BOOK REVIEWS


The premise of this work is a simple one: “to demonstrate that, for the contemporary world as well as for the ancient one, the basic principles of the moral life can be discovered by an intelligent person who uses only natural reason” (p. vii). O'Keefe, a Jesuit priest, derives his title from the rhetorical argument that introduces Paul's Roman correspondence. O'Keefe desires to establish a moral theory based on and in God's visible handiwork, a handiwork that includes the infusion of logic into the created order.

The work itself is divided into three sections: Introductory Considerations, The Theoretical Part of Ethics, and The Practical Part of Ethics. The final two sections contain numerous subdivisions, each of which concludes with a chapter summary. The text is composed primarily in outline form. The subdivisions begin with a relevant ethical question (“What are ‘good’ and ‘evil’ acts?”) that is then systematically handled. While the work was written as a textbook, the prose is not stiff and is quite readable. The system employed is the classical tradition rooted in Plato and Aristotle. According to the author he chooses this tradition “not out of any nostalgic love of tradition, nor indeed out of a sort of disillusionment with contemporary efforts of another genre, but rather simply for the pragmatic reason that the classical method works.”

The introductory section is brief (perhaps too brief) and contains helpful historical orientation for the nontechnical or nonscholarly reader. The subsequent chapters of the second section are more extensive and extremely cogent. The theoretical section is long but necessary. O'Keefe is concerned that ethics remain a practical, healthy study. In order to apply a morality that is not the “top-of-the-head counsel” a substantial amount of time is spent developing a theoretical basis for ethical judgements. The final section of the work deals with ethical issues that confront the whole warp and woof of the human condition. O'Keefe, in the final 140 pages, attempts to cover twenty or thirty issues and definitively argue the morality of various avenues of choice regarding each one. This proves to be the weakness of the work: It is too ambitious. The ground of morality for some issues was lost as I attempted to remember the theoretical basis (perhaps previously established in section 2) that enabled O'Keefe to make some bold assertions. His discussion on abortion, however, is the most lucid presentation of all his practical ethical discussions.

O'Keefe has attempted to take Paul at his word and establish a rational ethical philosophy that is both theoretical in basis and pragmatic in scope. Presuppositionalists may balk at the idea that a moral life can be known through natural revelation, but they will agree that O’Keefe’s work is persuasive and compelling.

John M. Kenney
The Stony Brook School

It is difficult to think. It is more difficult to think about thinking. It is most difficult to talk about thinking about thinking. Yet that is the task we assign to homiletics. If Christians are to live and love and choose on the basis of the great truths of Christianity, then what is required is compelling communication of those great truths by those who preach. That requires thinking about how we speak. Buttrick has set himself to the noble task of rethinking thought about communicating the Christian message. Few will question that he has made a major contribution to the discipline.

Buttrick conceives the homiletic task differently from most others, as even his title reflects. Limiting himself to an extensive treatment of matters of homiletic design and procedure—the making of sermons—he passes over delivery and other standard topics and divides his work into two major sections. Part 1, “Moves,” treats the components of sermons, with successive sections devoted to moves (4 chapters), framework (introductions and conclusions, 2 chapters), images (illustrations, 3 chapters), and language (3 chapters). Part 2, “Structures,” develops Buttrick’s understanding of overall structural theory in sermons, with successive sections given to hermeneutics (authority and interpretation, 3 chapters), homiletics (3 chapters including Buttrick’s rethinking of outlining and purpose in sermons), structures (5 chapters on designing sermons to fit three “moments in consciousness”), and a final “Brief Theology of Preaching.” The work concludes with a very extensive annotated bibliography arranged under 33 headings (24 pages listing approximately 700 titles). Subject and Scripture indices also are included.

After an initial chapter in which he affirms the value of words because they form our perception of reality (“naming”) and our identity (“narration”), thus giving preaching its promise, Buttrick moves into development of his unique understanding of the basic unit of the sermon. Taking his cue from recent evidence that audience attention span is limited to three or four minutes, he concludes that effective communication must frame sermons in several three-to-four-minute segments, each of which must deal with one idea by defining it, saving it from “oppositions,” and “imaging” it from lived experience. Such a three-to-four-minute module of language Buttrick calls a “move.” He deliberately avoids calling them “points,” as in more traditional homiletics, feeling that “move” captures the nature of communication as language arranged in an ordered sequence, moving from idea to idea. Each move consists of three ordered parts: “statement” (the idea of the move, extended over at least three sentences to fix it in congregational consciousness); “development” (in one of three ways: “bringing out,” “associating,” or “dissociating”); and “closure” (a restatement, in some form, of the idea of the move). Several moves in sequence, properly “conjoined,” make a sermon. Buttrick argues, however, that the preacher’s task is not to join moves (as traditional “transitions” do) but to keep them separate so that they will form in congregational consciousness as a series of ideas that are logically connected. Such is Buttrick’s unique understanding of the basic building-block of the sermon. It is probably the most distinctive aspect of the book.

The great strength of *Homiletic* is its detailed and thoughtful analyses of the elements of sermon design. Buttrick’s approach has been described as “phenomenological” because he devotes such attention to the actual process by which language forms in human consciousness. This approach produces a kind of thoroughness that presses beyond the typical treatment. His very helpful discussion of examples and illustrations (chap. 9) demonstrates this by dealing with such things as the
variation in voice pattern that usually attends the insertion of prose quotations into sermons and how to match images used in a sermon with the model of the passage on which the sermon is based (e.g. choosing agricultural imagery when preaching on the seed/sower parable). This orientation also leads him to argue that sermons should be “plotted,” not outlined (chap. 18). Particularly suggestive is his development of the idea that sermons can be arranged to fit one of three possible “moments in consciousness” (chaps. 20–25). These correspond to the three types of impression that a painting might make on the mind: an immediate impression, a deeper impression upon reflection, and a long-lasting change of perspective that might cause one to view the subject of the painting in a new way whenever one encounters it apart from the painting. These three phases or “moments” in consciousness can serve as a strategy for sermon design with each mode of consciousness serving certain types of Biblical literature particularly well. Buttrick names the three modes “immediacy,” “reflection” and “praxis.”

A highlight of the book is Buttrick’s “image grid” (chap. 10). He shows that images and illustrations can do more than illustrate particular ideas in a sermon. They can be worked together to form an “image grid” that will help them build upon each other so that together they will form in consciousness and reinforce the meaning of the sermon.

The overall excellence of Homiletic should not be discounted because of the reservations it might evoke from an evangelical reviewer. While the treatment of style (word choice) in chaps. 12–13 was helpful, I would have liked a treatment of style that attained the level reached in the discussion of illustrations.

Nor will evangelicals appreciate the author’s understanding of authority or of hermeneutics expressed in chaps. 15–17. His depreciation of the original intent of the author, his conviction that we are justified in finding meaning in texts that the author never intended, his suggestion that we restructure the way we receive the Bible as our authority, his seemingly fuzzy understanding of how to derive meaning from texts—all will strike most evangelical preachers as a wasteland.

The most serious problem with the book is that it is difficult to read. Statements that encourage us to replace “purpose” in a sermon with an “intending of” and then say, “What do we mean by intending of? We mean the aim of our focused consciousness” (p. 294) are typical. Reading Homiletic is like going to the dentist: It is difficult but well worth it.

In summary, Homiletic challenges many aspects of traditional homiletics. It is a profound contribution to the preaching art. But other texts, such as Haddon Robinson’s, will serve better as introductions. Anyone serious about good preaching will profit from thinking through Buttrick’s rethinking of homiletics.

Van Campbell
Calvary Evangelical Free Church, Indiana, PA


In the foreword Charles Curran, another Roman Catholic theologian who is also under examination by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, says that many readers, like himself, might not agree with everything Küng says but that they will profit both theologically and spiritually from this book. Küng adds in the preface that he has tried to set out simply and briefly much of what he has
written elsewhere about Christian commitment. I shall paraphrase his message and save criticisms till the end.

Much like Carl Henry, Küng begins by addressing the crisis of authority. Many of the movements to liberalize or liberate, beginning with the student revolts of the late 1960s, have led to developments that have gone too far and been anything but liberating (p. 20). This large-scale crisis of values has thrown modern society into conflicts. What is needed is a rational means of gaining a system of essential values, a commitment.

To move toward an answer Küng distinguishes between what is “nominally Christian” and what is “truly Christian.” There can be no civilized society without laws, no legal system without a sense of justice, no justice without an ethic, no ethic without basic values. There are no binding values apart from religion. True religion is founded not on “anything humanly conditioned at all; but on the absolute itself, to which we give the name of God” (pp. 26–27).

But much has been done in the past and in the present that officially claimed the name “Christian” and that reflected nothing of the deeper, pure, original sense of Christianity. Küng cites pages of examples, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, of excesses and, he thinks, sins. These range from heretic and witch trials, to rejection of the full role of women in the discipleship of the Church, to suppression of teachers, theologians and journalists.

What then are the essentials of the true Christian religion? First is belief in God, who is Creator, Guide (both of the physical world and of human history) and Fulfiler (personally and corporately for humanity). Thus orientation to the one true God is the essential truth of Christianity (pp. 42–48).

Second, we get essential Christian values from Jesus Christ, who is historical and for that reason authoritative. Jesus revealed to us the true God, who is different than the god rejected by Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. He is righteous, just, loving, giving. He forgives, liberates and rejoices. And because he does, we as his followers may do so too.

Every person is faced with the question of believing that we die and pass into nothingness or that we die into God. We have reasonable grounds, not rational proof, for the latter (p. 54). Therefore we can commit ourselves to this God in enlightened, reasonable trust. This leads us to live in the here and now with greater meaning, responsibility and involvement.

In this identification of God we not only find the one whom Jesus revealed but also find that Jesus himself is God. This is confirmed to us by God resurrecting Jesus. Thus Jesus is the standard for us, both as God and as genuine human person. He is our Lord (pp. 55–56).

What does this Christian commitment mean in practice? The model of the Christian life is not given in a set of rules or theories, but in a person: Jesus. He is our living example and calls us to discipleship, to come and follow him in daily life. In this following we find the reality of Jesus’ message and pert•en. Therefore there is a third answer to the basic question of life’s orientation: “I know what I can rely on because I believe in the Spirit of Jesus Christ, who is alive today, who is the Spirit of God himself, who is the Holy Spirit” (p. 65).

In the next-to-last section, “How Do We Persevere?”, Küng says that all Christians must persevere in their faith in spite of obstacles, both in the Church and in life, because our trust is in God’s grace, not in our own success or achievement.

In the final section, “Is Christ Divided?”, Küng argues that all Christians can come together around the Lima Liturgy of 1982. This is the least satisfactory section of the book. But he concludes with a strong appeal to the unity of the Holy Spirit as the fundamental attitude for Christians toward each other.
This book is exciting and refreshing. It presents a good appeal to modern non-
Christians to turn to Jesus Christ in faith. It provides a trinitarian basis for
Christian unity. For these emphases it is to be commended.

However, it still manifests Küng’s liberal approach to the text and his rejection
of Biblical inerrancy. Now, in this conservative context more than ever, he needs a
reliable text to convey the message of God’s love and forgiveness in Jesus.

It is curious, in the historical orthodox and Biblical contexts he presents as a
background, that there is no mention of sin or salvation in the book. The focus is
on the reality of God in Jesus Christ and on his ability to meet our need for security
and significance. Man’s predicament and search may substitute for sin, but there
is no discussion of either the atonement or of spiritual salvation. The final chapter
shows a decidedly Roman Catholic image in spite of the early emphasis on main-
taining a unified Christian position.

The book is well worth reading. You may find better books to give to your non-
Christian friends (by Pinnock, McDowell, Miethe, Bright and others), but this
comes as close as anything I have seen in Catholic literature to a useful apologetic
tool for persuading non-Christians to believe in Jesus.

Stephen M. Clinton
International Leadership Council

_Theological Method in Jacques Ellul._ By Daniel B. Clendenin. New York: Uni-

Clendenin’s helpful interpretation of Ellul exhibits theology’s existential relev-
ance, provides valuable interaction with related literature, and advances four
trenchant criticisms.

Ellul’s dialectical method of reasoning incorporates an infinite qualitative dis-
tinction between God and humanity (God as wholly other), an absolute discon-
tinuity between Biblical revelation and reason, and tensions between God’s no and
yes. Clendenin fails to provide critical interaction with other methods of reasoning,
evaluating dialectic only from within its assumptions.

The primary dialectical tension in Ellul à la Clendenin’s exposition occurs
between individual ethical freedom and collective necessity. Heredity, social struc-
tures, environment, public opinion, education and a host of other sociological and
psychological factors determine our lives in a variety of ways. Closed in, confined
and impotent, humanity has no solutions sociologically and is without hope, ap-
proaching a rising tide of disaster—the end.

Revolutions do not provide freedom. Although they change society formally,
they fail to change it in reality. Freedom must break the closed circle of necessity.
The Christ from above is the answer. The whole of Christ’s work is a work of
liberation (overlooking propitiation and reconciliation). So the work of a Christian
in society is to shatter the fatalism of social necessities.

But the Church has failed to provide freedom. Ellul admits that his 21 years of
service on the National Council of the Reformed Church “failed totally” to reform
the Church’s structure and met with little success in revitalizing theological educa-
tion. Even the World Council of Churches reflects static conformism rather than
dynamic liberty. Instead of being the standard-bearer of freedom the Church too
often is enslaved to the cultural status quo. Instead of coming of age the con-
temporary Church has become gullible, religious and irrational in its enslavement
to the new “demons” of our society.
Society’s new demons include the power of the technocrats, propagandists and politicians. While promising freedom, technological power enslaves others. Propaganda provides the illusion of freedom while continually conditioning people to do by necessity what they think they do by personal choice. And political powers, instead of being simply modest and useful administrators of the common patrimony, become totalitarian. Politics in general has become the religion of the age. What is the greatest evil of our age? We treat all problems politically—we put politics first and politicize all values. Truth, liberty and justice have little meaning apart from a political context. The only hope for escape from these inescapable political necessities comes from outside this closed and impenetrable system. Without a transcendent reality above and beyond these social determinisms we face the loss of personal freedom and despair.

Personal freedom is the center and sine qua non of meaningful human existence. Liberation theologies (whether for a race, gender or socio-economic group) reflect startling conformity to sociological trends, are unrealistic, and fail insofar as they advocate coercion or force. Freedom is an ethical expression of the liberation effected by God for people in Jesus Christ. Illusions of freedom come from promises of new technology, propaganda and political liberalism. Freedom is not inherent, the mere ability to make choices, collective, pure, absolute or permanent, the complete absence of restraints or limits. All freedom exists in dialectical tension with social necessities but has its source in the incarnate and inscriptured word of God. Jesus frees from false beliefs and servitude to the world’s demonic powers. Scripture in its entirety is a book about liberation. Freedom is the basic theme that ties everything else together.

God frees his people from political bondage in Egypt and Babylon, regimentation by religious authorities, slavery to the law, and the tyranny of the state (1 Samuel 8). God also frees us from the “flesh”—the power of persons in opposition to God. Having set us free from all restrictions and obligations, God frees his people for the love of neighbor and the glory of God. God’s vice-regents must oversee nature—not for blind and egoistical profit but by love. In agapē, the supreme expression of freedom, we voluntarily limit our power and reject the spirit of domination, erōs, and the will to power.

Clendenin’s criticisms of Ellul’s thought are well-taken: (1) Reductively Ellul limits Christian life to one factor—freedom, failing sufficiently to engage other characteristics. (2) Ellul has regarded all power unjust, violent and domineering, the absolute enemy of God. Does not God endorse ethical uses of power? (3) Ellul’s universalism amounts to an overpowering act of God in spite of what individuals may freely will. (4) Ellul’s final “calm of the lotus” makes his dialectic only penultimate.

Gordon R. Lewis
Denver Conservative Baptist Seminary


Montoya’s book is difficult to review, especially for a Hispanic who is committed to theological integrity and missiological accuracy. Its title is seductive for those of us who are interested in North American ministries related to the Hispanic community. With the projected high rate of population growth of Hispanics in North
America, this book is one in which many missiologists and mission societies would be interested. Its greatest difficulty is that the title is extremely misleading, and the book itself does not provide us with the information we are looking for. A better title would probably have referred to Hispanic ministries in a particular community, naming the area and giving a demographic overlay.

There is a tendency to look at this book as a series of workshops for a selective group of people who are Anglos and who will accept the authority of a Hispanic who is speaking of Hispanics. In other words, who is to question the expert? Montoya, however, often speaks of a general population of Hispanics without providing us with specifics about who he is referring to. Furthermore he frequently relates anthropological and sociological information but fails to document his statements. On p. 13, for example, the author states that “Hispanics are primarily on the lower end of the scale economically. The vast majority are lower middle class.” We are not sure, first of all, who he is talking about. Also we do not know if the information is well-researched and accurate. Another illustration of this is the author’s statement that “most Hispanics have come from the most desperate and deprived group in Latin America.” Again no documentation is given to the reader for verification. In one case he indicates that “if you know Cubans and the speed with which they speak, you will understand why the Mexican Americans are not drawn to this ministry.” This is an offensive and unnecessary generalization based on data that are merely localized and anecdotal.

Though the book’s first chapter, “The Hispanic Community,” is the place where most students of missiology, anthropology and sociology would question the significance of the book in terms of both its enhancement of missions and theology as well as the achievement of Hispanic authorship, Montoya throughout continues to speak of Hispanics as inclusively representing all Hispanics in North America. The impression the author leaves with me is that he is primarily talking about Mexican Americans living in a certain part of Los Angeles.

The book addresses serious questions of contextualization all too inadequately. The author does, however, provide the reader with some guidelines for administration of the local church in relationship to growth. He also notes various points of interest concerning the integration aspect of Hispanic and Anglo churches that plan on joining together.

In conclusion, let me reiterate that the title of this book is misleading because it falls short of representing accurately any Hispanic subculture. It is my opinion that the book would have been best represented as a case study of a particular local church in a particular community. It makes numerous theological, anthropological and sociological errors that minimize the effectiveness of Hispanic authorship. Hispanic Ministry in North America is not a book that I would recommend to any serious student of Christian missions and theology.

Manuel Ortiz
Westminster Theological Seminary


Religion and politics share a natural affinity. They intersect at a level of moral discourse. And they each provide a forum in which individuals can determine the meaning and direction of social existence.
The editors of this volume have assembled 26 essays that wrestle with the character of the relationship of religion and politics in American society. More specifically the authors are interested in probing the sometimes tempestuous relationship of religion and politics as it is understood by evangelicals and fundamentalists.

Certain questions frame this analysis: What do fundamentalists want? Is the evangelical worldview changing? How is it possible that theological kin differ so radically in political persuasion? What is justice? Peace? Public morality? Tolerance? Is the new religious right a defensive reaction to modernity? Is secular humanism a myth? Can evangelicalism and fundamentalism recapture and redefine the contemporary cultural imagination?

Neuhaus and Cromartie have organized a fascinating set of previously published articles into three sections: the historical and theological perspective of evangelicalism and fundamentalism, a section in which evangelical and fundamentalist leaders speak for themselves, and a series of essays in which outside observers (nonevangelicals and nonfundamentalists) comment on the contemporary political resurgence of evangelicalism and fundamentalism. Anyone desiring a quick study of religion and politics will find this book very helpful. And the credibility of the book is enhanced by the quite impressive scholarly stature of the individual authors. Among them are C. Colson, H. Cox, C. F. H. Henry, J. D. Hunter, G. Marsden, M. Marty, A. J. Reichley, R. J. Sider and J. Skillen.

This resource text suffers from one serious limitation. While the subtitle indicates a profound interest in fundamentalism and part 2 lets evangelicals and fundamentalists "speak for themselves," only one self-professed and avowedly fundamentalist writer is included: J. Falwell. All of the other nine Christians with essays included in this section are recognizable as leading evangelicals, individuals who would not be comfortable with a fundamentalist label.

One must admit that the fundamentalist intelligentsia have not written a great deal about religion and politics. In fact some fundamentalists are apparently uneasy with fundamentalism's newfound political conscience and are even more distressed with fundamentalist political activism. But these observations notwithstanding, there are some fundamentalist leaders who have written on religion and politics and who could have been included in a volume of this type—e.g., E. Dobson, T. LaHaye, C. Stanley and C. Thomas. Each of these men has been associated with Falwell in some capacity. Other fundamentalists also could be considered, such as E. Pickering, who has questioned the wisdom of Christian political activism, or Bob Jones, who has militantly disagreed with the style of Falwellian fundamentalist politics.

Neuhaus and Cromartie have offered this anthology in the hope that it will stimulate discussion and that the newly resurgent religious movement this book catalogs is a "renewal of the moral legitimacy of the democratic experience, including, most importantly, the moral imperative of religious freedom" (p. x). They desire to avoid what Neuhaus elsewhere called the "naked public square"—an unnatural, dangerous place unfit for human habitation.

Neuhaus and Cromartie must be commended for their motives and their contribution. Although many are writing about religion and politics, too few "new class" intellectuals understand the significance and import of religion for modern life, much less historic orthodox Christianity. Neuhaus is one of the few religious leaders outside fundamentalist ranks who has seriously attempted to grasp the disposition of political fundamentalism with something less than an ideologically jaundiced eye. One wishes that Neuhaus and Cromartie would have favored the reader with their thoughts in a concluding essay. Nevertheless the reader gets the
point: For the modern Christian, religion and politics are critically important enterprises.

Rex M. Rogers
Cedarville College, Cedarville, OH


Protestants find many aspects of Roman Catholicism objectionable. Primary among these, for both theological and symbolic reasons, is the papacy. Granfield addresses the extent of papal authority in the context of the current discussion of authority in the Roman Catholic Church.

Granfield has written about the limits of papal authority for Roman Catholics, so he concludes where Protestant interest begins: the papacy and non-Catholic Christians. Despite his recognition that this is a serious difficulty for Protestants, Granfield’s discussion is unsatisfactory because he concentrates on those Protestant denominations that have entered into dialogue with Roman Catholicism and that share its hierarchical structure. In each instance these Protestants have offered positive assessments of the papal office that evangelicals will find unacceptable.

On the positive side, however, this book provides non-Catholics with an interesting and informed tour of the debate going on within Roman Catholicism about the proper role of the pope. Drawing on history, Granfield shows the papal office to have been the subject of development and discussion for over 1,500 years. He also uses the various cases of discipline and intervention under the current pope to show how papal authority is used and what its limits are in terms of canon law, Scripture, and tradition.

Granfield plainly supports papal primacy, but he also believes ecclesiological and practical limits exist to papal authority. Drawing on Vatican II he offers the collegiality of all bishops as fundamental to the exercise of Church authority but refuses to make the pope merely the spokesman for the collective wisdom of the bishops.

Granfield introduces his study by summarizing the various cases of discipline imposed by the current pope on theologians, priests and religious, and bishops. These are the cases we have read about in the papers. Granfield’s presentation clarifies the issues involved and shows how each relates to the extent of papal authority. Using these cases as a springboard he examines the historical claims to papal primacy and then examines the relationship of the pope to the bishops, local churches, Catholic laity and other Christians.

Granfield traces the historical claims in terms of theology and canon law. He finds that the claims developed gradually. From the second century the bishop of Rome occupied a special position because Peter and Paul were martyred in Rome, it was the capital of the empire, and it was the only apostolic see in the west. Bishops of Rome asserted no claim to primacy until the fourth century, however. The idea of a universal papal theocracy reached its zenith during the medieval pontificates of Innocent III and Boniface VIII. Vatican I asserted the supremacy of the papacy over every other human office, but Vatican II returned to a more collegial ecclesiology. The current debate is over what Vatican II meant and how it is to be implemented.
The expansion of papal power can be understood historically, says Granfield, but not Scripturally. He proceeds to show that limitations on papal power are consistent with historic Roman Catholicism. He offers historical limits in terms of opposition movements; Church tradition; divine, natural and Church law; Church doctrine; and practicality. Collegiality provides the strongest institutional and theological limit on papal authority. Granfield argues that collegiality provides for "the optimal use of papal authority" (p. 104), but its promise remains unfulfilled.

Papal authority is also limited in relation to the local church and the Catholic faithful. Consistent with the ambiguity of Vatican II in this matter, Granfield recognizes multiple definitions of the Church: organic, hierarchical and geographic. The local church is a necessary, visible entity because through participation in the local church one enters the universal Church, whose earthly head is the pope. In explaining the relationship between local and universal, Granfield discusses in detail the local bishop and his relation to the pope. The Catholic faithful provide a limit on the pope's authority in terms of the *sensus fidelium*, reception of papal teaching, and nonreception of papal teaching. The first is the belief that the Holy Spirit can preserve the Church as a whole from error by bringing the faithful to unanimous agreement on a particular revealed truth. The result must be consistent with Scripture and the view of the magisterium; it is not an ecclesiastical Gallup poll. Papal authority is limited in practice by its need to be received by the Church as a whole. Granfield says reception does not grant legitimacy. It merely recognizes the validity of a decree. Reception may take time and is not automatic. In terms of the nonreception of papal (or conciliar) teaching, Granfield offers six arguments for the possibility of valid dissent but cautions that any decision to dissent is a serious matter.

Granfield's book is informative and timely. It helps non-Catholics understand the unrest within contemporary Catholicism and explains the history and rationale of the papal office and its authority. The book appears to address a Catholic audience, but the reader need not be an expert on Roman Catholicism. The book presents clearly not only the nature of the papacy but also Roman Catholic ecclesiology. Granfield writes clearly, comprehensively and evenhandedly. We may not agree with his conclusions, but we will understand contemporary Roman Catholicism better when we have finished this book.

Doug McCready
Temple University, Philadelphia, PA


The work of an Anglican nun, the book under review is a somewhat awkward attempt to narrate numerous accounts of reputed miracles from across Christendom and to relate how medieval people from all levels of society regarded them. Sister Benedicta has immersed herself in the medieval Catholic *Weltanschauung*, and in the process she has produced a useful compilation of data on her subject. Her research appears to be extensive and her documentation thorough, as the 22-page bibliography bears witness. This is an erudite work that will be of interest chiefly to medievalists. The average reader might find the hundreds of miracle tales intriguing, but to him the analysis might prove bewildering.

Ward regards Augustine of Hippo as the formative influence upon medieval thinking about miracles. She contends that his eagerness to find miracles in
abundance led clergymen and laymen alike to expect frequent supernatural occurrences. She holds that believers did not begin to think critically about miracle tales until the twelfth century, when Anselm raised the question about whether some unusual events might be attributed to nonsupernatural causes.

As the medieval cultus developed into an elaborate ritualism, preaching became only a marginal aspect of worship. Most parish priests were unable to expound the Scriptures or to give their congregations adequate instruction in Christian doctrine. Those who did attempt to preach often recited exciting miracle tales. Ward's account of the sermonic use of such stories is perhaps the most valuable part of this book. "Miracles of Vengeance," by which departed saints punished those who scorned their powers, is, however, the most amusing section. Although the author does not express explicitly her attitude toward medieval miracles she does admit that many accounts of divine intervention were fabricated. But even then she prefers to regard them as "pious inventions" rather than simple frauds.

I found Ward's book rather tedious reading, but I nevertheless agree with her argument that Church historians and medievalists would enhance their understanding of the Middle Ages greatly if they would give more attention than heretofore to the influence of reputed miracles upon the people of that period. Her style of writing will, however, discourage many readers from finishing the book. Because she uses the passive voice excessively I found it difficult to get involved in the events. Ward's clumsy writing has made an exciting subject very dull reading.

James Edward McGoldrick
Cedarville College, Cedarville, OH


When I studied Ugaritic many years ago, C. H. Gordon's _UT_ was just about the only manual available to those who wanted to learn the language. Segert himself was among those who mastered Ugaritic with Gordon's help, and he expresses his gratitude in his "Acknowledgments." But the days when _UT_ was the only thing going are long past. The three volumes under review have updated the discipline and are now among the best tools for the beginning and the intermediate student.

I can only agree wholeheartedly when Segert states that "knowledge of Ugaritic has become a standard prerequisite for the scientific study of the Old Testament" (p. x). Indeed, he telegraphs the connection—and his own interests—by gently suggesting that a fair knowledge of Biblical Hebrew is helpful if not necessary for using his grammar. Ugaritic, he says, is "an ancient North Canaanite dialect" and is thus a close cousin of OT Hebrew. It is therefore unfortunate that he includes no Scriptural index (or any other indices, for that matter).

Segert's grammar treats phonology, word formation, morphology, how words function in sentences, and sentence structure. In general he makes good use of cognates and of comparative Semitic linguistics, although he tends to favor Arabic over Akkadian in his glossary. In addition, he could have made much more extensive use of Canaanite Amarna (which he helpfully calls "Old Canaanite") materials, especially the glosses, since he is concerned to vocalize the Ugaritic consonantal text whenever possible. For example, the gloss _gagg(i)_ would have
been instructive at *gg*, “roof,” as would *ṣahr(i)* at *ṯgr*, “gate.” Amarna *allû/ā/ê* and Hebrew *hâlô* are surely cognate to *hl*, “behold.” And Amarna *anû* (EA 89:38; 92:23; 114:30) is a better vocalization for *an*, “I,” than Segert’s ubiquitous and tentative *‘andâ*—which again, one suspects, is due to the Arabic parallel.

In dozens of places the glossary would have been improved immensely by including fewer East and South Semitic cognates and more West Semitic parallels. Under *ktr(l)*, e.g., why not cite *kôšârot* (Ps 68:7) instead of “Arab. kawtar, a fountain in Paradise”? How about Hebrew *‘okel* instead of (or at least in addition to) Arabic *akl* under *akl*, “food”? Is not Hebrew *‘l-mut* a helpful parallel to Ugaritic *blmt*, “deathlessness”? Hebrew *‘az* is surely as pertinent for *id*, “then,” as is Arabic *‘id(â)*. And so forth.

Other miscellaneous suggestions would include reference to Akkadian *šumma* as an ultimate cognate to (or at least distant cousin of) *hm*, “if,” and normalization of Hebrew *bâtîm* (not *bâtîm*), the plural of *bt*, “house,” as due to assimilation of the medial consonant *h* as represented in the Ugaritic form *bhtm*.

But Segert is to be generously commended for doing an excellent job overall. Individual quibbles will be numerous, some are a matter of personal judgment, and Segert himself welcomes constructive criticism.

The two volumes by de Moor (Spronk’s major contribution in the cuneiform volume was the drawing of the texts) could well be used together, since the cuneiform texts in the one are identical to the translated texts in the other. He is careful to point out that his is not a critical edition but an eclectic and idealized text designed for classroom use by beginning students. All the texts chosen are religious in nature, consisting of Ugaritic myths, rituals, legends and incantations.

Included in the cuneiform volume are alphabetic and semantic glossaries. The purpose of the latter is to enable students to restore passages in 77 semantic categories, the broadest of which is “motion” (238 entries) and the narrowest “jewelry” (7 entries).

The English translation volume represents years of concerted effort on de Moor’s part to untangle texts that are often maddeningly difficult and in which admission of uncertainty is often the only honorable option. Two extremely helpful indices (Biblical reference [OT and NT] and subject) conclude the volume.

Whether Segert’s assumption that his grammar is suitable for self-teaching is correct will have to be tested over a long period of time. It has been my experience, both as teacher and as student, that only in rare and/or desperate situations is it possible to learn a foreign language thoroughly without the help of a human teacher who is available for personal interaction. But Segert’s grammar, combined with the two de Moor volumes, will at least make the learning of Ugaritic—whether or without a teacher—not only easier but also more palatable. And that is all to the good.

Ronald Youngblood
Bethel Seminary West, San Diego, CA


Miller and Hayes have again teamed up to produce yet another comprehensive treatment of the history of the Holy Land. However, unlike the earlier *Israelite and Judean History* that they coedited, this effort strives to be more of a survey. Therein lies both its strengths and its weaknesses.
Generally speaking, the authors follow the standard outline and format of previous histories. Nevertheless their intention is to approach the material from a fresh and less constrictive viewpoint than those that have hampered their predecessors. For Miller and Hayes a proper understanding of the OT is to be discovered not through a simplistic interpretation of the material that accepts *prima facie* the historicity of the text, nor through some of the more recent interpretations of higher criticism that reduce the entire account to a purely literary (and predominantly fictionalized) composition. They intend to follow a more moderate path that mitigates the "extremes" of verbal, plenary inspiration of the Biblical text as well as the vagaries of "liberal" Biblical scholarship, though many evangelical readers will rightly conclude that the authors' sympathies lean toward the latter. Miller and Hayes assume the overall accuracy and integrity of the Deuteronomistic history as proposed by Noth *et al.* In an apparent effort to make that concept more comprehensible to the nonspecialist, however, they have exchanged one set of confusions for another, referring to "Dtr." as the "Genesis—II Kings narrative."

The approach taken by the authors is to weave the isolated "objective" historical data from the Scriptures with evidence available from archeology and other extra-Biblical sources. Their expertise in the areas of archeology and literature enables them thoroughly to evaluate and interpret that hard evidence, which they then couple with a good dose of "intuitive speculation" (to which they freely admit). The finished product is an account of Israel's history that flows smoothly and evenly. There are a number of points, however, where the authors' conclusions reveal their biases and consequently leave their methodology open to criticism.

The introduction of each historical era opens with an assessment of the relevant Biblical sources reminiscent of those in N. Gottwald's *Tribes of Yahweh*. The relative merits of each passage as factual historical record are established by analyses of the editorial and theological perspectives of the Biblical authors (see pp. 62–63 for an excellent introduction to these issues) and a keen eye for distinguishing fact from embellishment. In addition, where available the authors provide a synopsis and critique of pertinent extra-Biblical material. They have also reproduced samples of some of the more important non-Biblical texts, which adds immeasurably to the readability of the book and affords readers the opportunity to examine the materials at a glance.

As Miller and Hayes apply their methods to the problems and uncertainties of the patriarchal period they are led to conclude (and they are certainly correct in this assertion) that "a confident treatment of the origins of Israel and Judah in terms of critical historiography is, in our opinion, simply impossible" (p. 78; italics mine). Thus they have elected to begin their treatment of Israel and Judah in the time of the judges. Yet here too they find no certainty in the Biblical text. The authors summarize the value of the textual material of Judges accordingly: "While these narratives will not . . . provide a basis for reconstructing any kind of detailed historical sequence . . . they probably do offer a reasonably accurate impression of the general sociological, political, and religious circumstances that existed among the Israelite tribes" (p. 91). If there is any contribution to be made by the text here it is that it reflects conditions that accord with information already known about Palestine at that time.

The meticulous attention Miller and Hayes have given to the Biblical text and the syntheses of the Kings and Chronicles material in the divided kingdom period is certainly one of the highlights of the book, for they have fleshed out and offered highly plausible resolutions to a multitude of seemingly insignificant, unrelated and often confusing historical situations. Especially illuminating is their account of the state of commercial relations that prevailed between Israel, Judah and
Phoenicia under the Omrides. The marriage of Jezebel the Sidonian princess to Ahab, and that of Omri's granddaughter to Jehoram king of Judah, created a political alliance that would have allowed for relatively free movement along commercial routes through Israel and Judah to seaports in Phoenicia. While not a new idea (see J. Bright, A History of Israel [3d ed.] 242), the authors expand it to reconstruct a realistic economic model for ninth-century-B.C. Israel.

Miller and Hayes also address the complexities regarding the chronology of Hazael and Benhadad of Damascus from a purely historical angle and propose a solution that is worth deliberation. On the other hand, the theory that Jehoram (2 Kgs 8:16) and Joram (1:17) were one and the same person who ruled over a briefly reunited kingdom, while intriguing, goes well beyond what can be reasonably extrapolated from details given in the text.

The editorial decision to dispense with footnotes of any sort is frustrating. In discussing the length of regnal periods recorded in the Biblical text the authors state that "the figures were somewhat fluid during the process of transmission... as is evidenced by the numerous variant readings in the different manuscripts... Discrepancies are especially pronounced between the various Hebrew and Greek manuscripts" (p. 227). Such comments beg for further reference or an explanatory note, but to no avail. The authors are content to refer interested readers to their earlier Israelite and Judean History.

Additionally, the very tentativeness of the authors is distracting. While caution in making definitive conclusions is to be commended, one looks in vain for a point at which Miller and Hayes feel they are able to establish any credible historical context for events or persons in Scripture. They also seem rather summarily to dismiss the value of some of the Biblical material (e.g. p. 199: "Solomon's connection with the Song of Solomon... can be dismissed out of hand") with little or no explanation. Lastly, as the history of the divided kingdom unfolds, Miller and Hayes are disposed to find conspiracy behind prophetic statements that certain individuals would die, generally of unnatural causes, and the subsequent deaths of those persons. Thus the prophets are to be viewed as those who incite rebellion, assassinations and coups d'état when their prophecies are fulfilled at the hand of opponents of the decedents. Here, as at several other places, Miller and Hayes seem to rely on arguments from silence to sustain their position.

On the whole this book is an informative treatment of the subject, incorporating as it does extensive archeological and textual material with the Biblical narrative. Several factors may, however, limit its usefulness as an introductory text: (1) the tendency to make inferences from the text that are based more on conjecture than on details from the text; (2) the lack of footnotes and references; (3) the unresolved issues of the book, both historically and Biblically. Even so, this text is an important addition to the field of Israelite history, and for those with a basic understanding of the field it will undoubtedly spark much discussion and study both by and among conservative and liberal scholars.

Thomas Dury
South Evangelical Presbyterian Fellowship, Denver, CO


This volume collects thirteen papers circulated and discussed at the 1983 Springfield, Missouri, Working Seminar on Gnosticism and Early Christianity. It was the third conference since the publication of the Nag Hammadi library in...
facsimile and English translation and the first to focus exclusively on the relationship between gnosticism and early Christianity. The list of contributors reads like a Who's Who of figures long associated with the disciplines of gnosticism, NT studies and early Church history.

A brief introduction by Hedrick orients the beginner to the problems of definitions, sources and origins, leading ideas, and possible links with early Christianity. The collection proper is gathered under three headings: Non-Christian Gnosticism; Gnosticism, the New Testament, and Early Christianity; Gnosticism and the Early Church. Following a brief resume of the author each contribution begins with a précis summarizing its salient features and explaining how the essay fits into the overall scheme of the book.

B. Pearson begins part 1 with a study of the content and structure of Ap. John and Apoc. Adam. He concludes that the earliest gnostic literature was produced by Jewish intellectuals who were estranged from the mainstream of their culture and dissatisfied with traditional answers. Rather than reject their religious traditions these revolutionaries reinterpreted them. In chap. 2 Layton, who has recently translated the Nag Hammadi material in The Gnostic Scriptures (Garden City: Doubleday, 1987), examines the intersection of rhetorical modes in Thund. and concludes that the text is an example of a "riddle gospel" that, by mixing rhetorical forms (riddles and traditional Jewish sapiential aretology), both strengthens the speaker's claims to authority and undermines confidence in the content of the Jewish wisdom tradition. J. Turner identifies the characteristics of Sethianism as an independent religious movement and discusses the group's interaction with early Christianity over five successive periods in the first three centuries of our era by analyzing the literary dependencies and redactional history of Sethian texts.

G. MacRae (to whose memory the collection is dedicated) begins the discussion in part 2 with a brief look at seven areas of possible contact between the fourth gospel and gnosticism. H. Koester adopts John 8:12-59 as a test case for understanding the process of composition of the Johannine discourse and for identifying the traditional sayings used in their composition. From a comparison with Ap. Jas., Gos. Thom., Dial. Sav. and Pap. Eg. 2 he concludes that two types of materials have been used to create a disjointed discourse: traditional sayings of Jesus, and a written source of debates of Jesus with his Jewish opponents. H. M. Schenke concludes that the beloved disciple in the fourth gospel is a creation of the redactor. The figure's function is to ground the document and its tradition in the eyewitness testimony of one who was especially intimate with Jesus. In a rambling essay J. Robinson offers the latest chapter in a long-standing exploration of the "sociological roadbed for a trajectory from Jesus to gnosticism" by focusing on two documents he considers similar in genre and early in date: Q and Gos. Thom. F. Wisse concludes part 2 by refining the thesis of W. Bauer's Orthodoxy and Heresy and postulates the era prior to A.D. 200 as a "heterodox milieu" from which orthodoxy emerged from orthocracy as a result of the conflicts with heterodoxy. The gnostic texts were part of a literary phenomenon and were produced as heterodox literature in a syncretistic situation conducive to speculative thought.

D. Parrot initiates the discussion in part 3 by examining Soph. Jes. Chr. and other revelation dialogues involving Christ and his disciples and demonstrates that early in the Christian gnostic movement a circle of Jesus' disciples was chosen to be the bearers of the distinctive Christian-gnostic message, while at the same time another group was identified with the orthodox position. P. Perkins demonstrates that Irenaeus' anti-Platonist objections to the gnostics in the cosmological section in Adversus Haereses are dependent on well-established second-century polemical topoi between philosophical schools. She suggests that the
limitations for the rhetorical genre used by the bishop of Lyons not only fails to represent the doctrine of his opponents accurately but may also have “over-Platonized” the gnostic system. H. Attridge reexamines the troubling relationship between Gos. Truth and the Valentinian tradition and concludes that the text is “a carefully constructed attempt to domesticate the unusual and to minimize the problematic” for the purpose of inviting ordinary Christians to share the basic insights of Valentinianism. It is a missionary tract whose purpose is more exoteric than esoteric.

In a wide-ranging investigation of gnostic exegeses of the writings of Paul and Genesis 1–3 in four Nag Hammadi texts, E. Pagels suggests that gnostic authors were concerned not only with cosmological speculations but also with issues concerning marriage, sexuality and celibacy. Despite the differences in the hermeneutical approaches taken by the authors of the gnostic texts, she points out their common demand for celibacy for gnostic Christians. In the final contribution S. Gero contests the uniformly enracitive characterization of Syro-Mesopotamian Christianity by examining the widely scattered material attesting to a clandestine group called the Borborites who promoted salvation through deliberate and full exercise of human sexual potentialities.

The contributions vary in readability (Robinson’s reads like a collection of notes) and are rarely easily digested. Each contribution presumes familiarity with the most advanced tools of critical scholarship. The 21-page bibliography and excellent indices (ancient texts and modern authors) makes the book a gold mine for further study and a useful reference tool. In keeping with the nature of the book as a collection of working papers it would be quibbling to fault the tentativeness of many of the proposals. Readers will find much to debate and disagree with both in terms of methodology and conclusions. For example, Schenke’s proposal that the redactor of John created the beloved disciple to authenticate the fourth gospel reveals the radical nature of his agenda. Robinson and Koester’s contention that Gos. Thom. contains primitive traditions similar to the hypothetical Q that underlies Matthew and Luke has been the subject of much disagreement. Recently C. Tuckett, Nag Hammadi and the Gospel Tradition (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1986), has demonstrated the futility of discovering pre-synoptic sources in the Nag Hammadi tractates (he deliberately excludes Gos. Thom. from his study inasmuch as it has been the subject of numerous comparisons). The debate will certainly continue, since decisions on NT allusions in the Nag Hammadi material are often based upon subjective judgments.

All in all, this is a provocative and important collection representing the cutting edge of Nag Hammadi studies. The publisher and editors are to be commended for making the material available to the world of scholarship in one volume. This book will encourage study of the Nag Hammadi corpus and its place in the earliest history of Christianity.

James L. Jaquette
Boston University


The term “fundamentalist” receives a lot of media attention. The press has broadened the term to include virtually anyone with a conservative religious
stance. As Ammerman points out, however, fundamentalism is not simply a conservative view of life or the Bible. It is also a unique outlook on the world and its future, an outlook that shapes the lifestyle of a fundamentalist Christian.

Ammerman describes herself as the daughter of a cleric and a “born-again Christian with an evangelical background” (p. 10). In 1979 she devoted a full year to studying a particular fundamentalist church (designated as “Southside Gospel Church”), which advertises itself as “Independent, Fundamental, Premillennial and Baptistic” (p. 14). With the pastor’s permission she immersed herself into the life of the church by attending virtually all the services, teaching Sunday school, singing in the choir, etc. Over time the congregation, which had been told of her study, came to accept her as “one of [their] own.” From this perspective she conducted interviews, analyzed statistics, and made observations. This book is the result.

The first three chapters contain an introduction, a brief and not-too-thorough history of fundamentalism, and a history of Southside Church. The remaining eight chapters discuss the different aspects of church life at Southside and their attraction and effect on its members and on the surrounding community.

Ammerman’s thesis is that the spirit of separation that characterizes this fundamentalist church and its constituency is prompted largely by their view of American history and by their premillennial eschatology. Their view of history sees America as possessing a unique Christian calling. To them, America is in danger of losing its special place in God’s plan if it does not “get back to God.” Thus the sermonic emphasis is often on how far America has strayed from its God-ordained purposes. But this produces a tension in the church members’ minds because their premillennial eschatology demands that the world does not get better but instead gets worse as the rapture approaches. The people, then, are thrown into a dilemma. How should they live? They struggle with knowing how to relate both to a modern world and to an America that has a pluralistic tradition. The result is a simplistic yet understandable approach that says, “I can’t understand the world, but I find some relief and sense of worth here in my church.” Thus the tendency toward separation.

This book had a special appeal to me because I became a Christian and spent the first few years of my Christian faith in a church similar to Southside. Ammerman is not a fundamentalist, and my initial prediction was that as a sociologist she would denigrate their faith and worship tradition. I was pleasantly surprised. She conveys a spirit of respect and appreciation for the members of Southside. Her book is thus a fair analysis of a typical American fundamentalist church.

Stan Giles
Sugar Land Bible Church, Sugar Land, TX


Reviewing Wolter’s latest selection and translation of works by John Duns Scotus has an aspect of paradox to it. Book reviewers are generally expected to judge the works they describe, but if I were to attempt to meet that expectation in this case I would find myself in the absurd position of judging the very authority to whom I would inevitably appeal to corroborate my judgment.
As a student and teacher of the poetry and thought of John Milton, I have had occasion to use Scotus' ideas to clarify certain difficult moments in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, particularly the fall of Satan and the origin of moral evil. In studying Scotus I did my best to plow through the perplexing Latin of relevant portions of the enormous Wadding edition of Scotus' works (in twelve folio tomes averaging more than 1,000 pages each) and soon learned to trust the translations and opinions expressed by Wolter in more than a dozen books and articles on Scotus. I only wish that at that time there had been available Wolter's latest effort, which through judicious selection and lucid, detailed commentary reconstructs Scotus' surprisingly coherent ethical philosophy out of the various works in which it appears. It thus offers a definitive representation of the place of Scotus' ethical thought in the context of his overall philosophy.

Wolter's herculean attempt at distillation—over 400 facing pages of Latin texts and English translations, plus 123 pages of commentary—took shape during a decade of graduate seminars. According to the preface he designed these courses around his selection and rough translations of key passages from Scotus' work. The goal, as Wolter says, was to place "Scotus' ethical views in proper perspective, particularly in view of the distressing repetition of old errors by professional philosophers" (p. x). After more than forty years of working in Scotus' philosophical labyrinth Wolter is well qualified to correct such errors and to provide the guidance necessary for anyone adventurous enough to enter the maze. This is particularly true in light of last decade's edition, a translation (with Felix Alluntes) of Scotus' *Quodlibetal Questions* (Princeton, 1975), a work that deals with the relations between God and his creatures and includes full discussions of the interplay of wills between creature and Creator.

Wolter organizes the excerpts that comprise the present volume under eight major headings, the first two devoted to Scotus' analysis of the will as a rational faculty and the nature of the will's inclinations. Part 3 concerns moral, as opposed to natural, goodness, and part 4 sets the moral law in the context of Scotus' logically rigorous and crucial distinction between God's absolute and ordained power. Part 5 offers Scotus' thought on particular issues of moral law, including the Ten Commandments and their basis in natural law, as well as marriage, bigamy and divorce. Parts 6 and 7 define types of virtue, especially the love of God as the absolute good to which all other virtues are subordinate. Finally, in part 8 Wolter provides a fascinating selection of Scotus' basically Augustinian thinking about sin, with particular attention to the sin of Lucifer. Wolter has in each case indicated the source of the selection and the rationale behind his choice of text. Further, inasmuch as the original Latin appears on the page opposite the English translation, he has adopted a freer style of translation than is customary, thus alleviating some of the more cryptic twists and turns of Scotus' notoriously crabbed style.

The main error that Wolter hopes to clear up is that which sees Scotus' ethical philosophy as fundamentally inconsistent. On the one hand, scholars have observed, Scotus appears strikingly voluntaristic in his conception of morality and law: What is good is good simply because god so orders it; God's will is the ultimate criterion, and man's natural mental powers have no access to that criterion. On the other hand, scholars have also noted that Scotus asserts that the goodness of any given act depends on its conformity to right reason, which suggests that goodness is formally distinct from and prior to divine volition. Theologically, much depends on which side of this antimony one chooses. A voluntarist deity such as Calvin's is essentially inscrutable to human reason so that morality becomes basically a
matter of abject submission to the divine will, and even such submission depends entirely on God's volition because creatures have no capacity to will obedience on their own. At the other extreme lies the God of the stoics, who may be considered a divine mind made manifest in natural law. One does not obey this God so much as agree with him. One version of the deity leaves creatures with an arbitrary creator whose whimsy at any point could force one to perform what ordinarily one would loathe to perform—sacrificing one's own child, for example. The other version leaves creatures with a creator who appears as no more than an echo of their own rationality.

What is Wolter's—or, rather, Scotus'-solution to the impasse? He interprets Scotus' famous claim that "everything other than God is good because it is willed by God and not vice versa" as referring to the contingency of all creatures on the Creator's will. For Scotus, nothing exists necessarily except God. All goods that are owe their existence to the divine will. But this does not mean that God is free to will absolutely anything. God's own goodness is logically prior to his will; God must of necessity love his own goodness. Hence God is good simply because he is good, not because he loves or wills himself. And God's absolute goodness, being prior to his will, determines that whatever he chooses will be good. Contingency enters the picture only because God has infinite good choices and actually chooses into existence (i.e. creates) only a finite number. The existence of created goods, in other words, depends solely on the divine will: Some goods are created and others are left undone, silent, unapparent testimony to divine freedom. That creatures and the order in which they live are good is necessary because of the nature of the Creator; that they are created (and thus that they are good) is owing solely to the Creator's will.

Scotus' famed subtlety is obvious, even in the above brief representation of his discriminating mind. And the genius of Wolter's selection, ordering, and translation is to make that discriminating subtlety more readily available to us. Thus he begins with passages defining ethical fundamentals such as the nature of the will, its goals, and moral goodness before introducing the difficult and crucial discussions of God's justice and the distinction between his ordained and absolute power. Wolter's translation of Scotus' description of this key distinction, furthermore, reflects the consistent simplicity and clarity of his translation, even when involved with the most metaphysically complex notions: "In every agent acting intelligently and voluntarily that can act in conformity with an upright or just law but does not have to do so of necessity, one can distinguish between its ordained power and its absolute power. The reason is that either it can act in conformity with some right and just law, and then it is acting according to its ordained power (for it is ordained insofar as it is a principle for doing something in conformity with a right or just law), or else it can act beyond or against such a law, and in this case its absolute power exceeds its ordained power. And therefore it is not only in God, but in every free agent that can either act in accord with the dictates of a just law or go beyond or against that law, that one distinguishes between absolute and ordained power" (p. 255). With the exception of the difficult knot in the parenthesis midway through the passage, Wolter unties Scotus' cumbersome, original two-sentence paragraph by allowing the helpful cognitive break of a third sentence and adjusting his diction for the sake of brevity and smoothness. Phrases such as per intellectum et voluntatem, which might have been more literally translated as "through the intellect and will," are transformed into more graceful, less burdensome equivalents—in this case, the adverbs "intelligently and voluntarily." Wolter thus smooths out a prepositional convolution in the grammar and improves the readability of the
passage. It is the accretion of small advantages achieved through such choices that makes Wolter's translation far more accessible and Scotus' thought more intelligible than one could otherwise hope.

In sum, Wolter's book is highly recommended for anyone interested in the ethical philosophy of an influential scholastic whose thought has had direct and indirect impact on Protestant as well as Roman Catholic theologians. The tendency of Protestants, particularly in England, to denigrate Scotus for his intricacy and subtlety (thus the term "dunce") is belied by the fact that his works were prized, collected, and frequently recommended at Oxford and Cambridge through the seventeenth century. It may have been ideologically proper to label the scholastic Scotsman a dunce, but tutors interested in training the minds of their students in rigorously logical, theological reasoning could find no better model.

John Peter Rumrich
University of Texas, Austin


Preliminary inspection of this book turned out to be both helpful and misleading. It is published by a new entrant on the scene, specializing in developing themes of interest to Pentecostals. The eight contributors all teach either at Evangel College (Assemblies of God) or Southwest Missouri State University, both located in Springfield. Any Pentecostal connection, however, is obscure in most of the essays. Only one treats constructive doctrinal theology in a positive way, and only one forms a strong apologetic for the familiar features of Pentecostal teaching on "baptism of the Holy Spirit," speaking in tongues and the charismata.

I will report briefly on eight of the nine chapters, listing each by number, name and author:

1. "Perfectionism in Human Evolution" by K. W. Luckert, who has specialized in "primitive" religions. Assuming "hominid," "humanoid" and human history to be about three million years old, he traces the features of the ethical-religious character of Christianity back to the hunter stage of *Homo sapiens* and finds the Genesis 3 story reflecting a post-hunter state of the race. He finds four types of perfectible activities (conquest, sports, arts, mystical religion) in which some "humans" have pursued "ego-addition." These correspond to four personality types. The lowest ("conquering hero") and next lowest ("athlete") are on some sort of less-than-human scale, while "artist" is next highest and "mystic saint" highest. Other types he decides not to discuss. "Human balance and survival must be worked for continually along the entire scale of human experiences and responses from control, experimentation, hypothetical arrangement, analysis, familiarity, fascination, awe, trembling and trance to complete surrender" (p. 10).

2. In "Perfectionism in the Old Testament," M. D. McLean examines what the editor designates as "three communities which adopted perfectionist lifestyles—Nazirates, Rechabites and the prophets" with lesser attention to Samaritans and other "remnant" groups of separatists. McLean says he is interested in the "articulation of a hermeneutic appropriate for Pentecostal theology" (p. 40) but comments only briefly on prophetic ecstasy and accompanying music, dancing, singing and trances. I was puzzled that he made so little of these features of prophetic technique in light of the book's sponsors and the authors' interests. I also was
surprised by his acceptance of liberal views in OT criticism. Exceptions were several quotes from D. Aune’s *Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World*.

3. “Holiness Tradition and Social Description: Intertestamental Judaism and Early Christianity” by R. Hodgson, Jr., treats the holiness “idea” or “tradition” of intertestamental Judaism and early Christianity. Hodgson treats Leviticus 17–26 and the chief holiness-sanctification texts in the NT. He connects the two via the LXX translations of the Holiness Code. He draws conclusions also from Pseudo-Phocides and CD and emphasizes the important of the social history of Christians in the empire in interpreting NT holiness passages (e.g. Rom 13:1–7). He thinks that holiness in contemporary thinking is “all too often limited to being a quality of God’s life or the life of the believer” (p. 87).

4. “Past and Future as Ethical Exordium: A Survey of Foundations for Christian Behavior in the New Testament” by C. W. Hedrick, in good *redaktionsgeschichtliche* style, seeks to establish ground for the ethics taught by early post-Biblical Christianity by using only the sayings of “the historical Jesus” (p. 95). Eliminate anything in “the tradition [i.e. the NT as is] characteristic [of assumed] early Christian emphasis” and you have a basis for Christian ethics previous to the victory of early Christian catholic orthodoxy.

5. “Montanist and Patristic Perfectionism” by Burgess provides a sympathetic treatment of the Montanists (from A.D. 160) Montanus, Maximilla, and Priscilla with Tertullian. The age of the Spirit and new prophecy (said by these to be introduced by themselves) introduced, they held, the final revelation before the end. Ethically it was a new asceticism. These teachers would properly be called “charismatics” in the present connotation. Clement taught an *apatheia* (apathy) asceticism similar to that favored by the stoics. He had no doctrine of original sin as now commonly understood. Origen taught an asceticism more like a Christianized Platonism. Ultimately all spirits will return to the perfection of their original, primeval, created state. In the *apokatastasis*, men again will be bodiless, pure spirits. Gregory of Nyssa “portrays the ascent to perfection as one of continual progress for the saved. . . . Evil has no inherent existence” (p. 133), and he argues for “universal salvation” (p. 135). All of these fathers of the Church taught some form of asceticism as necessary for Christian perfection.

7. According to “The Non-Perfectionism of John Calvin” by G. J. ten Zythoff, Calvin taught progressive sanctification, a process completed only at the resurrection. He also taught that all our knowledge of perfection is to be drawn from Scripture and that all our strength for growth in grace comes from Christ through the Holy Spirit. In this growth all Scriptural means of grace are useful, including church attendance, the sacraments, hearing the Word, and submission to church discipline. This chapter is a very good summary of Calvin’s life and teachings on salvation, one that makes good use of key passages from Calvin’s *Institutes* (pp. 188–199).

8. “Christian Primitivism as Perfectionism: From Anabaptists to Pentecostals” by R. T. Hughes states that “the concern to perfect the church [not individual believers, as such] by rejecting Christian history with its imperfections and ambiguities and by restoring instead the primitive church of the apostolic age” may be called “primitivism.” In ecclesiastical primitivism restoration of the structures of the apostolic Church is attempted; in ethical primitivism the morals and style of life of ancient Christians are imitated and promulgated; in experiential primitivism the gifts of the Spirit, thought to characterize the apostolic age, are sought. Hughes draws his pictures so vividly that most evangelicals or fundamentalists will see their own faces in more than one frame.
9. "Purity and Preparation: A Study in the Pentecostal Perfectionist Heritage" by E. L. Blumhofer asserts that American Pentecostalism arose not out of an historical connection with ancient or medieval expectations of an age of the Spirit in "the last days" but out of the "broad mainstream of American evangelicalism among those who, at the end of the nineteenth century, for a variety of reasons, were pursuing experience in the Spirit." Blumhofer traces its origins in the "holiness" branch of the Wesleyan tradition and in the premillennial dispensationalism of the early decades of the twentieth century. She brings the development up to date in sufficient detail.

This is a valuable book for the history of Christian perfectionism.

Robert Duncan Culver