BOOK REVIEWS


The Nature of Doctrine grew out of Lindbeck's presentations in the St. Michael's Lectures delivered in the fall of 1974 at Gonzaga University. It concerns itself particularly with defining and advocating what the author styles the "cultural-linguistic" understanding of religion. This model, found extensively in the current literature on anthropology, philosophy and sociology, offers a noncontent format for the ecumenical enterprise inasmuch as it concerns itself with faithfulness of doctrine rather than truthfulness of doctrine.

If (at least for the purposes of discussion) a religion is conceptualized after the analogy of a language, then the ecumenical task considers whether current teachings, rituals, or ethical imperatives in various sectors of Christendom break the grammatical rules by which Christianity operates when it organizes the world and speaks about life in it. "Lexicographically," different Christian traditions could even affirm mutually exclusive ideas without breaking fellowship or capitulating to other fellowships, because in expressing these ideas neither side breaks the rules of Christian syntax. The approach buys time for discussion and lets opposing traditions recognize their common factors that make it possible for them even to contradict each other. Perhaps this exercise in formal analyses could occasion even substantive agreement by removing the competitive attitude that blocks mutual understanding.

Evangelicals will probably find the cultural-linguistic proposal helpful for providing a format for discussion, but they will see it as only minimally helpful because they most naturally subscribe to another view of Christianity as a religion—what Lindbeck styles the "informative propositional" viewpoint. In this latter perspective, Church doctrine makes truth claims about objective realities. Any ecumenical endeavor that does not structure for a potential meeting of minds on substantive issues does not suffice, even though much undesigned good indeed comes from any interaction between variant beliefs.

The traditional orthodox Christian will find helpful the critique of yet another definition of religion much in vogue among descendants of Schleiermacher. This "experiential-expressive" approach regards doctrines as nondiscursive symbols so that conceptual agreement is not part of the ecumenical agenda. To the experiential model Lindbeck offers in chaps. 1–2 a number of significant critiques.

Much of the value in a book like Lindbeck's lies in matters beyond the specific purpose for writing it. The Nature of Doctrine grasps a broad range of subjects and their literatures. Consequently, the reader may become aware of significant trends in disciplines related to theology and can profit from the integration of these insights into the theologian's task. Stimulating insights from social studies and the history of theology/philosophy enhance interest and reflection in addition to elucidating the proposed cultural-linguistic framework for current ecumenical discussions.

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Classical Apologetics begins with the sentence: “Christianity is rational.” This sets the tone for an apologetic work that stresses the ability of the human mind to achieve knowledge of the existence and attributes of God before looking to Scripture. The preface affirms explicitly the co-primacy of mind and heart: The mind has primacy of order, the heart of importance. With this distinction in mind the authors can safely “affirm reason without rationalism” (pp. ix–x). They take an optimistic view of the cogency of apologetic, particularly theistic argumentation. They complain that many modern apologists have constructed arguments that prove more than their framers realize. Too many today think their theistic proofs are merely suggestive, not coercive. But “a proof must demonstrate that something is really true. If it does not demonstrate something to be true, then it is not a proof and ought not to be referred to as such. . . . Why the fear of coercion? . . . What objection is there against logical compulsion? What is logic if it is not compelling?” (pp. 126–127).

“Classical” or “traditional” apologetics means for the authors a two-step approach, which first demonstrates the truth of theism using theistic arguments based on common ground with unbelievers and then shows the truth of Christian theism based on historical evidence. This method obviously parts company with presuppositionalism, which denies any common ground. It also differs significantly from an evidentialist approach, which moves directly to the establishment of Christianity on the common ground of historical data.

The book is divided into three sections. The first, a prolegomenon for apologetics entitled “Classical Natural Theology: An Overview of Problem and Method,” comprises about one quarter of the total volume. In five chapters the authors discuss the need for and possibility of doing “traditional” apologetics in an age of increasing secularism (chap. 1). They argue vociferously against irrational (chap. 2) or fideistic views (chap. 3). But the role of faith is carefully protected. The Reformers’ distinction between three aspects of faith—the content of the gospel, intellectual assent to that content, and personal trust in the God revealed in that content (p. 21)—supports their view of head and heart as separate but equal.

Having cleared the deck of other methods, the authors build their defense of natural theology (chap. 4). They attack the notion that natural revelation does not produce “real” knowledge (a premise dear to the heart of presuppositionalists) by claiming that “Romans 1 repeatedly asserts that humans do apprehend general revelation” (p. 50). God shows his truth to the unbeliever; “if the pupil does not learn, it is not because the teacher did not teach” (p. 43). Finally, a positive basis for natural theology is developed to set the stage for section 2 (chap. 5).

As part of their discussion of the common-ground question, the authors take a significant tack. They posit three assumptions held in common with unbelievers: (1) the validity of the law of noncontradiction; (2) the validity of the law of causality; (3) the basic reliability of sense perception (p. 72). These methodological presuppositions are held in common with all humans, claim the authors. Though Zen Buddhists might question noncontradiction, Hume causality, and Descartes sense perception, such denials are “forced and temporary”: “The triad . . . is integral to all knowledge. Their forced and temporary denials take place in the courts of subjectivism. In instance after instance where natural theology in general and the theistic proofs in particular have been attacked, one or more of these three building blocks of knowledge has been negotiated” (p. 90).

Overall, I found section 1 satisfying if a bit rationalistic in tenor. Despite explicitly
disclaiming rationalism, the authors assume the mind functions without much handicap. On their interpretation of Romans 1, the reason unbelievers do not have saving knowledge is moral, not intellectual. Presuppositionalists would undoubtedly insist that the authors have not taken into account fully the noetic effects of sin. Undoubtedly sin affects human knowing. But in my opinion it is important to make clear the distinction between the intellectual and moral dimensions of knowledge. Sin affects knowledge, but it does not obliterate it. The authors may have overstated their case by separating rather than distinguishing the intellectual and the moral. Yet the case is well argued and generally convincing.

The positing of noncontradiction, causality, and sense perception is crucial. "Traditional" apologetics stands or falls with these methodological premises. I am inclined to accept these assumptions based on a transcendental type of argument. In fact this seems to be essentially what the authors are doing. The assumptions are not baldly asserted; they are affirmed because they are "necessary for science," "prerequisites for knowledge," and "necessary assumptions for life itself" (p. 72). Yet though I assent to a move of this nature, I acknowledge that it is not uncontroversial. Denials of these assumptions may in the long run turn out to be as "forced and temporary" as the authors claim. But given its crucial role, this point could certainly be argued in greater detail.

Section 1 has much to commend it. The writing is fresh. The motto of pluralism, say the authors, is E Pluribus Pluris (p. 9). They mention those who have a "persistent allergy to rationality" and remind us that Aristotle no more invented logic than Columbus did the New World (p. 76). These are nice touches. Many clear distinctions elucidate the discussion—for example, distinction versus separation (p. 26), rational versus rationalism (p. x), secular versus secularism (p. 5), cognitive knowledge versus intimate knowledge versus saving knowledge (pp. 49–50), and contradiction versus paradox versus mystery (pp. 72–79). Some may find such distinctions pedantic or scholastic, but I believe they are necessary to any clear discussion. It is the lack of careful use of language that so often confuses the issues this section addresses.

The second section is entitled "Classical Apologetics: The Theistic Proofs, the Deity of Christ, and the Infallibility of the Scripture." Like the first this part makes up about a quarter of the book. But there are differences. One basic impression is that someone has turned the movie projector to fast forward. In four chapters the authors conduct a whirlwind tour from the incomprehensibility of God and the ontological argument (chap. 6), through the cosmological and teleological arguments (chap. 7) and historical evidence based on miracle for the Bible (chap. 8), to the mutual confirmation of the Spirit and the Word as well as the Church's testimony to the Word (chap. 9).

I have several complaints about this section. The climax of chap. 6 is the authors' affirmation of the ontological argument in the form presented by Jonathan Edwards: "Edwards shows that we cannot think of nonbeing... that nonbeing must not—cannot—be. If nonbeing is, it is not nonbeing. If being is not, it is not being. Since nonbeing cannot be, it cannot be conceived; just as, since being cannot not be, its nonbeing cannot be conceived" (p. 106). Stated a few pages later, "perfect being exists... because we cannot not have an idea of it. It is impossible to think of nonexistence of infinite being because we cannot think of pure nonbeing or nothing... Infinite being must exist because we cannot conceive of its not existing" (p. 108).

Aside from the fact that this argument would be difficult to use in apologetic encounters, it also seems to me to depend on subtle shifts in meaning. The basic argument seems to move from the premise, "nonbeing cannot be," to the conclusion, "perfect/infinite being must be." For the premise to be true, "being" would have to mean being, existence, reality of any sort—necessary or contingent. This would make the premise clearly true, for it is inconceivable that I should think that nothing existed; at least I am here thinking. But
if "being" in the conclusion means any being or existent whatever, then it does not prove what the authors want it to prove. To reach the desired conclusion, "being" must mean "perfect/infinite being." But if "being" in the premise is understood to mean "perfect/infinite being," then it is not obviously true. It is possible to conceive of a possible world in which the necessary being as the authors describe it should not exist (even though it is impossible to think of this world with no being whatever). For these reasons I have the gnawing suspicion that the argument depends on instability in the definition of the word "being."

Another unsatisfying argument illustrates the tendency to depend on subtle equivocation: "Chance does not explain a purposeful event. It could not even explain a chance event. For if we said that chance explained a chance event, then it would not be chance but it would be some deliberate (therefore, purposeful) producing of a so-called chance event" (p. 133). For the argument to work, "explain" here must mean "give the purpose of." But this prejudices the argument. The authors' opponent does not mean chance "explains" in the sense of giving purposeful explanation. "Explain" could well mean "give a descriptive account of." True, the category of chance does not give the purpose of chance events, but it can describe them. This is all the opponent needs to claim.

In addition this section presents an argument for the cessation of miracles. But the authors overstate their case in claiming "that the cessation of miracles is almost as essential to the case for genuine miracles as miracles are for Christianity." Allowing miracles today, they say, means that "all miracles self-destruct, . . . making God the author of confusion" (p. 161). But why God should be held accountable for counterfeit claims to miracle is unclear to me.

This section does contain some interesting insights. The authors strongly emphasize that one datum could be sufficient for the cosmological argument (p. 115). Although they are not the first to make this move, they avoid circularity in the argument for the authority of the Bible based on the teachings of Christ (p. 141). They note that omniscience implies infallibility, though the reverse could not be true (p. 154). But taken as a whole this part of the book seemed to me to cover too much material too quickly and with too many idiosyncratic arguments. It does not, in my opinion, have quite the elegance of section 1.

The third section, comprising nearly half the book, is entitled "A Classical Critique of Presuppositional Apologetics." In eleven chapters the authors alternately defend traditional apologetics against presuppositional objections and level their own criticisms at their opponents. They hope to persuade presuppositionalists of their error so that apologists "could close apologetic ranks and stand united before an unbelieving world" (p. 265).

After an overview chapter (chap. 10), the section first considers the history of Reformed apologetics (chap. 11—Calvin is claimed as ally of the traditionalists) and the primacy of intellect (chap. 12). Several chapters then defend the traditional view on the noetic effects of sin (chap. 13), the theistic arguments (chap. 14) and Christian evidences (chap. 15). Finally this part discusses the presuppositionalists' views on God's self-attestation (chap. 16), the testimony of the Holy Spirit (chap. 17), verification (chap. 18), analogical thinking (chap. 19) and circular reasoning (chap. 20).

Section 3 presents several major arguments in its critique of presuppositionalism. These arguments continue to surface in various forms. First, the authors criticize presuppositionalism for confusion on its starting point. Presuppositionalists claim that God must be the starting point, but it is we who do the starting. We unavoidably start with ourselves. "[Presuppositionalists] do not seem to realize that even if they did find God by beginning with God it is their conclusion nonetheless. They begin with themselves even while they argue that they cannot begin with themselves. It is they—the finite—who are thinking that the finite is not capable of the infinite" (p. 213).

Second, the authors point out several times the confusion of ontology with episte-
mology. God is primary in being, but this does not imply that he is primary in our knowledge of his being: "Given the proposition that God is first in order of being and the human intellect is second, does it follow that in our thinking we are able to move in the same order? It does not follow. . . . If we are endowed with intellect, then our intellect has first to function in apprehending the nature of God who created the intellect for that purpose. . . . Using the intellect first (the primacy of the intellect), we then discover that the order of being was indeed prior to the order of knowing" (p. 229; cf. pp. 215, 216, 327).

Third, the authors show how Van Til and friends use argumentation prior to the assumption of God even though the presuppositional system says this is not possible. Every apologist offers arguments to show the necessity of belief in God, the authors argue in effect, even presuppositionalists. "If Van Til's apologetic is sound, then he proves rationally at the outset with his mind as it is to the other minds as they are the necessary assumption (not arbitrary presupposition) that the Bible which alone reveals this God, must be true (indeed, the Word of God)" (p. 277; cf. pp. 216, 265, 321, 324, 328, 329).

These three arguments are important in my opinion. It seems to me that they do expose basic ambiguities in presuppositionalists' arguments. Apologists sometimes sustain these arguments by blurring subtle but important distinctions (e.g., order of being versus order of knowing) or by equivocating on word definitions (e.g., knowledge—cognitive knowledge that need not be denied of the unbeliever versus saving knowledge that surely does). The authors have tried to sort out the ways in which these problems actually arise in presuppositionalists' writings. Given the complexity of the material this is a monumental task, and they have done a commendable job.

Presuppositionalists will no doubt try to find loopholes in section 3. But at least the authors have apparently made a genuine attempt to understand presuppositionalism fairly. They respect Van Til (see pp. 184, 283, 286) and even dedicate the book to him. They acknowledge indebtedness to J. Frame for hours of discussion time on the fine points of presuppositionalism (p. x). If presuppositionalists still do not agree with the criticisms, it cannot be for lack of effort on the authors' part. Section 3 is, on the whole, a satisfying analysis.

Viewing the volume in its entirety, I observe that the space allotted to various parts appears to be out of balance. The length of section 1 seems about right for its material. But section 2 deserves far more space to elucidate the details of its many subjects and to resolve the problems I experienced with its arguments before I would be completely happy. I feel that the critique in section 3 is inordinately long. It sounds, in fact, like this section originally might have been written to stand alone. ("Though this book is intended as a refutation of Van Tillian apologetics" [p. 184] is a line that seems to refer only to section 3.) Better balance would have enhanced the book.

Several errors were found in the text. One major slip comes on p. 31 where the text reads ad hominem when it should read reductio ad absurdum. The most interesting line comes on p. 187, where presuppositionalists are said to criticize traditional apologetics for overlooking the "poetic effects of sin." Surely a case of noetic justice.

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Francis A. Schaeffer (1912–1984) was a student of J. G. Machen (1881–1937). Charges have been made that Schaeffer's last book was written by a "bitter man," not unlike certain charges that had been leveled against Machen. It is curious that evangelicals
can criticize fundamentalists and be applauded. But when evangelicals criticize fellow evangelicals it becomes deplorable.

Machen stated in a 1935 letter to Mrs. Lillian D. Smith: "Christ demands not a part of our lives but all of our lives. And certainly no one who really believes the Bible can avoid controversy, because the Bible is full of controversy from beginning to end and indicates controversy in the most solemn way."

Similarly, Schaeffer writes here: "But if we truly believe this, then something must be considered. Truth carries with it confrontation. Truth demands confrontation; loving confrontation, but confrontation nevertheless. If our reflex action is always accommodation regardless of the centrality of the truth involved, there is something wrong" (p. 64). "Truth really does bring forth confrontation—loving confrontation, but confrontation—whether it is in regard to those who take a lower view of the Scriptures than both the original users of the terms 'fundamentalist' and 'evangelical' took, or in regard to holding a lower view of human life" (p. 102).

The great evangelical disaster that the book title refers to is defined by Schaeffer in one word: accommodation. His astute criticism of evangelical feminists, those who are in favor of abortion on demand, the World Council of Churches, and also Evangelicals for Social Action is, in my opinion, just. Such critiques in a spirit of love are needed. When the same attacks come from militant fundamentalists they are too often devoid of Christian charity, let alone brotherly love.

Most fitting is Schaeffer's conclusion, an ever-timely warning: "If there is not loving confrontation, but courageous confrontation, and if we do not have the courage to draw lines even when we wish we did not have to, then history will look back at this time when certain 'evangelical colleges' went the way of Harvard and Yale, when certain 'evangelical seminaries' went the way of Union Seminary in New York, and the time when other 'evangelical organizations' were lost to Christ's cause—forever" (p. 151).

Crossway is to be commended not only for this final volume but for a convenient five-volume edition of The Complete Works of Francis A. Schaeffer. The evangelist to the intellectuals has continued Reformed apologetics in the line of the Princeton tradition. Well may it be said that the mantle of Machen rested on Schaeffer.

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Evangelicals have finally discovered worship. Long content with worship experiences modeled after the revival services of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a spate of books has come out in recent years showing that evangelicals are looking for richer liturgical fare than choruses and altar calls.

Howard has always been a bit of an iconoclast. His first book was Christ the Tiger, which recounted his coming to grips with his upbringing in a prominent fundamentalist family. (His father was editor of The Sunday School Times, his sister Elizabeth was married to missionary-martyr Jim Elliot, his brother David has directed Urbana Missionary Conventions and now is a leader of the World Evangelical Fellowship.) It provided the model for the "up from fundamentalism" books that became popular in the 1960s. Evangelical Is Not Enough continues Howard's controversial writing career. In this book, which also has many autobiographical references, he describes the drabness of evangelical worship and his groping toward a more satisfying liturgy. In the course of describing his personal pilgrimage he deals with many of the objections fundamentalists have raised
concerning liturgical worship, providing an *apologia* for the "high church" style.

It should be noted that Howard has always been interested in the power of symbolism. Early in his career he wrote *An Antique Drum*, which demonstrated how so many commonplace things are symbols pointing beyond themselves (for example, why a Russian borzoi "seems" regal). Howard is certainly right when he indicts most evangelical worship for its drabness. In attempting to free themselves from dead, meaningless liturgical repetition, many evangelicals have evolved an unwritten liturgy just as rigid. Howard is correct again in observing that use of liturgical forms taps the riches of the centuries and the wisdom of uncounted saints. In this last point, Howard performs a valuable service in alerting conservatives to the value of the liturgical past. We evangelicals often hold a low view of Church history and, hence, tend to rediscover the wheel.

There is much in this book to applaud, and I hope that it does help fuel a liturgical renewal among evangelical conservatives. Many of Howard's comments are right. The spirit cannot be divorced from the flesh (chap. 2); worship ought mainly to focus on the being of God rather than the experience of the worshipper (chap. 3); the discipline of submitting to order does yield joy and freedom in the Spirit (chap. 4). Most of us will demur, however, when it comes to venerating Mary, replacing the communion table with an altar, or replacing the centrality of the pulpit with the centrality of the sacrament.

And so we come to this sobering final point. As this review was in preparation, word reached this reviewer that Howard had converted to Roman Catholicism, and this was confirmed both by a personal note from Howard and by a series of articles in *Christianity Today*. A few observations are in order. First, Howard's conversion, regrettable though it may be from the point of view of those of us who value our Protestant heritage, does not invalidate the points he makes. It is too easy to dismiss valid (though uncomfortable) insights by saying, "You see, that's where that sort of thing ends up." Second, we who have ignored liturgy bear some of the responsibility for Howard's defection. Why could not Howard find beauty, majesty and awe in evangelical worship? (It must be noted that liturgical dissatisfaction was only one factor in Howard's decision; the issue of theological and ecclesiastical authority seems to have been the dominant factor.) The third observation is a warning that beauty can become an idol just as can anything else. In this, Howard seems to have come an ironic full circle. Evangelical worship was drab because it centered on the worshipper's "getting a blessing" rather than the majesty of God. So Howard sought worship that gave proper glory to the being of God. He found that a satisfying experience, by which he then measured other worship. Is it possible that Howard merely supplanted the chatty, informal experience of evangelical worship with the formal, solemn experience of "high church" liturgy? A fourth and final observation is that Howard is still our brother in Christ and should remain in our prayers. His pilgrimage is not over yet.

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*The Church Confronts the Nazis: Barmen Then and Now.* Edited by Hubert G. Locke. Lewiston: Mellen, 1984, 239 pp., $39.95.

This volume of "working papers" was prepared for a symposium in Seattle in April 1984 on "A Half-Century after Barmen: Religion, Totalitarianism, and Freedom in the Modern World." The Barmen Theological Declaration is one of the major Christian documents of the twentieth century. The introduction by the editor spells out its importance, and an English text is reprinted. The "Confessional Synod" of the German Protestant
Church convened in Wuppertal-Barmen on May 29–31, 1934, sixteen months after Adolf Hitler had come to power, and in an atmosphere of confusion in the Church and terror in the society at large the 139 delegates debated and adopted a theological statement marked by clarity, forcefulness, and faithfulness to the Scriptures. The heart of the document was brief commentaries on six Biblical passages and the rejection of what were the "false doctrines" preached by ecclesiastical devotees of Hitler. Its scarcely veiled critiques of the "Fuehrer principle" of absolute leadership and rejection of the belief that the state "should and could become the single and totalitarian order of human life" mark it as an important oppositional statement to the Nazi regime.

The essay by R. P. Ericksen sets the Barmen Synod within its historical context. He discusses the crisis of Republican Germany, the activities of the pro-Nazi "German Christians," various church disputes in 1933, the "Confessing Church" faction, the synod itself, reactions to the declaration, and the failure of the Confessing Church to address the Jewish question. He concludes sadly that the Protestant church simply did not deal effectively with the National Socialist challenge.

In the strongest chapter in the book, J. S. Conway details the struggle between the churches and the Third Reich and points out the paradox that in 1933 no one really wanted this. He shows that the Barmen Declaration was not intended as a political protest against the Hitler state but only the nazified Church, that the Confessing Church was never really the spearhead of resistance to the tyranny that engulfed Germany, that the Roman Catholic Church was essentially neutralized, and that the churchgoing population did not realize the implications of Nazism until it was too late.

J. D. Bettis enumerates several lessons of Barmen—namely, the state did not have the right to define what it meant to be a Christian, the importance of religious pluralism, the dangers inherent in natural theology that is so much a part of liberal humanism, and Christians must not be identified with any cultural tradition. His outright rejection of propositional revelation diminishes the value of his essay. In a reflective piece on religion, totalitarianism and human freedom L. H. Letgers provides some stimulating observations on the counterpoise of popular religious fervor and the use of "instrumental rationality" by dictators as well as on how Hitler and Stalin were able to join popular religious intensity with the coldly rational machinery of governance. He identifies the urge or impulse on the part of a power seeker to exact willing and even cheerful obedience from people (mind control) as the most distinctive feature of a totalitarian system. Yet the dictator sees existing religion as a threat to his power and will always try to eliminate it.

The writers clarify that Hitler's advent to power was greeted by Church leaders and members alike. Lutheran theologian P. Althaus welcomed that "as mercy from God's hand," and the Bavarian church synod declared: "A state which begins to rule according to God's law deserves not only the applause but also the joyous and active collaboration of the church" (pp. 27–28). Barmen should serve as a stern warning to contemporary evangelicals that they should not hastily pledge their troth to states and their political leaders. As Conway puts it: "The on-going collapse of every credible religious or moral restraint on the state, the extraordinarily powerful force of propaganda, the growth of dehumanizing ideologies of various kinds, and the erosion of religious traditions . . . are social developments which are by no means confined to Germany" (pp. 139–140). The principal lesson Barmen and the Church struggle provides us is how necessary it has become to erect barriers to these forces today.

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I certainly hope this book will achieve a wide reading. Rausch has rendered a needed service by again reminding Christians (primarily) of the implications of the Holocaust for our time. The subtitle says it all.

Rausch compresses a virtual sea of literature into a well-written chronicle of the Holocaust. This incredible segment of human history is prefaced by a chapter that surveys Church and synagogue relations from the NT era to the Reformation.

This will be an eye-opener for those who have little knowledge of the subject. Some evangelicals may suspect that Rausch has pulled a fast one: Surely great heroes of the faith like Ignatius of Antioch, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Hilary of Poitiers, John Chrysostom and, above all, Martin Luther were not guilty of anti-Semitic attitudes and sentiments. But they were, and the evidence is indisputable. Furthermore Rausch's citations are but a mere sampling of "Christian anti-Semitism."

Of course anti-Semitism is not consistent with the NT, and anti-Semitic attitudes and actions by Christians are a morally reprehensible aberration. Thus in chap. 20 Rausch provides a corrective by briefly answering false interpretations of NT texts and by sketching a truly Christian response to all human beings and to Jewish people in particular.

The heart of the book (chaps. 4–16) traces the rise and fall of the Third Reich. That which lifts this book above the many dealing with the topic is that Rausch constantly has his eye on the features of our own society that are disturbingly similar to that of a German society that allowed the Nazi nightmare to become a grisly reality.

By the time this dreadful episode has been surveyed, Rausch is ready in chap. 18 to raise a question: Could another Holocaust occur in the United States? A thoughtful reading of this book can only lead to a sobering conclusion: It could. Christians could have made a difference in the tragedy of the "final solution." Why did they not do so? Why did the Christian conscience of Germany not rise up and resist Nazi racism? Why did Christians in the United States not lead the way in galvanizing the free world to oppose Hitler's steadily escalating measures designed to dehumanize and eventually exterminate the Jews?

Read Rausch's trenchant analysis of our present American society and his discussion of the psychology of those who inflict torture upon others. It will leave you shaken. As Pogo once said: "We have met the enemy, and we are it." Rausch does document instances of isolated voices of protest (both Christian and non-Christian) as well as courageous action on behalf of Jews. But the overall response was one that should smite our consciences.

Chapter 17 touches briefly on the current Middle East crisis and its bearing on anti-Semitic attitudes. Here I must confess to some disappointment—not in what Rausch says, but in the brevity of the discussion. Clearly Rausch is well versed on the complexities of the situation. I hope he will follow up this present book with another devoted to that seemingly intractable problem. I also applaud Rausch's forthrightness in exposing some of the rhetoric on the Middle East crisis for what it really is: blatant anti-Semitism.

In short, this book is not easy reading in terms of content. But I believe it is necessary reading. May we never forget.

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Central to Gustafson's discussion of ethics from a theocentric perspective is the pre-
supposition that "metaphysics determines axiology." In his view "descriptive premises are critical to how prescriptive, or normative, ethics are developed" (p. 5). Thus, given the view of God that Gustafson has established in volume 1 of this two-voluted set, he attempts in volume 2 to work out an interpretation of morality that would logically follow from such a view. However, his efforts to work out this interpretation leave something to be desired, in my judgment, not only from an evangelical position but also from the standpoint of theistic ethics in general.

Gustafson argues that a theocentric ethics requires us "to relate all things in a manner appropriate to their relations to God" (p. 279). But exactly what are these relations, and how can we come to know them? Gustafson claims that there are considerable difficulties in discerning what God's intended divine ordering is and the human behavior that is proper in respect to this ordering. He certainly does not believe that Scripture gives any authoritative help in providing for such discernment. He concedes that the Biblical material is not totally irrelevant for moral guidance, but he does not offer any criteria for establishing what its relevance is. He admits his approach to determining proper moral responses to God's intended divine order depends more on "general revelation" (although he does not use this term) than on special revelation. He says (with no risk of understatement) that in his discussion "the Bible has not been given the authority that it normally has in Christian theological ethics" (p. 144). Echoing Sartre, Gustafson maintains that as we attempt to relate all things in a manner appropriate to their relations to God "there are no divinely initiated or infallibly revealed prescriptions of proper actions" (p. 275).

But not only is special revelation inadequate as an authoritative basis for determining God's ordering purposes in the world. General revelation is insufficient as well. Gustafson believes that an empirical analysis of the character of human and physical reality provides what he calls "signals of the divine ordering" (p. 150). However, these signals are decidedly imprecise, such that the moral action that is required of humans cannot be read directly off the patterns of interdependence of life. As he says, "there is no precise moral blueprint in nature to which actions are to be conformed" (p. 275). And again, "the conditions that have to be met for human society are grounded in nature, but the precise ways in which they are met are not naturally determined" (p. 296). One reason for this imprecision in general revelation is the mutability of the divine ordering. In Gustafson's view the patterns and processes that characterize reality are not immutable. He claims that God has not so much ordered things as he is ordering things. For Gustafson, as for Whitehead, the world is in process. Thus moral judgments have to be in the context of things as they are at the moment. As the divine ordering changes, what constitutes a proper moral judgment can change.

Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that "the signals of the divine ordering are not as loud and clear as might be preferred" (p. 249), Gustafson argues that the moral ambiguity that can result from this imprecision can be reduced through ethical reflection. In his discussion of marriage and the family, suicide, population and nutrition, and biomedical research funding Gustafson examines what he believes are the patterns and processes reflected in these areas in order to clarify the relevant moral concerns and to determine appropriate ethical responses. Gustafson offers insightful and provoking analyses of the areas he treats. He is very good at asking the kinds of questions that stake out clearly the parameters of a moral issue and that bring its key concerns into sharp focus. His four patterns of discernment—"points to be considered, boundary conditions, presumptions in favor of certain values and principles, and general rules" (p. 303)—are helpful criteria for analyzing areas of moral concern and determining appropriate responses.

Gustafson says that the Reformed Christian tradition has informed his theological construal of the world, which is certainly true. But it is not very clear how his use of this tradition offers ground-breaking insights into ethical decision making. For example, his
contention that our relationship to God is in part that of a steward of creation is certainly
grounded in the cultural mandate of Gen 1:28, but this "doctrine" has been worked out
in more illuminating detail in the Reformed theology coming out of the Dutch tradition.
Again, Gustafson's view that "God orders the life of the world through the patterns and
processes of interdependence in which human persons, institutions, communities, and
the species participate" (p. 298) seems to be similar to the position expressed in Dutch
Reformed circles that God has established reality in terms of "creation norms" and that
these creation norms are to be exemplified in culture on the part of man in terms of
"ordained channels of expression." Further, although he does not discuss it, Gustafson's
ethical theory also seems to presuppose a doctrine of common grace whereby even the
unbeliever can have insights into the patterns and processes of the divine ordering.
Whether Gustafson intends any of these similarities I do not know, but I do know that
his work does not seem to add anything new to the way that these positions have already
been developed, at least in the Reformed literature I have read.

The basic difficulty with Gustafson's work, as I see it, is that his theistic ontology is
so general that it does not provide a very helpful basis for resolving moral conflict. His
desire is "to develop how theocentric piety qualifies the life of moral agents and com-
munities" (p. 3). But what is it about his concept of God that provides even minimally
authoritative knowledge of the divine ordering so that a person might feel some degree
of assurance that he was responding in a morally appropriate way? Gustafson's approach
to answering the question of what God is enabling and requiring human beings to do is
essentially nothing more than an empirical analysis of the given phenomenon under
moral consideration. He claims that his position does not commit the infamous "natur-
alistic fallacy," in that what is valued in his approach is not derived simply from the
facticity of the patterns and processes of the interdependence of life in the world. But
how the nature of God determines value and how it serves as a logical guide to an
appropriate understanding of these patterns and processes are never made sufficiently
clear, in my opinion.

Further, Gustafson does not make clear how his theocentric perspective would dis-
tinguish his ethical approach from other systems that seem to use the same analytical
methodology that he does but without his theistic metaphysics. I said at the opening of
this review that a central thesis of Gustafson's perspective was that axiology presupposes
metaphysics. Gustafson claims that his theistic view particularly determines the way
he goes about treating moral concerns and the conclusions at which he arrives. But apart
from his view that man is God's steward, I find it hard to see how the moral analysis he
undertakes in his expository chapters of particular moral areas is significantly different
from what might be written from a nonetheistic, humanistic perspective.

Reginald F. McLelland

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1984, 120 pp., $7.95 paper.

The author writes in the aftermath of the church-renewal and small-group movement
with its flood of conferences, articles and books that proliferated in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. He declares that "the surge of fashionableness of the small-group movement
is over in America" (p. 17)—at least those that "sprang up without pastoral initiative or
church organization" (p. 17). However, Olsen remarks, small groups are still present
and their fires are still being lit, but pastors are now tending them. The purpose of his book
is to assist pastors and lay leaders in managing healthy groups (p. 14).
Olsen writes in a straightforward, personal and popular style. The chapters are well-structured and easy-to-read.

The main thesis of the book is this: As managers of ministry, pastors can develop healthy congregations through small groups. To Olsen, small groups are not the typical prayer or study groups. They are groups of seven to fifteen persons, which "bear all the basic marks of the church (worship, fellowship, nurture, mission) . . . groups that have both an identity as 'church' and intentionality which grows out of participation in Christian community" (p. 13).

But, according to Olsen, in order for pastors to effectively develop their congregations through small groups they must understand the predictable stages or "life-cycles" through which every group will move. The major portion of the book is then given to articulating this "life-cycle," which is comprised of four stages: (1) initiation, (2) formation, (3) functioning, and (4) terminating. He writes that "one vital key to small-group development within the congregation is to recognize the life-cycle nature of groups and deal openly with the termination process" (p. 34). Olsen might here be throwing a wrench into the ecclesiological wheel of some readers. He believes that every small group should and will terminate. The pastor must look for and plan for the terminating stage.

This book can be commended for several reasons. First, the author stresses the managerial, supportive and enabling roles of the pastor. The traditional one-man super-pastor ministering for the onlooking nonparticipatory congregation is absent from his presentation. Olsen endorses the training of key people to understand the life cycles of small groups and to help the pastor manage the groups as lay leaders.

Second, the emphasis on the small group as a basic building block developed by the pastor from within the structure of the congregation over against that which is imposed upon the structure is healthy. The author would seek to have pastors develop the small-group ministry from the inside with cooperation and participation of the people and the church leaders. He gives practical ways to do this in chap. 3.

Third, Olsen visualizes a variety of small groups bearing the self-conscious and intentional marks of a "church": worship, fellowship, nurture and mission. He also places the small groups as functioning within a context of the larger corporate body. Identity, accountability, cohesion and coordinated efforts, I believe, are achieved through these foci. To foster in the small microcosmic setting all the elements needed in the larger macrocosmic setting will facilitate a balance between the small group and congregation in edification, unity of purpose and goals, and maturity. In the book an emphasis on covenant-making is also stressed for successful small-group growth.

However, this book can also be criticized for several reasons. First, too much attention is given to group theory and insights from behavioral sciences and not enough attention given to specific "how to's" of small-group management and lay-leadership training for small groups. It does include sections in all but the first and last chapters on the pastor's enabling skills and practice in churches and does provide examples, but the discussions are not sufficient to accomplish the purpose of the book. The title does not depict the contents well. A better title might be Understanding the Life Cycle of Small Groups.

Second, Olsen does not make it clear if each small group should bear all four marks of a "church"—i.e., worship, fellowship, nurture, mission—or bear a combination of them or concentrate on just one. On p. 13 he suggests that the groups should bear all four marks, but on p. 75 he recommends that each group should focus on one of the marks while the other marks interplay in a supportive way. Then on pp. 99–100 he intimates that one mark should be focused on in the small group. Here he describes the terminating signs of each type of group—whether the fellowship style, nurture style, or mission style. What should a pastor have his groups do? Personally I would utilize the first option.

Third, the issue of whether every small group should and will terminate is certainly debatable. The author cites various secular "scientific" studies on group development
whose conclusions exhibit some common threads of developmental steps or phases (pp. 47–48). However, the studies cited are not unanimous in their recognition of an inevitable terminating phase. Olsen stresses the certainty of the terminating stage to the point of ignoring any Biblical data regarding the ministry of the Holy Spirit, the life and experience of the early Church (e.g. Acts 2:42–47; 1 Corinthians 12; Eph 3:14–4:16), and the presence of Christ in small groups (Matt 18:20). He wants group leaders “to help people disengage from intimacy and to do ‘grief work’ openly and unashamedly” (p. 34)—hardly a way to overcome transient attitudes toward group commitment.

True, some groups will and should terminate—especially in regard to a prearranged purpose or time limit—but to categorically state that “all groups will terminate someday. That is built into their very nature” (p. 98) is another matter. The spiritual and supernatural dimension of true Christian fellowship can overcome the humanistic and horizontal focus, which might precipitate a terminating stage. Olsen’s “mystery of death and resurrection theology” (p. 99) is inappropriate by suggesting that “the experience of group death, when accompanied by theologizing, can provide a burst of experimental spiritual growth.” It is through trials and sufferings that we experience spiritual growth, not through death and resurrection (cf. Rom 5:3–5; 1 Peter 4; Jas 1:2–18). With the marks of worship, fellowship, nurture and mission attending small groups, what better ingredients for ongoing group and corporate life?

In conclusion, the book has useful insights, examples, information, and principles to apply with regard to small groups and their management. The life-cycle stages are worth taking into consideration, but the terminating stage should not be pressed absolutely. The general tone and manner of the book are comfortable and generally colorful. The criticisms from this reviewer do not negate the overall quality of the author’s contribution to this subject.

Roger B. Helland
McGill University, Montreal


Streiker proposes a psychologically healthier alternative to coercive deprogramming for helping people out of cults. Unfortunately he fails to offer them an alternative worldview with a reliable source of knowledge. His major concerns are psychological, to the exclusion of a Biblically-based theology.

Streiker defines a destructive cult on such considerations as a group that has a single, authoritarian, innovative and idiosyncratic leader, a belief that it alone possesses the truth, a highly structured and strictly disciplined lifestyle, a major on new-member recruitment and fund raising (sometimes through deception and psychological manipulation), consciousness-altering practices, no communication with the outside world, and leaders making decisions for the followers and rendering them totally dependent upon the group (pp. 19–20).

The power of cultic groups is seen in their manipulation and exploitation of an individual’s behavior for the group’s rather than the individual’s interests, harming members beyond what is socially/ethically acceptable (p. 76). Some people are more prone to get hurt by groups than others. Some groups go too far, and something should be done about those groups (p. 77).

The atmosphere in groups that go too far includes removing the person from all distractions, encouraging childlike dependence on leaders, and creating instant community by appealing to everyone’s desire to be better, more loving and effective persons.
Destructive cults exaggerate the negative aspects of life and encourage confession. People are programmed by a sensory overload and indoctrination by appeals to holy and wise authorities (such as the Bible, Koran or Bhagavad Gita or big names from any field) and testimonies of admired converts who say, "I once was lost but now am found, was blind but now I see." Cults involve the convert in different behavioral patterns, making it difficult for him to leave, encouraging avoidance of negativity, emphasizing the group's positives, loading the language, and keeping the convert busy putting his faith into action (pp. 77–79).

Streiker claims that a 75–90% turnover rate of recruits in the cults occurs because "no matter how tenaciously the cult or sect disparages the mind, there are rules at work to which a world view is subject. To phrase these rules in the form of questions: Does our way of describing reality suppress, violate, invent, or deceive? Is it complete? Consistent? Simple? Does it satisfy?" (p. 113). Although no worldview can be strictly proved or refuted, he says, all are constantly subjected to reality testing (p. 114). Unfortunately the importance here given to the epistemological criteria of truth and the testing of truth claims in cultic worldviews does not seem to function to provide an alternative worldview in the author's prescription for cultists.

Streiker sees grave dangers in the vigilante approach of physically coercive deprogramming that (1) denies cultic assertions, (2) derogates their source, (3) logically refutes them, and (4) strengthens the original concept through counter-argumentation. He thinks trying to counteract a cult with arguments is like trying to dispel a rumor. He thinks such "gossip" leads to counter-gossip, spreading the rumor further. Instead, he thinks, people in the cults need a new sense of direction, identity and hope. As if all reasoning were rationalization, he says they do not need substitute dependencies. They need freedom.

Streiker dismisses not only the approaches of the "anticult network" including the Citizen's Freedom Foundation, deprogrammers, and cult-concerned mental health professionals, but also "born-again anticultists." After previously calling for truth on sound criteria, he dismisses approaches based on theological considerations in Spiritual Counterfeits Project, Christian Research Institute, and InterVarsity Press, using such emotive terms as anticult propaganda, hostile cult-baiting and xenophobia.

Properly avoiding coercion, the author's Freedom Counseling Center approach (1) discovers whose problem is primary: parents, or son or daughter, (2) develops a strategy for dealing with the estrangement, (3) establishes contacts, develops trust and creates opportunities for dialogue, and (4) helps cult members gain a perspective from which they can judge their experience for themselves and accept responsibility for their own lives. He does not seek to lead them to any other group. He says, "Each of us should be our own theologian and ethicist, creating our own structured and dovetailed system of truths" (p. 184). Each may ask, "What kind of world do I want? As I pursue what I want, what must be true of reality in order for me to get it?" (p. 186) Are people without the Scriptures solely with the authority of the counselor to create their own universe?

Streiker's subjectivistic approach is less violent than coercive approaches, but it is tragic that his authority-phobia keeps him from recommending for consideration a worldview that fits the facts of general revelation in nature and special revelation in Scripture. Quite inconsistently he calls for recognition of rules by which any worldview must stand or fall. On Streiker's own "rules" not all theological considerations are propaganda.

More careful research of the approaches of SCP, CRI and IVP would show that they seek to avoid unethical propagandizing, proselytizing, programming and deprogramming. Instead such evangelical Christian approaches, however imperfectly, include (1) an ethical pre-evangelism proposing the reliability of Scripture on criteria similar to his, (2) Christlike evangelism including a call to repentance for sin not only against families
but also against God, and (3) spiritual and psychological rehabilitation to a healthy, personal, family and church life.

Surely the time for warfare between psychological and theological counseling is long past, and our common concerns for truth, civil liberties, and religious freedom should lead mature people in both psychology and theology to value the well-founded contributions of the other. And where is teamwork more urgently needed than in assisting people who have been deprived of these great values by fanaticism?

Gordon R. Lewis

Denver Seminary


Perhaps no contemporary practice among evangelical churches brings more emotional reaction than does the use or nonuse of an altar call or public invitation at the end of the preached word. Kendall adds to this current discussion his own thoughts about the nature and value of the altar call. He calls it the "public pledge," and he seeks to present it in a way that is meant to convince fellow pastors that they are not only warranted in giving such an appeal but that in fact they should do so in order to experience more of the power of the Holy Spirit upon their efforts. Says Kendall, "It releases the Holy Spirit to work more freely."

What I find rather remarkable about this book personally is that the author pastors the church previously served by the late Martyn Lloyd-Jones, who wrote and spoke extensively on this subject, always taking a view diametrically opposed to that presented by Kendall in this short work. The consequences of Kendall's views have altered the stance of London's Westminster Chapel considerably, not without some stress in the church.

Kendall's work is written in a popular style and is really an apologia for pastors who may be timid about giving such public appeals. He writes particularly for the Calvinist, for Kendall considers himself a Calvinist and hopes that pastors who are—with him—convinced of unconditional election will not refuse to utilize this effective and powerful tool for bringing people to the Savior. This reviewer seriously questions Kendall's use of terms like "High Calvinism" and "Hyper-Calvinism," but this is not the place to deal with these matters—which are dealt with more directly in Kendall's 1979 work entitled Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649. The reader who might like to follow this debate should also consult P. Helm's Calvin and Calvinism (1981).

Kendall gives us some of the history of the altar call, suggesting that the first such invitation came in a revival meeting in the early eighteenth century under the preaching of Eleazar Wheelock, a Calvinist who called upon the distressed to gather in the seats "just below the pulpit that he might the more conveniently converse with them, counsel, direct, exhort them, etc." Kendall sees this as a beautiful beginning since it was born spontaneously out of true revival brought by the Holy Spirit, not under more carnal efforts that later tended to corrupt the practice. In this vein he is quite critical of Billy Sunday for abusing the invitation by making coming forward synonymous with becoming a Christian.

Kendall sees the primary purpose of the "public pledge" as offering an opportunity for those who have believed during the sermon to "stand up and be counted" through confessing Christ before man. The instrumental purpose, says Kendall, is that "it allows people to seek the Lord in a public manner, although they may not be sure they are saved." Here he develops the idea of the "inquiry room," made famous by D. L. Moody at the end of the last century. Such "seekers" should be counseled carefully with the Bible
and led to respond to Christ immediately. What follows is direction about how to do this sensitively.

Kendall avoids the most serious dangers of the altar-call system by specifically saying that the act of walking forward is not the same thing as receiving Christ. He seems quite concerned to point out the dangers of the “public pledge” by showing how a type of sacramentalism can result if the preacher is not careful.

Does Kendall establish his point? Will the pastor who does not presently give an altar call be convinced by this short book to begin now to give one regularly? Obviously a reviewer cannot answer that question, except to say that he is not personally convinced of either Kendall’s Biblical grounds for this practice or his pastoral arguments. As to his Biblical grounds he leans heavily on Abraham’s “public pledge” in Gen 14:22–23 when he “raised his hand to the Lord . . . and took an oath” before the king of Sodom. He refers to Acts 2:40 and makes a lot out of Peter’s counsel “to save yourselves from this wicked generation.” Other such proof-texting is sprinkled throughout because admittedly this is a practice that can not be clearly found in the NT. Kendall seems to think that the “public pledge” will strengthen the church and make it more truly evangelistic. This too I find questionable, especially on both exegetical and historical grounds. Is the worship of the church to be primarily oriented to reaching a climax in which unsaved people are asked to slip out of their pews and come to the front? Does this not continue to perpetuate the idea that the preacher is the church’s evangelist? Have not the great mass evangelists gone out into the public places and reached people where they were?

Thomas Nettles, By His Grace and For His Glory (Baker, 1986), refers to Kendall’s book and sums up well this reviewer’s response: “Those who have reservations about equating immediate post-sermonic calls for physical response (initiated by a planned appeal for such) with following the will of God desire strong biblical rationale before they can approve it. Baptism, incorporation into a believing group, regular worship and fellowship with other believers, and day-by-day pursuit of holiness and acts of Christian love—all these have the character of confessing Christ before men and are specifically commended, as well as notably exemplified, in Scripture. Where is either the mandate or example of the engineered call to ‘come to the front’ stated as an act of obedience to God’s call to repentance? When walking down an aisle is tantamount to following Christ and professing him before men, the biblical idea of godliness has vanished. The system that relies on the altar call encourages these perversions.”

John H. Armstrong

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The author’s aim to relate Christian doctrine to Christian witness is to be commended. Through his own teaching experience Kolb developed the conviction that the teaching of Christian doctrine must be coupled with the equipping of students with the skills necessary to actively and meaningfully apply the Biblical message to their own cultural setting.

Kolb’s approach is reminiscent of Tillich’s theological “method of correlation.” Tillich’s apologetic theology makes an analysis of the given cultural interpretation of life, seeking the questions asked of society. Theology then answers the questions that people are asking. Rather than setting the witnessing agenda by our own categorical presentation, Kolb continues to ask what and why the sinner wants to know about his own human experience and destiny. He contends that Christian conversation can begin only
when the believer knows why the unbeliever is asking the question. The motive for the question reveals whether the unbeliever is "secure" in his unbelief or "broken" in his unbelief. The Christian witness can then be skillfully applied to the given situation. The major questions on people's minds as they relate to the major theological categories form the major sections of the book.

God's existence, creation and revelation are first discussed by dealing with man's need to take personal responsibility for one's appropriate response to the Creator and his revelation to us. The false gods that give the sinner security must give way before God's twofold message of wrath and mercy can penetrate.

The second major section of the book deals with leading unbelievers to see the perversion of human sin and to enable them to see that they as well as their objects of trust are spiritually dead. Kolb wisely points out that the witnessing Christian must be able to analyze both the conceptions of evil (the problems) that lie heavily on the consciousness of his hearers and the defenses of unbelievers who are secure in their unbelief. The believer may have to wait and continue to cultivate friendship in order to let the secure sinner experience the crumbling of his own gods. Kolb makes a helpful contribution when he discusses the Christian witness to those caught in obsessive compulsive behavior. He maintains that liberty from the crumbling gods of deteriorating habits does not simply come from the mere proclamation of liberty but must come through the witness leading the trapped sinner through "the pathways of genuine freedom" (p. 91).

The third major section discusses the person and work of Christ. Kolb gives a good understanding of the metaphors for Jesus: Jesus the image of God, Jesus the Word, Jesus the prophet, Jesus the light, Jesus the bread of life, etc. Since man's sense of responsibility for evil—his guilt—must be dealt with, Jesus as our "vicar" and "victim" came to take our place and exorcise our guilt and feeling of responsibility under the wrath of God. Christ's death satisfied "God's fury against evil" (p. 112). Kolb does a good job in bringing Christ's atoning work to the modern man in helpful motifs and metaphors. Jesus as the bread of life offers the starving soul a continuous life-sustaining power in the believer's life. Jesus as the head of the body comes to us as our source of direction for life and coordination with others in his company. Kolb rightly integrates redemption with our psychological need when he again relates to the obsessive compulsive sinner trapped in bondage: "The message of redemption also holds out hope that Christ will conquer the habits of hell which enslaves and tortures as well, but believers should recognize that exchanging the habits of hell for the habits of heaven very often takes longer than the restoration of the vertical relationship. God redeems us for Himself with far greater ease than the implications of that redemption develop in concrete form in our relationships with others, nature, and self" (p. 137).

The fourth major section deals with the believer's sanctification through the Spirit of God in conjunction with the family of God. Much work is done on the body of Christ as the Church, the body of Christ in the Lord's supper, the body of Christ at praise and prayer, and the body of Christ in witness and service. Kolb sees the goal of Jesus' design for Christian witness as discipleship. The witnessing Christian should keep in mind that he is not selling "tickets to Heaven" but that he is presenting a "restored relationship with the Author of Life, a relationship of dependence on Him" (p. 152). Although there are many strong contributions in this section, some readers will be troubled by Kolb's sacramental theological approach to baptism and the Lord's supper. The strongest statement of baptismal regeneration declares (p. 154): "Peter can flatly state that Baptism saves (I Peter 3:21), and that it does so not in some merely external or symbolic fashion, as though it were washing dirt off the body. It saves because the baptized conscience can appeal to God without hesitation or fear since its appeal is based on the resurrection of Jesus. Baptism unites us with Jesus in His death and resurrection (Rom. 6:3–11)." Another troublesome statement for many readers concerns infant baptism (p. 158): "There-
fore, God may use this sacrament in accomplishing His intent, the reestablishment of a saving relationship between God and his human creature, also when the creature is still an infant." Another statement that may not be appreciated by many evangelicals concerns the meaning of the bread and wine of the Lord's supper (p. 184): "Most Christians, apart from many in the Anglo-American religious ghetto of the past quarter millenium, have recognized that God is present in the body and blood of His fully human and divine Son Jesus, also in bread and wine, and that He is so present because He says so." (Kolb footnotes this thought to Bonhoeffer, Christ the Center, pp. 54–56.)

Because of Kolb's strong sacramental theology and his more philosophical and psychological approach (which positively adds great integrative depth and application) and his frequent quoting of Thielicke, Bonhoeffer and G. Wingren (to the exclusion of a greater breadth of writers), this book may not be a popular evangelism resource in many evangelical sectors. I feel, however, that Kolb has made a strong contribution to the linking of theology with a vibrant and relevant witness in our day.

Gary D. Seaquist

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From the pen of the premier living missiologist of our era comes a new contribution. He insists that crucial decisions are needed that are basic to the mission of the Church today. His intention is to apply the principles of Church Growth to the Church worldwide. Evangelism is his theme as he addresses three groups of Christians: ministers and practicing Christians of the sending and receiving churches, executives of missionary societies, and missionaries who serve overseas. (Seemingly missions is mainly overseas, though some will debate that concept. Access to the gospel does make a difference, however.) Momentous decisions are categorized as four in number: theological, the racial mosaic (to reach all ethné of the world), mission agencies (from all people to all peoples), and new strategies in missions (including peer countries and urban centers).

It is good to see his basic argument underlined again that the fundamental purpose of Church missions is the spread of the gospel and the conversion of hearts to Christ. "The greatest poverty of all is that of not knowing and following Jesus Christ our Lord" (p. 8). If "true ecumenicity is ardently evangelistic" (p. 73), we need to identify with all those so concerned and rally forces with them. If there is uncertainty in some quarters over divine authorization for this mission, then let us press forward with those who do. In a sense, why be so concerned with those at Melbourne and Vancouver who may differ? We have our marching orders.

One of McGavran's major pleas is to encourage existing national churches to be aggressive and reach out to the unreached and make disciples of all segments of their society. Yet missionaries are still needed, especially where the national church either does not exist or else is small or weak. McGavran makes a major issue over the innovation of international teams. Churches and mission agencies must cooperate and coordinate their efforts—but here a strange imperialism intrudes: Funding and control of the team's activities are to be the role of the sending agency. Is it any marvel that "no existing national church would feel responsible for or direct the operation" (pp. 125, 127)? Does not cooperation include sharing fiscal responsibility? Ethnocentricity is a major barrier to coordinated efforts and clear communication.

The book's emphasis on reaching peer nations is well made. Developing nations are not the only valid mission fields, nor is this the criterion of an unreached people. Many
Europeans consider themselves Christian only because they are not Buddhist or Moslem or barbarian. David Barrett's statistical analysis of Europe is completely misleading at this point. (In reality there are several times more true Christians in mainland China and India, proportionate to the population, than across Europe. McGavran quotes Barrett as saying that France today sends out 23,000 missionaries to the non-Christian world. This is clearly in error; there are less than half that number representing Roman Catholic efforts, lay social workers included. Many of these are neither truly Christian nor missionaries.) Christians in name only need to know the life-changing dynamic of the gospel of Christ. Peer nations in Europe, like Japan, need conversion by "converting missions" (p. 167).

The need for many new faces in the Church is a positive note. The more we study people groups the more we see a mosaic of personalities. Working-class migrants, some employed and some not, inner-urban and outer-urban dwellers, white-collar, blue-collar, no-collar—all show that faces of the body of Christ are multifarious and should be. On that great and coming day men from every tribe, nation, people and tongue will gather before his throne. McGavran is right in saying that we must develop a growing conviction that all people (in Europe, in North America, in the third and fourth worlds) need to accept a sure word about God. People by people, group by group they ought consciously, individually to yield to Christ as Savior and Lord of their lives. Though we may not agree with all the applications McGavran makes from his momentous decisions, we must accept the challenge of assembling all the pieces of the ethnic mosaic for which the Church is responsible. Discipling the nations is the command of our God.

Robert J. Campbell

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Anabaptism and Mission is a collection of thirteen essays that discuss Christian mission from the perspective of the Anabaptist tradition and the significance of this standpoint for contemporary mission.

When multiple writers develop related themes, some repetition is inevitable. Common influences and convictions are apparent. Most of the authors are Mennonites. Nevertheless the broad scope of this book is admirable and the general quality of writing high. Some of the chapters are reprinted from other sources going back as far as 1947, while others appear in print for the first time.

Several themes surface with great frequency in the course of this book. The most predominant theme—heavily underscored by Shenk, C. J. Dyck, J. H. Yoder and W. Schäufele—is the assertion that obedience to Christ's great commission lay at the heart of the Anabaptist movement from its very beginning. Early Anabaptists interpreted the great commission as binding on all believers at all times. This explains the great missionary passion that characterized their rapid expansion during the early sixteenth century. Unlike the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, the Anabaptists viewed Europe as a mission field filled with lost persons in desperate need of radical transformation rather than an already Christianized society in need of doctrinal and ecclesiastical reformation.

Second, the communal nature of NT faith as expressed in the life of gathered and disciplined congregations composed of identifiable adult believers is integral to the Anabaptist vision. Early Anabaptists stressed responsible commitment to the Christian brotherhood, even to the point of economic sharing, as a necessary and natural corollary to individual conversion. Personal faith found corporate expression in the life of the Church.
Third, the mission imperative of the early Anabaptist movement was lost within a century as seclusion from the world replaced engagement with the world. Several essays analyze diverse aspects of this demise. Still others point to signs of its recovery and call for an ecclesiology that takes seriously the missionary nature of the Church.

Other themes also appear with regularity: persuasion rather than coercion as the principal evangelistic method, holiness as both command and possibility, the relationship of eschatology to missionary urgency, suffering as the authentication of the Church. Many themes mentioned in this book have great contemporary as well as historic significance: powerlessness, nonviolence, lay ministry, banishment as a mode of sending, the role of women. Church growth insights are also scattered throughout the volume.

While this book is shorter on the narrative than on the conceptual, it does contain sufficient historical material to both orient the reader to the issues raised and to humble him at the example of the cost of discipleship willingly paid by the radical wing of the Reformation. Especially moving is the description of the liturgy for a commissioning service, called a farewell service.

As one whose own view of mission theology and history has been shaped by the Reformed and pietist traditions, I found this book particularly illuminating. It greatly enhanced my own understanding of and appreciation for the often-neglected Anabaptist tradition. I suspect that readers who find their roots in eighteenth-century pietism and nineteenth-century revivalism will also discover much in this book that is new and instructive.

Kenneth B. Mulholland
Columbia Graduate School of Bible and Missions, Columbia, SC


Strauss' stated purpose (p. 9) catches the spirit of the book and is worth repeating here: "One day it occurred to me that God is the most fascinating person alive and that getting to know Him could well be the most helpful thing that ever happened to me. The more I probed His nature the more convinced I became that knowing Him is the solution to most of my problems. And as I listened to others share their burdens with me as their pastor, I became convinced that knowing God better was the answer to many of their problems as well. I decided that I want to get to know God intimately, and that I want to help others get to know Him as well, if I possibly can."

The scope of the work encompasses the same terrain as Tozer's _The Knowledge of the Holy_ including chapters on God's knowability, attributes, trinity and sovereignty. Solid Biblical exposition abounds within clear explanations. Strauss discusses significant Biblical and present-day practical issues in an easy-to-understand fashion. Each chapter concludes with a suggested "action to take" to help the reader experience the benefit of the divine attribute in his life. The work is delightfully devotional, encouraging worship.

Strauss' treatment lacks the completeness desired in a theology text. There is no discussion concerning the incomprehensibility of God or philosophical issues. The simple discussions at times become simplistic. A few minor points lack technical precision. For instance, he seems too negative concerning the acceptability of lament as a legitimate aspect of petitionary prayer (p. 30). Stephen was killed for proclaiming the OT theme of Israel's hardness of heart. Jesus was Daniel's Son of Man (messianic divine King); he was not killed for proclaiming God's omnipresence as Strauss claims (p. 103).

As a whole, however, the book is a well-balanced, Biblical presentation of God's attributes and trinity, written for either a lay or a basic college audience.

Douglas W. Kennard

Mid-South Bible College, Memphis, TN
**Equals Before God: Seminarians as Humanistic Professionals.** By Sherryl Kleinman. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984, 142 pp., $15.00.

Kleinman seeks to address two issues in her work, which is based on a sociological study of a midwestern seminary. She explores the phenomenon of deprofessionalization as it relates to the pastoral ministry and then focuses on the situation of the female seminarian in this context. The professions once based their standing on knowledge that was beyond the reach of their clients. Doctors, lawyers and ministers were viewed as above review except by their peers. Even within this select group, ministers hold the distinction of being the original “professionals,” as the term “professed” has as its earliest meaning one who had “taken the vows of a religious order” (p. 1). “Their exclusive access to the transcendént gave them the authority to make moral prescriptions for their clients.” The present situation has seen a loss of prestige among the professions as naturopaths, counselors, and Bible-study leaders compete with the professional office-holders. The professionals in the ministry have accelerated the demise of their mystique as they have renounced claims of special status and want to be ministered to by their congregation.

The field work at Midwest Seminary, an unnamed entity, took place in the 1976-77 academic year when the author lived in the on-campus dorm with single female seminarians in the Master of Divinity program. The study documents the shift that had occurred in this institution’s emphasis toward a view of the minister as a “humanistic professional.” “Humanistic religion is grounded in the human situation rather than in the transcendent. In this view, the distinction between transcendent and mundane realities no longer exists, for everyday reality takes on a religious significance. Hence, humanistic religion has a this-worldly emphasis. Religion becomes a matter of human symbolism rather than a God-given truth” (p. 49).

Illustrative quotations from the interviews conducted as part of the study are frequently included to clarify students’ views: “Was the seminary what you expected? No, in some ways. I at least thought everyone here would believe in Christ as Divine, although I knew there would be theological differences. But what I can’t understand and what bothered me the most was people who don’t even think these questions are relevant. I distinguish between social ministry and Christian ministry. Some people here are really into social ministry—they could be psychologists or social workers. They don’t see what they’re doing as being guided by God or their relationship with God. I can’t understand why they’re here” (p. 41).

The study points to the difficulties facing female graduates as they are accepted by some of the more traditional constituency and seek to put their situation in the context of an evolving profession.

The primary strength of the study lies in its sociological context. The bibliography and notes represent a wide interaction with the literature of social science valuable to seminary educators who are usually not familiar with these sources. The greatest weakness of the study is that it was conducted taking no account of any theological issues. The place of this “humanistic religion” in American Protestantism was not considered, and the fact that the role of women, laity-clergy relationships, and the role of the pastor might be theologically considered issues does not enter into the study. However, this should be read by seminary educators and is a necessary acquisition for academic libraries.

R. A. Krupp

Western Conservative Baptist Seminary, Portland, OR

Using imagery from Moby Dick, Wentz, who is himself a distinguished scholar of religious studies, calls the members of his discipline back to the original meaning of their subject and its study. “Ishamel is a wonderer, who learns many things about the mystery of otherness by way of a simple mode of detached participation.” On the other hand there is Ahab who seeks to conquer and destroy the other. In Wentz’s symbols, Ahab represents much of contemporary study of religion—a subculture of scholars who are trying to master their subject matter by emptying it of its lifeblood. Wentz wishes for us to return to the model of the awestruck Ishmael.

At the heart of religion lies the encounter with an other. Wentz develops this theme by delineating various types of otherness. First, there is the singular other, encountered whenever the scholar studies any phenomenon and invariably revered along religious lines. Then there is the representative other, which means that one cannot ever disengage oneself from involvement with the reality and tradition of the encounter. Finally there is the wholly other, the center of religion, which insures the abiding presence of mystery. Ultimately the proper response to the other cannot be mere mastery, but it must include its contemplation.

In the last three chapters Wentz seeks to integrate this notion of otherness into the activities typical for scholars: reading and study, teaching, and making books. In each case his message is simple: to get away from the pseudo-technological approach that prevails in our academies based on meeting the requirements of the guild and the mass production of materials. Instead we need to return to the study of religion with the reverent engagement that the subject matter demands.

This little book is not an easy work to read or summarize. Every sentence is well thought out and seems to carry several levels of meaning. But it is well worth studying for the sake of the insights contained, even by those who are not part of the religious academic community.

There is a significant difference between religious studies and theology, since theology is the systematic exposition of our particular tradition carried out by its believers. Wentz’s words apply to us a fortiori. Especially the evangelical theologian ought always to resist the temptation of carrying out his craft as a piece of intellectual technology only. We too are running the risk of judging each other’s contributions on the basis of volume of output, utilization of jargon, and complying with the standards of not only theological but also scholarly orthodoxy. What Wentz is perhaps saying to us may be this: After all the verbs are parsed in the original languages, the references have been interpreted, the classics have been cited, and contrary arguments have been refuted, if we have not simultaneously contemplated the living God, we have not been faithful to our calling.

Winfried Corduan

Taylor University, Upland, IN


Those who live and work in the third world cannot but be overwhelmed by its poverty. Its social realities seem beyond solution. Adeney speaks directly to the issue and tries to answer the question: “What is our intelligent response to the poverty of brothers and sisters around the world?” (p. 3).

Though her book is directed to North American believers and local churches, she
speaks from within the third world as one who appreciates the diversity and dignity of its cultures. Indeed, the “theological” chapter (chap. 6) underscores that the richness of cultures ultimately is grounded in the Creator himself. Yet the presentation is a realistic one: Because of the fall, man’s cultures are tainted by sin. To make God’s rule, his kingdom, manifest in the world will therefore be a struggle. This is not a call to build a utopia but rather to caring cross-culturally.

Adeney explores concrete ways to express Christian caring through development in health care (chap. 1), agriculture (chap. 2), business (chap. 3), and the resettlement of refugees (chap. 5). The book is replete with vivid examples, and necessarily so, to help the reader visualize and become aware of the magnitude and complexity of the problems in the third world and of possible solutions. The suggestions and illustrations are designed to emphasize that projects must “be economically realistic, socially responsible, and prescriptively sensitive to cultures beyond ours” (p. 26). The goal is to help people help themselves.

Her chapter on politics (chap. 4, subtitled “Helping People Fight Oppression”) will surely cause a strong reaction. To work to influence policies and multinational corporations at local, national and international levels will be seen by some as beyond the bounds of the Church’s mission. Quotes by well-known liberation spokesmen M. Bonino (p. 60) and Gutiérrez (p. 71) will raise doubts about the author’s theological discernment and depth. Yet Adeney is an anthropologist, not a theologian. She nowhere suggests moving beyond legal boundaries; Marxism is portrayed as cruel and opportunistic; and evangelism is still a priority (p. 78). But “politics matters,” she says, and must become part of the Christian’s vision.

The last chapter is devoted to presenting alternatives to North American Christians. In light of the world situation priorities, values and lifestyles must be reassessed and reshaped. This reorientation process is urgent, and none of the common “cop-outs” will withstand scrutiny.

Adeney’s vision for “integrated holistic development” is refreshing and thought-provoking. Not all might agree with her analyses; some might chafe at her suggestions; but all should give God’s Foreign Policy a careful reading.

M. Daniel Carroll R.

Central American Theological Seminary, Guatemala City


With this work, first published in 1977 as Jesús: Ni vencido ni monarca celestial, the Maryknoll Fathers continue their commendable record of making seminal theological studies from the third world readily accessible to an English-language audience. One need not be uniformly sympathetic to views expressed in such documents to recognize their importance.

The dozen essays in this volume are a bit uneven in quality and focus, but most are quite useful as analyses of how Jesus is actually perceived within the Latin American context. Latin culture is filled with distorted and misleading images of Jesus, too often with the tacit approval or outright encouragement of religious authorities (primarily Roman Catholic, though not exclusively so). Jesus is merely a babe in his mother’s lap, dependent upon her for his power and authority. Jesus is dolorous and defeated, a symbol of abject suffering with whom downtrodden indigenous peasants readily identify, yet one who offers no resurrection hope. Jesus is a disincarnate celestial monarch far removed from the problems and impurities of this world. As many as nine similar stereotypes are
delineated within a single article. The persistently flawed understandings of Jesus prevent the development of a genuinely Biblical Christology. The insights proffered into Latin American religious psychology, especially in the section “The Meaning of Latin American Christs,” are invaluable. Older evangelicals, however, may protest that they put forward many of the same criticisms decades ago, at least on a more popular level.

While the contributions generally come from the orbit known as liberation theology, they are a good indication of the diversity within that movement. Some essays are still marked by classical liberal theology, but more exhibit antagonism toward it. Perhaps L. Boff is most typical, in that he criticizes nineteenth-century approaches even while betraying his own continued dependence upon them. Of course a majority have read Marx, and a few appropriate him rather directly. But just as often the references to Marx are fairly guarded and nuanced. H. Assmann admits a Marxian attempt to “read reality” is “still highly imperfect” at best (p. 133). Furthermore there is an explicit rejection by different authors of the “guerrilla Christ” (p. 43), the “revolutionary Christ” (p. 94), or the “political Christ” with a facile link to the Zealots (pp. 117–118), though the simultaneous equation of Zealots with fascists by J. S. Croatto took this reader by surprise. At the same time, there is general recognition that a Christological reformation would bring political consequences, especially in a continent where Church and state have been so thoroughly and deliberately intertwined for so long and where both have so frequently served to secure and perpetuate grossly unjust socio-economic structures. S. Galilea presents Jesus as a charismatic figure who renounces politics and violence even as he denounces their abuses, but denies that his lack of personal participation was ever intended to be normative for all Christians. More than one author implies that whatever the defects in emerging Christologies of liberation they are certainly far superior to their traditional Latin predecessors.

The book’s most penetrating excursion into theology is by L. Schuurman from a Dutch Reformed perspective. Protestants and expatriates are liberally represented, “Juan” Stam being the best known to North American evangelicals. But by comparing the South African Christology of A. Nolan to that of H. Berkhof, Schuurman presses the limits of his assigned parameters. If the collection lacks consistent, first-rate acumen, it nonetheless provokes considerable thought. Surely orthodoxy and orthopraxy cannot be separated. The Biblical theologian must take into account the plight of the oppressed. In Colombia during the mid-1970s, courtroom defendants could still periously plead: “We did not know it was a crime to kill an Indian.” The good news of Jesus Christ speaks to such monstrosities, does it not?

The University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Timothy Erdel


The dust jacket of this book calls liberation theology the most important new movement in theology since Schleiermacher. If this be the case, liberation theology deserves more attention from evangelicals than it has received. Unfortunately this volume does not remedy the situation because, despite the title, it deals more with capitalism than with liberation theology. Some of the articles on capitalism are excellent, but they are not what one would expect from a book purporting to be about liberation theology. As with many edited works the diverse contributions do not fit together as well as they might. But these problems must not be allowed to mask the real values of this book, the foremost being recognition of the need for evangelicals to deal with this new theology.
Certainly the best chapter is R. J. Neuhaus' interaction with G. Gutiérrez' *Theology of Liberation*. Neuhaus takes Gutiérrez seriously, appreciates his strengths, and challenges his weaknesses. Placing liberation theology within the tension inherent in all theology between the need to be indigenous and the need to be universal, he warns against presuming to have a perfect transcultural theology from which to criticize others. Using the standard of the gospel to judge all theology, he finds liberation theology wanting in regard to its understanding of freedom, the mission of the Church, and the effects of human sin. A second critique of Gutiérrez by D. Vree adds nothing to Neuhaus and with its condescending attitude might well have been omitted.

The three other generally theological studies are C. F. Henry, H. O. J. Brown and J. Schell. Henry's contribution is abridged from *God, Revelation, and Authority*, and while helpful here should be read in the original (4.542-592). Brown's article provides a helpful introduction to the book, discussing the roots of liberation theology and some of the issues that must be faced in assessing it as a theology. He also undercuts the dust-jacket statement by pointing out that liberation theology bears a distinct resemblance to the liberal Protestantism that derived from Schleiermacher, showing that in many ways liberation theology is not so new. Brown's theological analysis was well done as far as it went but left this reviewer wishing for more because it was so well done. Schell shows that the background of liberation theology is as much German as Latin American. He goes on to challenge the liberationist attack against western democracies as the source of all Latin problems as being utterly misdirected. The success of liberation theology in Latin America, he charges, would doom the area to perpetual underdevelopment and political repression. Schell points out a measure of naivete among liberation theologians in believing that their good intentions can be achieved through counterproductive means. R. Walton adds an excellent study of J. Moltmann's theology of hope, a major source for liberation theology. He deals with both the theological and political-economic implications of Moltmann's work. Walton's long chapter is by far the most difficult of the book but repays a close reading. Schell and Walton are weakened in some measure, however, by their overemphasis on economics, a condition that affects most of the contributions.

M. Novak and Nash have written about democratic capitalism and seek to defend it against socialism, apparently believing that liberation theology can be reduced to a socialististic economic program. (Neuhaus' concluding article shows the invalidity of such a reduction.) Novak's is the better article and in another context would be very useful, but he does not really touch the heart of liberation theology. Apart from Brown, the book opens with an extended apologetic for capitalism. Only at the end do strong theological critiques of liberation theology appear. But how many readers are going to wade through what is properly the subject for another book to get at what the title claims this book is about? Nowhere in the book is there a systematic evaluation of the elements of liberation theology. One would hardly know liberationists are hard at work on a Christology, yet this is the heart of any theology that claims to be Christian. Likewise anthropology and sin are mentioned, but without conclusions that would get to the heart of the liberationist system. Furthermore the single charge that liberation theology's weak doctrine of sin masks the dangers of a collectivist government might also be applicable to the authors' oft-expressed enthusiasm for capitalism's individualism. A note of caution would appear necessary at this point.

C. Pinnock's reminiscence about his radical days appears superfluous to the plan of the book because he is talking about a North American situation very different from that addressed by the liberationists. E. Norman's reminder about the danger of politicizing religion is a timely reminder to evangelicals because Norman points out the almost universal politicizing of Christianity throughout history—by both the right and left.

The contributors agree that liberation theology has its good points, but the thrust of this book appears to be that of defending the current western economic system against
liberation theology instead of trying to understand where it challenges us to do better and evaluating it theoretically for consistency and correctness. Liberation theology has critical if not insurmountable defects in its Christology, anthropology, hermeneutics, and understanding of Scripture and authority. Not all of these matters have been dealt with in this volume, and all take second place to economic concerns. In part, Neuhaus and Henry are exceptions to this problem. Nevertheless a comprehensive evangelical response to liberation theology remains to be written. The book contains a good index and an equally good bibliography that will assist those interested in looking further into the subject.

Douglas McCready

Temple University, Philadelphia, PA


It is refreshing to read a book that deals with the ecology of both human and non-human creation from a Christian perspective. But this book does more than simply that: It is a theology of Christian concern for all of God’s creatures, and it is written so that evangelicals (and other Christians) with reasonably good reading skills could use it for their own learning or an adult study class.

The work is divided into three parts, in the first of which Granberg-Michaelson documents not simply the ecological peril of the world (creation destroyed) but also the role of Christendom in creating this peril, including the charge by many that Christianity must be abandoned if we are to save the earth. The second part begins with that charge and shows that, far from being unfriendly to the earth, a true reading of the Bible offers a promise for the earth (creation redeemed). Finally the author tries to work out this promise concretely in a third part, which describes the prospect that he believes faith calls us to pursue (creation restored). In the process of these last two parts he draws out the implications of most major doctrines of the faith—e.g., creation, redemption, eschatology, grace, pneumatology, ecclesiology—and sketches how this perspective might apply to some of the major issues of our day (economics, ecological problems, nuclear arms, biotechnology, etc.). In its scope and much of its perspective one is reminded of the late F. Schaeffer’s Pollution and the Death of Man, which Granberg-Michaelson does indeed cite.

In general one must simply say that this is an admirable book and deserves a wide hearing among the evangelical public. It is not an idealistic single-issue work created in a world that never existed but a call to work out the implications of our own salvation and a careful documentation of what they are. It clearly shows that concern for the poor and for ecology (he purposely does not separate humanity from the rest of creation, so development aid, medical missions, and cleaning up oil spills can all be interchangeable examples) is a necessary implication of commitment to the Bible.

On the other hand, one fears that because of its imperfections the book may be ignored by many who should read it. For example, at times our author takes critical positions (mainly on Genesis) that do not materially affect his conclusions but that could alienate some evangelicals, even though they are indirectly stated. In fact his clear address to evangelicals in some sections (e.g. his discussion of premillennialism) coupled with these other sections makes one wonder if he really knows his intended audience well. Another problem is his argument that one should take a Reformed amillennial eschatological position, which will not delight many—especially since he does not argue this on exegetical grounds but on the grounds of the implications of the theology for creation. He
The modern master of the Socratic dialogue has struck again. The subtitle—“A 20th-Century Socrates Looks at Power, Pleasure, Truth and the Good Life”—says it all. Kreeft has presented a masterful refutation of several modern egocentric philosophies in the form of twelve dialogues on the campus of Desperate State University.

Readers of Kreeft’s previous IVP books will recognize his style, including his acute “appendicitis” (p. 28), immediately. Unlike his other books, however, this one deals with the broad topics of truth and values in general rather than with specific issues like the person of Jesus (Between Heaven and Hell) or abortion (The Unaborted Socrates).

The philosopher begins his series of dialogues with a student named Peter Pragma, who is trying to decide whether to major in business or science, to decide which will make him more money and bring him “the good life.” By the time Socrates is through with him, he has a much more important task: defining “the good life.”

The sage then moves on to Peter’s friend, Felicia Flake. After Socrates has demolished her quest for “fun” and meaning in life, they engage in an Oxford tutorial on the question of values: Do absolute values exist, or are values relative to culture and situation? This chapter includes a helpful outline summary of the arguments for and against the concept of absolute values. The reader thus gets the message that the values question is the real focus of the book. Socrates refers to it several times under the name sumnum bonum.

A whimsical postscript relates the united efforts of Moral Majority and the ACLU to ban Socrates from the campus. The charges: He “is ‘corrupting the minds of the young,’
according to the Moral Majority people, and proving himself 'an enemy of the people,' according to the ACLU.' These accusations must have sounded awfully familiar to Socrates.

The book scores several stinging points against modern pragmatism (including technology) and sensualism (including popular psychology). Unfortunately the points are rather well hidden within the complex pattern of the Socratic dialogue. For one who is already well schooled in philosophy and accustomed to winnowing the grains of a worldview from the chaff of people's rhetoric, it provides a lighthearted and fast-paced look at some telling arguments for a theistic (though not necessarily specifically Christian) worldview.

For those not well taught in philosophical dialogue, however, the book will require at least three slow and careful readings to glean the real meat of the arguments from the discourses. The arguments that Kreeft presents are worth the effort, though, and the humorous interludes, coupled with the wonderfully human character of the participants, keeps this task from becoming laborious or boring. This book is decidedly not a philosophy textbook, but it will make excellent supplemental reading. It is also useful as a refresher for anyone who wants to sharpen his philosophical tools and skills.

David L. Washburn
Denver, CO


It is becoming increasingly important for us to address again the question of who and what the Church should be. Lohfink is representative of the new Tübingen school, a group of scholars who are expounding the Biblical text with a faith we are unaccustomed to associating with German scholarship. Although speaking for and from within the Catholic tradition, Lohfink's treatise addresses the illnesses and misunderstandings that have immobilized our witness as well. This publication is thus a challenging and prophetic voice.

The work begins by asking "how Jesus gathered Israel and how he envisioned the community of the true Israel, because right here we reach the ultimately decisive question of what the church should look like today" (p. xi). Lohfink traces a faithful witness to Jesus' vision up to the "Constantinian Turn" and, as a literary indication of this break, Augustine's *City of God* (p. 182). These mark the beginning of a development still present years later in the individualism of nineteenth-century liberal Protestantism and therefore also evident in his own tradition—all in all, a convincing indictment coming from a Catholic.

The recurring themes are two. First, Israel was to be God’s sign among the nations for their salvation (pp. 17 ff.). When Israel failed "to mediate salvation to the nations through its faith, it did so through its unbelief" (p. 142). The Church is the eschatological Israel, called into existence by Jesus. The apostle Paul expected a successful missionary effort to the Gentiles (Rom 11:26) to move the nation of Israel to jealousy and ultimately to salvation. "At this point the scheme of the pilgrimage of the nations recurs, this time in its original direction. As Rom. 11:12, 15 suggests, in the eschatological hour at which Israel as a whole comes to faith (due to the messianic attraction of the Gentile church) the effect on pagan society, still unbelieving, will be immense" (p. 143).

Second, the Church is to be a "contrast" or "alternative society." It is not the kingdom of God, but it "can already taste the powers of the age to come (Heb. 6:5)" (p. 84). By its nature it should stand out in sharp relief from the world. The Christian community is
loving (pp. 113 ff.), egalitarian (p. 87), pacifist (p. 52) and eschatological (p. 175). Lohfink refers to the Church as a people (always in the singular), and the people of God is a community, never "a universal, interior reality in the souls of individual believers scattered over the face of the earth" (p. 28).

Lohfink's forthrightness is disarming, his scholarship comprehensive, his theology conservative. His sources will unfortunately be inaccessible to most English readers. And his exegesis sometimes extracts more from the text than is justifiable (a point hardly noticed because the theological fruit of the exegesis is otherwise sound and attractive). There are elements of the thesis that I find difficult to accept—perhaps minor items on the menu, but unpalatable nevertheless.

For example, Lohfink's distinction "between an ethic of discipleship and an ethic of the entire people of God" (p. 39) is counterproductive. However he might protest, allowing such a distinction leads inevitably to one of two developments: separation from the Church, or isolation within the Church. We Protestants did the former and continue to separate from one another regularly. The Catholics encouraged the latter by sanctioning asceticism, monasticism, the priesthood and—a more recent phenomenon in America—the formation of so-called "authentic Christian communities." Lohfink can even refer to "a present reality in the church and in Christian communities" (p. 70). The NT knows no such distinction. In the end Lohfink's ecclesiology fosters the easier paths of separation and isolation rather than the challenge of spiritual reconciliation and communal redemption. This inevitable proclivity in his thesis adumbrates his own admission that originally the Church was not so conceived (p. 132).

Second, Lohfink's implied ethics is open to the charge of ignoring reality. Can a thoroughly pacifist community ever join the world in executing justice? Has the Church no relation to the world apart from the role of a loving but distant judge? How does it affect our witness if by love the NT "means almost exclusively fraternal love within the communities" (pp. 113–114)?

It would be naive to think that Lohfink is unaware of such objections. Nor should one conclude that they are formidable. Indeed, my lasting impression is that of having drunk deeply from a fountain of prayerful reflection. It made me aware of how thirsty I really was.

Robert W. Herron, Jr.

Lee College, Cleveland, TN


Moberg's widely acclaimed work originally published in 1962 has been re-issued and updated for this second edition. It is invaluable because of the wealth of statistical data it contains and its extensive coverage of the topic. Like the original, the revised version is surely destined to become a standard text. Moberg deserves praise and commendation for providing scholars and students alike with such a useful volume.

Irving Hexham

University of Calgary, Alberta


This rather lively little book comes from Gary North's camp in Tyler and has three
aims: to show that Christians should be involved in politics, to state Christian political positions on issues ranging from education to foreign policy, and to give practical political advice on campaigning.

Its tone is both beleaguered and triumphalist—decrying the secular humanist assault on education and the family, and announcing a conservative countertrust. Its arguments are hectoring and shallow, or nonexistent. Its style is popular and frequently witty—Thoburn seems to be not only committed but amiable and amusing.

The principal defects of the book are (1) its excursions into philosophy and history, which merely show that the author knows little of either; (2) its simple identification of Biblical Christianity with conservatism; (3) its idolization of the United States—adopting the frequent American conservative tactic of virtually raising the Constitution into an extra-Biblical source of revelation; (4) its ignorance of Christianity, and most other things, beyond American borders—Thoburn writes that "the United States has continued under the Constitution longer than any country in the world today." As a British citizen I find this particularly galling.

The comments on the appalling American trends in abortion, zoning and government intrusion into education and the family are useful. The advice on campaigning is trenchant and funny. But when faced with difficult questions the author invites us to read a relevant book by R. J. Rushdoony. This is good advice. Those who want an apologia for a synthesis of the Bible and American conservatism should go straight to Rushdoony.

Paul Marshall

Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto, Ontario


Davis has ably contributed to the pro-life stance on the question of abortion. His work is more extensive than C. Bajema, Abortion and the Meaning of Personhood (1974). However, it does not discuss as fully the problem of the law and abortion as J. W. Montgomery in Slaughter of the Innocents (1981), but Davis does update Montgomery's discussion. This work in time may take to itself the same amount of popularity achieved by both C. E. Koop, The Right To Live: The Right to Die (1976), and F. A. Schaeffer and C. E. Koop, Whatever Happened To The Human Race? (1979).

Davis' work thoroughly yet concisely furnishes the reader with an excellent resource guide for studying this issue.

Earl L. Brown, Jr.

Philadelphia, PA


The series entitled Spirituality and the Christian Life is intended for "one 'obliged to live an ordinary life' " (editor's introduction, quoting Francis de Sales, in Holmer, p. 11). Holmer's volume seeks to help in the Christian nurturing of emotions, virtues, will and thought.

Using an analogy to verbal communication, Holmer teaches "a grammar of living," which is required to make sense in life. In the realm of emotion he identifies senselessness
with hopelessness or false hopes. By cultivating a Christian perspective on God and creation, on his fatherly love, and on Christ Jesus, one’s old emotional patterns can be replaced by Christian hope.

Moral senselessness, a life dominated by a vice, is contrasted with Christian virtue, defined as “an acquired disposition or inclination that will make behavior predictable and regular” (p. 67). Such temperance is the result of resting in the “passive righteousness” of Christian faith and then moving toward “active righteousness” (moral virtue). In so doing the illusory thought that virtue makes one acceptable to God is avoided. Virtue, instead, is simply part of the grammar of sensible living.

Senselessness of will is seen in a lack of resolve or in chaotic wants. A “good will” is steady and long, neither abstract nor singlemindedly concrete, focusing on daily life. Faith is vital, for by it one’s will is formed in unity with God’s will, letting that govern and discipline life.

Intellectual sense is provided for as Christian concepts give one an accurate view of life. These concepts are not simply words but also abilities since they enable a proper relationship between self, world and God.

A major concern for Holmer is to show Christianity not merely as teaching or idea but as inherently involving nurturance. Certainly the truth of Christian faith is accepted, but what is emphasized is that genuine truth always enables greater sensibleness. As a Lutheran this reviewer appreciated Holmer’s concern to divide law and gospel rightly and avoid legalism. He shows the value of the idea of imputed righteousness without minimizing the place of morality. He avoids the easy trap of legalism in his discussion of will, noting that my will is reformed because God’s “will is active on my behalf” (p. 95).

But a major disappointment must be registered. The reviewer found a simple message in the book, but it has to be unearthed from beneath unnecessarily pedantic distinctions (nine pages distinguishing types of affects), laborious explanations, and a roundabout style. As part of a series intended to be written in “plain, intelligible words” (editor’s introduction, p. 11) it fails the test of plainness.

The second book addresses the issue of “spirituality” more directly—as least according to the usage of that term now in vogue. Roberts begins by defining spirituality as “the possession of deeply etched and stable character traits” (p. 22). Among these traits are three “strengths”: self-control, patience, perseverance. They are his subjects. They are capacities that make for strength of character.

Illustrations abound in Roberts’ work. He certainly succeeds in showing the everyday value of these strength virtues as he contrasts anger with self-control, shows the place of patience in dealing with trying people (e.g. a dawdling child), and illustrates perseverance via a look at fidelity in marriage. Neither is spirituality left by the way. As he deals with anger Roberts shows the value of meditation on the offensive brother as one for whom Christ died. Patience emerges as the necessary requirement for effective prayer and meditation. And perseverance is finally no less than a way to speak of faith that endures. Specific helpful techniques for fostering each strength are given to round out the practicality of all this.

The book is not obscurely written. Rather, this reviewer and an area layman who read the book agreed that Roberts tended to be more often patronizing than obscure.

A deeper fault, however, for one who is schooled in the thought of the Reformation is the extent to which a more or less mystical thought mold intrudes into the book. For example, Roberts sees self-control as not really being control of one’s self (which apparently is good) but control of something so close to self that the metaphor of “self-control” is necessary. That seems inadequate when compared to the NT view that self-control is control of me, for I was put to death in baptism (Romans 6; cf. Colossians 2–3). Not the real me but “Christ-in-me” must govern. Such an inadequate anthropology is a necessary
first step toward a mystical spirituality. The process continues as prayer and revelation are confused (pp. 69–71), the Word is reduced to a spiritual writing rather than the means of grace (p. 72), meditation instead of the communion of saints becomes the place for union with Christ (p. 75), and faith becomes faithfulness (p. 110).

The strengths Roberts discusses are certainly the strengths of a Christian, but they do not make the Christian. The practical techniques he advocates may be just so much legalism unless the practitioner is working out of the love activated by faith.

Larry M. Vogel

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Le Goff has written this work “to trace the formulation of the idea of this ‘third place’ through time, from its roots in Judeo-Christian antiquity to its final emergence with the flowering of medieval civilization in the second half of the twelfth century” (p. 1).

The book is a comprehensive review of the ideas and beliefs that caused the concept of purgatory to be born. Le Goff identifies the Alexandrian theologians Clement and Origen as the “founders” of the doctrine, while ironically the great western theologian Augustine is called “the true father of purgatory” (p. 61) primarily for introducing a number of the ingredients that were ultimately brought together when the doctrine was finally worked out in detail at the Council of Trent.

Le Goff contends that purgatory held a relatively minor place in most early theological systems until purgatory “triumphed” as a doctrine in the thirteenth century, when doubts about its existence were silenced and it became a truth of faith and of the Church (p. 289). He shows that the growth and acceptance of the idea of purgatory were inseparably tied to the fundamental social changes of the middle ages—namely, by “saving” from hell sinners belonging to specific social groups who previously had little hope of escaping perdition.

This is a book for professional historians. Le Goff is not a theologian, and in the few places where he does make comments on passages of Scripture he does not show a firm grasp of hermeneutical and exegetical principles. In fact in the concluding chapter, “Why Purgatory?”, Le Goff seems to indicate that the existence or nonexistence of purgatory is not even a question of understanding Scripture at all: “In our time, particularly in the so-called developed societies, man’s questioning, his hopes and fears, have concentrated on two polar extremes. As for this world, if we leave out of account the large number of people who really ‘don’t care,’ it is the image of death looming on the horizon that has tended to draw man’s gaze. The question is how to die. For Catholics as well as adherents of other religions and people who for one reason or another must face the issue of death, the decision again seems to have narrowed to a choice between various paradises and various hells: paradises that are projections of this-worldly dreams and hells that are projections of fears for which a new kind of imagery has been invented. Our apocalypse is nuclear destruction, and a part of mankind has already endured the terrifying experience” (p. 360).

In spite of such dubious conclusions, the book provides a wealth of information about the origins and development of the doctrine of purgatory. A bibliography and an index make this work even more useful for the student of the history of Christian doctrine.

Daniel E. Deaton

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Küng is doubtless the most notable and controversial contemporary Catholic theologian. His most recent major work reveals his characteristic willingness to directly confront age-old questions as well as contemporary ones.

Each of the three major parts of the book consists of three chapters that actually comprise a collection of nine expanded lectures. The translated form and print of the book is very readable. At appropriate points the reader is referred to specialist literature and further detailed discussion placed in numbered notes at the end. Helpful indexes of names and subjects are also included.

The author writes informatively, interestingly and very perceptively in a cogent, smooth-flowing style. His theological writing reveals an extensive and detailed familiarity with relevant material in German, English and French, especially in the sciences (both physical and social), drama, poetry and politico-social theories as well as in theology, Biblical criticism and philosophy.

Küng gives the rationale for his treatise in the preface. In spite of a modern age in which man is supposedly experiencing an increasingly better quality of life here and now, the author feels that the question of life after death is still relevant (p. xiii). Neither expressions like “wishful thinking,” “opium,” “resentment” or “illusion” from certain philosophers nor the prevalence of positivism and materialism can effectively dismiss the question of eternal life (pp. xiii-xiv). A revival of interest in the question of death and survival has also resulted from the serious doubts that science, technology, revolution and socialism can produce a continually better life (p. xiv).

In chap. 1 Küng concludes that the question of the afterlife cannot be settled in advance by medical science, and the evidence that medicine offers is not adequate for theological argument (p. 22).

Chapter 2 offers an evaluation of the views of modern philosophers concerning the question of eternal life, and the author believes that they cannot give a logically conclusive answer to this question.

A historical/comparative study of religions (chap. 3) reveals not only a prevalence of belief in life after death (p. 52) but also a diversity of conceptions of eternal life (e.g. cyclical existence, reincarnation, singular life).

In chap. 4 Küng examines Biblical evidence for resurrection from the dead and proceeds to reject Biblical authority as a basis for certainty of belief in eternal life (pp. 73–78). In place of Biblical authority he proposes a “knowledge of eternal life related to experience” (p. 76), which involves a positive existential decision on man’s part (pp. 76–78).

Küng responds to the alleged difficulties with the accounts of Jesus’ resurrection by treating them as largely legendary (chap. 5). He thinks that they have significance not in the details of the stories but as testimonies of faith when interpreted existentially (pp. 100, 103).

Chapter 6 includes a discussion of (1) heaven and hell, which are not understood literally and spatially; (2) purgatory, which Küng admits is not Scriptural (p. 137); (3) the devil and demons, which are thought to be derived from Babylonian mythology (p. 135); (4) eternal punishment, which is opposed by an appeal to God’s loving character and by a sympathetic appeal to human reason and emotion (pp. 136–142); (5) heaven, which is given a nebulous description as “the future of world and man, which is God himself” (p. 144). The general thrust of Küng’s thought inclines him toward hope for an ultimate universalism (p. 141).

In chap. 7 Küng correctly observes that the rapid increase of improved technology has made prevalent an inhuman practice of medicine that is mechanized and objectivized
(p. 151). The proposed solution to the problem is a skilled, humanitarian, ethical and holistic approach to medicine that is grounded in religion (pp. 154–159). Küng affirms that it is personally beneficial to approach death with the assurance of eternal life (pp. 162–164), but his point is greatly weakened by his sub-Biblical concept of eternal life presented in chaps. 8–9.

Küng devotes chap. 8 to a discussion of the meaning of life on earth in relation to heaven or future life. His conclusion takes a paradoxical form: "Heaven cannot be set up on earth" (p. 199), and yet "God’s heaven refers man to the earth" (p. 200). Thus heaven is limited to an existential experience and precluded as an objective reality.

In chap. 9 Küng deals with the end of the world and the kingdom of God from the standpoint of "the problems of both modern literature on the future and modern physics" (p. 203). He so strongly reacts against detailed apocalyptic calculations that he seems afraid of any definiteness and simply indicates that the future is God (p. 214) and that "the consummation can be described in a dialectical movement of thought as life, justice, freedom, love, [and] salvation" (p. 220). Küng further indicates that he is not concerned with "the individualistic-spiritualistic approach of ‘saving our souls’" (p. 222) but with a community action toward a better human world in this life. Küng’s thought here is clearly irreconcilable with the NT emphasis upon Christ’s work to save individual sinners (cf. e.g. Mark 8:36–37; Luke 19:10; 1 Tim 1:15) for eternal life with himself (John 17:3; 1 Thess 4:17) as well as to serve society (Gal 6:10).

In his epilogue Küng responds to the primary question of eternal life by expressing his belief "in a consummation in eternal life by God as he showed himself in Jesus of Nazareth" (p. 231). Küng’s further explanation of this belief only tends to cloud instead of clarify his concept of eternal life.

The author thinks that belief in his concept of eternal life has practical implications for this present life in that it can (1) motivate work for a better society and Church, (2) show that this world is temporary and not ultimate reality, and (3) make personal life meaningful. Yet one wonders how such a nebulous and subjective ideal of eternal life can produce such concrete, external and practical results in everyday life.

When asked why one should believe in eternal life, Küng would reply that it is "an existential alternative" (p. 226), a personal "decision of trust or mistrust" (p. 227), and that to trust in the hope of eternal life is a reasonable choice just as the scientist chooses to trust his perceptions of the external world as real rather than be a philosophical solipsist (p. 227). However, proof in the religious realm and proof in the scientific realm are not as analogous as Küng thinks. Also, such a supposedly analogous argument for the reality of eternal life would be very unconvincing to the purely naturalistic scientist and at least problematic to many Christian apologists.

In summary, Küng confronts the question of eternal life by turning away from the objective divine certainty that Biblical authority could give him that man does exist forever (p. 73). Instead he turns to an existential hope related to human experience for his belief in life after death (pp. 75–76) but apart from bodily resurrection (p. 104). In all of his profusion of thought Küng has missed the simplicity of the Biblical message, which so clearly and affirmatively answers his question about eternal life: "And this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent" (John 17:3; cf. 11:25–26; 1 John 5:13).

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Any writing from the pen of Walter Liefeld is sure to be characterized by clarity and
force, and this is no exception. It sets high standards for those of us who teach the Bible and for those seminarians who are called to preach. Drawing upon extensive pastoral and teaching experience, Liefeld as preacher and as scholar has proved himself uniquely qualified to write a book that proposes to bridge the gap between homiletics and exegesis.

Liefeld’s approach involves reflecting upon and marshaling Biblical material in order to present a synthetic view of expository preaching. He clears the ground for this in part 1 by first disposing of the fallacy that expository preaching is merely verse-by-verse exegesis. Liefeld insists that the good preacher will avoid the extremes of detailed exegesis on the one hand and pointless sermonizing on the other. Expository preaching, in his definition, is not a message filled with details of vocabulary and grammar but the study of a passage as a whole and with attention to the flow of thought. This point is a much needed rebuf for those preachers who do exegesis in the pulpit. Such preachers, says Liefeld, tend to be more descriptive than pastoral. They usually lack clear goals and practical applications for their congregations.

Liefeld is clear that the distinctiveness of expository preaching is in its emphasis on broad principles. He therefore sees only a few essential characteristics of a true expository message: focus (dealing with one basic passage of Scripture), faithfulness to the text (if we are careful to explain the text, we are free to choose our own method of presentation), cohesion, direction and application. While he endorses freedom in technique, Liefeld searches for (and I believe has found) something more distinctly Biblical: obligations imposed on preachers not by homiletics professors but by God.

The remaining chapters of the book deal with the actual preparation and application of the sermon and address such areas as determining the dominant theme of the passage as well as considering the needs of the congregation, the form of the sermon, and how to preach from difficult texts (e.g. parables, miracle stories, obscure passages, controversial or sensitive issues). This last section of the book dealing with difficult texts is both more substantial and sophisticated than similar sections on the subject in other textbooks on homiletics.

Of course, not every detail in this work will carry assent. Its undoubted competence and professionalism is slightly marred by two features. First, although paying lip service to the way in which the science of linguistics can affect the exposition of Scripture, it never really points the reader in this direction, being inevitably bound up in technical jargon much of the time. The use—without satisfactory explanation—of such terms as discourse analysis, deep structure, semantic patterning, morphemes, semantic fields and so on does little more than make the reader aware that such applications of linguistic science to the Biblical text exist. It is a pity that the author has not drawn on works such as Louw’s *Semantics of New Testament Greek*, Silva’s *Biblical Words and Their Meaning*, and Nida’s *Style and Discourse* in his brief discussion of discourse analysis and semantic field theory. A better understanding of such works might have kept him from making several erroneous statements (e.g., *adikos* [Luke 16:8] does not come from the root *adik*, p. 34). This I find to be the weakest part of an otherwise useful book.

Second, I find it difficult to believe that effective and Biblical expository preaching can be accomplished without a great amount of attention to details of language and grammar. Some of Liefeld’s comments suggest a certain confusion between exegetical and practical considerations—e.g., whether a detailed linguistic investigation of the text is compatible with a busy pastor’s schedule. To many readers the problem with this book will be the schizoid relationship between the two parts of its subtitle: the text and the sermon. For example, the Semitic background to Biblical Greek is generally ignored, as is the distinct flavor of the *koine* as compared to classic Greek usage. A questionable attitude toward the complexities of textual criticism is also displayed in the author’s advice to simply follow the conclusions stated in Metzger’s *Textual Commentary* when confronted with a variant reading. Better to advise readers to consult volume 2 of Moul-
ton's *Grammar* on Semitisms, to consult LSJ, or to take a course in textual criticism (if competing theories of the history of the text are taught). The study of rhetoric can also be a guide to our understanding of the text, but here the author gives little help, with only a very brief statement of multiple levels of meaning. In short the linguistically able, who are prepared to dig deep and hard, may well find themselves perplexed by the sometimes oversimplified approach to questions of a linguistic or grammatical nature.

But these are comparatively minor matters. Taken as a whole, *New Testament Exposition* is a solid achievement in the area of sermon preparation. It is too simple for advanced students to use, but it is excellent for drawing some threads together and as a textbook for those who have just gotten underway. And it would make a valuable refresher for those pastors engaged in the ministry who are open to some new ideas in the preparation of sermons.

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There is an increasing interest in the philosophic community in general, and among evangelical ethicists in particular, in the ethics of virtue. MacIntyre's *After Virtue* has been the focus of much of the recent debate on the subject. Now available in an expanded second edition, the book is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it offers a deeper analysis of the history of ethics than earlier offered by MacIntyre in *A Short History of Ethics* (1966). Second, it signals a shift among contemporary British and American philosophers from philosophy as analysis to a more historically sensitive perspective on philosophic problems. Third, it suggests—at least partially—the rationale for MacIntyre's acceptance of Christianity. Up until the last few years MacIntyre wrote from an atheistic perspective—as, for example, in "The Debate about God: Victorian Relevance and Contemporary Irrelevance" in *The Religious Significance of Atheism* (1969). Finally, the second edition of *After Virtue* includes an additional chapter in which MacIntyre reviews and responds to the criticisms engendered by the first edition, thereby suggesting further areas of reflection on the virtue tradition.

MacIntyre expresses his thesis in terms of a question: "Nietzsche or Aristotle?" He views contemporary moral discourse as a set of fragments preserved from earlier moral theories. These fragments include a teleological view of human nature rooted in the Aristotelian tradition and a set of moral precepts rooted in divine law. MacIntyre views as a doomed project the attempts made by Enlightenment thinkers to replace the teleological and theological moralities of their predecessors with moralities based solely upon reason. There was not a suitable context for the moral principles discovered by reason. "The moral scheme which forms the historical background to their [the Enlightenment thinkers'] thought had, as we have seen, a structure which required three elements: untutored human nature, man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos and the moral precepts which enable him to pass from one state to the other. But the joint effect of the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic theology and the scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism was to eliminate any notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos" (p. 54).

The failure of the Enlightenment project sets the stage for Nietzsche, who calls us to base morality upon will. Moreover the rise of Nietzsche's moral philosophy causes us to reconsider the viability of Aristotelianism. "It was because a moral tradition of which Aristotle's thought was the intellectual core was repudiated during the transitions of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries that the Enlightenment project of discovering new
rational secular foundations for morality had to be undertaken. And it was because that project failed . . . that Nietzsche and all his existentialist and emotivist successors were able to mount their apparently successful critique of all previous morality. Hence the defensibility of the Nietzschean position turns in the end on the answer to the question: was it right in the first place to reject Aristotle?” (p. 117). Hence ethical theory can be seen as a choice: “Nietzsche or Aristotle?” MacIntyre chooses Aristotle, and After Virtue is an explication and defense of that choice.

MacIntyre’s defense of an ethic of virtue cannot be briefly summarized because of the scope and detail of his philosophical and historical argumentation. But some sense of the argument can be perceived through the criticisms that have been raised with respect to the relationship between history and philosophy, the question of relativism, and the relationship between the Bible and Aristotle. William Frankena is one of MacIntyre’s critics with regard to the relationship between history and philosophy. Frankena charges MacIntyre with failing to distinguish between history and philosophy. MacIntyre argues that points of view cannot be rationally appraised when they are abstracted from their historical context and acknowledges that the form of historicism that his philosophy requires is fallible. Robert Wachbroit argues that MacIntyre is committed to some form of relativism. MacIntyre notes that while it is the case that “my account is compatible with acknowledging the existence of distinct, incompatible and rival traditions of virtues” (p. 176) it is also the case that moral disagreement may be resolvable by appealing to features common to the traditions of the disagreeing parties. Finally, MacIntyre acknowledges the absence of commentary on the relationship between Aristotelianism and the Biblical conception of virtue. Evangelicals will be especially concerned with the issue of relativism and may be able to make a genuine contribution to the ethics of virtue by supplying the Biblical perspective missing from MacIntyre’s narrative.

It should be noted that there is already a significant evangelical response to MacIntyre’s theory of virtue. Richard Mouw has argued in JRE 13/2 (Fall 1985) 243–257 that the role MacIntyre ascribes to the Reformers in the transition away from ancient and medieval ethics of virtue to modern emotivist ethics is subject to serious questioning. Evangelical readers will want to consider Mouw’s cultural analysis alongside MacIntyre’s. At a Wheaton philosophy conference, Arthur Holmes suggested connections between Aristotelian ethics of virtue and Biblical conceptions of justice, thereby supplying some of the commentary MacIntyre acknowledged to be missing in his narrative.

The second edition of After Virtue with its postscript of criticisms and responses suggests ways in which exegetes, theologians and ethicists can contribute to an important discussion. It is hoped that other evangelicals will follow the lead of Mouw and Holmes and make such contributions.

David Werther

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Not having an advanced degree in philosophy puts obvious limitations on my ability to review Allen’s book. I have had just enough philosophy to make me dangerous in this regard. However, the author is aiming this work at the uninitiated students who are just beginning their theological studies, and as such I may have some advantage over the more specially trained reviewer. Can a student with a limited philosophical background understand this work and therefore gain a better understanding of theology?

Allen aims his book at what the seminary student needs to know about philosophy.
In the preface he points out that "often the lack of knowledge of some key philosophic term or concept impedes significant understanding of a vital [theological] issue" (p. iv). Allen ignores much of what is covered in conventional history of philosophy textbooks and examines only those philosophers and philosophical concepts that have influenced Christian theology most directly. Most importantly, Allen recognizes that his work should be only a beginning. It is no substitute for studying the philosophers and their works first hand (p. vi).

The philosophers and concepts examined by Allen cover Plato and the Platonic tradition, Aristotle's influence on medieval theology (with critiques from Barth and process theology), modernism, Kant and Hegel and concludes with contemporary philosophy ("The Search for Meaning"). The text includes an annotated reading list and an adequate index of authors and subjects.

Before launching into the main task, Allen lays the "Foundation of Christian Theology." The two main sources of Christian theology, Allen states, are "the Bible and hellenic culture, especially Greek philosophy" (p. 1). He then proceeds to contrast the Biblical view of creation with the Greek. The created world of the Bible is contingent. It has a beginning since God created it, and God alone is ultimate, not his creation. For the Greeks, or at least Aristotle, the world always existed and always will exist. Allen notes that this view of creation differs from the Genesis story ontologically and epistemologically.

At this point Allen is in real danger of creating a problem for most of his uninstructed readers. However, a major strength of the book is the way he introduces technical vocabulary. Rather than simply defining "ontology" and "epistemology" and rushing off to more important matters, Allen takes time to explain the terms and give illustrations of their significance. He does this by contrasting the Greek and Biblical views of ontology and epistemology, especially as they relate to God as creator.

Allen carries this major strength—the concern to explain terms clearly and completely—throughout the book. As a result, at the end of the introductory comments on the foundation of Christian theology he can say, "God's ontological uniqueness limits our understanding of God, and the essential hiddenness of the divine permeates all our theological reflection and formulations of doctrine" (p. 14), knowing that the uninstructed reader should follow the meaning and the significance of the statement.

Allen achieves coherence by examining the view of each philosopher and theologian concerning the "foundation of Christian theology"—the mystery of God as manifested in creation and God's self-revelation. For example in chap. 7, "The Beginnings of the Modern World," Allen examines the rise of the scientific revolution. Aristotle argued that principles of matter and form are related to potency and act. William of Ockham challenged this long-held belief. Matter, Ockham argued, is not "potential" but is actual in its own right. He contends that our knowledge extends no further than our experience, and thus the existence of God is relegated to the sphere of faith. This critique of Aristotle underlines all the natural theology of the thirteenth century, the basis for political and moral action.

Ockham rejects Aristotelian categories of matter and form, but he is not skeptical about knowledge of the world (which creeps up in later theology). The world is orderly for Ockham, and therefore one can rely on reasoning. This is a form of realism, but not the ontological realism of Aquinas.

The critique of Aristotle by such theologians as William of Ockham and Duns Scotus combined with Renaissance humanism to lead to the rise of the scientific revolution, which carried the critique of Aristotle even further than did the nominalists (Ockham and Duns Scotus). Indeed the scientific revolution had many implications for the "mystery" of God, who "was pictured more and more as the God of the sabbath rest . . . . God's
existence could still be affirmed with confidence because it was solidly based on the existence and order of nature" (p. 169).

_Philosophy for Understanding Theology_ hangs together quite well with its unifying theme of God’s revelation in creation. Allen admirably achieves his goal of introducing the uninitiated students to philosophers, philosophies, and the key theological themes influenced by them. The work is clearly written, and it has a wealth of information and keen insights.

The major problem in a work such as this is the tendency, almost a necessity, to oversimplify at points. Each of us could find this point or that with which we feel uncomfortable, and we would want to modify or qualify in some way. A more serious concern is this: Where does this book fit? It does not quite fit in a general doctrine class, although much of it would be useful. Nor is it exactly suitable for a systematic theology course or a conventional history of philosophy course. While the book may be difficult to place as a text, there is little doubt that beginning theology students can benefit greatly from Allen’s effort to make accessible the vital relationship between philosophy and theology.

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Evangelicals are far from being either monolithic or monotonous. There is no evangelical college of cardinals, and evangelical leaders rarely meet to discuss or settle anything. Yet some key individuals are almost universally acknowledged as spokesmen and as thought-shapers for all of us. We will all affirm our own responsible intellectual (and denominational) independence, yet John Stott, Martyn Lloyd-Jones, Francis Schaeffer, James I. Packer and Billy Graham will continue to challenge us and call to us from the front.

Catherwood is a grandson of Lloyd-Jones, thus explaining the presence of Lloyd-Jones in the book. He is perhaps the least obvious choice. Lloyd-Jones has been a preacher’s preacher, however, in a way that none of the others has. The essay on Stott was the most enlightening for me personally, and the one on Packer was perhaps the most helpful.

The format is simple: Tell a little about the relevant biographical matters, and then outline the major theological emphases in a biographical context. Essays like these on living men always seem incomplete. Nevertheless I do not subscribe to the theory that such intellectual histories have no value prior to the subject’s homegoing. We need now the mind-expanding insights (Stott, Schaeffer, Packer) and the motivating encouragement (Lloyd-Jones, Graham) of men like these. Catherwood’s style is journalistically readable as well as theologically illuminating. I think recommending this book would be an excellent way to introduce some of our church members to the real issues evangelicals face in the secular world of today. If Catherwood misrepresents the individuals included, I was not able to detect it. I sometimes thought he oversimplified (e.g. the essay on Schaeffer), but I do not really fault the author for writing to a nonspecialist audience.

These essays are what Christian testimony ought to be: proclamations of Biblical truth in a context of mutual encouragement. You will enjoy reading this book.

L. Russ Bush

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In the fall of 1974 Robert Webber, son of a Baptist minister and theology professor at Wheaton College, joined an Episcopal church in adjoining Glen Ellyn. In Evangelicals on the Canterbury Trail Webber and six others explain the appeal to them of liturgical churches.

The book is timely. The stories of Webber and his friends have apparently been repeated many times over in recent years as dissatisfied evangelicals, some calling themselves the “Orthodox Evangelicals,” make the choice to switch to Anglican and other older denominations. Further outstanding examples include the celebrated decision of Thomas Howard, then an English professor at a conservative evangelical college, to enter the Roman Catholic Church. Or consider the formation of the Evangelical Orthodox Church in 1979. This new denomination originated with one-time Campus Crusade for Christ staff members who now serve as ordained priests in a church modeled on Eastern Orthodox liturgy and order. Webber’s book provides an opportunity for nonliturgical evangelicals (henceforth called evangelicals) to understand, and then evaluate, what their liturgically-minded friends are finding at the end of their pilgrimage on the Canterbury trail.

At the outset Webber makes two things very clear. First, in identifying himself with the Anglican tradition he in no way intends to scorn the evangelical-fundamentalist tradition or his own past. He does not suggest that we all ought to become Anglican, or that the Anglican Church offers a “higher form” of spirituality. Second, Webber and his six fellow pilgrims still consider themselves to be both orthodox and basically evangelical. Webber explains how this can be true by comparing the Christian faith to an artichoke. Just as the kernel in the center is covered by layers of leaves, so the various Christian traditions are like layers of secondary truth and interpretation that have been added to the common core of the faith: Jesus Christ who died and rose again for our salvation. Sometimes these traditions help us to encounter the truth of Christ in all its power, sometimes they interfere. The point of the book is that for Webber and friends the Anglican tradition enhances their Christian faith in a way that the evangelical tradition did not. Specifically it provides an enriched experience of worship and a deepened sense of spiritual identity with God’s people throughout history and around the world.

“Why did you choose to walk the Canterbury trail?” Webber has posed this question to an “overwhelming” number of evangelicals, and in every case the first reason given was that “I wanted to worship God.” Evangelical churches typically provide a pastor-dominated worship service. Whether evangelically oriented or more of a teaching ministry, the role of the man in the pulpit is central. Webber confesses that as a preacher “this educational mentality toward worship put me under a terrible strain. I felt that I had to perform intellectually.” Later as a layperson and churchgoer he was equally dissatisfied. What he longed to be part of was not an educational institution but “a worshipping community.” His experience of Anglican liturgical worship and his reading in the early Christian fathers of the Church showed him what he had longed for. Webber found that worship according to the Book of Common Prayer was focused on God, not our experience. It was Christ-centered, as the eucharist rehearsed the role Christ played in creating and re-creating the world. As in the early Church, there was an emphasis on Scripture reading with at least three readings and a psalm all related to a central theme. Webber found that his worship of God was further enhanced by the rich symbolism and drama of the Anglican service. The sacraments are not simply magical means of salvation with no faith required on our part. Rather, they are “visible signs that take us to Jesus.” This conviction is rooted in the principle of the incarnation—namely, that God works through his material creation (preeminently through Christ the incarnation of God, but
also through the Word, water, wine and bread, oil, other people) to establish and maintain our relationship with him. The sacraments are so many symbols of God's love toward us, ways by which God leads us to Christ and thereby nurtures us in faith.

For Webber and others the Anglican Church has also met a need for an historical identity that includes all the great saints of past centuries. Just as our memory of early family experiences provides us with a necessary sense of individual identity, so as God's people we need a corporate sense of identity rooted in our historical past. A strong historical sense of our spiritual family heritage lends security and meaning to the Church of the present. Some Christian groups find their identity in the fundamentalist-modernist battles of the 1920s and the beginnings of their own denomination. Others trace their spiritual heritage back to the Reformation stand of Luther and Calvin or the Anabaptists. But Webber's search for roots takes him back to the early Church fathers and medieval saints such as Augustine of Hippo, Bernard of Clairvaux, Francis of Assisi and Thomas Aquinas. "The history of all God's people" is ours to affirm. The Anglican Church fulfills Webber's desire to identify with God's people through the ages. It draws on the patristic and catholic heritage in its worship and on the Reformation heritage for its Articles of Religion.

I have four observations to make about Webber's controversial book. First, one wonders if some of the reasons for Webber's pilgrimage are not personal as well as theological, subconscious as well as conscious. Almost all of those evangelicals returning to liturgical Churches are second- or third- (or more) generation Christians. In Social Sources of Denominationalism Richard Niebuhr pointed to a dynamic that begins to change the "sect" pattern of Church life into a mainline "Church" pattern after just one generation. A similar dynamic seems to be at work in the realm of worship needs in the second generation. Despite their basic evangelical commitment and orthodoxy, members of the younger generation are often less content than their parents with worship that relies on fervent music, preaching and altar calls. The focus for their piety is not conversion. That may have occurred at an early age and so is past memory. The focus of piety is now on the long haul: meaningful ministry and worship. Worship that provides significant involvement and is rich in Scripture, theology, symbol and aesthetic stimuli meets these needs most effectively. Further, the later generations of evangelicals do not live with the strong emotions or the overreactions that naturally go with the beginnings of a movement. They look at evangelical worship and feel free to criticize. They look at liturgical worship more objectively than their parents and ask: "Why not?" As a second-generation evangelical myself, I find that Webber's book scratches where I itch.

A second observation would be that as evangelicals we are no longer in a position to criticize the many ceremonies of Anglicanism as our forebears once did. Few evangelicals today would claim to abide by the classic Puritan-Presbyterian-Baptist response to Anglicanism represented by the "regulative principle." It stated that only those things were allowed in worship that Scripture expressly commands. Such things as prescribed responses and form-prayers, ceremonies involving robes, oil, kneeling, the sign of the cross, and musical instruments had no obvious basis in the NT. These examples of "human artifice" interfered with Christ's rule over his Church and the freedom of his Spirit to have his way in the worship of his people.

The classic Anglican position can be found in Thomas Cranmer's Preface of 1549, "Of Ceremonies why some be abolished and some retained." Cranmer stated: "Christ's Gospel is not a Ceremonial Law, but it is a Religion to serve God, not in bondage of the figure or shadow, but in the freedom of the Spirit; being content only with those Ceremonies which do serve to a decent Order and such as be apt to stir up the dull mind of man to the remembrance of his duty to God by some special signification whereby he might be edified." Ceremonies were to be abolished, said Cranmer, when they "did more confound and darken than declare and set forth Christ's benefits unto us." For the sake of some
order of worship, however, certain ceremonies were necessary. And if ceremonies of some kind were to be used, then let it be the ancient ones—"for their antiquity" and for the sake of unity and concord.

Most evangelicals today would have to admit that in principle they agree with Cranmer. They feel justified in embellishing their worship to a limited degree with practices that clearly edify the people of God and that do not go against Scriptural principles. The use of organ and piano, songleaders, infant dedication services, church buildings, pulpits set in center stage are so many traditions that seem to us good for edification. Anglican worship practices differ from ours in their formality and antiquity. But this difference is a matter of freedom and taste, not of principle.

Third, as evangelicals we should grant that the formality and repetition of liturgical, prayer-book worship do not necessarily represent any great barrier to the true worship of God. In many situations of life, ritual and predictability can be enriching and comforting. My children count on the rituals of bedtime. They count on my presence, my stories and my love. In many ways liturgical worship is a place where God's presence, God's stories and God's love are passed on in a predictable framework that has been comforting for generations of Christians ever since the third century.

Finally, Webber is surely correct in noting the great benefits that would come if liturgical churches and evangelicals would be open to learning from each other. Indeed this is the "broader issue" and concern of the book. As evangelicals we are challenged to hold to our particular heritage and yet follow Webber's lead in affirming the whole of the Christian tradition through the centuries. It would be both maturing and strengthening for us to enrich ourselves by appreciating and using worship materials from the third-century tradition of Hippolytus, from the twelfth century, from Luther and Calvin and Cranmer.

A great evangelical statesman once admitted that worship is the missing jewel among our churches. Webber's book highlights a denomination where that jewel has kept its rightful place. The question to be asked: Can evangelicals who want to worship with the ancient liturgical forms find the freedom to bring renewal and change where they are? Or must they continue to walk the Canterbury trail?

Douglas H. Shantz

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Locating historical or theological texts suitable for use in college and seminary is often a difficult task. When one does surface, scholars welcome it enthusiastically. Spitz's newest volume, I am convinced, will enjoy such a reception. This text is the admirable finale to an already distinguished series, Harper's The Rise of Modern Europe (edited by W. L. Langer).

Because he is a skillful historian, Spitz has been able to avoid the most common shortcomings of his predecessors. Unlike the older, somewhat hagiographic, Reformation scholars of the nineteenth century he does not reduce the story of early Protestantism to a narration of Luther's spiritual anguish on the one hand and his towering and prophetic heroism on the other. And unlike some more recent Reformation studies Spitz's work is good narrative history, unmarred by peculiar or idiosyncratic revisionist interpretations. Its style is pithy, provocative, widely informed and informative. Its eight chapters carefully combine the varied but complementary insights of demographic, economic and
intellectual history. And like all good history textbooks it imparts wisdom to the careful reader.

The book’s scope is precisely that delineated in the title: the Protestant Reformation. One should not look here for extensive treatment of, say, Italian humanism and its medieval precursors. But this is not a flaw. While the Renaissance and Reformation are closely related they remain different movements, and Spitz himself has already dealt with their relationship at length elsewhere in such texts as *The Renaissance and Reformation Movements, The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists and Conrad Celtis*.

Of this book’s many virtues I must make special note of the far-ranging and well-annotated 44-page bibliographic essay that concludes the volume. Serious students of the Reformation, especially seminarians, will refer to it repeatedly for direction for further study.

One reservation: Because the Reformation, narrowly defined, was so largely a theological upheaval, one might wish that more of the book was devoted to a detailed accounting of the actual thought of the Protestant Reformers and to the Roman Catholic theology it opposed.

Michael Bauman
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Brown, in a major work that invites comparison with Albert Schweitzer’s *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, surveys European scholarship on Jesus from 1778 to 1860. The book, a revision of the author’s dissertation, is divided into five major sections. (1) Like Schweitzer he begins with Reimarus and the *Fragments* controversy. The contribution of Lessing is also explored. (2) Next he investigates the role of idealism. Here the main thinkers are Kant, Herder, Goethe, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling. Kant, Herder and Goethe conceived of Jesus as a profoundly moral and rational human being. The absolute idealists Fichte, Hegel and Schelling saw in Jesus the unveiling “of the rational, ontological principle of the universe” (p. 102). It is clear that philosophy rather than exegesis determined the Christology of these writers. (3) The third chapter concentrates on those who responded negatively, at least in part, to idealism. Schleiermacher focused on Christian experience as the ultimate reality, and the uniqueness of Jesus is manifested in his absolute dependence on God. Kierkegaard on the other hand emphasized the transcendence of God, insisting that even in his self-revelation God remains incognito, while Feuerbach reduced Christology to anthropology. But he was similar to Schleiermacher in that both based theology upon experience. (4) In chap. 4 the focus is upon D. F. Strauss, F. C. Baur and E. Renan. Strauss employed the concept of myth to explain the gospels, while Baur’s work was more historical in nature and majored in tendency criticism. Brown argues that Baur was not substantially affected by Hegel, and his Christology was actually somewhat similar to Schleiermacher’s. (5) The work closes with the response of the orthodox. Brown concentrates on the confessionalists (particularly Tholuck, Hofmann and Thomasius) and the mediating theologians (focusing on Dorner and Rothe).

Brown’s work functions as a salutary supplement to the correction of Schweitzer. For example, he demonstrates in some detail that Reimarus was not, contrary to Schweitzer, an isolated phenomenon. Instead, his thinking was clearly influenced by the English deists. The chapter on “Philosophical Idealism and Rational Religion” is also an area that Schweitzer skated over rather lightly. Schweitzer, after all, was concerned with the
quest for the "historical" Jesus. This very concern with history also led him to pass over the contribution of the confessional and mediating theologians who were more philosophically inclined. Brown, however, notes that the contribution of these thinkers is crucial because philosophy, whether it is acknowledged or not, has a decisive influence on one's Christology. Even those scholars who attempted a purely historical approach were influenced by their philosophical stance.

The work also includes the contribution of Kierkegaard. The latter, of course, was hardly known when Schweitzer was writing. But the course of twentieth-century theology has been such that his inclusion is a necessity. At times the work reminds one of Kümmel's The New Testament: The History of the Investigation of Its Problems, particularly in his discussion of Baur, Strauss, and the synoptic problem.

The purpose of the work is primarily descriptive, and thus Brown, unlike Schweitzer, does not offer his own program. Nonetheless the quality of research and the lucidity of his exposition are impressive. And when the author steps back to summarize and draw conclusions, his insights are consistently valuable and penetrating. He concludes that the study of Jesus over this time period shows that Christology did not move in a linear or unified direction. He also maintains that most of these scholars failed to see the Jewishness of Jesus and that many of them did not use historical criticism. One looks forward to Brown's own contribution in this area. He says that he finds Kierkegaard to be the best forerunner for twentieth-century Christology. The relationship between the Holy Spirit and Jesus is also seen to be crucial in formulating one's Christology. Finally, he hints that the thinking of Augustine and Calvin on the Trinity is programmatic. These latter issues are not the major concern of the present work, but in this detailed and comprehensive volume Brown has stimulated the reader's appetite for his own contribution.

Tom Schreiner
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C. S. Lewis was extremely gifted and diligent in his work. In most tasks to which he addressed himself he enjoyed well-deserved success. As an apologist, however, Lewis should have been a failure. That he was not a failure even in this regard is evidenced by (1) the host of persons who publicly testify to the influence Lewis exercised over their journey into or reaffirmation of the Christian faith, and (2) the would-be critics who, for lack of appropriate critical comment, supply ample doses of invective. Beversluis suggests that perhaps it is precisely because Lewis was so diligent at applying his considerable literary skill to his apologetic endeavors that so many people fall victim either to "uncritical acceptance or excessive hostility."

Taking care to avoid both of these pitfalls, Beversluis successfully attempts a fair though highly critical appraisal of Lewis' main apologetic writings.

In chap. 1 Beversluis reconstructs Lewis' conception of the apologetic task. As such he defends (without critique) the face value of Lewis' claim in Mere Christianity that "I am not asking anyone to accept Christianity if his best reasoning tells him that the weight of the evidence is against it."

Chapters 2–4 are concerned with the question of the existence of God. Using a steady pattern of "reconstruction followed by analysis" Beversluis in chap. 2 considers Lewis' argument for the existence of God contained in Surprised by Joy and finds it wanting both logically and theologically, in chap. 3 considers the argument found in Miracles and
demonstrates it to be logically fallacious (a straw man coupled with a false dilemma), and in chap. 4 considers the argument found in *Mere Christianity*, which he finds dually fraught with the errors of phenomenalism and a faulty view of inference.

Chapters 5–6 appear to be transition chapters and are definitely the weakest portion of the book. In chap. 5 Beversluis discusses Lewis’ account of unbelievers and comes perilously close to presenting invectives of the sort he deplored in the introduction. Chapter 6 sets up the problem of counterevidence, setting the stage for the fuller discussion of the problem of evil that follows in chaps. 7–9.

In chap. 7 Beversluis returns to the “reconstruction followed by analysis” pattern centering on the argument Lewis presents in *The Problem of Pain*. He argues that Lewis finally sees a philosophical problem for what it is and thus avoids his hitherto customary lapse into the logical fallacies of the straw man and the false dilemma. Unfortunately he retreats instead to a red-herring discussion of free will as either absolute or nonexistent. Chapter 8 discloses Lewis’ ardent rejection of fideism despite its growing popularity due to then-contemporary developments in the philosophy of religious language. And in chap. 9 Beversluis argues for an interpretation of *A Grief Observed* as one in which “Lewis grieves like a husband, but thinks like an apologist.” It is this problem of counterevidence, specifically his personal experience of grief, that renders Lewis’ treatment of the problem of evil so inconsistent. He founders between the fideist and platonic interpretations of the goodness of God.

How, then, should we view C. S. Lewis? Beversluis answers this question with a brief tenth chapter entitled “Specimen.” “If anyone wants to know what orthodox Christianity is, what it requires in terms of personal commitment, and what difficulties it must ultimately face, he need only read C. S. Lewis.” Of such, Lewis was an outstanding specimen. But he was not a worthy specimen of an apologist.

Considered simply as a corrective to the “Lewis cult” phenomenon that has made Lewis into something that he was not—namely, an irreproachable apologist of the Christian faith—this book is excellent and invaluable. It weakens, however, when considered more generally. What, after all, should the defining characteristics of the task of the apologist be? And how does Lewis fare against these? The standard of a worthy apologetic against which Lewis is judged (and found desperately wanting) is the standard discussed in chap. 1 and quoted above. This seems adequate so far as it goes, but it is rendered insufficient when in chap. 5 an alternative and inconsistent account of Lewis’ view of the apologetic task is presented. If the view of chap. 1 is not entirely correct, however, the argument of the book begins to appear somewhat akin to a straw man.

Willis D. Van Groningen

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This work is an introductory textbook in the philosophy of religion from the standpoint of western philosophy in general and Christianity in particular. Chapter 1 discusses philosophy of religion and its relationship to other disciplines and closes with a discussion of faith and reason. Evans rejects fideism and neutralism (thinking about religious matters must be presuppositionless) and opts for critical dialogue—the view that one must be willing to test one’s commitments rationally and engage others in the process of critical discussion.

Chapter 2 surveys different concepts of God, offers a brief treatment of the attributes of the God of classical theism, and argues that a successful proof of God’s existence is
one that is cogent (sound, and known by someone to be sound) and convincing (accepted on grounds independent of the conclusion). Chapter 3 surveys ontological, cosmological, teleological and moral arguments for God. Chapter 4 discusses religious experience against the backdrop of two general theories of perception: representative dualism and direct realism. Evans opts for the latter and claims that one is prima facie justified in claiming to have direct experience of God since experience in general must be taken as normally reliable in the absence of defeaters. In addition, objective and subjective tests are offered for such experiences.

Chapter 4 argues that the propositional view of revelation is philosophically preferable to a liberal or neo-orthodox view and defends the plausibility of miracles. Chapter 6 analyzes objections to theism from modernity, the natural and social sciences (with emphasis on the latter), and the problem of evil. Chapter 7 discusses religious language by touching on logical positivism, Flew and falsification, noncognitive theories, the late Wittgenstein, and the Thomistic doctrine of analogy (only two and a half pages on Thomas). Evans argues for an eclectic approach: Religious language is more than cognitive but includes an essential cognitive dimension. In chap. 8, Evans concludes with a very helpful discussion of how one can be certain of one’s faith in a pluralistic society and still maintain a posture of critical dialogue.

As an introductory text, this book is a clear success. It covers a large number of topics in a clear, concise and interesting way. This is the real strength of the book. More specifically, four areas were most helpful. First, Evans’ treatment of the moral argument is well done, especially his discussion of naturalistic justifications of morality. His discussion of cultural relativism (a normative, not descriptive, thesis) is valuable except for Evans’ statement that cultural relativism makes it impossible to evaluate cultures morally. Many philosophers raise this objection against metaethical relativism, not cultural relativism, since the latter is an absolutist view about the source of an act’s justification, not the location of its occurrence. Thus a cultural relativist can judge other cultures wrong by the cultural relativist’s standards. Second, Evans’ treatments of modernity and pluralism were balanced, and he is surely correct in saying that worldviews must be epistemically appraised by a cumulative case. Third, Evans’ argument that propositional revelation is preferable to nonpropositional forms is timely and signals a call for philosophers to be more involved in the debate about revelation. Finally, the chapter on religious experience was insightful, especially the strategy of treating religious perception against the backdrop of perception in general.

In a more critical vein, the book’s strength is its weakness. Some topics are treated too briefly (the concept of God, science, the cosmological and teleological arguments). Second, the cosmological and teleological arguments need better treatment. Regarding the former, Evans seems to conflate the Thomist and Leibnizian forms of the argument, and he gives only one paragraph to the temporal version, which seems to be very promising (see the weakness of J. L. Mackie’s treatment of it in The Miracle of Theism, pp. 92–94). Regarding the latter, there is no discussion of cosmic singularities or the anthropic principle, and an analysis of the different kinds of design would have kept Evans from mistakenly agreeing that Darwinian evolution is a rival explanation for the design in the universe (p. 64). Some use design qua beauty in the argument, and beauty (in most cases) has no survival value. Third, Evans is wrong in holding that the social sciences provide sharper objections to theism than do the natural sciences (p. 126). This may be true culturally and historically, but not philosophically. Witness the debates raging over physicalism and also the implications of current theories in physics. Finally, Evans’ epistemology is unclear. He says his views are compatible with weak foundationalism (p. 185). I had difficulty identifying his theory of justification. This is important because a coherentist who weakens the observation/theory distinction will, accordingly, have difficulty accommodating direct realism.
In spite of these issues, Evans has helped us all with this work. It should experience wide circulation.

J. P. Moreland
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A technical, philosophical critique of the errors and presuppositions of secular humanism this book is not. Rather, it is a well-reasoned, experiential critique of the overwhelming inability of secular humanism to account for and support what the common man would call "being human.” However, this is not to say that the authors ignore the philosophical issues. On the contrary, Packer and Howard convincingly argue that all forms of Christless humanism ultimately undercut and destroy the basis for having and sustaining acceptable humanness. They demonstrate that only with Christ and Christian presuppositions can mankind really enjoy the humanness that even the secular humanist longs for.

In eleven chapters they discuss many of the basic human drives (such as the need for freedom, dignity, hope and esteem) as they set out to rationally defend the proposition that only the Christian worldview enables one to speak about these fundamental categories meaningfully. How can man have dignity if he is merely an insignificant step in the evolutionary ladder? (p. 140). This book makes for good reading—but not simple reading. Every sentence is thought-provoking and deserves rereading in order to allow time to fully appreciate the tight reasoning so carefully developed.

Perhaps the best feature of the book is that it is written to speak not only to arm the Christian humanist but also to personally confront the secular humanist. It is apologetic by design, and it does an excellent job of it. It takes no cheap shots at secular humanism. Rather, it attempts to analyze the alternatives with fairness. It is at this point that the erudition of the two authors shines.

The book fills a real void in the "humanism" battlefield today. By avoiding the fundamentalist "harangue" caricature as well as the nonunderstandable "philosophical" approach it charts a new path of dialogue available to all who will think and insist on consistency. My one disappointment is that the authors should have included the texts of the Humanist Manifestos 1 and 2. This would have been a logical appendix for reference and evidential purposes. But definitely this is an important practical tool in the debate.

Dan Cameron
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We are all beginning to experience the effects of living in a global city. Nowhere is this felt with more fear and fascination than in the meeting of religions. Our neighbors are no longer simply Baptist or Presbyterian, but Buddhist and Sikh and Muslim. And no one senses more acutely the problems raised by this encounter than the Christian. This is because the center of Christianity is the person and work of Jesus Christ, and its central confession is that Jesus Christ is the only Lord.

Knitter gives us three reasons to reconsider the nature of this claim for exclusivity.
First, there is the new experience of religious pluralism and with it the recognition that adherents of other faiths are living in deep sincerity of belief and vital devotion to their religion. Second, there is the movement within philosophy that compels us to accept an open-ended approach to truth. Reality is “in process” and is evolving, and as such truth is incomplete. Finally, the political and economic conditions of our age seem to demand that we all work for a peaceful world order where there may be “community within communities.”

With these reasons in mind, Knitter argues that there needs to be a reinterpretation of the Christian faith and of Christ. He proposes to show by way of this critical survey how Christians can come to an attitude where they can “be fully committed to Jesus and fully open to other ways” (p. xiv). He believes that this can be done while remaining consistent with the witness of Scripture and with much of contemporary mainline Christian theology.

Knitter divides his work into three parts. Part 1 reviews certain popular views of religious pluralism: Troeltsch (all are relative), Toynbee (all are the same) and Jung (all have a common psychic origin). Part 2 is devoted to an analysis of various positions taken within Christianity regarding this issue. Here he examines a number of models: the conservative evangelical model (Barth), the mainline Protestant model (Althaus, Brunner, Tillich, and Pannenberg, to name a few), and the Catholic model (Rahner). Knitter concludes this section by looking at another model, which he titles “the theocentric model.” These are some of the more radical theologians who, like Knitter, are calling for Christians to drop the claim to exclusivity. Those that he examines are men such as Hick, Pannikar, Samartha, and those in the Jewish-Christian debate and certain liberation theologians. Knitter finds this “theocentric model” the most promising path toward a “more valid reinterpretation of Christian doctrine and toward a more authentic inter-religious dialogue” (p. 169). Part 3 is his own proposal, which he calls “unitive pluralism,” for understanding world religions. It is also in this final section that he attempts to solve what Langdon Gilkey called the “theological trick of admitting the relativity of Christ without lessening his universal relevance.”

As can be inferred from the above, Knitter has shown himself to be the ally of most of the radical Christian theologians—or, better, theists—of the day. And as can be expected his initial intention to remain consistent with the witness of Scripture and with much of contemporary mainline Christian theology will appear to most to be puzzling. What Knitter calls contemporary mainline Christian theology most would consider the radical fringe. Hick and Pannikar do not speak for the majority. Similarly, what Knitter means by being consistent with the witness of Scripture means little when we find him adopting a radical skepticism regarding the truth of Scripture. What benefit and purpose then can such a book be for readers of *JETS*?

First, Knitter’s analysis, if not exhaustive, is penetrating. Because he is so radical he is also less tolerant of those theologians who are theologically walking the fence. His critique may be summarized by a question he asks all: If Jesus is the full realization of what is potential for all human beings, why should such a potential be limited to only one human being? With this question Knitter exposes the Achilles’ heel of every theology that, while denying deity to Christ, still wants to claim for Christ a uniqueness among men that can be explained only in terms of deity. Knitter’s book then provides a weapon to destroy those theologies—but from the left.

Second, the book confirmed this reviewer’s determination to take the offensive in the face of the criticisms leveled by radicals against orthodoxy. For example, Knitter stresses that one of the main reasons for the need to radically reinterpret the Christian faith is the new historical situation. And it is the orthodox insensitivity to the change in history that causes them to be insensitive to the new problems Knitter raises. Must the orthodox continue to erect a stumbling block by their insistence on the exclusiveness of Christ?
For Knitter, orthodoxy is myopic and idolatrous in its holding fast to a deposit of faith and making normative a past historical situation. But is he himself guilty here of idolizing the present and committing the sin that C. S. Lewis called "chronological snobbery"?

We must also ask Knitter whether he is himself historically myopic. Is our age unique in the Christianity-versus-world-religions debate? Is our age the first to be confronted by the truth claims of other religions? Is our age the first to find the world religions stumbling over the confession that Jesus Christ alone is Lord? What of the early Church? Was not their age one of religious pluralism? Was not their time one of even greater encounter as they stood as newcomers upon the religious scene? And what was their response? Was it an appeal to an abstract principle like unitive pluralism, or the confession—at times to death—that Jesus Christ is Lord?

Finally, Knitter's own idea that truth is in flux seems to be applied unevenly. Throughout his discussion he calls for a reinterpretation of the Christian faith, yet he does this by raising his own ideal of unitive pluralism to the level of a transcendental ideal and one that appears similar to ideas found within the neo-vedantist school of thought. He has substituted his own ideal for the truth of Scripture.

In all I found Knitter's work stimulating in analysis though frustrating in his futile attempt to make his own abstract ideal attractive. Give me a flesh-and-blood Person, a living Lord, for only one such as he can save.

Alfred J. Poirier

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The old cliche has it that a pessimist looks at a half-filled glass and says, "It's half empty." An optimist looks at the same glass and says, "It's half full." By that criterion, "Tony" Campolo is an optimist. In Partly Right he looks at Christianity's severest critics and shows how Christians can benefit from their valid insights. Far from decrying these men as the vanguard of "secular humanism" (the context in which they are more often found in Christian discussions), Campolo insists that their charges are more directed at bourgeois religion than Biblical Christianity. In order to establish a context for his evaluations, Campolo begins with a positive listing of middle-class Protestantism's contributions to the economic strength and moral fiber of western civilization. He then devotes one chapter each to the shortcomings of bourgeois Protestantism and to the thought of Hegel. The former chapter notes that middle-class Christianity is focused exclusively on issues surrounding individualistic salvation and family values. The latter notes that Hegel's vision of a Germanic-oriented Geist was the dominant form of philosophical Christianity in the nineteenth century, thus becoming the target of most anti-Christian thought.

Having established that backdrop, Campolo notes that critiques of Hegelian Christianity can be divided into two categories: those from above and those from below. Critiques from above originate from those who look down on Christianity as being banal, ordinary, uncouth and drab. Four chapters survey representatives of this attitude. Nietzsche blasted Christianity as being unheroic. Kierkegaard blasted Danish Christendom for being more committed to respectability than to Christ. Freud blasted Victorian-age Christians for glorying in their polite morality while dark forces of sex and death seethed beneath a placid facade. The fourth chapter in this section, on the neo-Freudians,
shows how contemporary disciples of Freud are opening new windows into human motivation.

The four chapters that survey "The Attack From Below" divide into three on Marx and one on Dostoyevsky. Marx represents those who, from the underprivileged strata of society, look up in envy at the wealth and comfort of the bourgeois. Dostoyevsky represents those who have faith in the strength and courage of the proletariat. The advantaged have abused their God-given freedom and have thus relinquished their role as society's moral pacesetters.

Campolo presents his material about as accurately as can be expected in so brief a treatment. Also, the book is written in a style appropriate to its subject matter. In spite of the whimsical title featured on the dust jacket, We Have Met the Enemy and They Are Partly Right, this book is definitely written by Anthony Campolo, professor of sociology, rather than Tony Campolo, popular conference speaker and evangelist. Apparently the controversy surrounding A Reasonable Faith served to "tighten up" the writing. (The earlier work was written in a breezy, anecdotal style.) Further, Campolo is to be commended for his consistency. In his earlier and controversial work the author's purpose was to develop an apologetic that considered the impact of secular thinking without rejecting it wholesale. In both books the emphasis is on "What can we learn from our opposition?" rather than simply "What's wrong with the opposition?"

Therefore any evaluation of Campolo's work will hinge on this fundamental point. How valid is Campolo's "half-full" approach? Many conservative evangelicals will paraphrase Tertullian: "What has Christ to do with Marx (or Freud, or Nietzsche)?" For such Christians, Campolo's attempts will seem utterly wrongheaded. "One only studies the opposition in order to discover and exploit their weaknesses," this view would argue, "not to show where they're right." Other evangelicals (including this reviewer) will see Campolo as standing in the tradition of Paul's Areopagus address. Paul also asked, "Where are the pagans right?" Campolo is a Christian prophet whose vision fixes one eye on the costly demands of Jesus Christ and the other on the needs of the world. We can gain from his unique insight.

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Peterson, editor of the book and author of eight of its chapters, has given the Christian education world a significant text that surveys the field of adults in Christian education. This volume supersedes an outdated volume from Moody and may very well become the foundational text for any survey of ministries on this topic. A significant improvement is the chapter on curriculum of adult education.

The book is organized in four areas that could be used separately by a pastor or teacher. They include the general orientation in part 1, teaching adults in part 2, adults in the church in part 3, and family ministry in part 4. Those training teachers of adults will benefit from the work of Perry Downs' five chapters on teaching adults. This will also be profitable reading for new teachers. Part 3 can be adapted for enriching the staff involved in organizing adult ministries. The section on family ministry is full of important insights in the expanding area of marriage and family life. An example is in the section on partnership discipleship where William O'Byrne states: "Couples need to be guided in learning how to have spiritual times together" (p. 283). He continues to give
objectives for these spiritual experiences and goals for marital maintenance as well as methods for meeting these goals.

Personally, it is regrettable that Peterson did not expand his expertise on management in this book. Perhaps a future volume will help fill a vacuum for the administration of adult ministries in the local church. I highly recommend this book, however, for what it is: a basic survey. It should be considered as required foundational reading before those being trained specialize in a selected ministry with adults.

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For the most part Anderson provides "a practical guide to the ministry," as the subtitle promises. The book was prompted by the author's futile search for a successor to a standard, now-outdated volume, The Pastor and His Works by Homer Kent, Sr.

Anderson is not afraid to question roles and programs. He begins his introduction with the question of expectations, noting that "in the past two decades no profession has seen greater diversification of expectation than the professional ministry" (p. xi). He repeatedly applies the question "Whose expectations?" to the role and work of the pastor. The most refreshing use of the question is found in chap. 5, "The Pastor's Wife." Here he gives some solid though nontraditional information and direction. An understanding of this chapter can help many young men and their wives avoid some conflict between themselves and their congregation. Neither is he afraid to go against the flow of today's trends. This is demonstrated in his treatment of Sunday evening services (chap. 14) and midweek activities (chap. 15).

The book is divided into four parts containing five to ten chapters each. At the conclusion of each chapter Anderson has placed "Questions for Discussion" and a list of "Helpful Resources." The questions vary in quality but provide a framework for thinking through the information on the way to application. The "Helpful Resources" include magazine and journal articles as well as books. The entries are quite contemporary in keeping with the author's purpose. However, one could wish that he had chosen to include some of the classics as well, especially in the areas of "The Pastor's Character and Calling" (chap. 1) and "The Pastor's Personal Life and Study Habits" (chap. 2). The inclusion of indices of subjects, persons, and Scripture is helpful.

Part 1 has as its subject "The Pastoral Role." Apart from chap. 5 it is ordinary but foundational to the author's thesis that the effective pastor loves the people extravagantly and preaches the Word faithfully (p. 365). In a day when the issue of the call to ministry is much in question, the author would have placed himself in the debt of all readers with a more thorough treatment of the subject.

Part 2 addresses "The Pastor's Relationships." In this section the writing is pastoral. It contains firm fatherly advice with practical and workable discussions in the area of authority and ethics. Repeatedly his message is that all of God's people are priests, saints and ministers (p. 100) and that all should be treated as such.

Part 3, "The Pastoral Tasks," is the strongest section of the book. Here the author fills the role of teacher, not from the tower but from the platform of experience. He handles well the tension between the traditional and the new. He comes to the heart of the issues by cutting through the equally damaging stances of sentimentality and change at any cost.

Part 4 gives direction in "The Pastor's Administrative Tasks." The author continues
as teacher, applying the points from parts 1–2 to the everyday tasks that face (sometimes inundate) the pastor.

Anderson has done the Church, its pastors and its people a great service in writing this book. Its value is at least threefold. First, it is a valuable source of advice and direction to the young man preparing for or beginning in the ministry. Second, it is a welcome "refresher course" and thought stimulant for the more experienced pastor. Third, it provides a realistic guideline for the expectations of a congregation for its pastor.

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This book by Art Beals, founder of World Concern, forms part of Multnomah's Critical Concern series. His passion is to broaden the social consciousness of North American evangelicalism and to present development as a viable Christian option in helping alleviate global poverty and suffering.

What makes the book compelling reading is its strong visual character. Each chapter is filled with personal experiences and chronicles Beals' struggle to make his faith relevant. This ability to create mental pictures is important to communicate to his audience: No one who has not seen life in the third world can appreciate the overwhelming impact of its problems. Beals works hard at trying to help people see and understand.

Another positive contribution that those who are seriously trying to grapple with the pragmatics of evangelical social ethics will find useful is the approach taken to describe Christian development. The author makes it clear that development work is grounded not in an emotional yet uninvolved sense of pity for the poor but in an engaging and purposeful compassion that takes concrete action on their behalf (pp. 35–47). Development is not the same as short-term emergency relief. It is instead the process of helping people help themselves (pp. 88–91). Moreover, development makes a realistic evaluation of human government. All systems and ideologies are man-made, sinful and oppressive. Only the Church can offer a lasting and meaningful solution to pressing human needs (pp. 109–121). It is this gritty realism that those of us who live and work in the third world applaud: Beals has gone beyond pious platitudes by getting involved in a constructive and humane enterprise. He has avoided the ideological myopia of liberation theology and the idealism of those from the first world who, in their desire to rectify injustice, defend left-wing governments. And he hits hard at the trap of consumerism, which pervades much of contemporary Christianity.

The book, though, does have its weaknesses. To begin with, it lacks specific suggestions as to how to implement its vision. The third and concluding section (chaps. 9–12) simply proposes an alternative perspective on evangelical stewardship, leadership, community and lifestyle. This is an important first step, but more practical ideas (such as in Miriam Adeney, God's Foreign Policy) could help guide the North American Church to action.

In addition, Beals' book, like so many other works on development, exhibits a disquieting lack of Biblical clarity and depth. I do not quarrel with his drawing upon Biblical texts to show God's concern for the poor. What disturbs me is how loosely the text is handled. Two examples: (1) Matt 25:35 ff. is used to claim the presence of Christ in the poor (pp. 68–69). These are problematic verses, to be sure, and they have been an important element in liberation Christology. (2) The Abrahamic promises of posterity and land are universalized as human rights and as fundamental concerns of development

As its title suggests, this book is an attempt to relate the perspectives and insights of modern anthropological studies to the task of interpreting the text of the NT. Malina believes (quite correctly, in my view) that cultural anthropology has a crucial role to play in the task of Biblical interpretation by enabling the contemporary, western scholar or preacher to "reconstruct and enter the social world of the biblical authors." Malina's laudable aim is to assist us in becoming what he calls "considerate" readers of the Bible—readers, that is, who take the social world from which the Biblical texts derive seriously in contrast to Bible reading that is "ethnocentrically anachronistic." A further and broader aim involves the construction of a set of models that might make possible a comparative understanding of social systems. The author uses the term "kitbashing" (which, he tells us, comes from the world of model railroading) to describe what he is at this volume—namely, the selective use of various social-science models welded together to create an interpretative tool that will enable the reader to discover "the broader dimensions of the implicit meanings found in the behavior portrayed in and represented by the New Testament writings."

While Malina draws upon the work of many anthropologists and sociologists, the basic foundation for his models is derived from the writings of Mary Douglas, in particular her ideas concerning "grid" and "group" as propounded in the book Natural Symbols—Explorations in Cosmology. Briefly described, Douglas' model is as follows: She draws a horizontal line to represent the varying social experiences of group identity. At one end group experience is minimal, the individual is of central significance; at the other end, by contrast, we discover societies in which the role of the individual is entirely subordinated to the needs of the group. Thus the further one moves along the line from left to right "the more permanent, inescapable and clearly bounded the social groups" (Douglas).

This line is then intersected by a vertical axis representing the second variable in the model, that of "grid"—that is, the degree of socially constrained adherence people in a given group usually give to the system of classifications and definitions by which society enables its members to bring order to their experiences. At the bottom end of this line are groups in which individuals frequently doubt or question adherence to the socially shared conceptions (low grid), while at the top end are societies in which people almost invariably adhere to their culture's conceptions (high grid). The resulting matrix consists of four quadrants identified as weak-group/high-grid (societies in this category stress individualism and produce cosmologies in which the universe is geared to individual success); weak-group/low-grid (here a person is bound neither by grid nor group and
lives—or attempts to live—free of all social constraints); strong-group/high-grid (the individual is subservient to, but not in conflict with, society); strong-group/low-grid (personal identity is still located in group membership, yet the internal lines of society are unclear so that individuals are often unable to discover how they relate to other members of the group or what their expectations should be). Malina follows Douglas in seeing this model as not simply a means of classifying types of social organization but, on the basis of the premise that social experience is somehow determinative of worldview and cosmology, as capable of demonstrating where and why certain forms of religious belief and practice may emerge. Thus, for example, dualistic cosmologies will be located in the strong-group/low-grid quadrant, where belief in the warring forces of good and evil will correlate with and be an expression of the confused and frustrating social experience of people in such societies. Malina in fact goes well beyond Douglas, adding so many features derived from other models that by the end the quadrants begin to appear crowded to the point of suffocation. Indeed, for all its usefulness I laid this book down with the uneasy feeling that the model that is the end result of Malina’s kitbashing activity may be in serious danger of running off the tracks.

Before proceeding to some criticisms I would like to stress the very real value for NT study of its adaptation of the Douglas schema. For example, Malina is extremely helpful when showing the crucial nature of the socio-cultural differences existing between mainstream American society and the world of the Biblical writers. The former clearly belongs in the weak-group/high-grid quadrant of the model and is “a rather rare cultural script on the planet both in the past and at present.” We may feel that Malina’s description of the shape religion is likely to assume in such a society reflects all too accurately much that passes as Christianity in contemporary western society: “God normally has a role like that of a waiting room attendant or secretarial pool member, to be called upon at the behest of the individual, not the other way around. Thus God-focused religion in weak group/high grid society is often a secondary, implicit, and private concern but highly important since the individual can be quite fragile and lose charge of things easily. Thus God the junior partner is still partner, even if junior, dealing with the devotees as a proud parent trying to steer a budding adolescent on his or her individualistic way” (p. 49). By contrast, the NT writings originate from cultures belonging in the strong-group/low-grid quadrant (Malina regards John’s gospel as an exception since he locates it in a weak-group/low-grid context) in which religion is embedded either in government (political religion) or in the family. Thus whereas contemporary American religion of a voluntaristic and individualist type might be called “formal” religion, first-century religiousness was “substantive” in character. The implications of this are immense and need to be recognized and given full weight and not only by NT scholars but by sociologists of religion, theologians and, and not least, missiologists.

Yet despite its usefulness this volume has serious weaknesses. The opening two sentences contain a blatantly false antithesis: “For believers, the Bible is the Word of God. For unbelievers, the Bible is a collection of ancient Middle Eastern documents.” I found myself disagreeing with Malina at many points in the text. To cite just one example, the inducements by means of which subordinates seek to influence their social superiors in strong group societies are wrongly described as “bribes.” There is a subtle yet vital distinction between a “gift” and a “bribe” in such societies (and, indeed, in the Bible), and it is surely wrong to say that “bribery in a whole range of forms is perfectly ‘ethical’ and normal in strong group societies.” But apart from such minor disagreement, I believe Malina conceives too much of a social science perspective that is both deterministic and reductionist in its approach to the phenomenon of religion. I do not at all deny the validity and importance of sociological insights, nor would I question the existence of a link between social experience and worldview or cosmology. Yet while sociological perspectives have much to contribute to the explanation of religious phenomena they must not
be allowed to explain religion away. This for two reasons: First, to allow social science to assume a position of such authority in the sphere of knowledge is to overlook its own relative, partial and even ideological character. When Malina argues for the “overwhelming significance” of the social and cultural context and claims that a social science approach to hermeneutics provides the basis for “reasoned explanation” that is “non-ethnocentric, non-anachronistic” he is taking a dogmatic, ideological position. As Viktor Frankl has warned, science is always in danger of becoming ideology when it indulges in what he calls the “pretense of totality.” It is precisely such a pretense that one detects in the status Malina grants to social science.

Second, and even more important, I do not believe that the phenomena of religion can be explained exhaustively in terms of socio-cultural categories. Malina, like Mary Douglas, is extremely helpful in pointing out the many ways in which social and cultural experience does affect the manifestation of religion in both beliefs and practice. Both these writers, however, fail to recognize that the essence of religion transcends their categories and that at many points in its history (this applies especially to the NT evidence) its manifestation makes nonsense of the neat analysis of the group/grid matrix. And yet perhaps all of this leaves those of us who deny the validity of reductionist approaches to religion facing some searching questions ourselves. Are such approaches made the more persuasive and convincing by the fact that so much of our religion is explicable in socio-cultural terms and so little of it bears witness to a Source who transcends the analyses of kitbashing sociologists?

David Smith

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“Man,” wrote Reinhold Niebuhr, “has always been his own most vexing problem. How shall he think of himself?” The present volumes attempt to answer that question, but in different ways. As both writers observe, anthropology has taken on a new importance in recent centuries. Schleiermacher’s entire program was based on specific anthropological considerations. More important, the atheistic critiques of religion by Feuerbach, Marx and Freud were really anthropological in nature, suggesting that religion consists of human projections based in personal alienation.

Pannenberg’s work continues his efforts to craft a “universal” theology that takes its place alongside all the sciences. For the above reasons, he writes, “an anthropological justification of the mode of theological argumentation” has become “indispensable” (p. 16). This basic presupposition, then, rejects any Biblical positivism. In fact he has no intention of writing a dogmatic anthropology that begins with Scripture (an impossible task anyway, from his perspective). Rather, he describes the present work as “fundamental-theological anthropology” that “turns its attention directly to the phenomena of human existence as investigated in human biology, psychology, cultural anthropology, or sociology and examines the findings of these disciplines with an eye to the implications that may be relevant to religion and theology” (p. 21).

Finding scientific implications that are “relevant” for theology is one thing. Requiring all theological statements to be “empirically demonstrable” (pp. 91, 152) is quite another, and therein lies a tension in Pannenberg’s method. On the one hand he affirms the priority of the Biblical revelation, as when he insists that “the secular understanding of a method must be subjected to scrutiny . . . and must be revised in the light of this
scrutiny” (pp. 390–391). Nontheological criteria or models form only the “starting point for a radical reformulation of it [the model] in a theological perspective” (p. 392). Again, anthropological findings that would justify theology must be “submitted to theological reflection and thought through in light of theology; a mere takeover of the data established in a pre-theological manner will not do” (p. 416). So far, so good, but in practice Pannenberg does just the opposite: He reformulates theology precisely because of pre- or non-theological data, as when he rejects the historicity of the fall. As John Neuhaus has observed, this absolute requirement that all theological statements must be rationally justified before the sciences is “one of the chief obstacles to the acceptance of his work” (Theology and the Kingdom of God, p. 43).

Given this method, it is not surprising that the work reads more like philosophy of religion than theology. In part 1 (chaps. 1–3) Pannenberg asks what it is that makes people “distinctly human” and concludes that it is our “excentricity”—our openness to the world, to others, and to that which is beyond the world. This excentricity defines the “basic form or structure of human behaviour” (pp. 158–159). Because current scientific knowledge militates against the idea of an original state of perfection lost in a fall, Pannenberg defines the imago Dei as a destiny to be achieved in the future, “a human destination of communion with God” (p. 74). Humans twist this image, though, and thus there develops a tension between our excentricity and our “centrality,” or what Pannenberg calls “a distortion between the central ego and the excentric aspect” (p. 106). Classical theology has called this “concupiscence” or “self-love,” an Augustinian conception that Pannenberg wants to retain for two reasons: its empirical bent, which permits psychological description and observation; and its emphasis that sin consists not only of transgressing God’s law but also in “a failure of human beings in relation to themselves” (p. 95).

Part 2 considers people as social beings, for our excentricity is socially mediated. Pannenberg devotes chapters to “Subjectivity and Society” (chap. 4), “The Problem of Identity” (chap. 5), and “Identity and Nonidentity” (chap. 6). The duty of cultivating “basic trust” falls especially to religious formation. Unfortunately, “conflict and not fellowship proves to be the essence of human relations” (p. 243). Guilt, the “heightened expression of the alienation of the ego from its own self” (p. 285), results from this failure to balance excentricity and centrality within the social matrix.

In part 3 (chaps. 7–9) Pannenberg moves on to discuss the nature of our “shared world” of culture at large. Noting the aporias in modern concepts of culture he concludes that “play” offers the best means to grasp the unique nature of human culture. This launches him into an analysis of the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of language, including a valuable section on “Theology and the Religious Implications of Language” (pp. 384–396). He concludes the book by discussing social institutions and their various constituents: property, work, economy, sexuality, marriage, politics and religion. His last chapter turns to his favorite theme, “Human Beings and History.”

Hoekema’s fine work could hardly be more different, and he excels in providing what Pannenberg never intended to write: a Biblical, dogmatic anthropology. He intends to offer a uniquely “Christian” anthropology that is “different from all other anthropologies” (p. 4). Indeed, we must avoid “hybrid anthropologies” that result from merging Christian and non-Christian views. We must ask ourselves: “Are there still remnants of non-Christian anthropologies in our thinking” (p. 4)? Drawing heavily on Scripture and Dutch theologians, especially Bavinck and Berkouwer, one looks in vain for interaction with the likes of Marx, Freud, Jung, James, and so on.

Thus there also arises a tension in Hoekema’s methodological perspective. This time, however, it is in the opposite direction of that in Pannenberg’s. On the one hand he is quick to remind us that “the content of the Christian faith may not be determined by the results of natural science . . . but must be drawn from the Bible itself” (p. 147).
Further, "the Bible does not describe man scientifically" (p. 203). On the other hand, though, he admits that science has required theological reformulation, as in the Copernican revolution, and that science has placed before theologians difficulties about the Genesis narrative that admit of no current solution, such as the antiquity of man. Therefore, to take one example, while Hoekema affirms the historicity of the fall despite "scientific evidence," Pannenberg rejects the doctrine because of it.

With this high view of the priority of Biblical revelation, Hoekema suggests that the *imago Dei* has both structural and functional aspects, "as involving man in his threefold relationship—to God, others, and to nature—and as ongoing through four stages—the original image, the perverted image, the renewed image, and the perfected image" (p. ix). After two introductory chapters, Hoekema spends most of the book detailing the various aspects of the *imago Dei* (chaps. 3–6) and then the origin, spread, nature and restraint of sin (chaps. 7–10). In chap. 11 he rejects both dichotomous and trichotomous views, favoring a "psychosomatic unity," while in chap. 12 he looks at "The Question of Freedom."

Both books deserve a wide readership, although they will appeal to different audiences. Given the methodological differences outlined above, they each make fine contributions. Hoekema's book, because of its length and its fine Biblical work, will appeal to pastors and students, while Pannenberg, with its broad-ranging scope and depth so typical of German scholarship, will appeal to the scholar-specialist.

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Not since Nida's *Customs and Culture* or Luzbetak's *The Church and Culture* has a work such potential for being the standard in its field. The work will rank in its own way with Kraft's *Christianity in Culture*.

Although this volume seeks to help missionaries adapt and minister across cultures, the work is also of value to their teachers and pastors. All live in a multicultural world. Increasingly, clergy and laity travel, minister and fellowship across cultures. Missionaries seek initial and furlough training at home, and their pastors need to know how to better minister to them and how to help them to minister at home on furlough or in retirement. Even the student-faculty relation is cross-cultural by being intergenerational. Exegesis and hermeneutics are both cross-cultural disciplines.

Before progressing to basic assumptions, the work begins with a discussion of the role of anthropology in missions. Anthropology is seen as a help to missions and cultural sensitivity. The theological assumptions are that history is redemptive, Jesus Christ was a missionary, the Holy Spirit prepares people for conversion, and missions need the theology of the Church as community. Cultures are rational and complex, and they interpret the Scriptures from the perspective of their own worldview so that hamartiology differs in societies (p. 267). The Church can transcend those differences. Cross-cultural theology is possible and desirable.

Former missionary and long-time anthropologist, Hiebert writes from first-hand experience in South Asia. As he notes in the introduction, the work is often autobiographical. One may assume that that is particularly true for the concluding discussion of the bicultural and the role of the missionary. He supplements first-hand knowledge with vignettes from around the world. He draws from the writings of Jacob Loewen and other missionary thinkers.
The portion of Hiebert's book that is most helpful to theologians is part 3, "Cultural Differences and the Message." Hiebert argues that the Church must develop ethno-theologies. He seeks answers to such questions as how to respond when nonwestern Christians claim that their theologies are more culturally meaningful than ours. He replies by distinguishing between Theology and theology. Theology (capitalized) is God's, while theology is our understanding of God's Theology. Exegesis of culture and Scripture brings theology closer to Theology. He also distinguishes between synchronic and diachronic theology.

Hiebert notes that different cultures ask different theological questions. He contends that the goal is a transcultural theology that recognizes a Biblical consensus across cultural differences (p. 217). He calls for sound Christology and theology that scratches where it itches, a theology that takes God, man, culture, Scripture, and the Holy Spirit seriously. His examples help point theology in that direction.

All this does not mean there are no problems with the work. There are questions: Does God seek to change corporate rather than individual sins? Do oral societies preclude the need for Bible translation (pp. 135–136)? There are omissions: the animal rights movement (p. 114), Ruth and levirate marriage (p. 49). There are errors: the Bible's condemnation of slavery (p. 56), the lack of pre-modern professional missionaries (p. 281, ignoring Catholic religious orders). There are contradictions concerning the past in the west (pp. 131, 133). Some diagrams are unclear or poorly located (fig. 9; pp. 198, 202). The index lacks some topics discussed in the text. The bibliography omits some items cited in the text.

The problems, however, do not impair the book's usefulness. Thanks to Hiebert's volume we may now add to Karl Barth's dictum that not only are good theologians good historians, but that good theologians are also good anthropologists. May their numbers increase through reading this seminal study.

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This is Gottwald's second massive work (after _The Tribes of Yahweh_ [Maryknoll: Orbis, 1979]) and consists of four major parts and a conclusion. Each part has a preface followed by three chapters, each of which is subdivided into numerous and generously cross-referenced paragraphs. The text is interspersed with copious illustrations (24 maps, 29 tables, 12 charts, 1 figure), most of which are very helpful, though some are, by the author's own admission, highly complex (esp. charts 11 and 12 illustrating the sociopolitical organizational domains and the socio-literary-theological sectors within them). There are also a list of abbreviations, a 65-page up-to-date bibliography (only English titles) conveniently arranged according to the divisions of the book (including a list of selected commentaries on each OT book) and, finally, an excellent 25-page index.

Part 1, "The Text in Its Context," presents in chronological fashion all the various approaches (methodologies) to the Hebrew Bible, Gottwald's own "social science method" coming last (chap. 1). Then follows a chapter on the world of the Hebrew Bible, mainly its geography and archeology (chap. 2), and one on its literary history (chap. 3).

Part 2 consists of one of Gottwald's main theses: "Intertribal Confederacy: Israel's Revolutionary Beginnings." He gathers from "traditions about fathers and mothers" (chap. 4), from "traditions about Moses, exodus, covenant and law-giving" (chap. 5), and finally from "traditions about intertribal Israel" that "Israel burst into history as an
ethnically and socioeconomically mixed coalition composed of a majority of tribally organized peasants (80 percent or more of the populace), along with lesser numbers of pastoral nomads, mercenaries and freebooters, assorted craftsmen, and renegade priests" (p. 284). The escapees from Egypt were former residents of Canaan, probably including war captives as well as voluntary migrants (p. 223). For an evaluation of this theory, see reviews of his Tribes of Yahweh.

Part 3 deals with monarchy as Israel's "counterrevolutionary establishment" as portrayed in the traditions of, respectively, the united kingdom (chap. 7), the northern kingdom (chap. 8) and the southern kingdom (chap. 9).

Finally, part 4 is a synthesis of traditions that came about when Israel was under great empires both as it was dispersed and restored ("colonial Israel").

This introduction is both traditionally critical and novel. It is traditionally critical in that it is based on all the commonly accepted critical premises without exception. The Hebrew Bible is likened to a great river consisting of rivulets, brooks, streams, tributary rivers and branches of the main river (p. 95). Emphasis is put on the diversity of these (diachronic approach). Though the author considers the first task to be a discernment of what holds the Hebrew Bible together (synchronous approach), there is little doubt that he majors in what makes it come apart (p. 97). What could have caused the confluence of those rivulets, brooks, and so on—namely, declivity (for evangelicals read: prophetic consciousness, revelation)—is dismissed as a value judgment made after the fact (p. 94). The Pharisees, rather, had the final say as to how the Hebrew Bible would have to look and be interpreted (p. 110).

Gottwald's introduction is novel in that his overarching aim is to pursue as much as possible the history of traditions or trajectories and to hypothesize as to what the socio-political and sociohistorical causes were that brought them about. There is therefore little interaction with other viewpoints. Only the pros and cons of major form-critical and traditio-historical theories are weighed. Source and redaction criticism, for instance, are foregone conclusions. His only interest, practically speaking, lies in those (people and circumstances) that gave rise to these traditions and their particular literary genre. In short, we have Traditionsgeschichte at its best, not just as another approach to the OT but as the final outcome of all other critical methodologies combined. To our knowledge, there is no more thorough discussion of traditions as generally accepted today on the market.

As expected, Gottwald hopes to convince his peers (but also the "believers and doubters," p. v) that one of the reasons why we have come to a "breakdown of consensus in Biblical studies" (p. 19) is the neglect of the "social science dimension" alongside the customary literary, historical and religious dimensions. In short, sociological exegesis may well be the savior out of the present-day methodological morass. Hence a characteristic paragraph titled "socio-historic horizons to..." is appended to most chapters in parts 2 and 4. Two fundamental questions are asked: "How did the oral and literary traditions of the Hebrew Bible take shape and what is the sociohistorical understanding they provide or presuppose concerning each period in ancient Israel? How does the sociohistorical picture of each period presented or implied in the Hebrew Bible enable us to comprehend Israel's place in its total ancient Near Eastern context?" Provided one accepts these traditions, his point is generally well made.

It is doubtful, however, that many evangelicals subscribe to them. Not a few are based on hypercritical premises. Methodological doubt is rampant, especially with regard to the historicity of events (e.g. the "iconic" form of the end of Judah's history according to the embellishments of the Deuteronomic historian [p. 378] or the Chronicler's "fabricated stories" [p. 518]). Even in the moral realm, anthropological studies are propounded to explain the prohibition of incest and homosexuality (p. 477). Value judgments are often
seen merely in the light of a tension between "critical traditionalists" and "authoritarian dogmatists" (e.g. in Proverbs; p. 575).

The issue seems to be: Has God spoken or not? It makes all the difference when religious beliefs end up being mere projections of men's minds and societies. Is Exod 3:14–15 only an "explanation" of the E source (p. 211) or Isaiah 40–55 but an "energetic document of controlled hysteria" (p. 502)? Does an existentialist/psychological reading come really closest to interpreting Ezekiel's psycho-physical symptoms (p. 491)? We fear that such ideas come up because "Yahweh and 'his' people Israel must be demystified, deromanticized, dedogmatized and deidolized" (Tribes, p. 708).

While it would be unfair to relegate this book to total uselessness for evangelicals—he does strike a strong note in favor of paying added attention to sociological factors, and some paragraphs (e.g. on Lamentations and Psalms) are genuinely excellent—all in all we have a demonstration of why evangelicals write their own introductions and have their own theological schools. There is just too much at stake. Biblical claims to the supernatural are part and parcel of Christian theology. The Bible is traditionally made up of OT and NT, and the latter strongly affirms the supernatural even as given in the OT (e.g. Luke 24:46; 1 Pet 1:10). A little more theology, especially Biblical theology—perhaps at the expense of sociology—would lead Gottwald to considerably different thoughts concerning the Hebrew Bible and its (often alleged) traditions. But of course we all know that in the long run it is a matter of choice between a conservative and a liberal approach. Can either one be convincingly proven? The conservative scholar has the advantage, however, on the basis of the texts' own claims not to have to prove his viewpoint first (cf. S. C. Goetz and C. L. Blomberg, "The Burden of Proof," JSNT 11 [1981] 39–63). While Gottwald makes a strong case for the Hebrew Bible to contain (mere) words of men as formulated in sociologically conditioned traditions, he has not succeeded in the eyes of this reviewer in demystifying or dedogmatizing the OT. The main reason is that he proceeds according to the typical epistemology of modern sociology—that is, focusing only on "the inter-subjective, the recurrent and the relational, thus ruling out ipso facto the existential, the unique and the absolute" (H. Penner and E. Yonan as quoted by E. Yamauchi, "Sociology, Scripture and the Supernatural," JETS 27 [1984] 182).

Daniel Schibler

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