BOOK REVIEWS


This book admirably illustrates the methodology of analytic philosophy in dealing with a theological issue—in this case, the divine attribute of omniscience. With extreme precision and logical rigor, Kvanvig sets himself to defending the traditional doctrine of omniscience against the charge of incoherence. In so doing, he manages to bring many creative insights into an already well-plowed field.

Perhaps the most original and interesting chapters are those in which Kvanvig seeks to define and defend omniscience in terms of knowledge of only and all true propositions. At face value, if this is the definition of omniscience then God cannot be omniscient, since he could not know propositions such as "I am writing this review now." It is up to Kvanvig to eliminate indexical terms like "I" and "now" from the propositional content of this statement if God is to know it. He considers and rejects D. Lewis' view that first-person indexicals involve the self-ascription of properties, so that knowledge de se is nonpropositional, because such a theory must treat self-refuting statements like "I do not exist" as logically impossible, which they are not. Instead Kvanvig proposes to solve the problem by claiming that persons access propositions differently: Those we access directly are expressed in sentences having first-person meanings, and those we grasp indirectly are expressed in sentences involving the third person. This has the interesting consequence that the excellence of God's knowledge extends even beyond omniscience: He not only knows all propositional truth but also grasps directly those propositions about himself.

Having completed chap. 2, the reader suspects that Kvanvig would handle similarly-tensed sentences and temporal indexicals—but unfortunately he is left hanging until Kvanvig takes these up again in the last chapter. It is a structural weakness of the book that this discussion was not included immediately following chap. 2. Sure enough, Kvanvig does regard propositions as tenseless and void of references to the here and now, and he explains the meaning of temporal statements in terms of direct and indirect access. Here, however, he introduces a startling new wrinkle: In an effort to defend divine timelessness he hypothesizes that God directly grasps all temporal movements. But this seems wrong-headed, for then God would not be timeless but would exist simultaneously at all times, knowing the truth of both "Now I have sent Christ to earth" and "Now I have not yet sent Christ to earth." In an attempt to avoid this incoherence, Kvanvig appeals to the absence of absolute simultaneity in relativity theory. But this merely muddles the issue, since no one could directly grasp all the "nows" in all inertial frames—he would instead exist in a cosmic "now" that does furnish absolute simultaneity in the universe, so that he would know what time it is "now" in all inertial frames. In the same way, a timeless God's directly grasping all (or any) temporal "nows" is incoherent.

Kvanvig also includes a long chapter on divine foreknowledge and human freedom in which he argues that no incompatibility between these has been shown.
His handling of this question is quite original. Unfortunately, he develops a theory of temporal necessity according to which God's past beliefs are necessary unless God is essentially omniscient. This concession seems, however, unwarranted: So long as God's foreknowledge is determined by the future events, then—as discussions of backward causation have shown—his knowledge is not necessary.

Kvanvig then takes up the theory of middle knowledge as a means of showing that essential omniscience is not impossible. Although he rejects the objections of Adams and Kenny, his discussion of Molinism is flawed by his failure to appreciate the logical priority of middle knowledge to God's decrees and free knowledge, which Kvanvig construes as temporal priority to creation.

Kvanvig also interacts with other issues such as omniscience and immutability and whether future-tense propositions are true or false (though on this latter score one could wish for some interaction with A. N. Prior's views). If the book has a major weakness it is that Kvanvig's style of writing and argument is extremely circuitous and needlessly complicated; many points could have been much more directly and simply made. Still the book is a rigorous and Biblically sound contribution from which theologians and Christian philosophers can greatly profit.

William Lane Craig
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This work is a technical monograph in pragmatist, process metaphysics. It seeks to answer this question: Given the inadequacies of materialism and classical dualism, can we still believe in personal immortality today? Fontinell answers with a tentative "yes" (in keeping with his pragmatism) by developing a doctrine of the self along Jamesian lines in two steps. Chapters 1–6 focus on the possibility of life after death, and chaps. 7–8 discuss the desirability of an afterlife.

The strategy of part 1 is to flesh out a framework of pragmatism as a metaphysical outlook and philosophical methodology, one that provides a context for defending a view of the self that could survive death.

Chapter 1 states that reality consists of a plurality of fields: processive-relational complexes composed of ever-changing, concrete centers of activity (i.e. pure processes or activities) individuated by relations within and among other fields and their centers of activity. Fields replace a world of self-identical entities with natures.

Chapter 2 develops a doctrine of the self as a field within fields (i.e. as a processive, relational complex formed by transactions with other fields). Chapters 3–4 continue the focus on the self by analyzing James' distinction between the empirical self (which includes the thing-body, the body-as-object) and the pure ego (which includes the lived-body, the body-as-mine). While I do not agree with many of Fontinell's conclusions, these chapters are valuable for evangelicals who need to do more work on a phenomenological analysis of the body. Chapter 4 is the real crux of Fontinell's case for immortality. He spells out a doctrine of personal identity that seeks to maintain a significant mode of sameness through change without a substantive ego by operating within a field ontology and a functional dualism. Personal identity is constituted by (1) feelings of warmth for earlier
selves, (2) resemblance, (3) continuity (understood as a continuous transition from earlier awarenesses to present ones), and (4) individual thoughts that pass on to later thoughts their contents so the latter can appropriate the former.

In chaps. 5–6 the book picks up the relational aspects of the self as a field. Chapter 5 argues that the self is constituted by the relations it sustains with other fields. Chapter 6 argues that in religious experience we realize that God is one of our constituting relational fields, and thus, after death, we can continue to exist because we continue to be constituted by our relationship to God.

Part 1 is an invaluable introduction to pragmatism in general and James in particular. It is also a good example of how metaphysics is done with a process ontology and a pragmatist methodology. But part 1 fails to make its case for reasons that I can only list without much comment. First, Fontinell has no room for real identity but only similarity, which is itself a relation in flux. This implies an ancestral chain model of personal identity. But this is simply not a form of individual, personal survival after the grave. Second, Fontinell’s doctrine of relations is inadequate. He substitutes for sameness through change a set of similarity relations that vary in rate and that are themselves in flux. But change is impossible without sameness. He has no real distinction between internal and external relations and seems to collapse all relations into the former. It is hard to see how Fontinell can avoid some form of monism here, especially when we remember that he has rejected essentialism. He substitutes a fleeting part/whole relation for the relation of predication, which among other things leads Fontinell to deny that we can truly (in a correspondence sense) talk about the world. Such a position seems self-refuting. Finally, it is simply impossible to accomplish individuation of anything, including the self, by relations. For \( p \) cannot be related to \( q \) unless \( p \) exists. Only a metaphysic of essentialism and substance can avoid these problems, and only a substance view of the self allows for literal personal identity after death.

In part 2 the book turns to consider the desirability of life after death. This part of the book is excellent in introducing the reader to some of the problems in this area and in some (but not all) of the solutions offered. Chapter 7 raises two problems for a desirable afterlife: the problem of boredom, and the fact that such a belief can devalue this life. The chapter focuses on the latter question, concluding that belief in life after death can enhance one’s involvement in this life and need not devalue existence this side of the grave. In the process, Fontinell offers a good critique of versions of Christian theology that seek to maintain Christian faith while denying life after death.

Chapter 8 considers the problem of boredom. Fontinell’s solution includes the idea that in the afterlife we will continue to grow, to have meaningful work to do, and to enter into significant relationships with God and others. He also believes that the afterlife will include the possibility of loss, struggle, and suffering for all, and not merely those in hell (which he says is real). While I disagree with these negative aspects for those in heaven, the philosophical problem of removing them is a real one. For if boredom can be solved only if some form of continued growth is embraced, a precondition of growth is lack. Evangelicals need to work on this problem. It seems possible to allow for growth without suffering or without a form of struggle and lack, which is evil. In any case Fontinell is to be thanked for introducing us to the full force of problems in this area, even if his solutions are often not wholly satisfactory.

J. P. Moreland  
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Shuster has done a remarkable job of presenting to us the life tensions of evil and good. While there is no doubt about her scholarly abilities, it is hard to pinpoint the audience for which she is writing. It certainly is not for those uninitiated in the social sciences. The style changes between the first section and the other three sections, which deal specifically with the book's title. The first part is 89 pages of interesting but often digressive introduction. It deals with "Matter over Mind," "Mind over Matter," "Paranormal Phenomena" and "Possession." As she develops this, Shuster opens to us the world of the paranormal. Not only do we live in a physical world; the supernatural realm exercises a great influence upon us.

This is not a book for the layman, though it might be suitable as a graduate school text, a fact that shows the depth of Shuster's work. At the beginning of each chapter there is a dialogue between an "Inquirer" and a "Stranger," which sometimes are confusing in relation to the topic at issue. The "Stranger," as the devil's advocate, is revealed later as Satan himself.

The three sections on power, pathology and paradox are the culmination of a phenomenal amount of work and are the result of a brilliant mind able to put it all together. The section on power shows us how all our decisions are based upon the concept of whether we have power. Even our powerlessness is compensated for by our daily decisions, and these decisions are made in response to the higher powers and principalities of the supernatural world. The section on pathology reveals to us that all "disruption of structure or will" is due to our powerlessness and how Satan, as "raw power," inserts himself into a person's weakness and compensates for their power-seeking. Therefore we must understand that this disease or pathology is demonic in origin. There is a dilemma, then, on how to remedy this impotence. The answer to this difficulty lies in the third section. Here we are told in good Biblical (and intellectual) fashion that we must not combat Satan on his own terms or on his own turf. We must do it through the Word and Spirit of God working in our weaknesses.

The three chapters in the section on paradox should be standard reading material for all those doing Christian counseling.

This book is not easy to read, but it is well worth the time and effort required to read it, as well as its steep purchase price. It also contains adequate documentation, bibliography and Scriptural index. The volume is a good and informative discussion for those of us who need to reinvestigate the enemy's strategies.

Arnold Boulianne
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The title of the book is deceptive in that it appears to be another "how to" concerning the "deeper walk" with Christ. While that is the author's intent, it is anything but another "how to" book. It is basically a book on applied systematic theology.

Swindoll has stated his purpose in his conclusion: "We are fast becoming a rootless generation that is giving less respect to those people who shaped our faith and less regard to those truths that solidify it. Riding on the highs and lows of
emotional waves, many (most?) are awash in an uncertain sea that lacks biblical guidelines, moral absolutes, historical breadth, and doctrinal depth. We have become dogmatic about the value of wings and dreams, but embarrassingly soft on roots and truth. Substance—time-honored biblical content—is increasingly conspicuous by its absence. Far too many in God’s family have minds like beds which need to be made and remade rather regularly. We need to be absolutely sure of certain things” (p. 406). Having thus spoken, Swindoll also states his hope that his readers would find “enough solid substance in these chapters to whet [their] appetite for further digging around the roots. My ultimate hope is that [they] would not only look intently but that [they] would abide by these things.”

In order to help the reader realize his hope, Swindoll has provided a number of questions and suggestions at the end of each chapter to steer the reader into the application stage of the particular doctrine under scrutiny.

The theologically astute reader will be exposed to familiar doctrines from a popular viewpoint that is both refreshing and meaningful. Each of the ten major theological categories with which Swindoll deals is explained from Scripture and fleshed out by real-life illustrations in such a way that the reader, whether theologically well versed or not, will say, “So that’s how this doctrine can affect me!”

Swindoll’s writing style (free-flowing, down-to-earth, humorous, evocative) captures the reader’s interest. He has accomplished his purpose and hope. Though this is not a book to replace those by Chafer, Hodge, Berkhof, Buswell or Calvin, it is a book that will supplement and perhaps prepare readers for them.

For the pastor, this text will help to provide insight into how to make theology interesting to the person in the pew. That, after all, is an important lesson. We need to present the Bread of Life in a palatable form for God’s people to eat it willingly. If they do not eat it they certainly will not digest it, and its value will be neither realized nor appropriated. Swindoll knows how to serve the meal.

William Olsen
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In reviewing a new hymnal for personal or congregational use, one must consider its Christocentric focus, its doctrinal soundness, its ability to edify, its esthetic quality and its reflection of the changing face of the Church. According to these criteria, the hymnal under review rises to the top. It has 17 indices organized for the thoughtful, quick and effective planning of themes for the worship service. Included are an index of Scripture readings and an index of Scripture texts and adaptations listed in canonical order. For those who desire to plan a musical goal as well as a theological goal there is a valuable index of key signatures, which lists hymns according to their key.

New features include 23 brief services, each approximately 12 minutes in length. Each is based on a specific theme (God’s majesty and power, for example) and begins with a Scripture reading followed by three hymns introduced and linked by organ/piano interludes, thus creating a sense of connection and climax.

The hymnal has some expanded features geared to help the choir director and enhance musicality. Twenty-one hymns have descants (a secondary melody to be
sung simultaneously with the standard melody), and forty hymns have special
choral endings. Nineteen hymns have last-stanza modulations (key changes).
These features are especially useful for integrating the choir with the congregation
and for supplying the musical variation for a church that sings vibrantly. Some
bold steps are the inclusion of the entire Hallelujah Chorus and making orchestra
parts available for the entire hymnal.

The Hymnal has over 90 Scripture and praise choruses. When incorporating
recently written expressions of our faith we must avoid common pitfalls, such as a
lack of esthetic appreciation of melody and harmony, theological inaccuracy,
extreme sentimentality, melodies not written for group singing, poor matching of
text theme with musical mood, and inclusion of choruses merely for the sake of
change. Most of the choices avoid these problems, and no attempt is made to
replace hymns with choruses. Many of the great hymns of the faith still remain
and make up the overwhelming majority of entries in the hymnal. This volume
also includes new hymns written within the last 30 years. These range from new
texts with standard melodies to completely new creations.

Today, as in every generation, when musical styles change the hymnal changes.
The editors of The Hymnal for Worship and Celebration have done well in
choosing hymns and choruses that enable the Church to praise God accurately and
esthetically with a range of musical styles appealing and edifying to young and old
alike.

Gerard L. DeMatteo
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Bits, Bytes and Biblical Studies. By John J. Hughes. Grand Rapids: Zondervan,

On the cover of this book is a quotation from S. Hockey: "Indispensable for
anyone interested in computer-assisted biblical studies." This one line says it all
and is no exaggeration. The book is to our use of microcomputers what TDNT is to
our use of Greek: an invaluable resource. There is one difference, however. While
Greek will remain more or less the same (although computers will themselves change some of our assumptions about it), computers and the programs that go
with them are changing rapidly. Thus we are glad that Hughes also publishes the
Bits and Bytes Review, which keeps one constantly up on what is new and which,
therefore, every theological library should subscribe to.

What is it that makes this book so helpful? It depends on what one is looking
for. Some will be fascinated to have a person explain to them how a computer
works and what the various video cards are (chap. 1). Almost all scholars will want
to know about how to evaluate a word-processing program as well as read prepared
evaluations of all those of present interest to scholars. (Yes, you can do word
processing in fully accented Greek and pointed Hebrew, as well as English; you
can have all of this on screen and on your printer with footnotes automatically for-
matted.) But that is only chap. 2. Bible-concordance programs, computer-assisted
language learning, communicating and online services, archeological programs,
and machine-readable ancient texts and text archives comprise the remaining five
chapters. There is something here for everyone with either an IBM compatible (XT
or AT) or an Apple (II or Macintosh) computer.

This work is not easy reading. In other words, it is more like a well-written
systematic theology than a popular theology book. Thus the writing is clear but
condensed; Hughes explains his terms but then feels free to use the technical
language he has explained. Some people will need to use the index to find where he defines terms if they wish to begin reading the book in the middle. And that is precisely how many people will use it, looking up the particular types of programs they are interested in at the time and then perhaps going on to consider other applications later. Now when I am asked questions about the use of microcomputers (as I often am), my first response is almost invariably the question, “Have you read Hughes’ work? The information you seek is in there.”

Yet there is one more aspect of this book that must not be overlooked. Computers are making the methods that many of us use outdated. Multilingual word-processing (and even sending manuscripts to the publisher on diskette) is only the beginning. Gramcord and similar programs have made our ways of studying Greek grammar outdated unless we are electronically searching the whole NT and LXX. We are already seeing articles that base their word studies not on standard concordances but on complete searches of the Thesaurus Lingua Graecae database (much of which is now available on CD-ROM). Rare words may not be so rare after all. Now even the scholar in an isolated community has the complete ATLA database available at the end of his or her modem. And there is no reason why scholars should not be coordinating their work by electronic mail. The possibilities, many of them already available, go on and on. Hughes opens them up to us. We hope that evangelical scholars will be in the forefront of taking advantage of them, as in many cases they already have. In other words, Hughes has not simply assisted Biblical scholars; he has himself made a major contribution to the advancement of Biblical scholarship with this work.

In short, if you use a microcomputer (and if you do not, you should), this work cannot be praised highly enough. The Bible will always be the chief tool on our desks, but over to the side by the computer, on top of the instruction manuals, *Bits, Bytes and Biblical Studies* should hold an honored place.

Peter H. Davids
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A number of ways exist for a reader to pigeonhole a book. Sometimes a particular publisher will tip off the subject matter or approach. At other times the author is familiar through other works or by reputation. More likely, a title will give some clues. I was less tipped off and more put off by the title of Silva’s book. It seemed to be one of those “The Bible is true after all” books. But because the author is familiar to me not only through his other fine works but as a former professor, I approached this book with anticipation.

Those readers who look beyond the title may be misled, however, by the subtitle: “The history of interpretation in the light of current issues.” Which “current” issues are addressed? Political? Social? In fact the issues are hermeneutical—the principles that guide our interpretation. By the end of the book Silva shows how our “hermeneutical predispositions” govern what we allow a text to say, much as my assumptions about the title and subtitle were governing what I expected from this work.

Silva’s book is the first in a series on contemporary concerns in interpretation. Thus part of Silva’s task is to show how various disciplines affect or address our understanding of “everything we see, hear, or read” (p. 5). He cautions that even “a sincere and intelligent commitment to the classical doctrine of biblical inerrancy in
no way guarantees that an individual will adopt expected interpretations” (p. 4) and that we must work at removing the obstacles that impede our growth in our knowledge of Biblical truth (p. 25).

Silva goes to great pains to reassure us that, even though contextualization (the process of reexpressing a work, necessarily constrained by our situations) must take place in all forms of interpretation, “God’s truth remains sure” (p. 23; see also pp. 24–25). Silva appeals to the work of the Holy Spirit in the lives of believers to lessen this problem that appears to relativize Scripture, but he is forced to admit that even this source does not guarantee infallibility in our interpretations (p. 25). If Silva is correct in both his propositions and cautions—and I think that he is—then this understanding of our interpretative limitations should move us to be a bit more relaxed in our expectations and in the constraints we place on others who do not share our hermeneutical bent. At a fundamental hermeneutical level, we have a degree of indeterminacy that is not easily overcome. Rather than being an occasion for despair, this could be an opportunity to enter into dialogue with others for the mutual benefit of all.

The subtitle also tells us that this book is about the history of interpretation. Again, one must be careful with one’s expectations. The book is less about the history of interpretation and more about hermeneutical issues that recur throughout the history of interpretation.

Silva makes several important observations about the history of interpretation, two of which are worth noting. First, the usual conception of the history of interpretation, where the NT use of the OT and the Reformation commentators receive high marks for their balanced exegesis and nearly everybody else is disparaged (especially allegorical exegesis), is sorely in need of major modification. Indeed, if nothing else Silva shows us just how much a new, full-scale, investigation of the history of interpretation of the Bible is needed.

A second point is that an investigation of the history of interpretation is not just an interesting and much needed enterprise but one that addresses the problems we face: The old controversies “are not substantially different from those that divide contemporary readers of the Bible” (p. 28). I think the history of interpretation shows us how pervasive contextualization is and gives a critical framework for engaging in further interpretation, not simply a repetitive task.

Both the hermeneutical issues and the history of interpretation point us beyond our self-interests and parochialism to the larger debate, one we can enter into with the proper amount of humility that allows us to be open to different meanings within a text. As interpreters we are not autonomous, and interpretation is an ongoing task.

In sum, Silva’s book is well-written and thought-provoking. My frustrations are not in content—except that I wanted more—but in packaging. The title may put off the scholarly community, while the price is prohibitive for a general readership.

A. J. Petrotta
Sterling College


Fundamentalism is not a perfect movement. Like all other large-scale human endeavors, it stands in perpetual need of reform. Of necessity that reform springs from sources that themselves are imperfect. Drama and conflict, success and failure, triumph and bitterness inevitably result when imperfect people seek the highest
ends with less than the highest motives or methods. This book is Marsden’s intriguing account of how Fuller Theological Seminary, itself always in need of reform, has tried to reform fundamentalism. Some of Fuller’s efforts, though well-intentioned, have proved ineffective, perhaps even counterproductive. Others, however, have been supremely well-designed and effective. From such books as this, one begins to learn whether complete theological purity is worth the price of ecclesiastical separation. The lesson is a valuable one, and the story that Marsden tells to teach it is well told and worth telling.

Employing an apt geological metaphor (especially with regard to a California seminary), Marsden believes that Fuller was “built on a fault, a fine ideological fissure that underlay the attempted fusion of the more malleable positive emphases of the new reformist evangelicalism and the hard rock of stricter fundamentalism” (p. 147). Or, to change the metaphor, Fuller Seminary is presented here as a school whose father was a Hatfield and whose mother was a McCoy. With such a pedigree, family gatherings are never dull.

For many younger evangelicals, like myself, this book serves much the same cultural function as Alex Haley’s Roots: It charts my spiritual ancestry and names my theological heritage. For that I am truly grateful. My keen appreciation for Marsden’s book, however, makes me especially sensitive to its chief shortcoming: It is too short. It focuses on events from the first two decades of Fuller’s history and presents them as the most significant (which they surely were). But it glides too swiftly over events since 1967, events that most of this book’s readers would find interesting because they lived through them. While it may be argued that eyewitnesses to theological events need not be told by an historian what it was they saw, I believe that they, of all people, might profit most. Even eyewitnesses forget. Some of what they forget is as important as it is profound, such as E. Carnell’s twin insights that “Jesus names love, not defense of doctrine, as the sign of a true disciple” (p. 138) and that “the final element in the glory of a theological seminary [is that it] inculcate in its students an attitude of tolerance and forgiveness toward individuals whose doctrinal convictions are at variance with those that inhere in the institution itself” (p. 141). Carnell’s admirable and self-effacing academic humility, as this book demonstrates, has repeatedly been hamstrung (some would say “corrected”) by the divisiveness and arrogance of those who appoint themselves the public custodians of doctrinal slants they perceive to be divine.

In short, the story of Fuller Theological Seminary is the story of the Church itself in microcosm, a story Chesterton once described as “the thrilling romance of orthodoxy.” “People have,” he said, “fallen into the foolish habit of speaking of orthodoxy as something heavy, humdrum, and safe. There never was anything so perilous or so exciting as orthodoxy. . . . [To avoid all heresy] has been one whirling adventure; and in my vision the heavenly chariot flies thundering through the ages, the dull heresies sprawling and prostrate, the wild truth reeling but erect” (Orthodoxy, chap. 6).

If a story like that sounds interesting to you, read this book.

Michael Bauman
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In The Dead Sea Scrolls and the New Testament (1972) William S. LaSor stated: “We have nothing to fear from truth; only ignorance can hurt us. . . . New truths
always challenge old opinions. But new truths never destroy old truths; they merely separate truth from falsehood.” These words should guide the reader’s thoughtful interaction with Luck’s provocative new book. The author strongly challenges traditional thinking regarding divorce and remarriage. Those who hold to the impermanence of marriage now have a scholarly, in-depth exposition of their viewpoint.

There are two dangers in responding to such a book. One is to reject it outright and fail to benefit from its contribution. The more subtle danger is to accept the author’s conclusions without sufficient critical evaluation. I suggest that this book be used as a stimulus to Scriptural exegesis and fresh thinking on this crucial contemporary issue.

Luck’s main thrust in his first and introductory chapter is to distinguish between permanence of intention and of fact. While certain Scriptural passages stress that marriage ought to be permanent, he argues that these do not prove that marriage is permanent ontologically. Luck uses the term “cohesiveness” to describe the marriage union. Marriage is a relationship that ought to remain intact but may in fact be dissolved. Marriage ends when the essential terms of the covenant, as expressed in the vows, are broken. Divorce, whether morally grounded or not, marks the end of the marriage.

Luck goes on to develop this view through the canon of Hebrew and NT Scripture. In chap. 3, “Termination of Marriage According to the Law,” he makes use of concubination (Exod 21:7-11) to argue the right of divorce from an abusive spouse. He concludes that Deut 24:1-4 is designed to protect the woman from an abusive and hard-hearted husband. The “deflement” of the woman is interpreted by a stigma that reflects back upon the man who caused the problem—that is, her first husband.

In his interaction with the prophets, Luck concludes that they taught divorce as a discipline for the sin of adultery. In his brief treatment of Hosea 1-2 Luck argues from this text (and Jeremiah 3) that Hosea divorced unfaithful Gomer. As Hosea divorced Gomer, so God divorced Israel. Divorce, then, is the Biblical discipline for adultery. Ezra 9-10 are cited as evidence for this view. What Malachi condemned was treacherous divorce, not divorce per se.

The interpretation of the teaching of Jesus is strongly influenced by what Luck understands to be the teaching of the law. Jesus, according to Luck, was firmly upholding the law. Whatever the law taught, Jesus must affirm. Luck therefore concludes that Matt 5:32 cannot be an unqualified prohibition against remarriage after divorce. Such an idea would apparently contradict the essence of Deuteronomy 24 and Exodus 21. It is groundless divorce that constitutes adultery against one’s spouse, and only this must Jesus condemn.

Developing the teachings of Paul, Luck’s views are consistent with his earlier findings. He concludes that when the unbeliever severs the marriage by legal (i.e. divorce) or illegal (i.e. desertion) action, the Christian is free to remarry.

Among the topics considered in the appendices are the morality of Biblical polygamy, the order of the gospels, the possibility of “nonsexual adultery” (which Luck affirms), and the early Church’s teachings on divorce.

Luck’s work makes a significant contribution to the academic community by providing scholarly and exegetical interaction with an important contemporary issue. He interacts well with contemporary sources and provides quotations representative of the viewpoints of his opponents. The work is well documented and includes an extensive index. But this book is not a primer on the subject. It should be carefully read and studied by those familiar with the issues.

My disagreement with Luck’s exegetical decisions are too numerous to cite. My major concerns are as follows: First, while the view is well argued and defended,
much of what is said is built on logic, implication and speculation. From the incident of Judah and Tamar, Luck argues that when a woman’s right to security is abridged she has the right to be freed from her spouse in order to establish a relationship in which the right will be observed (p. 49). Is all that in Genesis 38?

Second, Luck concludes that since divorce substitutes for the previously mandatory execution for adultery, it is morally obligatory (p. 91). He states that “disciplinary divorce is the only morally proper way of dealing with the offender” (p. 222). Where does forgiveness fit in?

Third, Luck’s view that marriage is impermanent seems to be set in concrete by the end of his first chapter. He makes no room in his treatment for clarification and refinement as the canon of God’s truth is progressively revealed. All subsequent revelation suggesting permanence is interpreted in light of Luck’s presuppositions. For example, Luck interprets 1 Cor 7:10–11 as referring to “divorce without grounds” (p. 165). There is no indication in the text that this was what Paul had in mind. Even Luck has to admit that the supposed “exception is implied.” Are implications a basis for exegetical conclusions?

Fourth, much of Luck’s discussion on the prophets centers on God’s supposed divorce of Israel. If God divorced Israel for unfaithfulness, then this provides a divine pattern for marriage. But did God actually divorce Israel? Isaiah 50:1 indicates he did not. Whether God divorced Israel or not, it is dangerous to build a theology of divorce on a metaphor found in Hebrew poetry. The more clear didactic texts of Scripture should take precedence.

It continues to baffle me as I interact with Luck’s work how two men of similar academic training, scholarly commitment, and view of Scripture could come up with such opposing viewpoints (see my book, The Divorce Myth [Bethany House, 1981]). It seems that any viewpoint can be “proven” by Scripture. How can scholars prevent personal bias and predisposition from influencing their exegesis? This is the challenge.

Luck’s book will provide an arsenal of arguments against the permanence of divinely-ordained marriage. My hope is that it will not be used by those who have neither carefully read its pages nor fully understood its arguments.

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Values exist: “The views of society, the opinions of men and women of good will, the limitations imposed by the historical epoch in which we live, all play a very important role in decision-making. But these conditioning factors do not determine whether the ways of acting in themselves are valuable or not. They have no effect whatsoever on the reality of value and its presence in a concrete situation. What they do affect (and often limit) is our *ability to perceive* the values which are there” (p. 92).

Clear statements such as the foregoing abound in Dwyer’s work. His is a thoughtful, quite carefully argued defense of nonrelativistic ethics. Another sane voice is heard.

One of Dwyer’s chief contributions to the discussion of relativism versus absolutism is a “deconfessionalized” Thomistic approach to the understanding of natural law. “The *content* of the term ‘natural law,’ as used by Thomas Aquinas, is at the heart of all sound ethical reflection” (p. 2). He insists that “the specifically Christian
element in ethics is not to be found in the realm of *content* but rather in that of motivation and empowerment." His hope is that the book will make sense to people who are not Christian but who nevertheless "admit the existence of values, not of their own making, which claim them totally and which have a right to make that claim" (p. 1). So on the one hand content is crucial (i.e. Thomas’ natural law) and on the other it is not (i.e. the Christian element is motivation and empowerment). He confesses that his book proposes in outline form a Biblical concept of freedom that is the uniquely Christian element in the morally good decision. It is, he says, a book broader than the title might indicate because it is about the challenge of being human, "the challenge to become a person" (p. 5).

The book's seven chapters amount to "what could be called the fundamental theology of ethical and moral commitment" (p. 3). The call to become persons comes from a Person. Thus the question of God is raised, the question of whether our lives have a goal or purpose. All the questions discussed by Dwyer are, he claims, "reducible to one question: the question of God. It is in raising the moral question that we, and all human beings, encounter God" (p. 6).

Becoming persons must, for Dwyer, entail being free to encounter God. The task of becoming a person is that of creating ourselves in our decisions. "Our decisions are, at their deepest level, not merely decisions about how to act; they are decisions about *what to be* and about *who to be*" (p. 7). Being free means that we can discover a call to be real persons. It is a summons to which we can respond because freedom means we have the power to do as we ought.

Throughout scores of pages he elaborates his thesis on the moral person by stressing that an act is right or wrong not apart from the intention and knowledge of the one acting. "There are no virtuous acts and there are no sins *outside us*" (p. 41). The only acts properly called right or wrong are those for which a person bears a degree of responsibility because they are chosen. Dwyer takes on radical relativism, the notion of double effect, "the Auschwitz principle of morality," the consensus-of-society view, invincible ignorance, values clarification in education, and situation ethics versus the views of the Moral Majority, among other things. He develops an argument not always in a meticulously perspicacious or flawlessly cogent way but nevertheless powerfully enough to put the opposition into frustration and defensiveness.

The reader will do well to pay close attention especially to chaps. 4 and 7. In the fourth chapter Dwyer provides an outline of how God-given intelligence might be applied in a practical way to some moral questions of our day. In chap. 7 he discusses the role of Christian faith in our moral lives. This chapter he entitles "Conscience" and claims that in this discussion he provides a good summary of the thought of the entire book (p. 196). Conscience is not to be identified with respect for taboo, for mere conventions, or with the Freudian concept of the super-ego. It is rather a judgment (this is a place in the book where perspicacity could be at a higher level) and an ability consisting in a number of deeper judgments (pp. 198–199). As Dwyer brings his work to a close he provides an eloquent and compelling summary on the Christian conscience judgment (pp. 221–227). He anchors it in the coming of Jesus Christ, who liberates a person from pseudo-values and compulsions.

For all of its merits, Dwyer's book would be an even more useful tool had he employed more illustrations of his major points and included an index. One thing more: Dwyer left me wondering about his view of the place of Scripture. Certainly you will want to examine what Dwyer means by saying that the moral imperative for Christians is never to "obey the law (of God, of Christ, of the church)" (p. 226). Perhaps he is right (making my criticism wrong) if his contextual argumentation
means that obeying external imperatives does not make a moral person. And yet in
other locations he makes the reader wonder about his view of God’s revealed Word:
“To speak of original sin is not, of course, to argue for the historicity of the myth of
creation and of the story of the fall of Adam and Eve” (p. 25).

William J. Kinnaman
C.C.R.I., Lincoln, RI

Duty or Pleasure? A New Appraisal of Christian Ethics. By Albert Plé. New York:

Throughout the history of the Church, Christians have vacillated between asceticism
on the one hand and antinomian debauchery on the other, frequently
finding the Aristotelian golden mean an elusive tightrope. The tightly reasoned
arguments of this unassuming little volume, together with 49 pages of endnotes in
several languages, take one quite by surprise. The arguments presented within are
so terse and dynamic that to attempt to reflect them accurately in the course of
such a brief review invites, perhaps even guarantees, distortion.

Father Plé begins his presentation with an introduction in which he lays down
his thesis: The western world, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, was afflicted
with “a [collective] schizophrenia accompanied by related symptoms of paranoia
and obsessional neurosis” (p. viii). Citing G. Devereux, he holds that one mani-
festation of this schizophrenia is socio-political. Here he cites as symptoms “the
childishness of parents, the refusal of children to grow up, destructiveness, a
fascination with death and the return to the inorganic, depersonalization, affective
and intellectual [systematism] impoverishment, unrealism, idealism, blurring of
the difference between imaginary and real, fixation and regression of the in-
stincts [hallucinations, ‘commands coming from outside’], ambivalence (obedience-
disobedience), loneliness, rejection of differences, fragmentation (inability to appre-
hend a person in his or her totality), discordanies, and so on” (p. ix). While he will
later praise Plato for giving us a system of morality that has its source of develop-
ment within itself rather than in externalities (p. 8), he bemoans the fragmentation
that is occasioned by the dividing of the soul from the body (p. x). He sees this
psychosis further developed in “the exaggeration of Aristotelian logic in decadent
Scholasticism, the idealist philosophies, the fixism that characterizes essentialism,
the rationalist dogmatism that leads to the cult of the goddess Reason in
Robespierre and to the ‘God Logos’ of Freud” (p. xi), reaching perhaps its ultimate
expression in the fragmentation expressed in Cartesian method.

This illness brings with it a quest for security, often manifested in the quest of
fourteenth-century bourgeoisie for wealth. Since that time “the Western world has
been living under the tyranny of an endless and accelerating development of
wealth; in the eyes of the farsighted this phenomenon represents a grave threat to
the human race” (p. xii). In religion, security was sought in “devotion” (in which
category he includes the Sacred Heart), which he flatly labels “a mystical expe-
rience that draws little of its nourishment from scripture.” He also squares off at
humanism, reason, science, progress, as well as at the occult, astrology, clair-
voyancy, witchcraft, and “more or less freakish mysticisms.” He calls dogmatism,
ritualism, formalism and “blind submission to religious or political authority” a
quest for “security at any cost” (p. xiii). The same trend, he says, is observable in
morality’s retreat to the shelter of authoritarian ethics where one is freed from the
need to pay attention “to the subject and the relationships that make up his or her
experience, or to his or her history and social, economic, and cultural environments” and where morality is based on law and duty (p. xiv).

Plagues, wars and invasions caused thirteenth-century Europe to draw on the seeds of stoic philosophy sown at an earlier period and seek refuge in the security of a dogma that gave rise to a morality of duty, just as Judaism had earlier turned tórá into law. Although his criticism of the Roman Catholic Church as a whole is only thinly veiled, Plé is particularly hard on William of Occam, whose ethic consisted, he says, “in submitting blindly, but also freely, to the law imposed by God.” This provided an “(illusory) peace” that served as a “tranquilizer,” allowing people to “get right with God” while never moving them from a reliance on ecclesiastical authority that absolved them of the “risks” of personal responsibility in making moral choices (pp. 53-55).

This, then, is a problem: a world of the blind leading the blind—or, rather, of schizophrenics trying to cure schizophrenics. Man perpetuates his commission of the original sin by assuming God’s prerogative to determine what is good or evil (pp. 25-26). How to address the ethics that are corrupted by all of this? By reintroducing the morality that existed prior to the fourteenth century, all systems for which were grounded “in the search for happiness” (p. 3). How should this be realized? Plé says, “Let me say it right off: I see this other morality as based on the fact and the laws of the quest for happiness and even for pleasure (in a sense which I shall define in due time). It is the task of morality to humanize and evangelize this pleasure” (p. xvi). He points out the lack of a list of duties or moral laws in the New Testament analogous to the Decalogue in the Old. Instead, he says, we have taken the “Blessed are you if you do them” of John 13:17 to mean “You must...” The morality of Christianity is not “structured as a morality of duty, of law, or of blind and fearful obedience to authority. On the contrary, it is a morality based on faith in the mercy of a Father ‘who is Love.’ It is a morality of love, and its fruit is joy” (p. 5).

Law “is neither the source nor the primary rule in the moral life” and itself reflects the institutionalized “customs and usages” of a people (p. 157). That is, law embodies the morals of the people, it does not determine them. In order to have just laws, the ethos that engendered them must be changed. “The aim of gospel morality must therefore be to incite and direct among the ‘masses’ a Christian journey toward the poverty which is openness to the action of the Holy Spirit. And because laws and sanctions are necessary, they must be used in accordance with their true nature, which is to be, not ends in themselves, but servants of people in their search for God” (p. 170). Those laws that are fundamental are those “which control the right and wrong way of seeking happiness or, to put it better, of experiencing pleasure in the way that befits a human being and a disciple of Jesus Christ” (p. 171).

Drawing heavily on the Aristotelian notion of entelechy, where happiness comes with becoming what one is intended to be, Plé blends in a healthy dose of Augustinian natural (divine) law and love, from which emerges the interesting mix that pleasure is love in terms of natural law and that true happiness lies in becoming the human being that one was destined by God to become and in helping others to the same end. Plé sees in the beatitudes a promise of happiness (p. 88), or pleasure, that is not egoistic (p. 101) and that must avoid indulgence for pleasure’s sake alone (p. 109). Affectivity is the very stuff of which morality is composed (p. 142), and the “reciprocity of giving pleasure is the central aim of any morality that seeks to be faithful both to the reality of the human person and to the gospel” (p. 156).
BOOK REVIEWS

There is much that is appealing in Plé’s analysis. At the very least, national paranoia would explain the frightening arms race of the late twentieth century. And the stress on love, faith and piety certainly would appeal to any devout Christian, be he Catholic or Protestant. But Plé errs in too rigidly dichotomizing love from duty in asserting that love is spontaneous and cannot be required as a duty or obligation. He fails to take into account that love, as Scripture defines it, not only can be but is required by numerous imperatives in both Testaments (e.g. Deut 5:5; Matt 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27; Matt 5:14; Luke 6:27, 35; Col 3:19; et al.). Moreover he seems to assume that love and duty are somehow mutually exclusive. To say, as he does, that the “commandment of love is no longer a law imposed from without” (p. 66), while true, begs the question. It is nevertheless a command, it is imposed, and it must be obeyed. Yet his conviction that morality is, in its “highest form[,] a gift of the Holy Spirit and, specifically, the gift which tradition calls the gift of wisdom” is a judgment that few would dispute. In its final analysis, then, ethics is “more than a science.” It is a “wisdom and an art of living, and when morality is this it has reached its perfect form” (p. 179).

Whether one finds oneself fundamentally sympathetic to the author’s thesis (as does the present reviewer) or in sharp disagreement, the well-reasoned arguments and the wealth of historical data packed into this small volume will prove rewarding.

William C. Williams
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Christian ethics is a challenging topic in any context, but this is particularly true in relation to foreign policy. Amstutz offers a balanced and informed guide to Christian action on American foreign-policy issues.

Amstutz’s text is more a primer than a polemic. It is an excellent overview of Christian thinking on international relations. The text is not a one-sided apologetic but a thorough review and Christian critique of prominent contemporary approaches to foreign-policy questions.

The first portion of the text is dedicated to a philosophic development of essential premises. Morality, justice and peace are discussed. The second portion applies the premises developed earlier to contemporary practical problems, including the challenge of nuclear weapons, the promotion of human rights in an anarchistic world system, the reduction of third-world poverty, and the Church’s place in foreign-policy debate.

Amstutz believes Christians must promote human dignity worldwide. This may be accomplished by working to assure that one’s nation promotes justice via a moral foreign policy. The author notes, however, that foreign policy is inherently morally ambiguous. Consequently, while Amstutz is a principled pragmatist who believes in moral absolutes, he nevertheless enters foreign-policy debate, and encourages other Christians to do so as well, with humility and tentativeness. Foreign-policy discussions must be the realm of maturity, not egotism.

For the author a Biblical framework for understanding world politics rests upon the sovereignty of God and his love, the reality of sin, and a commitment to justice. These principles lead Amstutz to conclude that liberal democratic systems of
government are not the only systems capable of protecting human dignity but historically have been the most benevolent, that the primary threat to human dignity in the world system is the political monism of totalitarian communism, and that arms control is the only morally prudent approach to the nuclear dilemma.

Amstutz corrects the notion propagated in recent years by some evangelical theologians that "God is on the side of the poor." He evidences a sound hermeneutic in illustrating that God is the Lord of all times, countries and cultures, including people representing different social classes and strata. Amstutz argues that God does not disproportionally favor one above another. In assuming this position, however, he in no way lessens the necessity for Christian commitment to reducing economic inequities and to encouraging social structures that create economic opportunities.

The author is chagrined that churches, especially mainline churches, have failed to contribute to moral debate on foreign policy. The foreign-policy resolutions churches have offered have been politically ineffective. Amstutz argues that churches are responsible for prayer, preaching, teaching and fellowship. Through these Biblically-mandated functions, the Church should be able to articulate moral principles broad enough to avoid politicization while Biblically specific enough to set moral parameters for foreign-policy debate. Policy recommendations should be left to the political leaders and institutions competent to draw these conclusions.

Readers interested in political expression and responsibility will find in this book a careful integration of faith and political philosophy. Given the complexity and importance of the issues discussed, this book should enjoy a long shelf life.

Rex M. Rogers
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The relationship between Church and state is one of the 1980s' most discussed issues both in political and religious circles. Maddox writes as one alarmed by what he sees as a "frightening erosion of support for religious freedom and its essential political guarantor, the separation of church and state" (p. 3).

Maddox wants us to see his work not "as a dispassionate exercise in scholarship" but as a manifesto that calls Americans to protect the institutional separation of Church and state from four enemies: "Extreme secularists, an intrusive government regulatory apparatus, political and religious ultra-conservatives, and, worst of all, a pervasive public apathy/ignorance" (p. 5). The author begins by exploring the historical and constitutional background of Church-state relationships in the first half of his book. The second half deals with Church-state tensions in modern times with special attention given to public and parochial schools (a full chapter plus parts of several others discuss a variety of Church-state issues related to education), United States diplomatic recognition of the Vatican, Church support of political candidates, and use of public property for religious purposes.

Maddox clearly states his understanding of what the institutional separation of Church and state means: "The government, as government, should and ought to be neutral, appreciative perhaps, but non-supportive, especially with money and official influence toward religion" (p. 62). Using this understanding as the framework for Church-state issues is for Maddox the best way for preserving religious freedom for all Americans.
The author makes a good case for Church-state separation. Many of his discussions of various issues are helpful, and evangelicals will appreciate his concern for religious freedom. Having said that, I would add that this work has some serious flaws, especially in dealing with the constitutional development of Church-state separation.

The author fails to see the danger that judicial activism poses for Church-state separation and religious freedom. His embrace of judicial activism can be seen in his discussion of how the Fourteenth Amendment applies to Church-state issues at state and local levels. According to Maddox: "It is moot for us to bog down in endless argument over the intent of the Framers and Founders when it comes to applying the Constitution to today's world. The Supreme Court, acting in concert with changing attitudes among the American people, has applied the Bill of Rights to both states and national government" (p. 83). The point is not moot, however, and remains hotly debated in the political, legal and religious communities.

These understandings allow too much room for legal interpretations to rest on fashionable causes and not the rule of law. Church-state separation and religious freedom are not subject to the rule of law but to the good favor of judges and legislators. Contrast the author's view of judicial activism with the words of Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy: "The whole idea of a written constitution is that there must be some fixed principles, some immutable laws, some constants that apply from one generation to the next... Judicial power without rational restraints is simply the exercise of raw will, the arrogance of power, abuse of office." Evangelicals will recognize that Justice Kennedy's understanding of judicial restraint guarantees religious freedom and Church-state separation far better than Maddox's embrace of judicial activism.

Maddox also exaggerates the threat of conservative Christians to religious freedom. Several televangelists have indeed made bizarre statements about Church-state issues. But that does not mean that the vast majority of religious conservatives constitute a threat to religious freedom or to Church-state separation. While castigating religious conservatives in several chapters, Maddox says very little about the abuses of religious liberals. Such selectivity seems to indicate bias on his part.

While this book does not purport to be scholarly, that is no reason for undocumented assertions and sloppiness in historical detail. For example, the author identifies noted Seventh-Day Adventist leader Ellen G. White as Ellen Smith (p. 90). Assertions about judicial activism and constitutional interpretation, such as those quoted above, are not footnoted.

Even in light of the above serious deficiencies this is an important book for Christians involved in law, government, or church leadership. It articulates well the strict separationist view. But the reader with little background in Church-state issues should turn first to R. Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square, for a fuller, more informed discussion of the proper relationship between Church and state.

Robert J. Mayer
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The title is descriptive of this volume. In four foundational chapters Mayo chastises the Church for an ongoing failure to provide a proper understanding of
sexuality or helpful sexual counsel for its people. She provides a vigorous argument against those who think it either ill-advised or unimportant for pastors to be available for and skillful in sexual counseling. She suggests that some level of sexual counsel is appropriate in the preaching ministry and even more in-depth counsel is appropriate in the teaching ministry, especially because the willingness to deal publicly with sexuality sends a receptivity signal to those who might want or need sexual counseling. Mayo criticizes pastors for contributing to a climate of secrecy and misunderstanding about sexuality by their public unwillingness to deal with this important aspect of life. She does not find any similar absence of understanding or inability to provide helpful advice in Scripture.

Perhaps the major weakness of the book is her very sketchy and even lopsided overview of the Church’s positions and practices regarding sexuality. She attempts an all-too-brief historical overview of what Christianity has had to say about sex. While she puts the best possible light upon what the Reformers said, she is far less generous when it comes to Christians from other ages. She betrays an anti-Catholic sentiment of some strength. Her major charge is that traditional Christianity has never succeeded in escaping the notion that sexual desire is sin: “If bodies are blessings and not the curse of the devil, if our senses are blessings and thus our sensuousness also, Christians are rather tardy in becoming thankful for the grace of being able to experience bodily pleasure as well as the gift that allows mortals a glimpse of divine love” (p. 31).

This certainly is a lively topic for debate. Much would depend upon definitions. At the very least, we must recognize that desires can be sinful—including sexual desires. And one might worry that perhaps Mayo errs on the side of excusing too much within our sensuality that should be condemned. Luther’s insight that a Christian is *simul iustus et peccator* is certainly a decisive dictum for our understanding of sexuality. But even if Mayo perhaps views sexual desire as too one-sidedly a characteristic of God’s created goodness rather than man’s sin, this is nevertheless a book that begs to be read and absorbed by pastors and, in particular, by evangelical pastors.

The main body of the work includes a description of God’s intentions for our sexual functioning, giving full attention to the fact that our sexuality is part of God’s good creation. Mayo provides current sexual theory with biological and psychological results described in readily accessible language. She unfolds a listing of primary types of sexual dysfunction and general reasons for such dysfunction. She provides realistic assessments of how well a problem can be dealt with by the pastoral counselor and then offers specifics for treatment. There are checklists to help evaluate what type of therapy is most appropriate and warnings about counseling pitfalls and dangers. A separate chapter is devoted each to female sexuality, male sexuality, and the sexuality of singleness. The final chapter makes plain that there will be some problems that the ordinary pastor should not attempt to resolve without the help of professionals in the field of psychotherapy.

This is a very helpful and timely book. It is so readily accessible to the average pastor that it would be a shame for any of us to miss it. It belongs on our shelves. Mayo’s chief complaint, that the Church has sought to ignore a whole area of ongoing concern, is certainly true. We pay a continuing and high price for our refusal to grapple with this issue. AIDS will not scare people back into quiet chastity. We pastors will have to learn to teach and preach and counsel if we are to be effective servants of the people of God.

Pastors have all shared in the recent embarrassment of Jim Bakker and Jimmy Swaggart. Perhaps the only problem with a book like this is that it takes for granted pastors’ own sexual problems and needs. Actually Mayo notes the fact
that pastors can and often do have sexual problems of their own and that a successful resolution of such problems is important for their own ability to counsel in this area. Doubtless this important subject has been neglected far too long by conservative Christians. We would do well to read this book and to consider its lessons both for our congregation's sake and our own. It would be well if we engaged in a lively dialogue over the question of sexual desire. Is it the paradigm for all sin or the *typos* of God's love—or something in between?

Larry M. Vogel  
St. Albans, NY


Books like this one, in my judgment, are long overdue. The AIDS crisis cries out for a response from Christians and the Church. Admittedly this illness, in many cases, can be traced to sinful behavior, but this in no way justifies the callous, self-righteous attitude taken by many. How can Christians, who experienced so much love and grace from Christ in their own sin, turn away from those who may be dying in disgrace and even despair?

The authors rightly point us to the Scriptures and to the example of our Lord in his ministering to those who suffer. The Scriptural evidence presented is overwhelming that Christ responded at every opportunity to relieve suffering. His anger was aroused by the unfeeling and unmerciful attitudes of legalists who saw the distress of people crippled in mind and body as an opportunity to moralize on a point of law.

The perspective given on illness, however, becomes disappointing when the authors deal with the "problem of suffering." Here the perspective shifts from clear affirmation of Biblical teaching to that of process theology. God does not wholly control the world. Rather, he is "an adventurer who not only enjoys humanity's experience of the pitch of enjoyment but who also experiences sufferings" (pp. 74–75). Despite this faulty theological perspective, this book challenges us as evangelical Christians to consider how we may minister to those suffering from AIDS. By virtue of their plight, people with AIDS, their family members and friends have a claim on the Church's ministry.

In addition it is hoped that we would also be challenged to see how these hurting people are in desperate need of the gospel of forgiveness and reconciliation in Christ.

Richard J. Venema


This book is a compilation of essays written by Wheaton College faculty members. The writers set forth, in three major divisions, what they consider to be a definitive statement on the issues surrounding abortion. While some of the discussion is thought-provoking, most of it has been read before by those well versed in the relevant literature.
At the very outset the reader will find a disturbing fact in the editor's introduction, a fact that can be seen as a self-indictment. Hoffmeier says that "this book grew out of questions students were raising in campus publications in 1985." Further on in the introduction he recalls that C. Everett Koop addressed the 1973 graduating class at Wheaton and made ten predictions that Hoffmeier admits now have come true. Koop challenged those present "not to be apathetic but committed and to have a valid basis for what you believe" (p. 21). Hoffmeier responds: "We take this challenge seriously." I would like to ask Wheaton College and the writers of this book why it took twelve years and student questioning to bring about this effort.

D. Lake's discussion (pp. 90–91) regarding the imago Dei as something dynamic rather than static, something one "grows into rather than just is," is a profitable addition to such discussion. He also addresses the ground-zero problem of the allowability of reproductive control of any kind (a question everyone faces when wrestling from effect [abortion] to cause [sexual ethics]). Lake concludes that artificial contraception is allowable in light of his theory of the "controllable family" and the fact that "the creation mandate to populate the earth has been fulfilled" (p. 93). As with most discussion in this highly sensitive area, the reader is given pronouncements that have little Biblical material to support them. Readers are told that "the human capacity to reproduce must be managed responsibly." Yet the reader is not given grounds for this assertion, nor is he provided with examples of what might be considered "irresponsible" behavior. Furthermore he is denied answers to such questions as why Scripture calls children a "blessing of the Lord" or why a man should be "blessed" in having a "quiverful." In today's mind-set such a man might seem "cursed."

Lake goes on to say that "the primary purpose of sex is (not) procreative" (p. 93). This widespread assumption seems to fly directly in the face of the biological fact that the end result of sexual intercourse is the production of an ejaculate that indeed carries the potential for procreation unless something is done to prohibit it. Lake's colleague, A. Holmes, realizes this in his essay when he states: "Biblically, sex is seen as both potentially reproductive and potentially unitive, and the same ends are indicated by the nature of human sexuality itself... Voluntary sexual activity is a tacit acceptance of responsibility for its reproductive as well as its unitive outcomes" (p. 105). D. Fletcher and A. Smith come to the same conclusion: "The family perspective reminds us to respect the God-created link between sexuality and procreative potential" (p. 125). My criticism of Lake on this point is the same criticism that must be leveled at much of the book: the presupposition that artificial contraception is unquestionably accepted as a valid option for the Christian. Nowhere in Lake's discussion is its validity called into question, beyond a passing reference on p. 92. The time has come for the Christian Church to do some radical reconsideration concerning the philosophical and social roots of the current contraceptive movement. Did artificial contraception spring from the discovery of a Biblical text, or was it the offshoot of the modern scientific age with its abandonment of moral absolutes and its motto: Homo mensura? Why has the Church so readily and so uncritically accepted the validity of artificial contraception? Is it not because of the "authority" of the scientific community and the power of the media?

Another disturbing factor in this book is a willingness on the part of some of the contributors to compromise on the moral principles that proscribe abortion if the conditions surrounding it are sufficiently serious (e.g. birth defects, rape, incest) and to condone early abortions in order to gain a political consensus. A. Holmes leads the way in this area: "In regards to abortion in our society, this might mean
working for a consensus that, for example, objects to late abortions and so proposing legislation to restrict abortions after the first trimester" (p. 111). Surely Holmes realizes that the major portion of all abortions are already being performed in the first trimester, so his view offers little improvement. In my opinion Holmes' discussion is the low point of the book. His allowance of “hard case” abortion, his implicit approval of the IUD, and his allowance of first-trimester abortions removes him completely from the pro-life camp. One would wonder why such discussion as Holmes offers would be included in a book that purports to take a stand against abortion. Any agreement in compromise, such as Holmes proposes, could preclude the possibility of continuing effective efforts toward the elimination of all abortion (except where the mother's physical life is gravely endangered) and should not be entered into.

Finally, L. Kellstedt’s essay, “Abortion and the Political Process” (chap. 12), is a weak and unconvincing effort. His assessment of the mind-set of the Supreme Court and the reign of law in the United States is somewhat naive, and his conclusions are often contradictory. For example, he says that “evangelicals have failed to grasp that there is a strong base of support for abortion in American society” (p. 196). But on p. 204 he says that “the country is deeply divided on the abortion issue.” Kellstedt is accurate, however, in his assessment that the Court “charts a new course” when it tires of “government inaction” (p. 203). The reality of American jurisprudence is that it has moved into the age of “sociological law.” America is no longer a Constitutional republic. Judges feel free to make new laws or reinterpret old laws as they see the need arise in light of current sociological phenomena. While Kellstedt shows that he knows this in some instances, in others his faith in the courts is naive and unfounded. (For an illuminating discussion of the changes in American jurisprudence in recent years see J. Whitehead, The Second American Revolution [Elgin: Cook, 1982].) Kellstedt rightly realizes the great difficulty that now exists for abortion opponents in somehow overturning Roe v. Wade and its progeny. What the Court did by a 7-2 vote, a five-man plurality deciding for fifty states and 200 million people, will take a gathering of political muscle and moral will equal to that which overturned the legality of slavery more than a century ago.

Abortion: A Christian Understanding and Response offers some quality information. Its discussions in the Biblical and theological areas are its highlights, as are the chapters on the development of the unborn child (chap. 10) and the “Crisis-Pregnancy Ministry” (chap. 14). But its commitment to a compromise ethic, by Holmes especially, mars the entire content. While it is a commendable effort, it is not the definitive word that the contributors hoped it would be. It will not convince the pro-chooser. The authors themselves admit this. Thus the book is an unspectacular addition to the plethora of books that build the case against abortion. I can offer it little recommendation because, with the exceptions cited above, this book contains, to use the words of Fletcher and Smith, “many positions . . . shaped by presuppositions and assumptions about the nature of human reality that are widely shared in our culture but . . . at odds with Scripture” (p. 124). The book's primary usefulness will be for those who study and write in this area of ethical concern. But as a tool to bring the Church to a common moral consensus on the abortion issue, this book will not do.

The time has come to realize that the time for the writing of books is past. Now the issue has come down to this: Who can muster the moral will and the political muscle to impose morality on the nation? Some morality will be imposed. Which will it be—Biblical or secular? The secular now reigns, and when the Church fails
to speak loudly against it, advocating positions of moral compromise instead of being God's redemptive alternative, it becomes a part of the problem.

Jeffery L. Guimont
Highland Park Church


Right from the beginning this book deserves both praise and prayer for a wide-reading audience. Its subtitle offers a quick insight into its theme: "Living Out the Sermon on the Mount." Ferguson begins by placing the sermon on the mount into its context within the gospel of Matthew. He then shows us the general theme of the sermon: belonging to the kingdom of God and living appropriately. Basically, once this theme is clearly focused upon, the remainder of the book is an exposition of the kingdom lifestyle.

Ferguson divides the sermon into very natural divisions, something that makes this a resource book for Bible study. If one were to offer a word of criticism, it would be that the exposition of the final two chapters of the sermon does not receive as much space as the exposition of the first. I suspect that this is because once one has truly grasped the first chapter of the sermon, one has a basic understanding of its next two chapters. Ferguson's brief analysis of these latter chapters, however, does offer sound principles with which to pursue further study.

I have been living with this work for the past two months as a resource book for a study of one section of the sermon on the mount—namely, the beatitudes. During this time I have found the book to be concise, yet packed with a wealth of insight and depth. Ferguson's analysis of the beatitudes shows their implications for the believer now and not just for the future.

*Kingdom Life in a Fallen World* is worthy to be placed alongside John Stott's *Christian Counter-Culture* and Martyn Lloyd-Jones' exhaustive work, *Studies in the Sermon on the Mount.* For its size and modest price this book is well worth purchasing for pastors, church leaders and well-informed laymen. George Gallup released some startling statistics in the fall of 1987 that clearly demonstrate the relevance of such a study of this great sermon: Of the Christians surveyed in America, only half even knew who delivered the sermon on the mount. Thus another look at the sermon is definitely not uncalled for.

Jack C. Whytock
Back Creek A. R. Presbyterian Church, Charlotte, NC


*Universe* is a theological statement with evolution as a *de facto* foundation. The evolution of matter, man and spirit is used as the mold to which all other knowledge must conform. God created "an open ended universe governed by law and chance" (p. 88). This is not a traditional theistic evolution, where the Biblical account of creation is treated symbolically and other doctrinal statements are taken literally. Ford has thoroughly wrestled with the consequences of his position. His work should be carefully considered by every theistic evolutionist. It shows the
consequences of carrying evolution to its ultimate conclusion. It is not an apologetic for a literal interpretation of Scripture. Rather, it shows the consequence of not adopting such a position.

Ford cites the Second Vatican Council statement to the effect that God inspired the writers of Scripture but not their works. If we are guided by God in our reading of the Scriptures we can gain new insights not available to the early writers because our level of knowledge is further evolved than theirs. The Scriptural accounts are described as myths, not literal truths. They are upheld as presenting symbolism that can only be understood in an evolutionary framework.

God submitted himself to evolution through Jesus Christ, who was therefore not born of a virgin but through the process of evolution like everyone else. God would not interfere with natural processes because to do so would be contrary to his own nature, which is expressed through evolution. This precludes miracles that would be outside of the domain of natural processes.

The resurrection account is symbolic of the process of upward growth and evolution to become more like God. Ford rejects a literal interpretation of the resurrection because “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God” (1 Cor 15:50). “If Jesus really walked out of the tomb alive, his dead, mutilated body revived, then what did he do with it when the resurrection appearances came to an end? If we are happy with a theology which interprets these articles symbolically and not literally then why not treat the resurrection story in the same way?” (p. 171). He is asking for consistency.

Sin is not treated as having originated in the garden of Eden but as another way of looking at Darwin’s doctrine of the survival of the fittest. The world and universe are not heading for an apocalyptic point of judgment. Rather, the universe will collapse upon itself and perhaps once again experience another big bang. Salvation is the outworking of the process of evolution, not the appropriation of the death, burial and resurrection of Christ for our sin.

Such a view is very ecumenical because “inspiration is not limited to the prophets of the Old Testament or the writers of the New Testament. A Christian who has undergone this paradigm shift will expect to find deep insights in religions other than one’s own and will reckon that the opposite of one profound truth may sometimes be another profound truth” (p. 183).

Ford draws considerably upon the earlier work of the Jesuit Teilhard de Chardin, who described Christ as the “Omega Point” toward which evolution slowly progresses.

Dennis Englin
The Master’s College, Newhall, CA


The brief book under review might have been more appropriately entitled Science and the Theologian. Kealy speaks of the authority of the theologian rather than the authority of the Bible. This poses an interesting challenge to evangelicals: Do we at times fail to make a distinction between the authority of the Bible and that of the theologian?

Kealy states: “Science . . . originated outside Israel, largely in Babylonia, Egypt and later in Greece. Therefore the bible reflects a prescientific culture” (p. 25). He also says that the Bible used “the limited scientific knowledge of its time, in its
faith presentation of its religious and salvific message” (p. 52), and that “the world of biblical writers was simply the rather flat world from the Mediterranean Sea to Babylon. It was covered by a solid dome-like sky above. The earth was the centre and above moved the sun, moon and stars, while beneath and above the sky swirled the dark mysterious waters of chaos” (p. 31). The authority of the Biblical “faith statements” can only give understanding as viewed through the eyes of the modern theologian in an evolutionary scientific context. Like Adam Ford in Universe, Kealy points to the Second Vatican Council as the basis for his view of Biblical interpretation. In his view Biblical authority lies in the inspiration of the reader, the theologian, who has much greater knowledge from which to speak than the Biblical writers. The key element missing in this view is the role of the Holy Spirit in the inspiration of the original writers of the Bible, an element Kealy inexplicably overlooked.

He makes a strong appeal for the cooperative searching for truth between the theologian (not the Bible) and the scientist: “Until the age of science, questions of fact were rather settled by authority and its interpretation of the Bible than by experiment” (p. 13). Kealy shows this by contrasting Karl Barth and Teilhard de Chardin. The latter affirmed that “Christianity must learn to speak of God and Christ and persons in terms derived from an evolutionary world view” (p. 19).

Kealy’s approach to miracles is somewhat different from Ford’s in Universe. Ford sets up natural laws as absolute, with God submitting himself to them so that he too can be part of the large evolutionary process. Kealy, however, views the laws of nature as expressions of our limited understanding. They embody great complexity and mystery that we as yet do not understand. Therefore, as our knowledge of science and natural laws grows, we will better understand the nature and purpose of miracles.

The bottom line is that Kealy is calling for the bringing together of theology and science within an evolutionary framework that largely ignores Biblical authority.

A better approach, I am convinced, is to view science as the study of God’s natural revelation and theology as the study of Scripture. Both studies must be conducted under the authority of God’s inerrant Word.

Dennis Englin
The Master’s College, Newhall, CA


A distinguished Israeli archeologist, the author of the volume under review is well known to students of the history and archeology of the Middle East. His previous publications include A Genesis Apocryphon, co-authored with the late Y. Yadin (1956), and the magnificent Discovering Jerusalem (1983). Hebrew Bullae from the Time of Jeremiah can only add to his already well-deserved reputation as a cautious and insightful Biblical (OT) scholar.

Although some readers might insist that bulla (plural bullae) is the first word in Penn State’s football fight song, it is actually the technical term for the small blob of clay often attached to the piece of string that was tied around a rolled or folded papyrus in ancient times. Bullae were imprinted with seals that usually bore the names of their owners. The present collection is a group of 255 bullae from 211
different seals displaying 132 different names of their male owners (no women's names have yet been found on Hebrew bullae), about two-thirds of which are attested in the OT. Although they constitute the largest such assemblage ever found, they were unfortunately excavated clandestinely. The original location of the archive, therefore, remains unknown—at least for the present.

As Avigad points out, however, all is not lost—not by any means. Two of the bullae mention the names of two senior governmental officials serving during the final years of the kingdom of Judah, officials who appear in the OT text as well. The first name, *Brkhyw bn Nryhw hspr* (bulla number 9), is none other than the fuller form of the name *Brwk bn Nryhw hspr*, “the scribe Baruch son of Neriah” (Jer 36:32), the well-known amanuensis of the prophet Jeremiah. The other, *Yrm'1 bn hmlk* (bulla number 8), “Jerahmeel, a son of the king,” appears in precisely that form in Jer 36:26—where, remarkably, it is joined to that of Baruch himself in an adversarial relationship.

If one rejects Y. Shiloh’s proposed identification of *Gmyrhw bn Spn*, whose name appears on a bulla recently discovered in Jerusalem, with *Gmyrhw bn Spn hspr*, “Gemariah son of Shaphan the secretary” (Jer 36:10), as does Avigad himself (and with good reason, though somewhat unclearly; cf. his comments on p. 129 n. 164), then the names of Baruch and Jerahmeel from the present hoard represent the first time that it has become possible to identify with certainty nonroyal names mentioned on Hebrew epigraphic finds with known OT figures. There can be no doubt that the bullae, baked hard by the fire that destroyed the papyri to which they had been attached, are genuine. Taken as a whole, these facts in themselves make this assemblage, dated to the final years of the seventh century and early years of the sixth century B.C., a series of historical and chronological documents of the highest order. In addition, the Baruch bulla brightly illuminates the account of Jeremiah’s giving to him for safekeeping a sealed deed of purchase (Jer 32:10–14).

Avigad sets forth the intriguing theory that Baruch son of Neriah may have been an official government scribe before becoming Jeremiah’s personal secretary. This would explain the fact that the bullae here described were apparently originally attached to documents stored in an official governmental archive of some sort (the titles of seven additional political officials are included among the bullae), whether in Jerusalem or elsewhere. As for the title “son of the king” applied to Jerahmeel, the question of whether it signifies “prince” or “royal official”—or both—must remain open as well.

The book, although well printed and arranged, is unfortunately marred by far too many typographical errors (including an occasional confusion of the singular and plural forms of “bull” as well as a misspelling of the word itself). The more serious ones: Read “is not found” for “is found” (p. 48, line 5); read “God” for “Yahweh” on p. 53; read “first two letters” for “two letters” on p. 94. In addition, the point is made on p. 115 that “lamed has a rounded or flattened base” on many of the bullae, and then no examples are shown in the chart for Avigad’s “Group 1” on p. 114. Finally, *is* frequently written for * (e.g. pp. 56, 60, 92).

All in all, however, Avigad’s presentation and discussion of the 255 bullae must serve as the starting point for further work on this significant assemblage. The author himself recently summarized their importance in “The Contribution of Hebrew Seals to an Understanding of Israelite Religion and Society,” chap. 12 in *Ancient Israelite Religion: Essays in Honor of Frank Moore Cross* (ed. P. D. Miller, Jr., *et al.*; Fortress, 1987). We are the richer for Avigad’s careful research.

Ronald Youngblood
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Looking Both Ways: Exploring the Interface between Christianity and Sociology.

In this most powerful discourse, a dynamic and deep reflection on the discipline of sociology and the social reality of the Christian believer, Perkins raises some very pertinent issues. He first addresses the issue of the integration of sociology and Christianity. Integration is always problematic because the underlying metaphysical assumptions of sociology are antithetical to the tenets of our Christian faith. Integration therefore requires more than strategically placing Scriptural references at regular intervals.

Perkins instead argues for a new sociology, a Christian sociology, one that requires a fundamental reorganization of sociology's existing metaphysical base. This new metaphysics would be an embodiment of Christian values. Of course this in no way will undermine the scientific validity of the discipline because, as he aptly demonstrates, all science is value-based—contrary to what we may often believe.

Despite the fundamental differences between sociology and Christianity, the Christian believer need not throw out the proverbial baby with the bathwater, for the benefits of sociology are immense. To begin, Perkins reveals to us the subtle ways in which Christians are squeezed into the world's mold. The primary method is through our ideological disposition.

Christians tend to don the veil of ideological conservatism, which is a secular worldview. The major drawback of this method of viewing the world is its inability and unwillingness to identify institutional sources as the root of some personal problems. Those problems, such as crime, poverty, or unemployment, are explained solely in terms of personal shortcomings. Having defined the problem on the level of the individual, the Christian then seeks to change the individual as a means of solving such problems. We assume that salvation and personal piety are the only avenues through which many personal problems will be eradicated. Any connections between such problems and our social institutions and structures are overlooked or even denied.

Sociology is therefore essential for a full understanding of how social structures and institutional arrangements affect our behavior and our lives. We must indulge in this kind of analysis so that we can learn in what ways we are controlled and affected by our social system. The disciple of Christ is charged with the responsibility of ministering to the poor, the sick, the unemployed, the delinquent, the orphan—the very victims of our social institutions. Sociology provides that added dimension to our ministry to these groups.

Finally, our unwillingness to analyze our social system critically and to establish linkages with our personal lives will result in the creation of an artificial dichotomy between our spirituality and the structures that serve us. History has shown the possible consequences of such a dichotomy in the instance of slavery and continues to show even now with apartheid how the Christian believer participated in and forthrightly defended these most brutal and repressive modes of social and economic arrangements that contradict the most basic principles of the gospel.

Perkins provides us with some very important insights into the ways of this world and gives new meaning to the "transformation of our mind." We get a clear picture of the path we need to take to make us more like Christ. Looking Both Ways is a positive step in that direction.

Judith A. Duncker
Northeastern Bible College, Essex Fells, NJ

Some of the most important recent works on ethics are volumes focusing on pre-Enlightenment ethical theory. For example, in After Virtue A. MacIntyre advocates an Aristotelian ethic. Natural Law and Natural Rights by J. Finnis and Contraception and the Natural Law and Beyond the New Theism by G. Grisez argue in favor of a neo-Thomistic ethic. Hittinger looks at the work of Grisez and Finnis in the context of the current revival of pre-Enlightenment ethics and subjects it to a careful analysis.

Grisez' and Finnis' construals of the first principle of practical reason and the first principle of morality constitute the foundation of their moral philosophy. They argue that these principles, as well as certain principles that follow from them, are self-evident. Together they can serve as the basis of a complete moral system. Such a system is said to avoid the pitfalls of utilitarianism and not only to be compatible with religion in general but also with orthodox Christian thought in particular.

Hittinger's analysis of the works in question is quite helpful. He carefully and clearly outlines the neo-Thomistic system. He writes well and, in some places, elegantly. His critique is evenhanded. Ultimately he finds the system wanting. If Finnis and Grisez steer clear of utilitarianism, they do not show that their development of the basic principles of morality is consistent with a religious commitment. The system fails in part because insufficient notice is given to metaphysics. One of the crucial issues raised by Hittinger's analysis is the relationship between ethics and metaphysics: Can one work in ethics without first working in metaphysics?

This is not a book for persons with a general interest in religious ethics, though such readers will find the introduction most helpful. It is, however, a book that seminary professors and specialists in ethics will want to obtain. Such readers will appreciate Hittinger's careful argumentation.

David Werther
Madison, WI


This collection of Machen's essays goes much deeper than a mere discussion of the relationship between education, Christianity and the state. It calls for reflection, both substantively and methodologically, on one's understanding of education.

The issues raised in these essays—the role of the state in education, the depression of content and the appreciation of methodology, the disapproval of a federal department of education, the place of the Church in education, Bible reading in the schools, the necessity for Christian schools—are still pertinent. Machen's insight into each of these is lucid and penetrating.

Two dominant themes can be identified in the nine essays. The first is the priority of the intellect in education. Machen observes that "the logical order is to learn what a thing is before one attends exclusively to what can be said against it" (p. 33). This has ramifications for all aspects of Christian ministry because a right understanding of God, he notes, is essential for salvation. A right understanding of God should thus form one of the aims of education. This aim is negated when people are educated in error instead of truth and when scholarship fails to bring
order out of confusion. He also observes that intellectual material, a body of stored facts, is a prerequisite for independent thinking. This potential is crushed when methodological considerations become the primary focus of education. The Christian intellect is important and cannot be neglected. But it is neglected when the assumption is made that there is neutrality with non-Christians in education.

The second theme of this collection: "There is no neutral ground with non-christians in education" (p. 80). Because of this the Christian school is a necessity, as it "contends for the right of parents to bring up their children in accordance with the dictates of their conscience and not in a manner prescribed by the state" (p. 68). The Christian school, according to Machen, is the only theologically consistent choice.

This collection of essays is essential reading for those who believe that their children can be entrusted to the state for their education as well as for those who believe that the battles they wage in public schools on behalf of their children are part of their Christian calling. Both groups can expect conviction, not encouragement.

Machen’s analysis and insights challenge the reader to be distinctively Christian in thinking about education. The historical perspective is enlightening. The conclusions are challenging, as is his reminder that the strength of the Church and its impact on society is only as strong as its intellectual commitment to the gospel. That commitment to the gospel, our eternal hope, is abrogated when education is entrusted to those who do not hold firmly to the authority of the Word of God.

Darwin K. Glassford
Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI


In 1985 the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals at Wheaton College in Illinois hosted a public conference on "The Task of Evangelical Higher Education." Carpenter, ISAE administrator, and Shipps, academic dean at Phillips University, collected several papers from the meeting and added some previously published material to produce this lively and useful volume on evangelical academia. Although the essays focus primarily on the Christian liberal arts tradition, readers who serve in Bible colleges or seminaries will discover much that is relevant to their educational concerns. The contributors, drawn from within and beyond the evangelical community, represent a healthy diversity of approaches to the problems and aspirations of distinctively Christian higher education.

The symposium achieves a commendable balance between the historical, theoretical and practical dimensions of the educational enterprise. Following an introductory piece by T. Smith on the variety of evangelical institutions, the first major section, "Assessing the Heritage," surveys Christian higher education since the middle ages. J. Van Engen and L. Ryken provide helpful context by tracing European educational backgrounds, including the Reformation and Puritan legacies of integrating faith and learning. The essays by M. Noll and W. Ringenberg have been published elsewhere, but they fit nicely into the historical narrative by examining Christian colleges from the American Revolution to 1930. V. Breton's perceptive analysis of the Bible college movement is eminently fair and discerns
well the complementary roles played by Bible colleges and liberal arts institutions. Finally, T. Askew completes part 1 with a careful discussion of the progress of evangelical schools since World War II.

The middle portion, "Refining the Vision," is perhaps the most substantive in terms of the educational philosophy and goals of evangelical colleges. N. Hatch's essay on Christian thinking is the centerpiece of the book, a stirring challenge to Christian colleges to pursue education "that is unflinching in its commitment both to Christian values and to serious learning" (p. 170). The remaining contributors in this section narrow the scope from this lofty agenda, and yet their work points to possible applications of Hatch's vision. W. Dyrness argues for the rightful place of theology in the liberal arts curriculum and also commends theological studies that contribute to "Christian formation" (p. 175). M. Van Leeuwen addresses the relationship between Christian principles and scholarship, urging on her colleagues the need for balance, charity and, above all, "intellectual sophistication and discernment in their understanding and application of Scripture" (p. 191). N. Wolterstorff assesses several possible curricular models for Christian colleges. He provocatively defends a "shalom model" with an emphasis on teaching for justice and peace as the most appropriate. Part 2 ends with the seasoned musings of R. Mouv on meshing Christian learning with activism.

Part 3, "Advancing the Mission," will strike some readers as trendy in comparison with the earlier sections, but the items it covers are crucial for the future of evangelical colleges. W. Martin treats the practical matter of institutional management and the philosophical issue of mission, implying that innovation in these areas will be essential to survival. The problem of college-government relations, particularly whether federal grants will continue to be available to students at religious institutions, is the subject of D. Winter's essay. He implores colleges to plan ahead for some tough decisions should government intrude into hiring practices, admissions policies, and campus religious activities. In a shrill and overly generalized jeremiad, D. Frank warns against cultural conformity in evangelical schools and calls on Christian administrators, faculty and students to repudiate American consumerism. R. Schmidt and A. Nieves, in separate papers, speak to the concerns of women and minorities in Christian higher education. Schmidt is more eloquent in her espousal of an "inclusive curriculum"; Nieves provides hard data and practical recommendations for increasing the presence of minorities on evangelical campuses. In the book's final essay G. Marsden discusses the prospects for establishing a major evangelical university and concludes that research institutes or study centers are more realistic options.

The strengths of this fine volume would be enhanced with more explicit analysis of the impact of secularization on religious colleges and more projections on institutional survival. Also, an editorial conclusion (or postscript), a bibliography and an index would add to the book's usefulness. Nevertheless this collection is must reading for all Christians involved in higher education.

James A. Patterson
Toccoa Falls College, Toccoa Falls, GA


When one reflects on educational methods thought to be hopelessly outdated, the Calvinistic God—or our best stereotypical mockup of such a God—is never far
away. Paltry with praise and impossible to please, this God terrorized students in the form of otherwise timid schoolmarms. Harris attended New York’s Union Theological Seminary, and thus her theology of education owes little to Calvin but plenty to Tillich, whose influence was mediated to her by Mary Anderson Tully, a Union professor whom Harris hails as a model teacher.

While invoking Tully’s example to telling effect in the praxis-grounded second part of the book, Harris stands in no one’s shadow. Indeed, every teacher worthy of the calling must become to her/his students a “sun of righteousness,” for Harris believes the teacher’s vocation is “to incarnate subject matter toward revelation and power, and thus to take part in the re-creation of the universe.” Throughout her lucid contribution to the neglected discipline of the theology of teaching, Harris’ dutiful teacher joins the divine on the higher ground often thought uninhabitable by the merely human.

But there is a double movement: of divine downward, and of human upward. The incarnation is first the humiliation of God in order to exalt the human. “God became human so that man might become divine” is an early Christian summation of the power of incarnation. Harris’ teacher also knows humility, as instructed by Kierkegaard: “All true effort to help begins with self-humiliation.” Every teacher must therefore be an ascetic, not of bodily buffeting but in rejecting prerogative and privilege that tempt toward lording it over the student. Hierarchies and stratification are out; collegiality and the Socratic method are in.

Harris does not quote, but should have quoted, Kierkegaard’s better-known insight, that between God and humankind there is “an infinite qualitative difference.” Her theology of education risks mistaking instruction for inspiration, pedagogy for penetration by the Holy Spirit, the routine for the rhapsodic. She correctly focuses on the relational and subjective character of revelation, asserting that it is “what happens in the ‘in between’ of personal relationships.” Can we forget, however, that to sit at table with God is not to dwell in the company of equals? Harris’ book invites this forgetfulness.

Subtitles seldom lie. Harris tells us that her work is “An Essay in the Theology of Teaching.” No responsible reader will hearken to the essayist’s every word, but a worthy essayist must prick and nibble and cajole along the way to convincing. E. B. White said that the essayist must have as many moods as Howard Johnson has ice creams. Harris’ prevailing moods are hopeful, corrective, synthesizing and contemplative. Her steady confidence in the purity of her own vision catches readers and gladdens them.

Because indirect communication is the only language a teacher must master, Harris’ writing is direct about indirection. It is in its own way the “language of Canaan,” for Harris believes that teaching “is able to save and to redeem.” This sounds dangerous—and would be with a pen less deft and a persuasion less urgent than hers. Harris’ volume succeeds not only for its nifty diagrams, meditations on meaning and power, and winsome suggestions for classroom adventure. We want to make the book a part of our lives because we sense that its voice is as honest as its author is excellent, as both a teacher and a human being. From her we learn that these two must be one: To teach is to live, to live is to teach. Now, following A. Heschel, we know what we see rather than see what we know.

Roderick T. Leupp
Portland, OR

Achieving notoriety with the words “We homilists mount the pulpit or approach the podium with the imagination of a dead fish!” Burghardt, a Jesuit priest with fifty years’ preaching experience, gives us an engaging text. Through chapters such as “Preaching as Imagining,” “The View from the Pew” and “Humor in the Holy of Holies?” the author displays his homiletic expertise and burden.

“Lord, to Whom Shall We Go? Masters Who Just Might Help” (a chapter on the history of preaching) sets forth several patristic fathers (Origen, Augustine, Chrysostom, Gregory the Great), J. H. Newman, and modern preachers such as F. Buechner and D. H. C. Read as models of preaching. For example, Burghardt quotes Newman on the issue of definiteness in preaching: “Definiteness is the life of preaching. A definite hearer, not the whole world; a definite topic, not the whole evangelistic tradition; and, in like manner, a definite speaker. Nothing that is anonymous will preach; nothing that is dead and gone; nothing even which is of yesterday, however religious in itself and useful” (p. 193).

Grieving over what he calls the “Sunday-morning affair where the hearts that go up to heaven hardly go out across the pews” (p. 44), the author describes preaching as the “delicate, indispensable task [which forms] consciences” (p. 134). Admonishing a congregation as rebels is easy; the tough thing is to “give [the audience] a taste for [its] duties, and to awaken in [it] a wish to do them” (p. 136). This believing community, like the Israelites of old, “needs to be led rather than driven on its tortuous pilgrimage to the Promised Land” (pp. 136-137).

Particularly helpful is Burghardt’s discussion of the preacher’s stock-in-trade: words. Although the preacher frequently finds that his “tongue has not been able to answer the demands of [his] mind” (Augustine), he is nevertheless a “weaver of words” and a “translator of worship to life.”

Although Webster’s Unabridged is his “second Bible,” Burghardt, acknowledging the limitations of human language, warns that such limitations “need not induce homiletic indigestion.” Routinely taking 60 to 70 hours to shape a 15-minute homily, the author is one for whom the bare message “must come alive, take wing. To play on the human heart, my words must leap and dance, quiver and shiver, burn and cool” (p. 65). “[As] our godly sharing in the work of creation, . . . the speaking and writing of words is at once the most human and the most holy of all the businesses we engage in” (p. 203, quoting Buechner). The author shares J. C. Murray’s test of communication: “I do not know what I have said until I understand what you have heard” (p. 13).

Burghardt promises the homiletic novice: “I can correct your composition, retool your rhetoric, propel you to project, perhaps even lessen your lisp. All these are important, especially in a context where the long-suffering laity are intolerant of the trivia we dish out, the constipation of thought amid a lessens your lisp. All these are important, especially in a context where the long-suffering laity are intolerant of the trivia we dish out, the constipation of thought amid a diarrhea of words, are surprised or scandalized by a dismal style and a vapid vocabulary unworthy of the word we claim to proclaim, and are puzzled by our ability to declaim about the divine without a shred of feeling or emotion” (p. 84). Your task, says the author, is to “unpack the Biblical passage for your specific community, take it out of its theological wrappings, [and] mold it into language that not only illuminates but ignites” (p. 107).

Burghardt reproves those who succumb to the temptation of homiletical ad lib: “To me, the unprepared homilist is a menace. I do not minimize divine inspiration; I simply suggest it is rarely allotted to the lazy” (p. 10). “I still blush to recall how
often I have knelt before Him as a last resort, a homilist in a foxhole, when all the resources of scholarship and human wisdom have failed me. I am not proposing that rosaries supplant sweat and blood” (pp. 115-116).

“Study the Biblical text!” exhorts this Roman Catholic priest. “Scripture must be the air I breathe” (p. 57); the Bible must not remain a mere reference book. Heed St. Jerome’s advice: “When your head droops at night, let a page of Scripture pillow it” (p. 57).

Knowing one’s congregation (the “view from the pew”) is essential: “By the law of averages, some live an intense religious life, most fulfill the basic commandments, a few may be candidates for the Mafia” (p. 39). “I rarely face,” says the author, “an audience drooling in anticipation of my message” (p. 45). He reminds us of Jesuit W. O’Malley’s sixth commandment for preachers: “Presume disinterest. . . . While you are poring over the readings for next Sunday’s homily, presume a cold audience. Presume that they would rather feed their children to crocodiles than listen to you” (p. 45).

What about the young man who goes to seminary with fire and leaves with ashes? Burghardt contends that between study and proclamation there is frequently a missing link. That link is experience, personal experience of God and his wonderful works. “That link spells the difference between the journeyman and the master” (p. 55).

Burghardt’s darkest moments in preaching are “not when my theology is porous. My darkest moments are when I have ceased to pray—when the familiar phrases fall trippingly from my pen and tongue but it is all rote, prepackaged, with the life-giving juices dried up” (p. 62). The written word “exists not to while away some disenchantment evening, but to transform me, to turn me inside out, to fashion a new creature” (p. 86).

How theological ought one’s sermon to be? “True enough,” Burghardt says, “it is not theology I preach; for the pulpit is not a classroom. But without theology I risk preaching platitudes. . . . Our homilies are rarely heretical. They fail, fall short, flounder rather because they are stale and flat, vapid and insipid, dreadfully dry and boringly barren. One reason? They are not pregnant with the inexhaustible riches that is Christ; they carry so little substance, so little sap to slake the parched spirit” (p. 59). “Life’s real enemy is not pain, not even death; life’s enemy is boredom” (p. 170). With Luther, Burghardt criticizes the kind of “preaching which would not entice a dog from behind a warm stove.”

In his chapter “So Sarah Laughed: Humor in the Holy of Holies?” Burghardt emphasizes that “homiletic humor should be part and parcel of the homily, woven into its warp and woof” (p. 167). One may season the sermon with wit, Burghardt suggests, by retelling a Scripture story in today’s idiom (p. 168). He asks: “Should we not see that lines of laughter about the eyes are just as much marks of faith as are the lines of care and seriousness? Is it only earnestness that is baptized; is laughter pagan?” (p. 166, quoting Thielicke). “To banish laughter from the pulpit is to forget that what distinguishes us from the beast is not only the power of analytic reasoning; we alone are genuinely able to laugh. Not grin—like a baboon or a Cheshire cat. Laugh” (p. 171).

On the practical issue of illustrative material, I appreciate an author whose illustrations for his text range from Gregory the Great to Amy Grant. “From anthropology to zoology,” Burghardt states, “whatever I learn about God’s creation is potential grist for my homiletic mill” (p. 55).

Rigid, nonliturgical Protestants who focus on Burghardt’s specific context (revitalizing the pre-mass homily) will miss his pastoral insights. His sympathy toward liberation theology as well as his antipathy toward evangelical views of
Inspiration may render his theological judgment suspect; his homiletic fervor, however, is contagious and educative.

Although pages 123–154 were upside-down in my review copy, Burghardt's work merits high marks for its imaginative insight—indeed, decidedly higher marks than many right-side-up homiletics texts.

Larry E. Dixon
Northeastern Bible College, Essex Fells, NJ


As the title indicates, Beals seeks to relate missions to the local church, and he does this with commendable consistency. The first section of the book presents the Biblical basis for missions. Beals not only underlines the emphasis on church planting but also presents a helpful discussion of missions within the context of the receiving culture.

The largest section of the book relates missions to the sending church in the homeland. One of the most needed emphases in missions is the role of the church in selecting and sending missionaries. He here agrees with M. Griffiths, Who Really Sends the Missionary? (Chicago: Moody, 1974). In the light of the shifting values of currencies, Beals also devotes a good deal of space to discussing the financial support of missionaries. This he couples with reference to the personal, prayer and advisory support that churches owe their missionaries. His book is a helpful handbook for the church missions committee, whose role is explored at some length.

From a discussion of the role of the local church, Beals turns to evaluate the missionary sending agencies. He presents a helpful schematic of the various associations of missions agencies. His real contribution, however, is seen in describing in some detail the role of the sending agency in accountability to both the sending and the receiving church.

Beals next turns to a summary of missions strategy. It is a fine overview, one that avoids some of the fads that flourish in this field. His emphasis falls upon the accountability a missionary must have, and this emphasis is sorely needed.

Another section of the book focuses on the theological training college. Beals not only engages in a discussion of curricular matters but also shows the strategic roles of administrators and faculty in fostering missionary commitment. The final section centers on two theological issues pertaining to missions: (1) the role of the Holy Spirit in motivating and directing mission, and (2) eschatology and its role in mission.

The book includes fine indices of Scripture references, topics and bibliographical sources. It would be hard to overrate this book as a text for teaching introduction to mission. Its organization is fresh and new, and it is a valuable addition to the available literature.

In utilizing the book as a teaching tool, one could make good use of the numerous figures, chapter summaries and excellent documentation. The strong Biblical content and the relatively plain writing would make this a suitable text for any level of higher education.

Wayne A. Detzler
Calvary Baptist Church, Meriden, CT

“This is a book about moral problems—but about how those problems look from a particular religious perspective. It is, therefore, at least as much a book about understanding our human nature within the contours of the story the Bible tells.” For Meilaender, understanding human nature holds the key to ethical decision-making (recall Calvin’s first sentence of the Institutes). In short, we must recognize the inherent limitations of human nature, a point Meilaender touchingly makes in his initial chapter, which recounts his and his wife’s relationship with a foster child. Human nature consists of both nature and spirit. We are finite creatures with eternal longings, beings of both abstract cognition and visceral feelings, people who struggle between reality and ideals. The tensions that result from this inherent duality cannot or must not be overcome but, rather, recognized and dealt with.

After an introductory part 1, parts 2-4 apply the ramifications of this view of human nature to seven moral dilemmas. Two deal with the beginnings of life (“Babies without Sex” and abortion), three with the end of life (euthanasia, the care of defective newborns, and the discontinuation of food and water for the terminally ill), and two with issues of community (marriage and political community). Given the length of his study, Meilaender accomplishes his purpose, and my criticisms emerge only from his skill in whetting my appetite for a more substantial feast.

First, the book suffers at points from a lack of coherence, a point even he observes in his foreword. I was not sure I understood the relationship of the three chapters of part 1 to each other, or the relationship of part 1 to the rest of the volume. The breadth of the book is limited by Meilaender’s tendency to discuss an issue by using a single text or writer as a foil for his own reflections. Realizing he has no intention of exploring the larger body of literature on the seven topics puts this observation in perspective. Related to this is the problem of depth. He tackles the seven issues in barely 100 pages of text, a tall order given their complexity. Masturbation and homosexuality, for example, are dealt with in four pages. Finally, I was disappointed that Meilaender deliberately (see chap. 6 n. 3 and chap. 7 n. 2) avoided relating his ethical reflections to the matters of public policy and legal codes, for this is precisely where Christian identity within the larger human community encounters even greater ethical complexity. For example, how does a Christian protect and affirm civil rights that in turn might allow or promote moral wrongs? Given his fine insights throughout, I was disappointed that his only response was “I do not assume any answer to the question, ‘Should what is morally wrong be legally prohibited?’” (p. 149).

Daniel B. Clendenin
William Tyndale College, Farmington Hills, MI


We live in an extraordinarily litigious society, and churches are just as susceptible to legal actions as any other social institution. In recent years the very delicate matter of church discipline has become the focus of court proceedings, something that I believe poses a serious threat both to the integrity of the church
and religious liberty in general. To help congregations cope with this problem, two lawyers affiliated with the Christian Legal Society have prepared this thoughtful and practical manual.

The authors lead off with a discussion of several cases that dramatize the magnitude of the problem. The arguments offered by the misguided litigants are that the discipline of erring members is a private affair and that such action violates their rights. They allege that it results in defamation of character, an invasion of the right of privacy, and the inflicting of emotional distress. In their opinion, discipline is "outrageous." But where did they get these ideas? According to Buzzard and Brandon, they are the outgrowth of several disturbing trends in modern life—excessive individualism, loss of norms and values that limit the autonomy of the individual, the crisis of authority, the rejection of guilt.

The Scriptures and history, however, both show that discipline is essential to the church and that its restoration is sorely needed. It is a matter of obedience to God, it preserves the integrity and witness of the church, it makes church membership truly meaningful, and it enables the body of Christ to function as a redemptive community. In short, it assures that the church will be the church. Because the theological base for discipline is unshakable, some recent incidents have approached the matter from the standpoint of protecting the right of association and religious liberty. Thus the difficulties lie primarily in the realm of the procedural. The authors respond with a survey of the history of Church-state litigation to show that in reality a very wide latitude of freedom for churches to maintain control over their internal affairs exists and that the actions of the dissidents and malcontents have little substantive foundation in constitutional law. Like most CLS writers they tend to overreact to the threat of secularism, but they do show convincingly that churches have the legal right and authority to discipline their members.

Buzzard and Brandon conclude with a practical section that spells out how churches may tighten up their disciplinary procedures. They also provide models for congregational leaders to utilize in disciplinary proceedings that will help to forestall the threat of litigation. This useful book belongs in every pastor's or church's library.

Richard V. Pierard
Indiana State University, Terre Haute, IN


Without reliable guidance, breaking into academic publication is often a mysterious and forbidding process, one that prevents many would-be writers from entering the field altogether. These two books, therefore, are an important aid to all who desire to expand the scope of their scholarly contributions to include writing. The books discuss, in plain language and with helpful illustrations, everything from motivation and manuscript preparation to negotiating a contract.

Luey's book seeks to eliminate the misunderstandings that can arise between authors and their publishers and the walls of division that result. Her intention is simple and valuable: "Once you understand what publishers want from authors, it is easy enough to provide it and thereby improve your chances of publication. That
is what this book is designed to help you do” (p. 2). It does it, I might add, very well.

She also provides helpful advice on such important considerations as how to make requests for permission to quote from a copyrighted text, how to shape a book proposal, and how to prepare an index. She includes helpful explanations concerning the universal battle for journal space in scholarly publications and the expenses involved in book publishing. Luey’s account of why books cost what they do, and why paperbacks cost only 75 to 95 cents less to produce than hardbacks, is a revelation to the uninitiated—especially to one like me who, until now, never had a ready answer when asked why his own paperback book costs $46.95. Now I know, and the answer is not publisher’s greed.

Of special interest to young scholars is her chapter on how to turn a dissertation into a book (and how not to) and how to mine it for publishable articles, if any there be.

In short, this excellent little volume provides expert guidance for editors, referees, reviewers, writers, and all who comprise the publishing circle.

Whereas Luey’s book deals with the mechanics of publication, that by Hensley and Adkins is more concerned with the writer’s methods. Their text is a guide for how to slant one’s work for a particular audience, how to become motivated to write, and how to stay that way. This nontechnical book is more than the standard good advice that one learns to write by writing; it explains how to build idea files, how to make one’s research readable, how to acquire brevity and clarity of expression, and how to select intriguing yet appropriate titles. It even includes such unexpected but useful bits of advice as 25 ways to say “he said” and when to phone the “Grammar Hotline” (p. 25—yes, it does exist).

Both those who have been publishing books and articles for years and those who are still waiting for their first by-line will find these books to be valuable, perhaps even indispensable, publication resources.

Michael Bauman
Hillsdale College, Hillsdale, MI


Evangelical apologists have grown increasingly sophisticated. Along with sophistication, however, comes specialization. And along with specialization comes the decline of the generalist. Moreland’s addition to the corpus of evangelical apologetics reflects this very trend. It reveals outstanding scholarship in the author’s area of expertise but displays areas of weakness as a comprehensive work.

Chapters 1-4 examine the traditional theistic proofs: the cosmological argument, the teleological argument, the argument from mind, the moral argument. These chapters demonstrate Moreland’s strength and conclude that these approaches are all valid for demonstrating the rationality of theism. In chap. 1 the author, with some apparent dependence on Craig, concentrates on the Kalam version of the cosmological argument. Chapter 2 is a tightly reasoned attempt to retrieve the teleological argument from the ash heap (to which it has mostly been consigned since the rise of Darwinism), even though Moreland concedes that this argument is not as strong as others. Chapter 3 argues that the existence of mind is most understandable if one postulates rationality at the core of the universe. In chap. 4
the moral argument is intertwined with the question of meaning and purpose in life. The chapter's major weakness is its failure adequately to treat the Kantian version of the moral argument.

Moreland reveals his limitations in the remaining chapters. Those on the historicity of the NT record and the resurrection of Jesus, while adequate, generally are written on a lower scholarly level. Footnotes in the first four chapters bristle with references to scholarly philosophical journals. By way of contrast, chaps. 5–6 quote Josh McDowell, who (though an excellent communicator and popularizer) is hardly on the cutting edge of Christian scholarship. One especially notes weakness in Biblical scholarship. Treatment of NT higher criticism focuses on the faulty philosophical assumptions underlying such an approach rather than wrestling with specific texts. The treatment of the Genesis creation accounts in chap. 7, for example, fails to note the use of the direct-object indicator to signal narrative rather than poetry. Chapter 8 is a potpourri of "typical" objections to Christian theism. These treatments, though excellent for use in a college classroom discussion, are less impressive in the context of an apologetics text.

This leads to the final point: It is difficult to determine this book's intended audience. The later chapters seem to focus on apologetics as a tool for campus evangelism. The earlier chapters, however, are highly technical and seem directed toward the specialist. Moreland's expertise is in philosophy, especially the philosophy of science, and it is to be hoped that he will continue to contribute in this area.

Kenneth C. Harper
First Presbyterian Church, Westminster, CA


This book is a collection of sixteen previously delivered lectures and papers by the editor of *The Ecumenist*. While the essays touch a variety of topics, the author's primary purpose is to look at how Catholic social thought has changed over the last twenty years and how it has been impacted by the perspectives of liberation theology.

The liberationist perspective represents for Baum a new religious experience that has "joined faith and justice in an indissoluble way." Furthermore this experience "differs from pietist experience which embodies the soul's encounter with God, the alone with the Alone, and hence excludes other people" (p. 4). The author is "greatly impressed by the evolution of Catholic social teaching" and declares his strong approval for liberation theology and its impact on the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church.

Among the issues discussed are the impact of Marxism on Pope John Paul II, the "official" Catholic blessing of liberation theology in the 1986 Vatican instruction entitled *On Christian Freedom and Liberation*, and liberationist perspectives on traditional Christian theological themes such as salvation and the nature of revelation. But evangelicals will especially be interested in chaps. 7 and 10 where the author focuses on the epistemology of liberation theology and the dialogue between Christian theologians and the sociology of knowledge. It is at these two points that evangelical theologians will have the most trouble with Baum.

According to the author, "liberation theology is less concerned with . . . [trying] to establish what a particular message meant at the time when it was written. [It
is] more concerned with a critical approach that brings out what the ancient texts mean today." This strong tendency to divorce the text from its historical context can easily lead to a distortion of Biblical teaching. Given this hermeneutic, it is not surprising to see the author speak approvingly of the "de-privatization of the Christian message." Classical evangelical (and Biblical) notions of sin, salvation and conversion as primarily personal are discarded.

In chap. 10 the reader will find helpful material on the interaction between theology and sociology. The author makes helpful points when he argues that the presuppositions of the sociologist always impact research and that "theologians must make sociological judgments as theologians." Unfortunately, in the same chapter the author takes what must be described as a cheap shot at French sociologist J. Ellul. Calling his work on propaganda and technocracy "bad sociology," the author accuses Ellul of minimizing the poor and their economic situation, a charge that indicates ignorance of much of Ellul's writing.

While I found other aspects of this work troubling, Baum has written a book that evangelical theologians, especially those wanting more understanding of liberation theology and its impact on Roman Catholic and Protestant thought, should read.

Robert Mayer

*Advent Christian Witness*, Charlotte, NC

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Petrus Cantor was one of the leading Parisian scholars of the last quarter of the twelfth century. He is chiefly remembered for works on practical ethics such as the *Verbam Abbreviatum*, a treatise on the virtues and vices (available in PL 205, cols. 21–554), and on sacramental theology (*e.g.* Summa de Sacramentis, ed. J. A. Dugauquier for the Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia in 1954 ff.). A large work previously existing only in manuscript was his *De Penitentia et Partibus Eius*, one book of which, *De Oratitone et Speciebus Illius*, has now been edited for modern readers by Trexler as *The Christian at Prayer*.

Literally titled "Concerning Prayer and Its Kinds," the book offers some fascinating insights into one medieval view of prayer. The Chanter analyzes prayer by the various bodily postures of the supplicant, viewed as expressing states of the soul. Prayer is defined as *dei benivolentie captatio* ("capturing the benevolence of God"). In order to be efficacious the prayer must be pronounced slowly and distinctly, the supplicant must be able to remember what he has said, and the postures must be performed correctly (no cheating on those that may be physically uncomfortable or humiliating).

Like most medieval theology, the *De Oratitone* is a curious blend of wisdom and utter nonsense. There is something crassly pragmatic and mechanical about the whole approach that leaves an almost impious taste in the mouth and that, it seems to me, ultimately goes back to the problematic central concept of prayer as *captatio*. No one single word better captures the whole deadening thread of synergism that runs through pre-Reformation theology and keeps it from grasping *sola gratia* and *sola fide*—as if God's grace were something that had to be or could
be "captured" by our performance. This concept of captatio even enables the Chanter to marvel at the paradox that homo dum orat est quasi maior domini because homo, qui nihil est respectu creatori, imperat deo ("Man while he prays is almost greater than the Lord" because, "although with respect to the fact that he is a creature he is nothing, yet then he commands God"). If his posture and pronunciation are good enough he can make God do things—like transforming the elements of the Eucharist. Though the Chanter is aware that he is speaking, as it were, as a fool in his efforts to exalt prayer, his hyperbole is consistent with a view of prayer that is close to magic and a view of God that is close to blasphemy.

And yet, having said all this I would still recommend the De Oratione as a book not just for scholars interested in the history of doctrine but also for Christians interested in prayer. Though elements of the kind of theologizing that made the Reformation necessary have left their mark upon the text, it also contains profound insights at precisely the points where many modern Christians tend to be naïve. Its insistence that posture and pronunciation matter is rooted in bad theology but also in good psychology. If others pick up from our body language signs of our attitudes that either confirm or contradict our words, then surely God is able to read such signs as well. It may be that indifference to whether one kneels, prostrates oneself, or stands with raised hands in particular contexts of prayer, along with a tolerance for multitudinous inarticulate "uhhs," the use of "Lord" or "Father" after every phrase, and other vain repetitions, signifies a certain laxness in our own approach. It should be remembered that Peter's emphasis on correct pronunciation and on being able to remember what one has said was aimed partly at keeping people in a liturgical Church from merely going through the motions. If our theology of prayer has risen from captatio to communion, our practice of that communion is sometimes guilty of a superficiality that would have astonished the Chanter.

Trexler provides a detailed introduction to Peter the Chanter's work and the manuscript tradition behind his edition. Petrus Cantor's Latin is not overly difficult: Only an occasional word cannot be found in a standard student's dictionary, and much of it is fairly smooth sailing for anyone who has—or used to have—a moderate competence in the language. For students of medieval theology or for anyone wishing to dust off his Latin with something less predictable than Vg but not as stiff as Vergil, The Christian at Prayer is a book worth owning.

Donald T. Williams
Toccoa Falls College, Toccoa Falls, GA


Who is Ramon Llull and what is "spiritual logic"? Johnston answers the first question briefly and the second question quite extensively. But this is no book for anyone who does not already have a good grasp of medieval logic and at least some familiarity with the thought of Llull. Johnston's aim is to analyze one facet of Llull's work, his treatment of scholastic logic, in the context of Llull's own thought and that of medieval scholasticism generally, and to demonstrate that Llull, although he uses the terminology and forms of Aristotelian logic, has adapted it to his own theological ends—i.e., spiritualized it.
Evangelicals have always found Llull an attractive medieval thinker because of his efforts to evangelize the Moslem world of his day. Born on the island of Majorca around 1232 to a wealthy merchant who had followed James I of Aragon when he conquered the island from the Moors in 1229, Llull was raised in court circles, married, had children, and became seneschal to James II of Majorca. When he was about thirty years old, however, he experienced a vision of Christ crucified on five successive nights, which moved him to give up his life as a knightly troubadour and devote himself instead to the cause of Christ by (1) founding monastic schools for training students in Arabic and other eastern languages, (2) writing a book proving the Christian religion against the errors of the infidels, and so (3) converting Moslems. But Llull was no mere visionary, for he also took practical steps to accomplish his goals, including spending nine years learning Arabic from a Moslem slave and obtaining the patronage of Christendom’s leaders to support his efforts. For example, at his urging James II founded a monastery at Miramar in Majorca to prepare Franciscan missionaries to Islam, and the Council of Vienne (1311–12) established chairs of Hebrew, Arabic and Chaldean in five university centers. Llull himself also went on four missionary journeys into Moslem lands and wrote not just one but several books seeking to unify all peoples under the religion of Christ. Significantly Llull was the first medieval theologian/philosopher to use the vernacular for the presentation of his ideas, but certainly this follows from his missiological motives.

Around 1274 Llull received a kind of intellectual illumination that became the basis for his Art, the metaphysical system by which he sought to demonstrate the universality of Christian truth. According to Johnston, basic to Llull’s thought is his doctrine of “intention”—i.e., the universal desire of the creature for the Creator, which in man’s case means the obligations to know, love and remember God. Furthermore God makes himself knowable to men by leaving his imprint upon the world of his creation by means of “divine dignities”—i.e., uncreated, essential attributes that signify God with respect to the created world. Llull specified these as goodness, magnitude, eternity, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth and glory. Llull also indicated nine relative principles by which the dignities mutually communicate their natures and are diffused throughout creation: difference, concordance, contrariety, beginning, middle, end, majority, equality and minority. Finally in his Art Llull generated the various possible combinations of these absolute and relative principles by means of geometric figures and algebraic logic so that one could analyze reality according to its underlying metaphysical structure—i.e., as manifesting the Creator. In short Llull proposed his Art as a kind of universal logic, which when employed would lead to truth because it was based on the actual structure of reality.

The specific contribution of Johnston’s work to Llullian studies is to show Llull’s system at work on logic, a fundamental element of medieval thought. Indeed, for centuries logic was regarded as basic to all branches of learning because logic was the science of right thinking. Therefore by the fourteenth century there was already a large body of received logical doctrine from such authorities as Aristotle, Boethius, Algazel, and Peter of Spain. Accordingly what Johnston does is to take Llull’s works that deal with logic and see what they say about the standard topics of logic in that day. Although Johnston divides his book into two parts, corresponding to two periods in Llull’s attention to logical doctrine, he organizes each part topically according to the divisions of scholastic logical theory: predicables, categories, propositions, syllogism, fallacy and argument. For each topic Johnston very carefully rehearses Llull’s views in comparison with scholastic thinkers and authorities.
What Johnston concludes on the basis of his analysis is that three features dominate Lull’s work on logic: “its popularizing design and goals, its natural ontology, and its moralizing procedures of argument” (p. 3). The first point means that Lull’s treatment of logic is not particularly deep or original, since he considers just the accepted topics in logic and is obviously dependent on the standard authorities. The second point means that Lull was philosophically an extreme realist. For Lull all particular beings exist by virtue of participation in universal essences or natures. Furthermore all reality forms a hierarchy, the apex of which is God. Finally—and in this respect Lull is more like a medieval preacher than a philosopher—Johnston’s third point means that Lull seeks to explain everything according to its duty to acknowledge God. Thus logic must deal with the true nature of things, not just mental constructs, and the true nature of things in turn reveals God. Therefore Lull’s logic is basically a spiritual exercise, a vehicle for orienting the mind to the Truth that is God.

Johnston’s book is not for everyone. For those who know little of Lull, J. N. Hillgarth’s Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France (Oxford, 1971) is a much better place to begin, and Alexander Broadie’s Introduction to Medieval Logic (Oxford, 1987) is more profitable for those unacquainted with that aspect of medieval thought. For those who wish to go beyond Hillgarth and Broadie, however, The Spiritual Logic of Roman Lull is scholarly and compelling.

Cameron A. MacKenzie
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Written as a master’s thesis at Wheaton College Graduate School, Gresham’s work is at once an historical study of an aspect of Finney’s thought and an apologetic for Finney’s doctrine. The author’s stated goal is not merely to articulate Finney’s doctrine but also to share Finney’s insights with Gresham’s “fellow participants in the charismatic movement” in order that his thought might contribute to their own theological reflection. Thus Gresham’s work goes beyond a mere descriptive analysis.

Gresham does a good job of laying out Finney’s doctrine of Spirit baptism. He understands Finney as having thought of the baptism of the Holy Spirit as a conscious experience subsequent to regeneration, an experience that effects a union of the believer with Christ. The purpose of this union is not only to sanctify the believer but also to empower him for effective prayer and preaching. Gresham affirms Finney’s idea of the baptism of the Spirit as a post-regeneration crisis experience and as an enduement of power for holiness and ministry. Rather than deal with the criticisms leveled at Finney by his own contemporaries, Gresham seeks to bring Finney into the current debate by defending his doctrine against the counter-views of J. D. G. Dunn and F. D. Bruner. The important critique of Finney’s views presented by the Princeton theologians, Hodge and Warfield, hardly receives a glance.

Although he is critical of Finney’s perfectionism and postmillennial triumphalism, both of which he rightly traces to Finney’s faulty definition of sin, Gresham believes that Finney can provide a vital contribution to modern pentecostal theology. While he sees no substantive evidence that Finney himself ever spoke in tongues, Gresham suggests that Finney’s theology offers pentecostalism possible
avenues for articulating the relationship between the baptism of the Holy Spirit and the practice of speaking in tongues. These would include Finney's ideas of Spirit-inspired prayer as the experience of union with Christ and the baptism of the Spirit as entrance into the spiritual realm.

This is an interesting little book. The comparisons between Finney and the rest of the holiness tradition in chap. 7 are quite helpful. Overall, however, there is more flavor than meat here. Gresham does a good job of telling us what Finney had to say about the doctrine of the baptism of the Holy Spirit. But he is not always successful in exegetting Finney. What does Finney mean to say when he describes Spirit baptism as bringing the believer into "union" with Christ? To say that "Finney verges on the mystical" (p. 50) is hardly sufficient. As well, theological judgments are handed down without the benefit of adequate evidence. Jonathan Edwards is declared to have been a determinist three times (p. 4) without a single citation. Almost as facilely, Finney is judged innocent of the charge of Pelagianism. Yes, Finney did say that "religion is the work of man." But he also said, Gresham adds, that God "induces man to do it." Man can do nothing without the "influence of the Spirit" (pp. 12-14). The onus of Pelagianism is not yet removed, however. The "influence" of which Finney speaks is merely persuasional. The work of God is merely revelational. Gresham depicts Finney's idea of the baptism of the Spirit in similar terms. To be sanctified is to be "conscious of God in the soul" (p. 22). "The Holy Spirit sanctifies by revealing Christ to the soul and giving that true knowledge of God which alone can produce true love and purity of the heart" (pp. 18-19).

The historical analysis of Finney's doctrine is interesting. Finney was, after all, a prime mover in the holiness movement in North America and as such is well worthy of historical and theological analysis. The problems appear when Gresham presents Finney as a worthy contributor to the modern theological discussion. The grievous problems of Finney's theology have not been adequately addressed here.

Michael Williams
Grand Rapids Baptist Seminary


Theology, wrote John Updike, "must always unravel and be reknit." The contemporary political, social and religious situation has for McFague largely taken care of Updike's criterion of unraveling. Today's world is the deconstructed world, and the brave soul intent on enduring it must develop "negative capability," which steels one "to endure absence, uncertainty, partiality, relativity, and to hold at bay the desire for closure, coherence, identity, totality." To resist the challenge of postmodern living is to take refuge in a God whom McFague must dismantle. If the God of nineteenth-century bourgeois morality deserved to die at the hands of Nietzsche, McFague is zealous to dispatch today's God, who dwells in splendid hierarchy and justifies the way things have always been.

*Models of God*, as its subtitle indicates, is not primarily a via negativa exercise in deconstructionist theology. Theology's formal criterion is to describe concretely a salvation fit for our times, and an ecological, nuclear age demands a vivid God who crushes the old assurances of individualism, distance and omnipotence. This
God, in whose heart there is perpetually a cross, McFague recasts in three paradigms: Mother, Lover, Friend.

Because all talk of God is indirect and theology is necessarily analogy, to freeze God as “Father” is idolatrous. “God is she and he and neither” is McFague’s epigrammatic end of patriarchy. Not only may (and must) God be called “Mother,” but so also must Jesus. Yet because everyone is a parent, McFague is willing to save God’s fatherhood—but only on provision of its working to preserve the world, not arbitrarily rule or preemptively fashion it.

Process theologians, notably J. Cobb, have underscored God’s need of the world. This comports well with God as Lover, who makes us whole rather than rescues vile sinners. Protestantism’s dire portrayal of depravity falls with God as Lover, even as sola Scriptura must be sifted by the need for cultural relevance. With God’s encouragement, more than direct divine intervention, we save ourselves. The God-as-Friend motif extends the collegiality metaphor suggested by McFague’s insistent rejection of hierarchy. Of the three models it is the least compelling because it lacks transcendence.

The book will provoke the timid and the scrupulously orthodox. There is much to turn the head and grind the teeth. The writer of Psalm 51 anguished that he had sinned solely against God, but not so McFague. Sin is against nature and other people, God’s presence therein implied. It is true that John Wesley proclaimed that “there is no holiness but social holiness,” but even so he kept firmly in sight the “over against” quality of God. This “absolute qualitative difference between God and man” has vanished for McFague. The dissipation extends to Jesus, who is “not ontologically different from other paradigmatic figures either in our tradition or in other religious traditions.” Her harshest critics may not allow McFague even to be a Christian. After all, “our foundational figure” she regularly calls Jesus of Nazareth and seemingly never Jesus the Christ.

One ends reading this volume by scrutinizing one’s own theological beginnings. The steady denial of Updike’s “unravel and reknit” insight lands one in obscurantism. Evangelicals do not have to agree with McFague that “theology is mostly fiction” to take up her call—if on their own terms—for refining and clarifying the understanding of God for the late twentieth century. Models of God is avowedly a theology for a postmodern, postreligious, post-Christian world, and likely even a postfeminist world. One may postpone the problems this book raises or seek to evade them but, because one’s doctrine of God determines the whole of one’s theology, McFague’s vision is as necessary as it is disquieting.

Roderick T. Leupp


Historian Charles Edwin Jones (Perfectionist Persuasion, 1974) is better known for his landmark bibliographies of the Wesleyan-holiness (1974) and pentecostal (1983) movements. In Black Holiness he brings together, revises, expands upon, and updates selected materials from his earlier bibliographical guides, focusing
specifically on the Black dimension in Wesleyanism and pentecostalism. The result clearly merits separate publication. The book illustrates well what Jones does best—namely, to ferret out marginal and ephemeral works from religious bodies that are often profoundly alienated from the mainstream of society. He not only identifies hundreds of titles that might otherwise disappear from the purview of Church historians but also provides a context for them through brief descriptions of the denominations and doctrines they represent. He then goes on to list tertiary schools and colleges for such groups, giving bibliographical citations when possible, and finally adds a bio-bibliographical directory of some 1,176 persons within the movements. The scope extends beyond the United States and Canada to the United Kingdom, Africa and the West Indies, though coverage of the latter two areas is more representative than comprehensive.

The work does have a few limitations, some beyond the control of the author. In some ways the book seemed too cryptic. The explanatory apparatus for the abbreviations does not really help much. One must resort to additional reference tools for further information concerning the books and institutions he mentions therein. Some are not so easy to track down as one might initially assume. Likewise the introductions to various bodies are too short, rarely more than a paragraph or two. Much fuller treatments would be welcome. On the other hand, the author’s generally commendable commitment to painstaking, enumerative bibliographical description sometimes seems overdone, leading him to give full citations for every edition and translation of a work (e.g., entries 37-40) and even to needless repetition where cross-references would suffice (cf. entries 40, 102). Then there is the problem of finding and securing the items even if one has the guide in hand. Library locations are listed for many, but by no means all, of the entries. But no library has more than a fraction of the titles, and many are likely to be found only in the private collections of bibliomaniacal scholars of the Black holiness movement, if at all. As it stands, however, the book represents monumental labors, a necessary first step toward recovering a mostly hidden history.

Persons desiring more extensive descriptive analysis in a bibliographical guide should prefer the approach taken in the book edited by Wilson. From his directorship of the Project on Church and State at Princeton he has brought together ten junior scholars who ostensibly contribute bibliographical essays on Church-state issues in America since the Civil War. (This volume complements an earlier one subtitled The Colonial and Early National Periods [1986].) What they actually do is survey secondary scholarly literature on American religious history in general, with only occasional references to Church-state issues per se, at least for the most part. While the pieces are reasonably current and well written, at times almost magisterial, the work is first of all historiographical and only secondarily concerned with the topic proclaimed by the title.

The essays vary a good deal in structure, scope and content. Because a uniform format was not imposed upon the contributors they overlap each other rather frequently. Each essay is followed by a substantial bibliography of works reviewed. The first eight chapters are roughly chronological, though some thematic arrangements are simultaneously possible. They include surveys of the Civil War era by W. F. Deverell, reconstruction and the south by G. H. Shattuck, Jr., industrialization by M. S. Massa, immigration and urbanization by R. H. Seager, the turn of the century by J. Beumler (excellent), 1920s and 1930s by R. D. Horn, 1940-1960 again by Beumler, and 1960 to the present by D. H. Watt. Evangelicals are treated fairly and extensively throughout. But perhaps because it never leaves the mainstream of scholarship to present original research, the book is especially poor in its coverage
of religious bodies at the margins of society. Significantly, studies by C. E. Jones and J. G. Melton are never mentioned.

The final three chapters turn to special topics: education by J. W. Lowe, Jr., law by W. F. Sullivan, and women by E. B. Clark. The overview of education is the weakest in the book, especially the section on higher education, which omits more important items than it mentions (to name two, where are the names of Riesman and Ringenberg?) and notes but a single court case (what about, for example, Bob Jones or Grove City?). Sullivan's competent discussion of legal history is the only article with substantial footnotes in addition to its bibliography. She also makes the only reference to abortion in the entire book, and that is an incidental one when pointing out the challenge to the tax-exempt status of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. Unfortunately treatment of women extends only to 1920 and does not include some major recent titles (for example, J. Hassey's No Time for Silence). But the essay is redeemed by the lively and insightful section on Mormon women, especially the way polygamy aided their remarkably early attainment of suffrage.

In January, 1982, during an informal meeting at the Library of Congress, Jones urged government bibliographers to consider systematically collecting materials from lower-class, socially-ostracized religious groups, works generally neglected and too often lost altogether. His appeals met with a polite but unsympathetic and simplistic dismissal: Government funds cannot be spent to support sectarian interests, especially those that have no bearing on public life and policy. Such a narrow misguided application of the doctrine of separation bothered me at the time, despite my anabaptism. After reading Wilson such a stand seems all the more arbitrary and petty. Preserving the story of America's disinherit is certainly no threat to the Constitution, not even if such efforts are aided by government librarians.

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