of Origen’s renowned Contra Celsum, criticized Christianity’s theological inconsistencies with satire and caricature. Porphyry was the first to impugn the integrity of Scripture on strictly literary grounds. Lastly, Julian the Apostate posed a dual threat. As a former Christian he possessed an insider’s knowledge of real and alleged weaknesses. But he was also in a position to undermine the socio-political gains of the Christians. He was marginally successful.

Wilken’s work offers one or two genuine insights but is also valuable for underscoring that which we know but too often take for granted. For example, pagan critics perceived Christianity’s relation to Judaism as “one of its most vulnerable points” (p. 198). Christians gave the impression of embracing and repudiating its heritage simultaneously. Second, “Christian theology took shape in dialogue and discussion with alternative points of view” (p. 200). Doctrinal positions now taken for granted were forged in the fires of ancient debate—e.g., historical revelation, incarnation, creation ex nihilo. One cannot accuse the Christians of supplanting reason by faith. The persistence of dialogue refutes this. “Christians and pagans met each other on the same turf” (p. 200). Third, many so-called modern discussions were adumbrated very early in our era: the historical character of Christian revelation, reliability of Scripture, embellishment of Jesus’ teaching by his followers, etc.

Very little pagan criticism is extant. Wilken devotes much of his time reconstructing a lot from a little. There is a tendency to attribute words to the critics when there is little evidence for it. Yet he is careful to note the liberty he is taking and thereby avoids discrediting his work. The book targets the public rather than the professional, but even so it is a substantial work. We need to be told again that “Christianity became the kind of religion it did because it had critics like Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian” (p. 205).

Robert W. Herron, Jr.

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This book is an attempt to provide for the first time a comprehensive index of Scriptural quotations and allusions in the works of Chrysostom. It is strictly an index insofar as it contains no analysis of Chrysostom’s use of Scripture, the form of the citations, and so forth.

I note one interesting point. B. F. Westcott has argued that Chrysostom was dependent on the Peshitta version of the NT and consequently never cited 2 Peter, Jude, 2 and 3 John, or the Apocalypse. Krupp, on the other hand, finds two citations of 2 Peter, one of Jude, and nine of the Apocalypse. My own check of the references indicates that none of them are direct citations of NT texts. In about half of the citations I could see no allusion
to the NT. In other cases one might argue that Chrysostom alludes to texts different from what Krupp indicates. For example, *In Acta* 23.4 says that death comes *hós kleptēs en nukti*. This could be an allusion to 2 Pet 3:10 as Krupp thinks, but more likely it comes from 1 Thess 5:2 as the following clause (*alla katheudontōn hēmōn epitithetai*; cf. 1 Thess 5:6–7) confirms.

Such differences of opinion are to be expected of course in scholarly judgments. The index will be useful for students of patristic exegesis.

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In a tribute at the opening of this volume, J. Pelikan, a former student of Pauck (1901–1981), characterizes the work of this historical theologian as "an ellipse, with one focus in the Reformation and the other in the modern critical temper" (p. xix). Pauck's dual commitment is clearly exhibited in this collection of journal articles and selections from books (originally published 1929–1970), compiled and edited by his widow and co-worker, Marion Hausner Pauck. The book consists of ten chapters, four devoted to Reformation figures and six dealing with theologians from Schleiermacher to Tillich.

Reflecting his prominence as a Luther scholar, three chapters focus on the reformer. Granting the necessity of considering the economic, sociological, political and psychological forces at work, the first chapter, "Luther's Faith," comes as a refreshing reminder that, at its root, the Reformation was a religious and spiritual matter. In chaps. 2 and 4, Luther is contrasted with Butzer (Pauck contending for the superiority of Luther's view of Church and state [pp. 18–19]) and with Philip Melanchthon. Given the current concerns of some regarding "humanism," the latter chapter affords a timely reminder of the virtues of genuine Christian humanism exemplified in Melanchthon.

Chapter 3 links Calvin and Butzer. Pauck here contends for the view that "the type of church which we call Calvinistic or Reformed, is really a gift of Martin Butzer to the world, through the work of ... Calvin" (p. 29). Some may question Pauck's portrayal of Calvin's dependence on the Strassburg reformer as an exaggeration suggesting that Butzer made Calvin a Calvinist.

Moving to the other end of the "ellipse" (chap. 5), Pauck defends Schleiermacher against the charge of being "unhistorical" (p. 77). While conceding that a certain ambiguity clouds the assessment of Schleiermacher's view of the historical (pp. 67–68), Pauck states that his work manifests a conviction that "the inner unity of an historical action, event, or process must be comprehended as alive" (p. 75).

Chapters 6 and 7 contain almost half of Pauck's book, *Harnack and Troeltsch: Two Historical Theologians* (New York: Oxford University, 1968). Both of these men "replaced the dogmatic method . . . by the historical method" (p. 91; cf. p. 120). It is perhaps in these two chapters, more than any others, that one gains insight into the *Geist* of Pauck himself. This finds expression in chap. 9 ("A Brief Criticism of Barth's Dogmatics") where Pauck states his view that "dogmatic speculation, even if this is based on the Bible, cannot help us. What we need most is historical understanding and not theosophy. The churches have more need of a Harnack than of a Barth" (p. 150).

Passing over a brief description of K. Holl (chap. 8), note must be taken of the only chapter containing hitherto unpublished material. Chapter 10, "Paul Tillich: Heir of the Nineteenth Century," represents the initial portion of the second volume of a two-volume biography of Tillich. At the time of his death in 1981, Pauck was working with his wife
on this project. The first volume was published several years ago (Paul Tillich: His Life and Thought, vol. 1: Life [New York: Harper and Row, 1976]) and met with mixed reviews (e.g. the highly critical review by J. C. Brauer in Christian Century 93 [1976] 1017–1020). The fragment of the second volume printed here consists in a description of the young Tillich. It includes an attempt to describe the influence exerted by Tillich's father, the Wingolfsbund (a student fellowship of which Tillich was a member), professors M. Kahler and F. Medicus, and above all F. W. J. Schelling.

Credits, with original publication information for each chapter, and a chronology of Pauck's life are included at the back of the book. All of the books from which the materials reprinted here were originally published are currently out of print.

In the essays presented here, Pauck is often content to describe, engaging in little critical analysis. There is some movement beyond this in the chapters on Butzer, Schleiermacher, Barth and Tillich. While the anecdotal and personal dimensions of his portrayals of the modern figures are enjoyable, his description of virtually everyone borders on the romantic. Given the nature of Pauck's work and the era in which he lived, this book can serve as both an introduction to nineteenth-century theological historicism and an illustration of the way in which this impacted a prominent historical theologian.

W. David Buschart

Drew University, Madison, NJ


Few nineteenth-century religious leaders made a greater impact on their society than Abraham Kuyper, and yet he remains a relatively unknown figure in the English-speaking world. Langley has written an intriguing book that introduces the reader to some of Kuyper's many activities. At a time when "Christian" political activity is a live topic in North America, this book provides the reader with many valuable insights into an earlier Christian attempt to think and act politically. One also hopes that Langley will follow it up with a full-scale modern biography of Kuyper.

Irving Hexham

University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta


Since the observance of the United States bicentennial in 1976, a significant historiographical debate has been brewing in evangelical and fundamentalist circles over the identification of America as a "Christian nation." On one side, a number of academic historians associated with the Conference on Faith and History have applied a perspective of Christian realism to the study of America's past, resulting in a decidedly skeptical posture toward prevalent claims about our country's Christian origins. This critical approach is reflected in works like R. Wells' edited collection, The Wars of America: Christian Views (1981), and the collegial efforts of M. Noll, N. Hatch and G. Marsden in The Search for Christian America (1983).

On the other side, books intended for a more popular audience have enthusiastically embraced the notion of America's Christian roots and unique destiny under God. This

The cover of *If the Foundations Be Destroyed* omits any identification of the authors, but its crumbling image of the Statue of Liberty, so jarring in the midst of a renovation campaign, graphically reinforces the book’s title and central thesis. Draper and Watson view American history as the story of an epic struggle between Christianity and the forces of humanism. In colonial America and the early republic, a relatively Christian paradise was nurtured and shaped by Puritan law, the first great awakening, the Revolution, and the founding fathers. But Draper and Watson contend that these positive developments were threatened almost from the start by the ominous power of “humanistic statism.” In the twentieth century, humanism has triumphed in government, education and the media, suggesting a tragedy of “paradise lost.” The vision and ideals of early America will be regained, the authors argue, only by the persistent efforts of “an alert, articulate, and informed Christian people” (p. 93). In this sense the book functions much like the jeremiad sermons of the colonial period that were preached to Puritan congregations to remind them of God’s special covenant with them and the necessity of constant vigilance to preserve it.

While the Draper/Watson volume purports to offer an alternative explanation of American history to counter “ secular” versions, this retelling of history seems to have become captive to the agendas of the new Christian right. In essence, Draper and Watson examine the past in light of the economic, political and social conflicts of the 1980s. This is particularly apparent in discussions of paper currency in colonial America (p. 66) and the stock market crash of 1929 (p. 144). This perspective also helps to account for thoroughly negative interpretations of abolitionism (pp. 103–104), Reconstruction (pp. 121–123), the direct election of senators (p. 123), the New Deal (pp. 146–149) and the media (p. 163). In the last case the press is blamed for the resignations of Spiro Agnew and Richard Nixon, and moral questions raised by their behavior in office are virtually ignored.

The interpretive problems of *If the Foundations Be Destroyed* are partly caused by a minimal use of primary sources and a highly selective use of agreeable secondary sources. This method leads to a number of unsupported generalizations (e.g. Protestant success in converting immigrants, pp. 110–112) and some unclear historical connections (e.g. between Marxism and Darwinism, p. 119). In addition, the authors’ treatment of villains and heroes betrays a glaring inconsistency. They employ a scathing, “no holds barred” criticism of creeping “statism” and its humanistic counterparts. At the same time their understanding of America’s “Christian heritage” is uncritically naive and nostalgic, a flaw endemic to most books of this ilk. The best that they can do to substantiate the Christianity of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention is to list the numerical strength of each denomination represented at the Philadelphia gathering (p. 86), which hardly demonstrates that Christian faith was integral to the proceedings.

Draper and Watson express some legitimate concerns about the secular drift of modern America. Unfortunately, any valuable cultural insights are obscured in their amatorish attempt to be historians. Their methods and interpretations deserve to be widely challenged.

James A. Patterson

Toccoa Falls College, Toccoa Falls, GA

The first four volumes of this series (which is to be completed in 1988) are: What Is Christian Doctrine (170 pp.) by J. P. Newport, Who Is Jesus Christ (168 pp.) by W. L. Hendricks, Revelation, Inspiration, Scripture (168 pp.) by J. M. Lewis, and The Nature of God (142 pp.) by F. Humphreys. All the authors are associated with the Southern Baptist Convention.

As the title states, these volumes are designed primarily for laymen and are written in laymen's language. We are told that the authors of the series were chosen for their understanding of Christian doctrine and also for their ability to express eternal truth in everyday language. Concise, as noted by the number of pages, the books are basically nontechnical, practical, and a handy reference on the major Christian doctrines. They are essentially in accord with the fundamentals of traditional Christianity.

The publishers affirm that it is the intent of this series to explain the Bible and Christian doctrine in a manner that one may work out his own belief system and not to tell the reader what to believe. With this purpose in mind, written by scholars possessing eminent academic credentials, the series should prove helpful to laymen in laying a doctrinal foundation for the Christian life.

Nickolas Kurtaneck

Biola University, LaMirada, CA


In 1972 I witnessed a remarkable dialogue/debate between theologian Clark Pinnock and a Michigan State University biophysicist named Trosko. Although stereotypes might have suggested that the scientist would be rigorously logical and the theologian sentimental and emotional, the roles were in fact reversed. Trosko, while maintaining the dignity of persons, was unable to justify his position. Pinnock, on the other hand, was successful in demonstrating that the dignity of humanity falls to the ground without a Creator to give creation meaning. That incident came back to me as I read this very fine introductory work by OT scholar and theologian Ronald Allen.

Allen is concerned that sensationalistic writing by and about "secular humanists" is stampeding Christians away from humanism in any form. The author builds a case that only a Christian can properly defend the worth and dignity of the humanum. After setting forth the problem of human dignity in the first part, "The Mystery of Man" (chaps. 1–4), Allen explores the theological bases for the value of persons in part 2, "The Majesty of Man" (chaps. 5–8). The final section, part 3, "A Mandate for Man" (chaps. 9–12), works out some of the implications of a Christian anthropology in such areas as sexuality, science and the natural world, life in a secular culture, and social concern.

I must admit that I was won over by this book, pleasantly surprised by its high quality. There are several admirable features that deserve mention. First of all, as one in the Reformed tradition I was delighted with the emphasis on the created goodness of the natural world, the value in studying science, and a general attitude of openness to truth. Evangelicals still tend to be suspicious of such things, fearing their "worldliness." Second, I was impressed by Allen's use of key OT passages to build his case. His expertise in OT studies comes through in the analysis of such passages as Psalm 8, Psalm 14, Genesis 1–2, Proverbs 1–8, and the Song of Solomon. The Biblical foundation is well constructed. Third, I was grateful that Allen takes such a sane and reasoned approach to secularism and the "secular humanists." He observes that Christians continue to be salt
and light in our culture. Therefore, the view that sees our country's structures as monolithic secular is overdrawn. Also the author refuses to be cowed by the secular humanists. Allen concedes that there is a secular humanist "agenda" but denies a conspiracy and avoids paranoia. Finally, I was pleased with Allen's writing style. The book is filled with colloquialisms, a fresh (not to say breezy) approach. He is not afraid of the first-person singular, and he avoids arcane theological terms (like arcane).

The book's weaknesses generally are an outgrowth of its strengths. As an easily-read introductory work, Allen speeds over topics in a way that left me wanting more. For example, after building a beautiful Biblical case for intimacy and sexual joy in Christian marriage, he fails to discuss what might be done to stem the tide of divorces. I wish he had spoken of how a Christian anthropology would help us deal with challenges from genetic research and artificial intelligence (although these topics are mentioned in the introduction, they are not satisfactorily developed). Second, one can argue that Allen has given us half an anthropology. His eagerness to stress the value and worth of humanity leaves him vulnerable to the charge that he has given short shrift to human sin.

These reservations aside, many pastors, along with many Christian college students and college-educated Christians, will find The Majesty of Man a helpful introductory volume.

Kenneth C. Harper

The First Presbyterian Church, Westminster, CA


Ashcraft has given us a summary of theology based on his thirty years of teaching the subject in several Baptist universities and seminaries. He writes within the free-church tradition and interacts with evangelical theology, although he does not seek to expound evangelical positions at every point of his conclusions. The book is written at a level that makes it useful as a seminary text but is very readable so that a layperson could use it comfortably.

Ashcraft notes that the title has been deliberately chosen because the word "beliefs" sounds more personal and confessional. He maintains that a doctrine could be taught by one who did not really believe it was true, but the term "beliefs" is intended to convey that the person who has Christian faith also holds certain convictions. These beliefs can be expressed clearly and coherently.

He introduces the work with a survey of basic theological approaches, including a nice section on recent trends in theology. At this point he evidences his existential bias, which can be seen throughout the book. He makes an interesting and astute observation concerning the interrelationship between the topics of study in theology, helping the reader to see that particular beliefs are intertwined with all other beliefs. There is value to this statement, but it leads to confusion for the reader as he or she works through the volume. At times it is even difficult to determine what subject is actually being discussed as Ashcraft moves rapidly from relationship to relationship.

Ashcraft is careful to state his conclusions on most subjects within a framework consistent with historic Baptist beliefs. He affirms the truths of God as creator, the necessity of faith in Jesus, the authority of Scripture, the importance of the Church, and Christ's second coming. Specifically, however, he wants to merge creation and evolution theories together. He maintains the deity of Jesus but hedges on the historicity of the resurrection. Concerning faith, it is viewed in existential categories as an encounter with the living Christ. He affirms that Jesus died vicariously for our sins but not as our
substitute. He affirms Biblical authority but shuns concepts of inerrancy. His statements concerning our salvation are quite confusing. He blurs regeneration, adoption and justification as if they were synonymous themes. He makes little if any distinction between justification and sanctification. I found these matters troubling.

Positively, his sections on the ministry of the Spirit, the Church, and the second coming are quite helpful. Perhaps his best section is the discussion of the Church, its mission, its organization and its ordinances. His discussion of eschatology is brief but readable and instructive. Especially helpful are his views on death and the future kingdom. He seems to lean toward an historical premillennial position concerning the second coming.

The book is the second volume of theology written by a major Southern Baptist theologian in the 1980s. It is encouraging to see Baptists again writing theology after the long delay since the days of Mullins and Conner. Perhaps this trend will encourage additional theological reflection and articulation by others. We hope that will be the case.

David S. Dockery

Criswell College, Dallas, TX


We all, no doubt, have seen the E. F. Hutton commercial that boldly if not presump-tuously claims: "When E. F. Hutton speaks, America listens." The point of the byline is obviously clear: E. F. Hutton has earned or assumed the right to be heard, at least when it comes to stocks and bonds. The same authoritative assertion can be made as well in the theological arena when it pertains to the works of Donald Bloesch: When Bloesch writes, theologians listen—and not simply evangelical thinkers, but those from the left side of Christendom's spectrum as well. Bloesch has become one of the twentieth-century Church's unique scholars whose voice is respectfully heard in all quarters of the faith. Consequently this author's well-established credibility alone will push _Crumbling Foundations_ to the head of the pack of the many assessments of the "post-Christian" west now appearing in print and clamoring for a hearing. In it we do not find Bloesch merely seizing on a popular theme but, rather, writing at his incisive best.

Bloesch indicates to us that this is not just another pessimistic ecclesiastical tract on the very first page of the book as he sets his two fundamental premises in which _Crumbling Foundations_ was conceived (and will develop): (1) The present-day Church's struggle to maintain an integral witness amidst the collapse of moral and spiritual foundations need not be viewed as a hopeless, depressing situation but, rather, may challenge us to refocus on the providential care of a sovereign God who promises that his kingdom will have consummate victory; and (2) the real enemy of the faith is not the humanistic heritage of the Enlightenment and its credo of autonomy but rather a conformity to "the collective values of the nation-state that is championed by the new technological liberalism" (p. 15). On this latter premise Bloesch further comments that "it is not the separation of church and state, which has received support from traditional humanists, but the enthronement of the state or nation that presents the most dire threat to the integrity and independence of the church in our time" (p. 15).

These sharp, sweeping, critical, yet not caustic and ultimately confident statements are indeed indicators of the prophetic objectivity Bloesch brings to the issue, a stance that will at the same time comfort neither right nor left. More precisely, both sides of the Christian pendulum come under the author's indictment for a less-than-faithful proclamation of the gospel. Concerning the liberal church he comments: "What is dis-
turbining and disappointing about the mainline churches is the selective nature of their indignation on controversial social issues. While vigorously upholding the sixth commandment, 'You shall not kill' (except where this applies to abortion), they remain strangely silent on the seventh commandment, 'You shall not commit adultery.' The sexual norms and codes upheld by the church through the ages are dismissed as archaic, while the prohibition of murder is inconsistently seen as eternally binding" (p. 23).

This arbitrary "holiness" is attributed by Bloesch to the mainline denominations' being in "captivity to the ideological left" (p. 23). But the religious right is hardly the paradigm of kingdom fidelity either: "The area where religious conservatives can be faulted most is their glaring inability to discern the encroachment of the values of the technological society upon the domain of the church... Conservatives generally welcome technology as an ally of the gospel. Technology becomes the means by which the gospel gains credibility and success in the world. It is legitimate to ask whether the gospel is not then translated into a program of self-help and faith into a method for gaining happiness and security—the goals of our secular, technological society" (p. 32). Such a technological Christianity, contends Bloesch, reduces the supernatural work of the Holy Spirit to humanistic, mechanical techniques. For example, inner healing becomes a matter of applying the "correct" prayer methodology.

While he stops short of echoing Ellul's sweeping denunciation of virtually all forms of technological faith, Bloesch nonetheless sounds a clarion call to both liberals and conservatives alike that the Church, in attempting to utilize the technological advancements of our age, must continually be wary of accommodating its radical message to our culture's technological values. Indeed it is this very radical faith that needs to be recovered if the twentieth-century Church is to recover her prophetic power over a civilization resting on an "unstable metaphysical foundation" (p. 33). This radicalism needs to be more than merely an inward spiritual renewal. It must manifest itself in the same iconoclastic behavior of the early Christians whose refusal to participate in the religious festivals and public spectacles of Rome brought charges of atheism and anarchism (p. 33). Only a radical, Biblically-centered faith will prevent American churches from repeating the same errors made by the German Christians some fifty years ago in their willingness to reinterpret the faith so as to accommodate the resurgence of German nationalism. Perhaps to the disdain of the liberal community, Bloesch presents a well-documented argument that it is not the "new right" that plays the handmaiden to a rebirth of Nazism (as popularly supposed) but rather the theologies and movements of the left—process theology, feminist theology, liberation theology—which are now, and historically became, the tools of Adolf Hitler. The very fact that these liberal ideologies seek a resymbolization of the historic faith and appeal to natural revelation make them the prime candidates for captivity by despotic forces, as was the case with their theological forbears in Nazi Germany (pp. 40–47). Indeed, Bloesch reminds us that it was the confessing Church, under the leadership of Barth, that almost singularly critiqued the atrocities of the Third Reich's religion of ethnocentrism and racism (p. 43)—an important historical notation needed in an American media culture that all too frequently equates a serious practice of the Christian faith with some kind of fascism. This is not to say, however, that the direction taken by the religious right is vindicated. In his careful, balanced manner Bloesch characterizes the fundamental error of such groups as the Moral Majority and Religious Round Table as that tendency to see America as the new Israel with a manifest destiny to bring light and hope to the nations—a "rapprochement between biblical faith and the American Way of Life" (p. 46)—which while holding to traditional Judeo-Christian values reduces them to the materialistic virtues propagated in the great, capitalistic success stories. This too is secularism, although its historical antecedents are to be seen more in the "fundamentalistic" German Church that sup-
ported Kaiser Wilhelm’s war policies in 1914 than that which so easily accommodated Nazism (p. 46).

Paradoxically, it is from this very type of “pagan climate” that a radical, Biblical faith will emerge, and indeed has done so before. Not only did the apparent “absence” of God signal an impending “shattering of silence” in OT days. Our present era of secular confusion also stands at the threshold of a new pouring out of the Spirit (p. 48). Indeed, contends Bloesch, such indications of spiritual renewal are to be seen in our own century in such “radical” and diverse saints as Bonhoeffer, Wurmband, Hungary’s Cardinal Mindszenty and Corrie Ten Boom, who all have brought testimony to the power of the living God in a desert land (pp. 97–104). These present-day people of faith should inspire us once more to a genuine “discipleship under the cross,” which demands the “narrow way” lifestyle of Biblical study, prayer and worship that provides the basis of social consciousness and correction (pp. 131–139). Although Bloesch stands firmly with evangelical tradition in asserting personal regeneration as the necessary prerequisite to social reformation (p. 135), he sets forth a social mandate that is generally more comprehensive and less simplistic than that generally espoused by conservatives. For example, the nuclear arms race must be addressed as well as abortion, environmental pollution is a Christian concern just like the breakdown of the family, and the growing disparity between rich and poor is a kingdom issue, not merely campaign rhetoric of the Democratic party (p. 134). This kind of “nonevangelical” yet undeniably Biblical critique is exactly what makes Bloesch an enigma in our conversative circles: He is one of us, and yet he really is not. While this reviewer is admittedly less than comfortable with some of Bloesch’s stands, he must also confess that in many ways Bloesch has a more thorough-going understanding of the meaning of sola scriptura than his own. Despite one’s differences with Bloesch (and they are relatively minor), one still knows that he stands in the presence of a modern-day prophet.

Crumbling Foundations is consequently (and not surprisingly) an enigmatic book. It will invite an evangelical audience, espouse evangelical convictions and yet avoid entering into an evangelical alliance. Like its author, it may not be “orthodox” enough to be compatible with the belief statement of the ETS, but unquestionably it has the “ring of truth.”

R. C. Kurka

DeKalb Christian Church, DeKalb, IL


Apologetics, especially that written from an evangelical perspective, is an overpublished field of study. It takes a rare combination of innovation and insight to make a new offering in the field worth the reader’s while. It is refreshing, then, that Craig has produced a volume that mostly fulfills such rigorous criteria.

Apologetics: An Introduction has several strengths. The first is a new and sensible arrangement of material. Noting that European theological education addresses issues of apologetics in the context of systematic theology classes (instead of in a separate class), Craig arranges his material under the headings of the traditional theological loci of Melanchthon. Thus, for example, the existential problem of the meaning of life is addressed under the heading “De Homine,” and the perennial question of demonstrating the existence of God is described under “De Deo.” In a way, then, Craig’s method is the mirror-image of P. Tillich’s Systematic Theology. Tillich moved from apologetics to theology; Craig moves from theology to implied issues of apologetics. A second major
strength is Craig's familiarity with secular philosophical literature. Along with this is a refreshing refusal to quote other evangelical authors. One sometimes has the feeling that conservative Christian apologists spend most of their time talking to each other. The only evangelical apologist to appear in the index is F. Schaeffer. C. S. Lewis is cited only to negatively contrast his fiction with that of F. Dostoyevsky.

There are two features of the book that this reviewer must regard as ambiguous. The first is the system of numbering sections in the manner used by L. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Thus under this system the section containing Dostoyevsky's analysis of the human dilemma is numbered 2.122. While this does "map out" the logic of each chapter, the absence of this numbering system would not detract from the text's readability. The second "ambiguous" feature is the source of this material—namely, Craig's seminary lectures. The transposition of lecture material to written form is difficult at best. There is a freshness in some of the material, a vitality that flows from a man pouring out his love of learning to his students. One finds this especially in the closing sections of each chapter in which the material is applied to the evangelistic task. At the same time, the lecture style is evident and does protrude.

When we turn to the negative, there are three questions to ask. The first is this: How can one possibly use the term "systematic consistency" without citing E. J. Carnell (see section 1.1321)? How does Craig justify his failure to footnote his debt to Carnell?

The second question: How are we to use the material on the existential dilemma of humanity in the 1980s? We (at least most of us in the United States) are not in the throes of existential despair, at least not at the moment. This is an upbeat decade; yuppies are enjoying the good life. The more serious issue behind this question is how one addresses the unquenchable hope in humanity, even unredeemed humanity. Given impending death, the non-Christian ought always to despair. However, as Clark Pinnock and others have shown, he does not. Why not? And how does Christian apologetics deal with this?

The third question is stylistic: Could not the historical material, especially in the earlier chapters, have been presented more attractively? In these sections the author is at his most pedantic.

Such reservations aside, Craig has produced a valuable volume that ought to find its way into the libraries of those eager to "be prepared to give an answer (apologia) to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have" (1 Pet 3:15).

Kenneth C. Harper

The First Presbyterian Church, Westminster, CA


This volume intends to serve as a companion for the study of systematic theology in the college and seminary as well as a guide for personal study of key Christian doctrines. Each section of the work contains a short introductory note followed by a selection of Scripture passages from the NIV addressing the doctrine in question. Each section also concludes with a list of suggested further readings taken from the systematic theologies of Berkhof, Buswell, A. A. Hodge, C. Hodge, Pieper, Strong, and Wiley, as well as selected monographs addressing the doctrine in question.

The notes in which the author seeks to relate the passages to the doctrine in question are in general quite good, though there is some unevenness. In the section discussing general eschatology 1 Thess 4:15–17 is listed, and it is noted that in the premillennial, pretribulational dispensational view this passage is seen as referring to a secret coming of Christ for the Church immediately prior to the great tribulation. On the following
page this same passage is noted as having implications for the posttribulation view and also the amillennial view. However, the notes for each of the three instances of the citation do not give the student adequate insight into the differences in interpretation of the same passage by the different eschatological models.

However, it should be noted that the notes in the section on sacraments are quite good. The section of notes on believer's baptism and infant baptism clearly discusses the implications of the passages cited and adequately summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of both views for the reader. Likewise, the section dealing with the Lord's supper leads the reader to an excellent understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Lutheran, Reformed and Wesleyan, and Zwinglian views of the eucharist.

This handy work serves an admirable purpose in bringing together significant passages in doctrinally segregated chapters for the study of systematic theology. It is certainly an excellent supplementary text for teaching on the college and seminary level.

R. A. Krupp

Western Seminary, Portland, OR


The second volume of a three-volume systematic theology includes treatment of humanity, sin, and the person and work of Christ. Like the first volume, this one is well organized, reflects careful, penetrating thought, and is clearly written. The reader will observe that the author interacts with a wide range of theological literature as well as current findings in related fields of philosophy, psychology and sociology. A good example of this is the discussion of "The Constitutional Nature of the Person" (chap. 24). This volume also continues the commendable pattern of relating a given doctrine to other doctrines and showing how one aspect of the faith impinges upon another.

This reviewer found himself in agreement with most of Erickson's positions in this volume—not unusual, since the author and the reviewer share a common ecclesiastical heritage. Several questions arose, however, in the course of the reading. For example, in his discussion of "The Image of God in the Human" (chap. 23), Erickson rightly judges, against various relational and functional views, that the imago is primarily substantive or structural. The person relates to his fellow and serves as God's vice-regent by virtue of his creation in the divine imago. Thus the author concludes that the divine image in the person consists in the powers of personality—that is, in intelligence, will and the emotions. But could it not be argued that the imago, which separates the person from the brute beasts, also consists of the moral capacity to distinguish right from wrong and the capability to act rightly toward God and toward other persons (Eccl 7:29; 2 Cor 3:18; Eph 4:24)?

Moreover, in his discussion of "The Constitutional Nature of the Person," Erickson stresses the unity of the person and argues that only the NT, with its Greek outlook, recognizes a twofold distinction in the human constitution. The Hebrew or OT perspective regards the person as an undifferentiable unity. Closer examination will show that, although not the dominant perspective, the OT writers did differentiate between the material and the immaterial or outer and inner aspects of the person. This is clear, for example, in Job 4:19; 7:11; Ps 42:5; Isa 26:9.

One may also question Erickson's treatment of Christ's resurrection. He maintains that the resurrection body of our Lord was different from the body of his ascension (only the latter being a "spiritual body"). Thus "the Easter event was something of a resuscitation, such as that of Lazarus, rather than a true resurrection" (p. 777). The resurrection,
according to Erickson, ought to be regarded not as a physical fact, but as a signpost of Jesus' victory over sin and death.

On the subject of the work of Christ, Erickson acknowledges the classical interpretation popularized by Calvin and widely embraced by the Church that our Lord performed his work as prophet, priest and king. Yet the author foregoes this view, amply substantiated by Scripture itself, and treats Christ's work under the rubric of revealing, ruling and reconciling. Has the modern nonevangelical bias against ontology and preference for functionalism had a subtle influence on this paradigm?

In chap. 39 Erickson discusses the "The Extent of the Atonement." He concludes that "the hypothesis of universal atonement is able to account for a large segment of the biblical witness with less distortion than is the hypothesis of limited atonement" (p. 835). Erickson adds that this conclusion need not be construed as Arminian; rather, it is consistent with "the most moderate form of Calvinism or...a modification of Calvinism" (p. 835). It seems to the reviewer that the real issue here, as Nicole and others have pointed out, is not the extent of the atonement but its intent—namely, the purpose for which the Father sent his Son into the world. 1 Tim 4:10 might provide the clue to loosen the impasse between the two major interpretations on this issue. If we read Paul correctly, God's purpose in sending Christ into the world was twofold: primarily to secure the salvation of the elect, and secondarily to impart the general benefits of the cross to all humankind.

We conclude that Erickson's systematic theology clearly is superior to the traditional theologies available to the Church today. Its attention to historical theories, openness to truth wherever found, avoidance of sheer indoctrination, and contemporaneity elevate this work above those of Hodge, Strong, Berkhof, Theissen, etc. But given the objections to systematic theology posed by friend and foe alike, one asks whether a distinctly new paradigm is needed for doing theology today. One aspect of such a paradigm would call for application of the method of Biblical theology (not merely quoting Scripture references) so as to unfold the meaning of the relevant texts in their historical and cultural contexts. Another might be, given the myriad of alternative views on just about every point of theology, the formulation of a carefully defined methodological paradigm for decision-making. Erickson tantalizingly suggests at one point (p. 674) hypothesis testing as a method of deciding among alternative interpretations, but he has not explicated this technique nor has he consistently applied it to the doctrinal issues treated in this volume. The Church undoubtedly will continue to struggle with the form its theological reflection ought to take. Until some new consensus is achieved, Erickson's systematic theology deserves the most serious attention.

Bruce Demarest

Denver Seminary, Denver, CO


In the present creation/evolution controversy the basic issue is the origin and nature of Adam. The title of the late Arthur Custance's last published work is taken from the fact that in the Bible we have not one man called Adam to account for but two (1 Cor 15:45). And these two men, the Adam of Eden and the Adam of Bethlehem, stand in direct apposition to one another, each being a prototype and a representative of the other and of true man. Whatever we can say with certainty about the last Adam must be assumed for the first Adam as originally formed, whether by creation or evolution.
Custance is well known in the evangelical community, having written sixteen books dealing with issues of science, faith, and theology in as many years. This latest work is a summary and conclusion of over fifty years of observation and thought on the subject of evolution and creation.

Custance's basic conclusion is that creation and evolution are both faiths and that because the basic premise of the Christian faith is completely opposed to the starting point of a strictly evolutionary worldview there is no reconciliation possible except by abandoning any rigid adherence to logical extension. The Christian view allows forces and realities of a spiritual nature to be causal factors in the physical world. Evolution absolutely forbids them. The two positions are logically irreconcilable, and thus it is hopeless to attempt a wedding of Christian theology and evolutionary theory. They are erected on different premises and can only be reconciled by the introduction of logical inconsistencies.

Custance concludes that if man derives his body from an animal source with nothing added beyond what can be provided by nature, then he must be an animal and nothing more. And if he shares the origin and nature of animals, it is only reasonable to suppose that he will share their destiny. To argue that he is an animal with a soul introduced from outside the system may be a sop for theology, but it is quite unacceptable to the strict evolutionist. And even for theology such a concession is wholly inadequate because man's body is to share equally in the redemptive process. So it is not enough to argue that a human soul is sufficient distinction: He must also have a body that is uniquely human.

Why is this not a sufficient concession to theology? Because the redemptive process required the vicarious sacrifice of a truly human body. If it should be asked in what way this redemptive process relates to the nature of Adam's body as created, the answer is to be found by considering the three following compelling affirmations that are locked together and must all be precisely honored or none of them has any validity.

First, unless the body of Jesus Christ was by nature under no necessity of dying, it could not be sacrificed vicariously. Second, unless his body was truly human, the sacrifice of it was not vicariously for man. Finally, if his body was by nature free of any necessity of dying and was therefore indeed sacrificed vicariously for man, then Adam's body in its original form must also have been by nature free of any necessity of dying. Such was Adam's body, and it cannot possibly have been derived from any primate body since all other primates are by nature subject to death. It must therefore have been a direct creation of God. Immediate creation thus meets all the theological requirements, whereas mediate derivation by evolution meets none of them.

The Christian evolutionist takes refuge in the tacit assumption that the soul of man is unique and that this is all that matters. As for man's body, since it is animal in origin it cannot have any transcendental significance. In short, the body is not essential to man's continuance in eternity. On this view, man is man only because of his soul. The Biblical view of man as a unique body/spirit entity has to be abandoned. Man can exist just as well as a mere ghost, even if that ghost supposedly has to assume the shape of his body for purposes of identity.

To the evolutionists, there can be nothing in nature of which nature is not the author. No discontinuities in the great chain of being from amoeba to man can be allowed: no divine intervention, no miracle to upset the strict chain of physical causality, no revelation to point up the inadequacy of the human mind in its interpretation of the evidence.

The Christian who admits to faith in either creation or evolution is suspect, for evolution is a strictly deterministic, materialistic, nontheistic philosophy. Thus it is difficult to maintain a position that falls between the two diametrically opposed worldviews. The passage from a little admission of doubt to a frank abandonment to any Biblical faith at all is along a slippery path, and those who start upon it innocently enough soon find it
is more and more costly to stop the slide—or if they do, they will in the end find it increasingly difficult to defend what faith they retain except on an emotional basis.

This abandonment of rational defense is made a little easier if one really has no understanding of why the issue of the body of man is so important, but such ignorance of the true situation hardly encourages a strong and mature Christian faith. Unfortunately, while we have a highly developed theology of the spirit, there is as yet no convincing parallel theology of the body. The importance of the body has been sadly neglected.

Custance makes an important point when he states that whatever we allow that diminishes the reality and the historical significance of the first Adam inevitably reflects upon the reality and historical significance of the last Adam. This is why he feels that the issue is so very serious and why it should be fought on both fronts, the biological and the theological.

He feels that we should contest the evolution of man's body because half of our humanity is wrapped up in it. It is a body that was glorified by the incarnation, a body that has made us redeemable creatures, a body that has a future beyond death and will be essential to our recognition of one another throughout eternity.

Custance adds that the NT asserts that this body will be resurrected in identifiable form and placed beyond the power of death forever. Moreover, the promise is applied to Adam himself and effectively to every one of his descendants, however far back we place him in time.

This prospect demands a unique origin because the redemptive process by which that destiny is to be effected hinges upon the fact that man began in the first place with a body that was potentially immortal. Such a body cannot have arisen by any evolutionary process because it was designed for a unique destiny not promised to any other creature.

Custance has captured the essence of the issue. I recommend that Two Men Called Adam be read by all church pastors and teachers.

William I. Thompson, III
Shrewsbury, MA


If the creation-evolution debate serves no other purpose, it has finally established the wisdom of the Preacher's saying that of making many books there is no end. But since the present reviewer has himself helped fulfill this prophecy, he would hardly suggest it as a criticism of every contribution. And as it happens, despite its title Adam and Evolution is typical neither of the bad nor of the good books that the debate has engendered. It is a distinctly curious book, and since this reviewer knows something of its author he confesses to mild surprise to find that it is being distributed by an evangelical publisher.

Adam and Evolution is a moderately lengthy volume in which its author displays a broad general knowledge of the various scientific disciplines that he brings to bear on his subject, which is not Adam but evolution. We are introduced to the history of the debate with the compulsory paragraphs on Anaximander, Erasmus, Darwin, Wilberforce, and the rest. The author's style is generally popular and, it might be thought, sometimes rather gauche, which makes the length of the volume and some of the technical material it covers somewhat anomalous. Charles Darwin "never knew his grandfather let alone Bishop Ussher" (p. 15); "No son of ape rose into Tarzan" (p. 253); "Was your grandparent a cell that divided and subdivided internally? Or a flatworm?" (p. 179); "The point of a chloroplast, which is invested with its own DNA for the synthesis of crucial proteins, is
to reduce carbon dioxide to sugar" (p. 171). Pitman seems to wish to inform his reader about everything he comes across. Sometimes this is genuinely interesting, if hardly relevant (Neanderthal man is named indirectly after the Reformation hymnwriter Joachim Neander, for example; and Teilhard de Chardin's mother was a great-niece of Voltaire). Sometimes it is merely odd (we are told the name of the only Englishman who was present at the burial of Karl Marx).

At one particular point the writer's sense of humor and religious convictions (or lack of them) combine into bad taste. In a discussion of the biological phenomenon of parthenogenesis we read the following: "Virgin birth, however, such as the union between a god and a woman involving n human and n divine chromosomes, has not been scientifically recorded in higher species" (p. 107).

Pitman's thesis is that neo-Darwinism is scientifically incoherent, and the evidence he presents in its elaboration derives from two standard sources: the classical criticisms that creationists have all along furnished of ape-man theories and so on, and the recent serious questionings that have arisen within the scientific establishment, through the development of cladistics and, for example, the strange theories of Hoyle and Wickramasinghe.

Pitman's own view emerges as the book proceeds: "I started as devil's advocate for the creationist view, and came, in principle, though not according to any particular creed, to prefer it" (p. 254). Micro-evolution has occurred, but both chemical evolution and the argument from micro- to macro- are unsubstantiated, and the general evidence of design is incapable of being upset by being placed in a Darwinian framework. What of an alternative scenario? Pitman is uncertain. "Did a complete creation or successive creations occur? Was life on earth made once-for-all or was its complexity purposely increased by stages on an age-old earth? Perhaps we will never know. What matters is the fact of coded design and the sensible inference of creation that it is possible to draw from a study of the biological machines we call plants and animals" (pp. 254–255).

Adam and Evolution poses two fundamental questions of the Christian reader in the light of recent debate. First, is it necessary to have an alternative to neo-Darwinism? The post-war resurgence of creationism has of course offered a reconstruction of historical geology and biology, and certainly this has been a strength. Another banner has been raised in the form of an alternative paradigm, and it has proved the rallying point of radical Christian opinion. But it has not simply been a strength; it has also offered a target that has been set alight. And some, at least, who could never accept a harmony of Bible and evolution have found themselves unable to opt for the young-earth scenario either. Pitman's conclusion: "Perhaps we will never know." Of course he finds no alternative to such a conclusion, partly because he will not draw on the resources of Holy Scripture. But as a solution to the problem of origins it has its own merit and could be held to be reputable both as science and as theology.

Secondly, and relatedly, we have the question of faith. Adam and Evolution, unlike most books of its kind, is not written "according to any particular creed," to use its author's words. He is plainly a theist—but so, of course, are the demons. He believes that one can argue from the nature of creation to the fact of a creator, but as to who that creator is and what he is like we are told nothing and therefore required to believe nothing. The reader of Paley may feel himself forced by every element of the natural order, great and small, to acknowledge the existence of a creator, but he is no more than the unknown god. And whereas the unbelieving theist is a distinct evangelistic proposition from the atheist, he is still without the gospel. There may be virtue in theism, but it is not salvation. There is always a tendency to seek to convince the world of particular Christian convictions, but this can only ever play a supporting role in the presentation of the gospel. Indeed, it could be argued that sometimes it can be counterproductive. We have all been asked by the skeptic: "Have I got to become a creationist to be a
Christian?” In one way, Adam and Evolution stands alongside J. A. T. Robinson’s Redating the New Testament as an example of the futility of having the unbeliever convinced of this or that—which, though it may also be the fruit of “orthodoxy,” is shorn of its raison d’être and thereby bereft of much of its virtue. Which is not to say that from the standpoint of apologetics we should not be glad for the credibility in which such enterprises cast our convictions. If Pitman succeeds in convincing some of our detractors that there is a case against evolution we shall be in his debt.

Rutherford House, Edinburgh, Scotland

Nigel M. de S. Cameron


The evolutionary establishment is an awesome structure. Audacious claims that “evolution is a fact which no reputable scientist denies” have intimidated many evangelicals who would prefer to take a more literal view of the early chapters of Genesis. Outside of Christian faith, there is an almost universal belief that a deep and irreconcilable conflict exists between science and the Bible. Actually the conflict is only in one area—the interpretation of the past.

Few books have addressed the creation-evolution issue in as satisfying a manner as has the present volume. Chittick is an accomplished chemist who has demonstrated a concern for the environment. He also demonstrates a refreshing commitment to Christ and to the authority and inerrancy of Scripture.

Chittick is an excellent communicator who knows the student mind. His clear thinking and helpful illustrations mark him as a master teacher. This explains his popularity on secular campuses and in creation conferences. An irectic spirit reveals his desire to win people, not just arguments.

One of the scandals of our day has been the obtuse attitude of scientists toward the philosophical implications of their “scientific” theories. Most scientists are either untrained or poorly trained in philosophy. The line between observational science and philosophy is transgressed often and with impunity. Virtually anything spoken or written by a scientist becomes “science.” Carl Sagan is just one example of a scientist who speaks as much philosophy as he does science.

In contrast, Chittick possesses remarkable insight in both areas. What many see as a conflict between science and the Bible, Chittick reveals to be a conflict between naturalism and supernaturalism. This conflict is a very old one. The evolution-creation controversy is just a modern expression of it.

An irony of history is that the Biblical faith that gave birth to modern science is now viewed by the scientific establishment as the enemy of modern science. This amazing change, Chittick shows, is the result of a shift in the prevailing worldview rather than a result of scientific discoveries. Creation has not been scientifically or logically disproved. It is only disbelieved. What used to be called “the creation” is now termed “nature.”

A recent glaring illustration of this bias against creationism is seen in the decision of the three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit regarding the Louisiana Act for Balanced Treatment of Creation-Science and Evolution-Science. The opinion said that “irrespective of whether it is fully supported by scientific evidence, the theory of creation is a religious belief,” which public schools may not teach. This is naturalism with a vengeance and demonstrates Chittick’s point that the present conflict is a philosophical one.

Chittick then deals with the nature of science—what it is and what it is not. In a
respectful way he examines the many intangible and subjective elements in what we call science. Only recently have a few secular authors dared to examine these "human" elements that make science far less objective than most people have been led to believe.

The concept of creation implies that nature is dependent on its creator. Evolution implies that nature is autonomous. Since man's declaration of independence from his creator is the essence of man's sinfulness, it is only natural that fallen man would prefer a worldview suggesting that nature is autonomous also. It is a case of one's basic assumptions powerfully influencing one's conclusions.

A demonstration that the facts of science fit well in a creationist framework concludes the book. The true nature of the concept of creation—not well understood even by many evangelicals—is clearly enunciated. There are also excellent sections on Genesis 1 and 2, the early earth, the flood, dating methods, and the age of the earth. The author does not hesitate to deal also with the problems of creationism.

It is unfortunate that Chittick does not mention the double-revelation theory, since that theory seems to be the common denominator of all evolutionary and/or long-age reconciliation of Genesis with contemporary scientific thinking.

Nature as dependent versus nature as autonomous is how Chittick views the creation-evolution conflict. Evolution is revealed to be an infinite regression of natural causes and effects. The concept of theistic evolution, however, is not adequately covered. As wrong as some may feel the theistic evolutionist to be, he certainly is not guilty of regarding nature as autonomous.

Chittick has made a genuine contribution in an area where there is much sound and fury.

Marvin L. Lubenow

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Three scientists whose doctorates are in chemistry (Thaxton), material science (Bradley) and geochemistry (Olsen) here present cogent scientific arguments that dispute the accepted theory that life originated by chemical processes out of nonliving matter.

They survey the effort of evolutionary scholars since mid-century to identify uniformitarian mechanisms that might promote a gradual generation of living matter from simple molecules. The data adduced as supportive of a naturalistic origin of life, they contend, are seriously flawed. Experimental conditions have been oversimplified; an enormous gap exists between the simplest living cells and complex laboratory "protocell" model systems. The authors hold that "the undirected flow of energy through a primordial atmosphere and ocean is at present a woefully inadequate explanation for the incredible complexity associated with even simple living systems, and is probably wrong."

The authors consider implausible the theory that matter organized itself into living systems. The theory is nurtured more by scientism that shuns the possibility of supernatural origins than by factual data. The writers do not claim to give "scientific proof of a Creator" but note that "special creation by a Creator beyond the cosmos is a plausible view of origin science."

Carl F. H. Henry

Arlington, VA

This is the twenty-fourth volume in the "What Are They Saying About...?" series. It is of particular interest to evangelicals because of the substantial quality and breadth of coverage it contains. Mueller writes very well, has good insight, and shows an ability to present a good summary of a complex position. His contention is that the method of systematic theology, which once was uniform for all, has been fragmented in the past two centuries. But "while uniformity of method has been superseded by a plurality, the question of unity remains." This question of unity across methods is not finally decided in this book.

Mueller surveys eight theologians representing four theological methods. He asks three questions of each theologian: (1) What is the vision of theology each is concerned with (including presuppositions and starting point)? (2) How does the method work, step by step? (3) What difference do its consequences make for our lives today?

The first chapter analyzes the transcendental method of K. Rahner and B. Lonergan. The starting point for theology is, and can be nothing less than, human experience taken as a whole. Our freedom and knowledge when honestly reflected upon tell us that we have encountered a mystery that has initiated itself in our life. Our freedom finds its true meaning only in responding to God. Only God can tell us truthfully who he is. But he has done this in Jesus Christ. "Thus if want to know what God is like and how He has involved Himself with us, then we look to Jesus." The human mind opens the process of knowing through experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding.

Rahner has analyzed the process of knowing and using existential-phenomenological processes within an orthodox Catholic framework. Lonergan has thematized the existing functions of the human mind. Both theologians place great emphasis on the person as the agent responsible to respond to God's call in his life. Thus the two starting points (Rahner's total human experience, Lonergan's act of knowing) meet in the reality of an encounter with the personal God in Jesus Christ.

Chapter 3 studies the empirical analysis of religious experience by D. Tracy and B. Meland. These two theologians are more empirical than transcendental and more analytic than existential. But Tracy borrows his starting point from Rahner, and Meland borrows much of his method from Tillich. Tracy develops a hermeneutic of experience and text that is linguistically oriented. Meland works on a hermeneutic of feeling and symbolic forms given to us in a cultural context.

Chapter 4 studies the socio-phenomenological approach of E. Schillebeeckx and J. Sobino. Schillebeeckx begins with an acceptance of the world situation and through dialog proceeds to bring religion to bear on the issue. "At some stage in the discussion the revelation of Jesus Christ enters and may require faith in order to continue the dialog." Both belief and the transformation of the world are at stake. Preeminently the Jesus experience is discovered in Scripture and lived out in faith. A knowledge of God will result from this living gospel that will nourish faith.

Sobino begins with the lived experience of the Latin situation but believes that in the process of following the struggle in a pluralistic situation the kingdom of God will come to be realized in history. Mueller sees Sobino's particular contribution as teaching us to analyze social macro-structures for the purpose of the application of theology.

In his brief conclusion Mueller presents seven common elements: (1) a commitment to a sacramental view of life and reality; (2) development of a method that comes from and extends the person to explain the world around him; (3) interpretation of data from a particular starting point; (4) insistence that Scripture study be integrated into all theology; (5) a unity between Christianity and humanization; (6) theology must result in changed lives; (7) man searches for God; God dictates where he will be found.
I found this a refreshing and informative book. In so short a space Mueller cannot do justice to each method. He never attempts to analyze any method in depth. His summaries and characterizations, however, seem accurate. He has looked for the central points of each theologian and tried to present him in conservative fashion and terminology. It does stretch the imagination to see Tillich, Schillebeeckx and Sobino as insisting that Scripture study be integrated into all theology.

Mueller accomplishes the objective of showing us in capsule form the central tenets of eight theologians. Thus his initial three questions are answered. But his goal of finding a unity of some kind in the various theological methods is not fulfilled. He is reaching to discern the seven common points in his conclusion.

From another perspective—my own as an evangelical theologian—it is interesting to see a Catholic theologian treating Protestants and Catholics alike with no apparent bias. Mueller seems willing to learn from any source. It is also interesting that Mueller and the series he writes for are so interested in relating Scripture to all theological work. In the book he mentions the necessity of exegesis, as well as application, for a full theology. The whole book will be interesting for college and seminary students as well as pastors and theologians.

Stephen M. Clinton

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This book is a rigorous discussion of the major issues in the philosophy of religion as they relate to monotheism, particularly Christian theism. As the author says in the introduction: "The focus will be on the basic monotheistic claim that God exists. It is not the purpose of this volume to present an argument for the Christian core claims" (p. ix). It is the author's desire to defend the view that religious claims can be rationally evaluated. In particular, he wants to show that theism can be assessed as being either true or false and that there are good reasons for thinking that it is true.

There are certain standard topics of study within the philosophy of religion, and Yandell explores each of these in turn. First, he takes up the topic of religious or numinous experience, and he asks the question whether numinous experience can provide evidence that God exists. This chapter is one of the most complex and difficult in the entire book, and it is not easy to follow at times. Quite a bit of background in philosophy of religion is assumed along the way. The success of the argument in this chapter, as Yandell admits, rests on an assumption that it is possible to discover a phenomenological or theoretical unity among descriptions of God as he is experienced in numinous experiences across many different cultures, places and times. Without this kind of unity, numinous experience cannot provide evidence for the theistic claim.

Second, Yandell discusses the traditional arguments for the existence of God. This discussion is very helpful, I think. He discusses first the cosmological, then the teleological argument. He concludes that they are not proofs of God's existence. Neither is the ontological argument nor the moral argument. None of the traditional arguments works as a proof, but they do serve as a useful way to articulate "relationships between the existence of God (if God does exist) and the various phenomena to which their premises refer" (p. 47).

In the third chapter Yandell argues that the notion that God is ineffable—i.e., that the concept of God cannot be expressed in human language—is indefensible and does
not provide a barrier to holding that there can be religious conceptual systems, including Christian theism.

The fourth chapter is taken up with a discussion of religious belief and religious knowledge. Is religious belief possible at all? Yandell discusses foundationalism and other epistemological alternatives to skepticism—including confirmationism and falsificationism—and concludes that each of the latter strategies has virtues and limitations but each is useful in developing genuine religious belief and knowledge.

In the fifth chapter Yandell takes up the issue of the rational assessment of competing moral claims. He discusses various ethical systems, including emotivism, subjectivism, egoism, hedonism, utilitarianism (rule and act) and formalism, and he concludes that one can indeed rationally critique moral claims in a relevant, nonarbitrary way.

The sixth chapter deals with the problem of evil in the world. Yandell's main concern here is to show that the existence of evil does not constitute evidence for the claim that God does not exist. The only way the existence of evil could count as evidence against God's existence is if we knew that there are evils in the world that God has no morally sufficient reason for permitting. There is of course no way we could know this unless we know that God does not exist. Included in this chapter is some material on possible worlds and free will, which seems to be taken from Plantinga's free-will defense. Even though this defense is intriguing, it is quite problematic. For one thing, it wreaks havoc with the orthodox doctrines of omniscience, omnipotence and sovereignty.

Chapter 7 is concerned with relating theism and morality. Theism certainly leads to a cognitivist system of ethics and bases value in the agent—i.e., man—who is created in God's image and who has inherent value simply because of this fact. So, as Yandell suggests, a theistic ethic arises out of an agent morality and is nonutilitarian. The goal is to develop one's character and mature into a person who imitates God. This chapter is very interesting and thought-provoking.

The final chapter is an attempt to provide criteria for rationally assessing religious (including theistic) claims. Yandell discusses criteria such as consistency and coherence, among others. He concludes that theism does not violate any of his criteria, so there is good reason to think it is true. This of course is a debatable methodology and conclusion. One could always argue with the list of criteria and its application to particular systems of thought.

Overall, this book is tough going. It is definitely not for beginners in philosophy. It is written in textbook style and probably should be used as a textbook for upper-division or graduate-level courses in the philosophy of religion. There is much provocative material here, and it is encouraging to read the work of a good philosopher who is wrestling with difficult philosophical issues and who is also a Christian.

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No one can fault Erickson for not being original in this attempt to articulate the notion of human presence and to adumbrate its experience. His originality consists in his effort to interface philosophy with psychoanalysis.

The predecessor to this volume is the author's *Language and Being*, written over a decade ago. A theme of that work continued in this one is that an entity's meaning is constituted by coming into human presence. Since writing it Erickson has been nagged by the feeling that human presence is more fundamental than he first thought. And this
volume was generated by classes in philosophy in literature and by contact with some psychoanalysts in Los Angeles. In the author’s mind it is transitional to a subsequent fuller statement by himself or someone else (he cares not).

Human presence, he maintains, is experienced through perspectives, views, and—most significantly—through worlds. These three basic notions are integral to achieving an understanding of human being (human presence).

His investigation at the boundaries of meaning draws from an intimate knowledge of diverse theorists including Husserl, Hume, Marx, Freud, Fingarette, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. And he unblinkingly affirms that human presence can be articulated, contemporary philosophical thinking notwithstanding. (This is hardly a text to use in any introductory course in philosophy, psychology, or theology.) He chides positivists—i.e., “the positivist fallacy” is committed by conceiving the relation between the cognitive and the extracognitive as one of functional independence. Nevertheless he honors the strengths of analytic philosophy by frequently employing ordinary language analysis.

During and after an orientation in the basic notions of world, view, and perspective in the first chapter, Erickson proceeds to develop a “language of human presence.” To do this a welter of terms is introduced by the author. A few examples are “eros-rate,” “possession-absorptive balance,” “possessive and absorptive drives,” and “worlds.” Such a language is felicitous, because without it his efforts to disclose the findings of his investigation would be like a wingless eagle.

He claims to have found that human presence is best understood as extracognitive as well as cognitive (chap. 2). And here he dips into dialectical models found in Freud, Heidegger, and the Judeo-Christian religion “for comprehending human worlds,” and these he construes by what he takes to be a fundamental facet of the human condition: self-deception. “Our presence to others and to ourselves is diminished through self-deception,” which is related to our fragile capacity to come to terms with death. H. Fingarette’s work on self-deception serves his thesis here.

In the third chapter Erickson’s discussion of interpretation as a cognitive process that can conceal as well as reveal items to us explicates how experience of human presence is problematic, which results in the philosophical issues involved being problematic. And in the fourth chapter he discusses psychoanalytic and existential modes of our experience in time.

The last chapter places his investigation within the context of the recent history of philosophy. In these closing pages he urges the reader to move within presence, not merely toward it, which leads to the bold proposal “that philosophy should return to the domain of psychology in a very particular way” (p. 137). By this he means what he calls “mediated reflexivity”—i.e., that which “both is man as well as the context within which man emerges as an object for empirical investigation” (italics his). The method for such an articulation, he says, must be phenomenological, for such a method best suits subject matters traditionally classified as psychological.

Erickson has construed human presence “as a worldly and synthetic force, motivated by possessive and absorptive drive, and cognitively revelatory and concealing. Language is its most significant and most fundamental possession as well as, paradoxically, its master; and self-deception is the cancer at the heart of human presence” (pp. 139–140).

He has included in this work the metaphilosophical task of making contact with philosophers of a primarily disputational orientation. His hope, I think, is to make their orientation primarily conversional like his own. Who knows? Maybe some disputationally-oriented human presence will take up the gauntlet and go from this transitional work of Erickson’s to the fuller treatment the author hopes for.

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Based on the first twelve lectures of the Wilde lectureship in the University of Oxford given by the author during the academic years 1981–84, this book is a thought-provoking essay in theology. It is an erudite, complex statement of theology distinguishable from statements made by "those who see their task as translating or interpreting a given deposit for today. This group includes such strange bedfellows as Karl Barth and Bultmann, [who] in practice both assume that there is a clear essence or core in Christianity and that the theologian's task is to re-present that in either (Barth) less misleading or (Bultmann) less antiquated terms" (p. 6). Sutherland claims to have reservations about endorsing the strategy of P. Geach, whom he quotes: "And if someone says that God's eternity is something simply out of relation with what occurs in time—that we ought not to say e.g. that God lived before the world came into existence—then his view is probably confused and certainly unscriptural." Our author's response to Geach is that a confused view must be clarified, and "if a view is unscriptural, it may be none the worse for that" (p. 7).

Near the end, after referring to and discussing views and positions presented in the writings of more than ninety philosophers (from Plato to Wittgenstein), theologians (from Aquinas to Bonhoeffer), and other writers such as R. Bolt in his play A Man for all Seasons, he admits that his revisionary theology would "not rate very highly" on the scale of orthodoxy (p. 203).

In his first chapter he offers five criteria that might be used to evaluate any enterprise such as his. Then by means of tight argumentation he brings the reader to a reconsideration of those criteria in order to see if his effort has satisfied them. The criteria: (1) Any successful revision of the content of religious belief must be undertaken in the context of European culture as a whole. (2) A religious belief that runs counter to our moral beliefs is to that extent unacceptable. (3) The acceptability of a form of religious belief is related to its comprehensiveness in the sense that it makes of our experience of the world in which we find ourselves. (4) A revisionary account of religious belief both commends itself and avoids the dangers of reductionism to the extent to which it gives or preserves insights that are not available elsewhere, into the human condition or into the world in which we live. (5) A revisionary account of religious belief is acceptable to the extent to which it makes and defends a claim to be true.

He claims limited success in meeting the first criterion on the basis of his alertness to the intellectual legacies of Kant's philosophy and to the growth in European sensibility to the fact that religion as well as other dimensions of human life has a history. He claims to have come very close to meeting the second criterion, to have met the spirit of the demand of the third, to have avoided the danger signaled by the fourth, and to have met the final one because his claim about belief is a claim "about the world and not a claim about the attitudes which men and women may adopt [sic] to the world" (p. 209).

On Sutherland's view, his revision of theology is a way forward for Christians. It offers a way to move from theological attempts to reconcile the realities of suffering and evil in the world with the idea of a personal, omnipotent, omnibenevolent God without forfeiting the view of human affairs sub specie aeternitatis (pp. 87–111). "Theology is the articulation of the possible" (p. 76). He substitutes a posse ad esse valet consequentia for the logical rule (thought by many to be irreversible) ab esse ad posse valet consequentia (pp. 78–79).

Several things could be said here. Among the most significant is that in offering his defence of a posse ad esse valet consequentia he may have undermined his own nonfoundationalist epistemology as well as his advocacy of philosophical reasoning that is neither inductive nor deductive. For as he set out the parameters within which he would operate he cited J. Wisdom's examples of using neither induction nor deduction while persuading
someone of a truth by coming to see that truth in a new light (p. 12).

For our author, theology is the articulation of the possible. And by this he means that showing the possibility is showing the intelligibility. "To show the possibility, i.e. the intelligibility, of . . . distinctions is to show their reality or actuality" (p. 82). In this light he faults established theology in part because it appeals to mystery and to incomprehensibility. "The nub of the disagreement is this: if we invoke the ideas of mystery and incomprehensibility at all, by what criteria do we decide when we appeal to them? There is something unacceptable about the tendency to invoke them in response to the questions raised by evil and suffering while apparently finding less difficulty in the intellectually equally problematic questions of the nature of God" (p. 28).

Do "incomprehensible" and "mystery" always mean insolubility for all and everyone? Perhaps our author would say no to this question.

Does intelligibility entail comprehensibility? Perhaps Sutherland would not claim such an entailment. But it is not clear that he does not because, after his expressed disagreement with some theologians' appeal to mystery and incomprehensibility, he frequently appeals to intelligibility but not to comprehensibility. And he leaves this reviewer in the fog as to what he means by intelligibility.

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