BOOK REVIEWS


E. Trueblood tells us that the changes in the Roman Catholic Church have been so fast since Vatican II that pundits now predict that the cardinals will come to Vatican III with their wives, and the pope will come with (you guessed it) her husband.

These two small works provide a glimpse into the changing Catholic Church that evangelicals would do well to view. The books are alike in attempting to put both changes and challenges in historical perspective, perhaps the most helpful aspect for readers of this Journal. The amount of historical information makes both books worth reading for anyone with an interest in contemporary Catholicism. With many of the value judgments, though, there will be considerable disagreement.

Fitzpatrick achieves a degree of objectivity as he surveys the impact of American culture on Catholicism and the challenges American Catholicism faces with a burgeoning Hispanic population. On the other hand Ruether is sometimes shrill, often strident, as she examines the problem of democratizing the Church, sexual issues and liberation theology.

While both authors deal with the problem of poverty and wealth in Latin America, neither really presents a substantive analysis of the fundamental issues involved. Fitzpatrick seems to favor liberation theology generally, although he presents a caveat as to how far the principle of absolute truth should yield to praxis. Naively he implies that the Marxist connection may be more appearance than substance. This reviewer would recommend the works of R. Nash, A. Nuñez; and especially M. Novak, a Catholic who began by favoring liberation theology but now argues against it. These three give more adequate treatment to the issues at the base of the Latin American theology.

Ruether deals with three topics: (1) liberalism in the Church, by which she means replacing hierarchical control from Rome with local, democratic election of bishops; (2) equality for women, meaning ministry leadership including the priesthood, and related sexual issues such as birth control, abortion, homosexuality and celibacy—she speaks against the Vatican positions on all these; and (3) third-world issues focusing on liberation theology, where she argues for "regimes that sponsor grassroots democratic socialist methods of development" (p. 52). She underscores the usual rhetoric—e.g., locating the "roots of violence in the institutionalized violence of poverty and repression" (p. 53). She too is uncritical of so-called Marxist analysis.

Fitzpatrick's development begins with the early Church conflict over circumcision, which he sees as primarily an issue of culture. After defining and explaining the concept of culture he devotes several chapters to illustrating the relationship of Church and culture. In chap. 3 he describes the struggles over the Slavonic and Chinese rites, where Catholicism was adapted to existing cultures. Chapter 4 views
the experience of European Catholics in the American "melting pot," and chap. 5 considers the ongoing process of preparing for and adjusting to the Hispanic influx. These Latin American immigrants bring an already inculturated Catholic practice that Fitzpatrick thinks should be preserved and not forced into the mold of "Americanization." He concludes in chap. 6 with reflections on religion and culture by various theologians (Rahner, Pieris), popes and other religious leaders, and conciliar authorities.

On the issue of authority Ruether is the most forthright of the two. For her, four sources are to balanced as sources of "credible teaching": the episcopal magisterium (Rome), Scripture and tradition, theological and social experts, and the "experience of the people." The hierarchy in her view is merely to enunciate a consensus of all these, not originate or control it. Fitzpatrick is more conservative. There is an "essence of Christianity" that cannot be negotiated in the process of balancing various cultures with the Christian input. Yet he is sometimes critical of papal decisions over against trends he likes, such as when a pope condemned the compromise with ancestor worship achieved in M. Ricci's "Chinese rites." He believes western Christian theology will have to yield much to third-world thought and culture and come out of its "Greek and Roman mold." His view of Scripture is liberal: As form criticism would hold, "God identified His revelation to the Hebrews with a culture" (p. 15). A more conservative view might be that God, by means of his law, created a culture that would fit the revelation he wanted to convey. When Fitzpatrick avers that "the original apostles spoke no Greek" he is apparently denying the authorship of Matthew to the apostle who was a tax-collector and so must have been fluent in three languages.

In summary, Fitzpatrick approves of Christianity breaking out of its mold in a western style of life into fulfillment in the ways of life of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Evangelical missiologists will resonate to many of his themes while holding to a higher view of Scripture. Ruether's thesis illustrates a Catholic approach to these issues with which few evangelicals will sympathize.

Gilbert Brewster Weaver
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The growing concern in evangelical circles for the lost megacities of the world has found a spokesman. Bakke has written a guidebook on how to penetrate and evangelize the world's inner cities—a guidebook that flows from his earned credibility as one who has successfully done both in inner-city Chicago.

While Bakke traces his own call from rural to urban ministry in the first chapter, the second chapter is a survey of the population shift to and identification of the megacities of the world. A chart (p. 29) on population history and projections of the megacities is included, along with a major-city classification system identifying them as cultural, political/administrative, commercial, or symbolic—with the primary megacities being those that combine the aspects above.

The heart of the book describes how to minister in the inner city. Bakke rejects the polarization of social ministry versus spiritual ministry (p. 145) so typical of those suburban churches that feel it is an either-or situation. He exposes the problem the average Christian has even caring for the city, let alone evangelizing
it. The city, of all audiences, needs personal evangelizing and pastoring that utilizes the networking inherent in family, vocation, recreation and location (friendship evangelism). He rejects the impersonal approaches of television and mass crusade as artificial and inadequate (p. 146).

Bakke adamantly maintains that until the pastor identifies and begins utilizing the inner city’s power/influence/decision structure for the kingdom he/she will be powerless to minister fully to the pressing needs. This point is challenging especially to evangelicals who insist upon an apolitical social posture. But Bakke demonstrates that congregations can and do work together in such a way as to improve and employ the systems that control the fate of the inner city.

Bakke’s chapter on raising a family in the inner city is a clarion call that needs to be heard by evangelicals. The Jonah-like flight to the suburbs and beyond by pastors and members alike has falsified our claim that the city should and must be redeemed. Bakke suggests that the pattern for raising your family in the inner city be that of the missionary family. Their strong interdependence usually overcomes the dangers encountered on the field and often results in producing second- and third-generation missionaries. In order to succeed mentally in inner-city ministry Bakke stresses that one needs to develop a “global meaning system” that places families in a larger historical perspective (p. 181).

The homogeneous-unit principle is rejected as incompatible with Biblical teaching (p. 138) and unworkable in the inner city. Insights are offered on how the Church can become multicultural in such a way that ethnic differences are maintained and appreciated and yet blended together in kingdom ministry. Suburban theology and practice, however, may be offended at certain points in Bakke’s strategy. There is always an uneasy tension between the now and the not yet in kingdom work—especially in the inner city. Methods and approaches to evangelizing may be far more radical (socially and politically) and may have to embrace some rather “un-Christian” situations temporarily. But Bakke compares this reality to that of first-generation missions in pagan cultures where one simply cannot change everything at once—maybe not for a long time.

Bakke concludes that the realization of effective ministry in the inner cities of our world will occur by means of establishing genuine equipping ministries in the churches. Pastors must train and equip the people to be ministers in their respective spheres of influence. While culture tends to view these inner-city systems as hopeless and corrupt, Bakke views them as imbued with possibilities for influence among an amazing concentration of lost peoples and needy persons—all at your doorstep in the inner city.

Dan Cameron
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The book under review is a theological defense of the animal-rights movement. As his central point Linzey argues that animals have “theos-rights.” This means that “God as Creator has rights in his creation”; that animals “are subjects of inherent value to God”; and that “animals can make an objective moral claim which is nothing less than God’s claim upon us” (p. 69).
Next Linzey spells out four areas where practical change should be made out of respect for animals' "theos-rights": protection from "wanton injury" (sport, entertainment, neglect, cruelty), "institutionalized suffering" (intensive farming, painful experimentation), "oppressive control" (zoos, pets) and "slaughter." At a minimum, Linzey believes this implies a vegetarian lifestyle, though he does not accept the radical vegan lifestyle that avoids even dairy products and leather shoes.

Linzey makes a number of good points. For instance, he argues that evolutionists are wrong to claim that cruelty to animals is a vice peculiar to Christians (p. 24). To his credit Linzey is less strident than radicals in the movement and less polemical than in his first volume, Animals Rights: A Christian Assessment (1976). Even though animals have rights, he argues, sometimes those rights must be sacrificed to animals' rights. His conclusions about cruelty, intensive farming, gratuitous and painful experimentation, and inhumane methods of slaughtering have weight. And he is not naive about the practical problems involved in changing our social structure to protect animals' rights.

But Linzey's conclusions are more satisfying than his arguments. If animals have "theos-rights" because they are created by God, then do the vegetables created by God have "theos-rights"? Biblically, Linzey counters, animals are classed with humans and contrasted with insects and vegetables. Humans and animals both have "spirit" (meaning "physical breath"). They have flesh and blood. Indeed, "whatever hope there might be for a future life for humans applies equally to animal life as well" (pp. 78–79; 37).

The virtue of these arguments is less their inherent plausibility than that they support the cause. Linzey's arguments sound like those of a "true believer." Consider these: "Since the *ousia* assumed in the incarnation is the *ousia* of all creaturely being, . . . what is effected in the incarnation for man is likewise effected for the rest of the non-human creation" (p. 34). "Since an animal's natural life is a gift from God, it follows that God's right is violated when the natural life of his creatures is perverted" (p. 112). "The election of Spirit-filled creatures [yes, including animals] . . . gives them . . . 'inherent value' by virtue of their capacity to respond to him" (p. 80). (Cf. "the theos-rights perspective does not locate the value of beings in any faculty or capacity, but in the will of God, which may be deduced from the givenness of Spirit-filled individuals" [p. 76].) Do these inferences work?

In a word, these arguments can be bettered. There is little serious, specific exegesis of Biblical texts. (For example, Linzey displays little sensitivity to various uses of *nepeš* and *pneuma.* "Traditions" are used loosely to reach predetermined conclusions. Those conclusions, if extreme, are often worthy. The paths used to reach them are not.

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Human rights have been a major point of discussion between the western world and other countries. One thinks especially about North American criticism of human rights in the Soviet Union, Israel and Central America. Similarly human rights "at home" have been the banner under which people have fought for and against abortion, homosexual acceptance and related causes. In a very readable
book (especially considering his subject) Holleman has attempted to evaluate this discussion in a theological perspective.

Holleman begins by showing how North Americans, in the tradition of western liberalism, define human rights in individualistic terms and how other societies (the Soviet Union, the Moslem world, and third-world countries in Latin America and Africa are his examples) define them by focusing more on collective rights. To them the decadence of North America is a result of a lack of proper human rights. Our pointing finger is viewed as a form of hypocrisy. How shall this impasse be broken?

Holleman examines Jacques Maritain and Reinhold Niebuhr and critically evaluates their theological contributions to this discussion. Of the two he finds Niebuhr the most helpful in critiquing western liberal idealism. He notes that if we take sin seriously, nonwestern nations have a right to fear the imposition of western (especially American) cultural hegemony through the human-rights movement. Niebuhr has also suggested that human beings must not be viewed solely as abstractions with certain rights but as people in a given historical-cultural milieu, as citizens who have not simply certain personal rights but also certain responsibilities and limitations. A dialogue is required in which liberal rights are balanced with economic and cultural rights.

Given the heated discussion of rights that is taking place in North America, this book would be valuable reading for any Christian who wishes to explore the deeper issues: In Holleman’s terms (although his concern is with international human rights) abortion is an issue precisely because the liberal human rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are abstract rights without regard to the historical-cultural situation of the individual (e.g. the woman, the medical personnel, the father of the child, the child himself). This book is even more helpful because of its clarity and its frequent summaries. Would that all ethical writing were as readable!

On the other hand, evangelicals will recognize that for all its excellence this book is weak in the area of Biblical reflection. What does the fact that Paul and Peter expect women and slaves to hold religious opinions different from their husbands or masters mean for individual human rights? What does the dealing of Yahweh with nations or the treating of the Church as a “body” mean for putting human rights within wider contexts? These are only two of many questions that we who want to reflect upon these concepts Biblically might wish to raise. We will not find the answers in this book.

Holleman’s book, therefore, is a good beginning. It will assist us in avoiding a culturally-myopic proof-texting that answers questions while uncritically assuming the truth of western liberalism (e.g. western democracy). It poses many important questions and suggests some answers, and therefore it should be read. But we must not stop with it. Evangelicals need to go on to write a second volume that will respond to western values from a Biblical perspective.

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This book begins innocuously as an attempt to set forth a Christian anthropology in dialogue with the major religions of the world with special reference to
the concept of a salvific word or revelation from God. But Viladesau, a Roman Catholic theologian, follows K. Rahner in concluding that Jesus is “a” savior but not “the” Savior for all persons: “Thus Jesus as a human being does not exhaust every human possibility of a positive relation to God and to others; he is rather the ‘exemplar’ of how every such possibility is to be realized” (p. 233). The author not only endorses Rahner’s concepts of the “supernatural existential” and the “anonymous Christian” but goes further in agreement with J. Cobb, calling for a “mutual transformation” of religions, advocating that “Christianity integrate within itself the positive elements of other faiths” (p. 251). Viladesau concludes his book as follows: “The Christian churches would do a service to Christianity and to the world by consciously making themselves a new context for the Buddhist tradition—as the Church did, less consciously, for neo-Platonism. A Christianity expressed in terms of Buddhist wisdom or of Vedanta philosophy—alongside its Semitic and Greek inheritance—will be Christianity enriched with a further dimension of Christ, and more capable of presenting itself as a sign of his salvation to the world.”

Here we have another volume in the crescendo of voices (Rahner, W. C. Smith, Cobb, Hick, Knitter, et al.) relativizing the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as “the” Savior for the whole world. This may be the most urgent theological issue for the Christian Church today.

While we may disagree with Viladesau’s syncretistic conclusions, he is quite correct in his assumption that theology must be done today in relation to the plurality of world religions. To conclude that they have no truth would be facile indeed. The validity of correlative and competing truth-claims from the major religions must be examined with care. This constitutes the strength of the volume. Viladesau is an able scholar of world religions—especially Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. Together with his fine grasp of Christian scholarship, such as Troeltsch’s critique of the absoluteness of Christianity, Viladesau advances his own position further relativizing the salvific uniqueness of Jesus. Chapter 8, “Salvation in Christ,” is pivotal. Viladesau asks: “Does the affirmation of Jesus as the ‘absolute savior’ imply exclusivity—or is it possible for the ‘absolute saving event’ to be plural in its historical realization?” He answers that, for the NT Christian, faith in Jesus is absolute but not exclusive (p. 237). Jesus is not the sole historical salvific mediation from God. This volume should be read by every serious Christian apologist to better understand the theology behind the Jesus-“a”-savior position gaining momentum today.

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Hayter demonstrates that the misuse or nonuse of the OT in the debate about women’s role and ministry in the Church leads to a misunderstanding of NT references. She challenges the conclusions of “those who take a more orthodox view of the authority of Scripture but whose mishandling of the complex hermeneutical problems surrounding the text undermines the credibility of the Bible in the modern world” (p. 2).
The book is organized in two parts, each with four chapters. In part 1 Hayter discusses assumptions about the OT that impinge upon the issue of women's role and ordination in the Church today. One such assumption is that the maleness of God necessitates the maleness of the priesthood. She rightly concludes in chap. 1 that what is important in the OT is not to prove the maleness of God but rather to define Yahweh as the God of Israel and to differentiate him from other gods and goddesses of fertility cults. Yahweh is neither male nor female but transcends human categories of sexuality. Chapter 2 concludes that Biblical language about God likewise does not connote a male or female God but a personal relationship with a transcendent Deity.

In chaps. 3 and 4 Hayter deals with women's exclusion from the priesthood of Israel. She concludes that woman's subordinate social status and ritual uncleanness affected her theological standing and resulted in her religious inferiority. To dissociate from cultic sexual custom Israel chose a single sex for the priesthood, and ipso facto women's inferior theological status qualified only men. For Hayter this perspective no longer precludes women from entering the ministry.

The four chapters in part 2 are the fruit of much careful exegesis and research and constitute a major strength of the book. The author analyzes each Biblical text in light of its historical context, especially those in which Paul uses the Genesis accounts.

In chap. 5 Hayter analyzes Gen 1:26-27 and rightly concludes that an unbiased exegesis provides no grounds for believing that woman does not fully participate in the image of God as does man. In chap. 6 Hayter demonstrates that the traditional deductions made from Gen 2:18-22 that women are inferior and subordinate in creation do not hold up under careful exegesis. For example, the precedence of man based on the order of creation does not denote superiority but, Hayter argues, that woman is the climax of the creation narrative. Woman's creation from man's rib does not support man's superiority but indicates sameness of substance. The words 'ezer kénegdo ("helper fit for him") are defined by Hayter as one who comes to his aid, as one who is equal and complementary (p. 102). Her exegesis of the fall in Gen 3:1-16 counters the misconception that Eve is a weak temptress by showing that the fall is a collective social act. For Hayter the fall results in sin, a state of "disarrayed human sexuality" in which male dominance and female subordination are a consequence (pp. 107-108).

In chap. 7 Hayter discusses Paul's use of the Genesis 1-3 passages with reference to the role of women in the Church. Here she is most creative, giving a fresh approach and interpretation of 1 Cor 11:2-16; 14:33-36; 2 Cor 11:3; 1 Tim 2:11-15; Gal 3:27-29. With regard to 1 Cor 11:2-16 she counters such misconceptions as hierarchical leadership of man over woman based on v 3 with a discussion of kphalē as "source" rather than as "superior rank." She contends that Paul takes Gen 2:21-23 literally to show that woman's source is from man but that derivedness does not imply subordination (p. 120). In v 7 Hayter concludes that Paul goes beyond the egalitarian interpretation of the image of God in Gen 1:26-27 and incorporates Jewish teaching containing androcentric tendencies that thus exclude woman from equal participation in the image of God. In v 10, Hayter contends, Paul uses his rabbinic training as a foil against which women's new status in Christ can be contrasted (pp. 122-123). Women are to pray and prophesy in worship on their authority.

In her discussion of 1 Cor 11:11-12; Gal 3:28 Hayter states that Paul provides a reversal of Jewish law, emphasizing women's new status in Christ as no longer subordinate to men under the law. She touches upon the issue of women's equal status in Christ in the work and ministry in the early Church in light of Gal 3:28.
She contends that in times of conflict Paul acquiesced to Jewish teaching based on the OT that women were to be subordinate (1 Cor 14:33–36).

In chap. 8 Hayter demonstrates that the culture-critical method used in modern scholarship can help produce a viable objective interpretation, true to the meaning of the text for the modern Church. She warns, however, that this method should not be confused with radical relativism that diminishes Scriptural authority. She is not advocating a selective approach but a synthetic approach, where one text illumines the other (p. 164).

Hayter’s book is well worth reading for a careful and objective exegesis of difficult, often misconceived passages pertaining to women. Although it is not a treatise for or against women’s ordination, as Hayter points out, it would be helpful if she could one day follow through her conclusions and make a case for women’s equal role in the ministry and work of the Church.

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This is the most helpful book on the doctrine of sanctification that I have read. Zondervan has brought together five evangelical Protestants, well known in their respective circles, and compared and contrasted their distinct views on progressive sanctification. Each author represents a major school of thought. Dieter has written from the Wesleyan perspective, Hoekema from the Reformed perspective, Horton from the pentecostal perspective, McQuilkin from the Keswick perspective, and Walvoord from the Augustinian-dispositional perspective. In addition each author has written a response to each of the other views. This gives the reader invaluable interaction between competent spokesmen for these major schools of thought.

A surprise to the reader is the realization that the authors agree with each other more than they disagree. Each author attempts to cover the same ground in progressive sanctification, and most of the difference is in emphasis, not in basic presuppositions. This could be attributed to the fact that none of the authors has written from an extreme perspective within his school of thought. Each represents at least the mainstream viewpoint within his school of thought, if not a more conciliatory position. For example, Dieter can hardly be considered an extreme example of Wesleyan thought. He is careful to explain entire sanctification in the least offensive terms possible. And Hoekema is not an extreme example of Reformed thought. Walvoord finds himself agreeing with Hoekema almost too much and cautions that Hoekema does not always represent classical Reformed positions. McQuilkin presents the Keswick position carefully so that all Keswick teachers could agree with him, even though they vary a great deal among themselves.

The result of this congenial interchange is that the student of sanctification learns the contributions of each viewpoint without being alienated by any. He learns that no one viewpoint can account for all the Biblical data and that each emphasizes one aspect of the truth to the exclusion of some other important aspect. What Zondervan has done so admirably is to stimulate dialogue among theologians. We need much more of this. We can learn a great deal from each other. The
student of sanctification will learn to temper his own view with the balance of correct emphases from the other views. The result is a more Biblical view of sanctification.

Though I would rate the book as excellent, there are a few criticisms I would make. They relate mostly to approach. In order best to compare the views, each author should have written from the viewpoint of the mainstream within his school of thought. Dieter and McQuilkin can be commended for this. Hoekema, Horton and Walvoord wrote from their personal viewpoints, however. This makes accurate comparison more difficult. Also, Horton spent too much space tracing his grandfather’s involvement in the origin of the pentecostal movement, and Walvoord’s attempt at tying the dispensational perspective to Augustine is weak.

Some have questioned whether a unified approach to sanctification exists among dispensationalists in order to warrant inclusion as such in this book. I am convinced that Walvoord has aptly demonstrated this. No other view emphasizes the two-nature view of the believer, or the possibility of a carnal lifestyle, as does the dispensationalist perspective.

I highly recommend this book to anyone seeking answers to his questions on sanctification.

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This work is a collection of most of Adams’ published papers on philosophy of religion during the last fifteen years. The essays are organized under four headings: faith, the problem of evil, religious ethics, and religious metaphysics. Students of Kierkegaard will particularly appreciate the first section, which deals with Kierkegaard’s objections to historical, probabilistic arguments for religious assertions. The first section also includes a previously unpublished essay on Kierkegaard’s notion of “the leap of faith.” Section 2 is concerned with the “possible worlds” discussion within current analytical philosophy and includes an essay arguing against A. Plantinga’s resurrection of the theory of middle knowledge. Section 3 deals with the meaning of “ethically wrong” within the divine-command theory of metaethics. One will also find an interesting essay on moral arguments for the existence of God in this section. The last section includes essays on contingency, necessity, and the logic of Anselm’s theistic arguments. The final essay consists of a previously unpublished argument for the existence of God based upon perceptual uniformity (“phenomenal qualia”).

Adams’ apologetic for theistic belief is to be appreciated. His stated purpose in writing is to break through the idea that theistic belief is “naively old-fashioned” and that there is no objective basis for belief in God. Such an apologetic is certainly needed in a theological-philosophical environment that takes it as a given that human religiosity is the only aspect of religion that is available to scientific analysis.

I have but two criticisms of Adams’ work. The first may be perceived as the picking of nits, and the second is the sort of criticism that philosophers of religion ought to expect from theologians and is therefore not aimed solely at Adams but all writers in the discipline. First, Adams seems quite vague in his use of the word
“grace.” He appears happy to define “grace” as merely unconditioned and unmerited love (p. 56). Exegetically speaking, such a definition is not only impoverished but can in fact lead to theological problems. Charis in the NT, and especially in the Pauline corpus, does not merely denote unmerited love but unmerited divine love as expounded in the cross. Understanding that divine gratuity has to do with God’s answer in Christ to the problem of human sin ought to limit the semantic range of how we employ the word within theological contexts. Second, philosophical theologians and philosophers of religion would do well to seek a greater exegetical grounding for their work. To my knowledge there is no preface attached to Holy Scripture that claims that its contents are the sole property of the theologian and are thus closed to the philosopher. The correlation of the findings of exegesis and philosophical argument only works to the mutual defense of both. Exegesis ought to work as a first-order testing of philosophical theses.

The appropriate audience for Adams’ work is probably a rather small minority of our membership. The semantic arguments, logical symbolism, and possible-worlds theory of analytical philosophy will doubtless leave many readers cold. Thus only those who work in the disciplines of philosophy and philosophical theology will find the work of real value. As a systematician I found the book very interesting, but I must admit that I probably would not purchase the book, nor would I be likely to return to it without some compelling reason.

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Sometimes it is hard to be on the outside of a movement and be able to look inside of it with sensitivity, but Poythress’ study of dispensationalism accomplishes this task well for one who was schooled in another approach. The book is an examination of the hermeneutics and history of dispensationalism. It focuses on classical dispensationalism as it existed under Scofield and Darby with some hermeneutical comments extending into the period of Ryrie, Walvoord and Tan. Numerous caveats exist that show an awareness of different groupings within dispensationalism (see chart on p. 36), but often Poythress’ critique applies only to more classical forms of the movement (as he notes on pp. 52, 57, 78, 109, 126). As a result some of the criticisms leveled against the movement will not apply as forcefully to current expressions of dispensationalism.

The goal of the book is twofold: (1) to acquaint those who do not know much about dispensationalism with its history and its “literal hermeneutic,” and (2) to evaluate that “literal” hermeneutical system. To accomplish the second goal, specific passages are examined.

The first three chapters survey the history of the movement and note that three types of dispensationalism exist, a description that is a very accurate picture of the current scene. The historical section closes with a notation of developments in covenant theology, especially the work of A. Hoekema. Dispensationalists who love to criticize the amillenarians for not believing in earthly fulfillment will no longer be able to offer such an unnuanced critique of amillennialism. As such, this chapter and Hoekema’s work are important for all dispensationalists to read.
The middle portion of the book attempts to explain why a debate with a dispensationalist is so difficult by concentrating on the hermeneutics of the movement. He notes two escape hatches in the "literal" hermeneutic: the appeal to "figures in prophecy," and the appeal to "applicational" use of the OT. He notes that these categories are appropriate ones to raise but questions whether they remove all the problem passages. He notes, correctly, that the appeal to figures within prophecy raises the possibility that in reading the text "plainly" one has to deal with the possibility of figures of speech. In fact Poythress argues, again correctly, that the phrase "plain" or "literal" interpretation is a slippery term, even when one examines actual dispensational usage (see chaps. 5, 8, 9). One must examine what Scripture says about itself in the particulars rather than simply articulating an interpretive principle.

This leads to the treatment of texts. Poythress examines two passages in detail (1 Cor 15:51-53; Heb 12:22-24) alongside a discussion of typology and the use of the term "Israel." He picks these texts because he believes they illustrate clearly how the NT handles itself and the themes of the OT. He believes the key to the issue is seeing how the book of Hebrews in particular handles the use of the OT, since it treats this area more fully than any other NT book (p. 70). What is seen is that the "literal" sense is superseded by the "typological-spiritual" (pp. 114-115), so that one need not look for the "shadow" of the earthly reality anymore. I do not know of a better place to find a succinct definition of the hermeneutics of amillennialism than here, including the effort to ground it in Scripture. He closes with the observation that if Scripture gives us this principle through the use of typology, which everyone acknowledges is present, then certainly one can apply this hermeneutic to the entire canon.

What is one to make of Poythress' study? He is to be commended for a fair, irenic evaluation of the movement. His comments, which apply most of all to classical dispensationalism, show why the Scofield Reference Bible was eventually released in an updated form. The old insistence on two New Covenants could not be held, and with this realization comes the fact that hermeneutics must be discussed on both sides. Poythress' book is a good starting point for such a discussion.

But four concerns remain. (1) I feel that when Poythress distinguishes between the "earthly" and the "typological-spiritual," even though appealing to Hebrews for the right to do it, he acknowledges that a referent, an OT one, that was a part of the promise has been superseded. Why make an "either-or" choice? He notes that the NT sees the promise of God in an "already/not-yet" form, so why not argue that the "not-yet" has an earthly and Israelite reality to it, as the OT seems to indicate? The loss of these referents is difficult to defend when one looks at Peter's words in Acts 3:18-21, where he says that all that the OT promised will come to pass.

(2) Is Hebrews really the best choice to settle this discussion? This strikes one as a form of reductionism, especially because Hebrews emphasizes the realized elements of eschatology, the "already," more than it does the "not-yet." What Hebrews shows is how present fulfillment can be explained and defended as a turning point in God's plan, but it does not deal sufficiently with future concerns to qualify as the point at which to settle matters.

(3) The dispensationalist's desire to continue to discuss Israel is important to him for one fundamental reason: The future of Israel is an issue of God's grace, faithfulness and promise. In the OT, God staked his promise on this nation by his grace and promise. It is the issue of God's Word that causes one to focus on Israel
and her future, just as Paul suggests in Rom 11:17-32. If these referents change or take on a “deeper” form and Israel loses out, then what happens to the picture of God’s grace and promise as the OT portrays it and as it is promised to us? For the dispensationalist the salvation of Israel is a small picture of one’s own salvation, for she will not have deserved it, just as individuals do not. It will be a triumph of God’s grace.

(4) I believe the dispensationalist could focus on “problem passages” too. Acts and Romans were mentioned above. I mention two more. First, what is one to make of Rev 20:1-6, with its repeated use of the term “one thousand years,” six times in a few verses? This frequency seems like an overuse of the figure unless the number means something. Second, Eph 2:11-22 (which makes the point that whatever the Church is, it is the new man) shows the distinctness of the Church from Israel as an institution. It had its start in the ministry of Jesus and the apostles when Jew and Gentile were brought together. Israel did not become the Church. Jews and Gentiles became Christians and entered the new entity.

Now it is certain that Poythress has answers to these concerns. So the dialogue can, must and should continue. The Church can only benefit from such honest, healthy discussion about what the Word teaches. And even if we cannot agree with one another, maybe we can appreciate one another’s concerns and recognize that we all share the view that when Jesus returns, one way or another his glorious power will be displayed so that all the earth can bow at his feet because of his grace. Poythress should be thanked for helping to open up healthy dialogue among brothers and sisters in Christ.

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Written by a pastor, this volume seeks to educate the layperson in basic Christian doctrine while showing how cults can distort these doctrines.

The author begins with an introduction as to why it is important to evangelize cult members. This is followed by four major sections, the first three dealing with three major doctrines (the person of Jesus Christ, the triune nature of the Godhead, the requirements for salvation) and the fourth with the question “Why is Christianity the truth?” Each section concludes with a series of reflective questions.

In illustrating doctrinal distortion the author uses not only the more familiar traditional cults such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Christian Science, The Way International, and the Worldwide Church of God (Armstrong) but also lesser-known groups of which little has been written from a Christian perspective, such as the followers of W. Branham and the “Jesus Only” theology. Furthermore the author cites current cult publications, such as the Watchtower’s You Can Live Forever in Paradise on Earth.

This volume would serve as a helpful tool in training Christians to reach people in the cults with the truth. It would also be a valuable addition to one’s cult reference library.

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**Mormon Neo-Orthodoxy: A Crisis Theology.** By O. Kendall White, Jr. Salt Lake City: Signature, 1987, x + 196 pp., $11.95 paper.

Finding the words “Mormon” and “neo-orthodoxy” juxtaposed in the title of this book may be somewhat intriguing to evangelicals. It will be worth their while to read it in order to discover just what the phenomenon of Mormon neo-orthodoxy is. The author is an oft-published Mormon professor of sociology. At the outset he makes clear that his approach is that of a sociology of religion prescinding from the truth claims of any particular theologies (quotation marks enclose the word “truth” when applied to religious claims—e.g. p. 25).

After providing a concise introduction to some tenets of the sociology of religion, White proceeds to develop his theory of the development of crisis theologies. These latter emerge out of social and cultural crises. A helpful schematic chart is provided (p. 22) that delineates the distinctions between low and high levels of both social and cultural crises. The theological responses to such crises are apocalyptic, apologetics, martyrlogy and neo-orthodoxy. Neo-orthodoxy arises when the basic conceptual meaning framework of a group is threatened (i.e. during a high-intensity cultural crisis). This in turn is caused by the secularization of culture and the corresponding weakening of religious structures through the rationalization and desacralization of human consciousness.

The significance of the neo-orthodox response is that it calls into question the adequacy of human reason, which in its heedless autonomy has precipitated the crisis. When a society’s meaning framework is rationalistically undermined, a pervasive feeling of contingency and powerlessness results. Neo-orthodoxy integrates these sensations involved in the experience of crisis into its understanding of the actual essence of human nature. Thus a humanity perceived through the crucible of cultural anomie understandably appears especially finite, sinful, inadequate, and in desperate need of the reassurance provided by a transcendent, sovereign God.

In order to explicate Mormon neo-orthodoxy, White incorporates a discussion of the more notorious Protestant neo-orthodox movement. He provides very good summaries of the thought of Barth, Brunner, and the Niebuhrs. Enlightened human reason had promised them much but could not deliver. Such crises as a World War and an economic depression, along with the devolution of the traditional gospel to ethics, spurred the Protestant neo-orthodox movement. With regard to the liberal assessment of human reason, such crises were powerfully iconoclastic. Thus the ascent of revelation tended to coincide with a “celebration of nonrationality” (p. 52).

As Protestant neo-orthodoxy is understood against the foil of modern liberalism, so Mormon neo-orthodoxy must be contrasted with what White terms “traditional” (or “humanistic”) Mormonism. This latter began to emerge after 1835 with the evolution of Joseph Smith’s speculative theology. The near orthodoxy of the Book of Mormon gave way to the innovations of the later King Follet discourse. White organizes his discussion of the developed doctrines under the headings of God, human nature, and salvation. God, in current mainline Mormonism, is finite. He is an exalted human male with a body of flesh and bone who conjugally cohabits with (at least one) mother deity. He is thus spatio-temporally located and therefore limited. As well, he did not create **ex nihilo** but merely organized preexisting matter. The plurality of other gods in the universe further finitizes him. The traditional Mormon deity, in brief, is humanity writ large. Human nature with its rational abilities is viewed with extreme optimism, as evidenced by the traditional
rejection of original sin along with the understanding of the human self as an eternal, uncreated (ontologically necessary) existent. The Genesis fall is radically reinterpreted as a necessary condition of the full flowering of humanity's innate godhood. Thus salvation (more correctly, exaltation) is seen as the proper use of one's radically free will to make all the appropriate choices conducive to the attainment of godhood.

Mormon neo-orthodoxy ("redemptive Mormonism") is a minority movement that has lately arisen from the crisis encounter of Mormonism with secularity. It differs from its Protestant namesake in that the latter takes Biblical critical methodologies far more seriously. The Mormon version has had the greatest doctrinal impact in the areas of human nature and salvation and almost none with regard to the understanding of God. Distinctively untraditional in its pessimistic assessment of human nature, this movement (re)turns to the Book of Mormon in order to justify a version of original sin. Autonomous human abilities are distrusted. Thus, as with the larger genus of neo-orthodoxy, in this Mormon species reason is subordinated to revelation. According to White, anti-intellectualism is apparent in the way this movement attempts to discredit critics by means of a revelational, presuppositionalist apologetic (p. 135; n.b. Westminster Van Tillians). The traditional merit view of salvation is conspicuously absent, with calls for salvation through faith (apart from works) in Christ, and even for the need for a "born again" regenerative conversion. Apart from God's grace, humankind is for these Mormons utterly without hope of redemption. Thus Pauline theology has finally found a toehold within Mormonism, according to the author.

While this may appear as a step in the right direction to evangelicals, White lucidly shows that a profound problem remains for Mormon neo-orthodoxy. In line with the diminished view of human nature, God is spoken of as absolute. And yet a glaring inconsistency emerges at this point. Neo-orthodox Mormons retain the traditional Mormon metaphysics in which God is corporeal and limited by other co-eternal metaphysical entities. White rightly concludes: "One simply cannot proclaim that God is absolute and retain traditional Mormon metaphysics" (p. 157).

The volume includes a praiseworthy bibliographical essay that leads the reader through the pertinent literature. By way of criticism, White does not abide by his self-imposed restriction with regard to theological truth claims. He notes that "Protestant fundamentalists" have utilized his own work in order to buttress their claims that Mormonism is not truly Christian. And rather than rest content with a sociological description here, he proceeds to theologize (poorly): "This argument obviously rests upon provincial evangelical Protestant assumptions about the essence of Christianity" (p. 174).

There are other problems that it would have been fascinating for someone of White's caliber to consider. For example, neo-orthodox Mormons are clear in their call for a soteriologically effective Christ. And yet is this still the Jesus Christ who is the firstborn in the preexistence of the conjugal union of father and mother deities? Traditionally Jesus is temporally such a firstborn, with Lucifer and all of humanity following as siblings of their "elder brother." How may these new Mormons advance beyond the traditional Mormon exemplar Christology with a Christ who differs by degree but not kind from those he would save? As well, do these new Mormons who call for a transcendent deity continue to participate in the Mormon temple ceremony that roundly ridicules the sovereign God of classical theism? Finally, what of the distinctive Mormon claim to continuing revelation? By what hermeneutic is the theocentrism of the Book of Mormon allowed to diminish the anthropocentrism of the King Follett discourse? In fact the Book of
Mormon to which appeal is made clearly teaches that the Lord does not limit his revelational scripture to any single volume. Still, such additional issues would merely be frosting on a cake of considerable substance.

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After virtually ignoring psychology for seventy-five years a few evangelicals entered its environs in the 1950s and 1960s, focusing mainly on specific counseling problems and issues. Next came "integration" in the early 1970s as evangelicals sought the common ground of psychology and theology. But while the integration issue remains unsettled, these three books hint that the conflict is winding down and that Christian psychology is coming of age.

The two books from Baker solidify that publisher's dominance in this emerging field. Benner has already produced the renowned Baker Encyclopedia of Psychology (1985) and Psychotherapy in Christian Perspective (1986). Moreover, Christian Counseling and Psychotherapy is the first of his Psychology and Christianity series, a joint project of Baker and the Christian Association for Psychological Studies (CAPS), which already projects four additional volumes. Both of these present volumes are collections of previously published articles: Counseling from the CAPS Bulletin (1974-82) and Journal of Psychology and Christianity (1982 on), Religion from the Baker Encyclopedia.

Psychology and Religion merits serious attention as the first contemporary psychology of religion by evangelicals. Despite the lack of continuity inevitable in a collection, Benner has arranged these fifty-two articles skillfully enough to give even nonspecialists a fairly comprehensive grasp of the field.

The material is divided into three distinct parts. The first focuses on the psychology of religion per se. The first article provides an essential orientation, while subsequent articles take up major aspects of religious experience. The nineteen articles of part 2 examine psychology from a Christian perspective. They address both major issues (presuppositions, mind-brain relationship, et al.) and major aspects (love, maturity, self-esteem, et al.) of scientific psychology. Articles by P. Vitz and M. Cosgrove call psychology to task rather severely. The other articles generally handle the subject more sympathetically but in a balanced way. The article on sexuality by S. Jones is particularly valuable. The remaining fourteen articles of part 3 depart from traditional psychology of religion by dealing with aspects of Christian faith having psychological implications.

It is here that new evangelical attitudes toward psychology are most apparent. Benner notes, for example, that "the Scriptures should not...be expected to provide a comprehensive theory of personality or psychotherapy" (p. 267). He admits that most Christian theories are merely revised secular versions. Yet his suggestion that Biblical themes may inform counseling actually legitimates this kind of eclecticism. W. Weyerhauser states that "Jesus calls each one to align with a way of being which brings one inwardly in touch with the deepest possibilities of
the self” (p. 317). Such a statement reads much more like human potential psychology than Biblical faith.

Christian Counseling and Psychotherapy, like Psychology and Religion, commands attention as an important contribution to Christian psychology in its own right. Directed more toward specialists it does not read so easily as Religion, but it does evidence an artful manipulation of the articles into a whole that, if not organic, is utilitarian. Three sections address “General Issues and Approaches” (six articles), “Specific Therapies and Techniques” (six articles) and “Case Studies” (nineteen articles) drawn from the experiences of very diverse Christian psychotherapists in equally diverse situations. These studies make for fascinating reading and graphically illustrate the pluralism in Christian counseling. Unfortunately the contributors are not identified, a troublesome omission for specialists and non-specialists alike.

Judging by this volume, the dominant question in Christian counseling is identifying precisely what makes it distinctively Christian. The contributors generally reject Biblicist models, and yet the alternative is a vague eclecticism that approaches Scripture to justify rather than generate data. More troubling, however, is that many of these Christian psychologists seems to have abandoned the effort of breaking this pattern.

The majority of articles in parts 1 and 2 make this clear. H. Wahking, for example, can only define “Christian counseling” in terms of three “contributions”: (1) The therapist is a Christian; (2) the framework of communication is Biblical; and (3) the goal is Christ-likeness. But he adds that reactions from non-Christian clients or therapeutic considerations may limit the value of these “contributions.” H. Ellens asserts that “Jesus was preoccupied, as were the prophets, with social-psychological wholeness” (p. 30). Thus sin must be a “failure in achievement of authenticity to self of full-orbed personhood in Christ” (p. 29). A. DeGraaff rejects both theoretical exclusivity and eclecticism, but his “integral mode” of psychotherapy merely appropriates different (secular) methodologies for what he calls the “dimensions” of human life (pp. 47-49). M. Vander Vennan manages only two explicitly religious references of any sort in an article brimming with enthusiasm for the family therapy movement associated with Bowen, Satir, Laing and others. One is her closing assurance that “God blesses such efforts” (p. 116).

The book by Collins addresses some of the evangelical uneasiness over trends reflected in these other two books. Collins writes with characteristic integrity and competence but with rather uncharacteristic passion. “Never before,” he writes, “have I felt so strongly that a book forming in my mind needed to be put on paper” (p. 12). He approaches his task by following his headline question with twenty-nine subsidiary questions about the value of psychology.

While Collins answers every question with unapologetic evangelical fervor he raises other questions in the process. He states that modern psychology represents “progress” (p. 92), that secular counseling may sometimes be the “best” help (p. 33), that “many benefits can come from therapy, in spite of its weaknesses” (p. 28), that Christians may use “secular” techniques just as the Christian physician uses ‘secular’ medical techniques” (p. 72). But these judgments are laden with value and are intertwined with a bewildering array of assumptions.

The tenuousness of these conclusions might have been anticipated. Collins answers the question “Can psychology be trusted?” early on with a highly qualified “Yes”: “When a psychologist seeks to be guided by the Holy Spirit, is committed to serving Christ faithfully, is growing in his or her knowledge of the Scriptures, is well aware of the facts and conclusions of psychology, and is willing to evaluate
psychological ideas in the light of biblical teaching—then you can trust the psychologist. . . . If the psychologist and or psychological technique is not at odds with scriptural teaching, then it is likely to be trustworthy” (p. 19).

Most evangelicals would heartily agree. But the answer is really not the answer; it is only another form of the question. Granted that we can trust deeply committed Christian psychologists, on what basis do we establish trust in a field fraught with a-Christian or even anti-Christian presuppositions, goals and values? “Psychology” and “Christian psychology” are not synonymous. It remains for evangelicals to press the question of what makes any psychology Christian.

In effect Collins assures us that godly people who study people are generally dependable. But the moment we step from that small zone of stability into the real world of psychology the assurances dissolve.

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This is a comprehensive volume designed to give a professional orientation within an institutional setting. The unique contribution that it makes is in terms of the spiritual concern manifest on its pages. While encouraging spiritual motivation, it is never divorced from the necessary professional competence required.

This is a technical volume that would be helpful in all clinics and institutions. It advocates a quality approach with techniques and skills. Supervision is understood as a learning process based on a relationship between supervisor and supervisee. Interpretation, professional identity, and personal integrity are the three dimensions identified as the foci of attention.

The content of this manual is not easily summarized. It is technical with a practical touch. It is religious, spiritual and Christian. It deals with all aspects of the supervisory process. Though it has a broad application to persons involved in social work, human services and graduate-level programs, it is limited in its application for the average pastor or church worker. Unless one is directly involved in a structured clinic where such supervision is an essential part of the operation, it would not prove practical.

The authors are well qualified educationally and experientially to write such a text. Their religious orientations are Lutheran and Roman Catholic. They have a particular liturgical pastoral background that sets the tone for their professional critique and their call to the mission of supervision. This book would serve well as an introduction to this subject.

John E. Hill
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This volume can be recommended highly to a large audience. Written as a supplement to the introductory courses offered in colleges, it should prove helpful to
parents, Christian students, serious laymen, Christian workers and pastors. It seeks to touch upon each of the subjects covered in today's ever-broadening world of psychology. Because the point of view taken and clearly stated in the title is "through the eyes of faith" (or, better, the "Christian" faith) the writers have a unique and helpful contribution to make.

Because so much of psychology falls under a neutral or even antagonistic attitude in the classroom, this book will allow the reader to reflect and interact with the subject from a Christian perspective. The book is not anti-psychology, nor does it adopt a narrow stance in terms of the Christian faith. It has more of a Reformed view of world and life integration. One would expect this from the previous writings of the two authors, both of whom have established themselves as highly qualified, distinguished authors and scholars.

For the most part the book is balanced from chapter to chapter. There are areas where one might want more on a given subject. In some instances more questions than alternative answers are given. But to bring the Christian faith to this discipline in the manner in which the authors have done it is a real service to the Church. The few negative comments I could make would be small and insignificant in light of the total positive impact of the text. It reminds me of a delicious smorgasbord of topics to be sampled and enjoyed by the reader. This sampler should well serve students committed to an integration of faith and learning.

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The volume under review presents a clear Biblical theology of work and suggests many practical implications. The book contains an excellent analysis and includes sixteen chapters, a brief annotated list of organizations for further help regarding the work issue, a suggested reading list, a general index and a Scripture index. Both authors are well equipped to confront this critical issue. Sherman is the founder and president of Career Impact Ministries (CIM), a Christian organization that helps business and professional people integrate their faith into their careers, and Hendricks is the executive director of CIM.

The book is divided into three parts. The chapters of part 1 present the need for a Biblical view of work and examine how Christians often view work. Part 2 presents a Biblical theology of work, discussing how God views work. Finally, part 3 examines a number of the practical implications of this theology. While the material is extensive, the flow of thought is smooth. Each chapter begins with a brief review of previous material and a brief preview of that chapter’s content.

Part 1 begins with the need for a Biblical view of work and a description of the secular view of work. This may seem slow to some, but the book’s relevance to the Christian community is quickly seen. For example, in chap. 3 the authors evaluate the "two-story" view of life, which divides things into superior and inferior categories (e.g. eternal things are more important than temporal things). Many Christians, especially collegians, have heard the pitch: "Since only God’s word and people are eternal, invest your life in full-time Christian service and implant God’s word in people." Sherman and Hendricks respond: "The problem with this view is
not that it fails to consult Scripture, but that it reads Scripture through a pair of glasses that distort its message” (p. 46). Their evaluation of this idea focuses on four related issues: (1) Is the soul more important than the body? (2) Are eternal things of more value than temporal ones? (3) Are sacred activities better than secular ones? (4) Does the clergy have a higher calling than the laity? The authors offer sound Biblical insights on each of these issues.

Sherman and Hendricks also seek to put evangelism in perspective by evaluating another common pitch: “Evangelism is the only reason God leaves Christians on earth. So use your work (and everything you do) to contribute to evangelism.” The authors respond to this idea by saying that while evangelism is indeed important, life (and particularly work) is more than just a platform for preaching.

In part 2 the authors first of all accurately demonstrate that work has both intrinsic and instrumental value. Intrinsic value arises from the nature of God (i.e. a worker) and the nature of man (i.e. a worker and coworker with God). Instrumental value comes from God-designed necessities of life (food, clothing, etc.). Thus work is a means to several ends: to serve people, to meet one’s own needs, to meet the family’s needs, to earn money to give to others, to love God.

In describing work the authors rightly qualify “work.” Work that is valuable in God’s eyes “somehow contributes to what God wants done in the world [e.g. provide for the needs of oneself and for others] and does not actively contribute to what He does not want done [e.g. prostitution, professional thievery]” (p. 84).

Many may ask: “Is not work a result of the curse upon Adam and Eve?” In response the authors again demonstrate sound Biblical exegesis. While work existed before the fall, the authors tell us, sin greatly altered the quality of work (e.g. made it harder and “futile”).

But if “it’s a jungle out there,” the authors ask, should one flee or fight? Some Christians withdraw from sinful society, choosing to work and live only with Christians. Others seek to reconstruct society along OT lines. Sherman and Hendricks reject both options: “Work is not our enemy. Sin is our enemy…. [Christ wants] to make us adequate to live in the jungle” (p. 107).

Having dealt both with man’s views and God’s view of work, the remaining portion of the book (part 3) covers practical implications. For example, concerning choosing a career the authors respond to the questions: How do inner impressions and feelings fit in? And what about “callings”?

In concluding the book the authors give consideration to lifestyle issues. For example, they challenge believers to reexamine their standard of living by asking: Are some needs really only wants? Should we live healthy and wealthy, or poor and pious, or neither?

The authors then examine the issue of how to relate to coworkers. Christians, they tell us, can impact non-Christians and Christians. Among non-Christians one must be a leader for Christian thinking and influence. Among Christians one should challenge, assist and motivate.

Step by step Sherman and Hendricks present a solution to restore potency to Christianity. Their message is greatly needed: Christianity and the Bible are relevant in the workplace. This book would benefit all—from secretary to scholar, from the church professional to the church layman, from the college student seeking a career to the seasoned career professional. The authors are adamant: Your work does matter to God.

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Moving into an era when men and women of the cloth are generally better cared for financially than they have been in the past has caused some rejoicing on the one hand and some new pressure and concern on the other. Many who personally served without reasonable financial support, or those who grew up in homes where financial support was lacking, had either not seen the need for financial planning or had been given some convictions against financial planning. Meyer's work is a welcomed treatise to give Biblical foundation, practical counsel, and solid opinion to the area of a minister's finances.

Beginning with the Scriptures, Meyer moves to applications of financial management that affect the minister's relationship with his church (or other religious employer), the government, the home, the household, the family (including college), investments, savings, retirement and social security. The crucial areas of personal finance are sufficiently covered. The ability to live on less as clergy is enjoined, and specific guidelines are outlined to move one into this direction without stereotyping the minister as the low-income person he/she often is seen to be.

Excellent information is presented on the pros and cons of home ownership. Criteria for making this most important decision are outlined and expounded.

Probably the best portion of the book for a larger audience is the chapter that deals with attitudes and actions of lay leaders toward the clergy. The matters detailed in chap. 15 include "Guidelines for Lay Stewardship," "The Housing Question" and the like. This chapter should be read by members of church boards and its directives heeded.

All in all I applaud Meyer's work. My fears, however, are twofold. First, its utter practicality and radical emphasis on stewardship might turn would-be readers away after a first glance. Second, it might be overlooked altogether by those it seeks to help the most because it deals with an issue that we too often hold as personally sacred and secretive. My advice to persons of the cloth: Buy, read, and heed this book.

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Now that Kaiser's OT "Toward" trilogy (including also Toward an Old Testament Theology [1978] and Toward Old Testament Ethics [1983]) is complete and its users have had ample opportunity to reflect on its contents, perhaps the time has come for an overall assessment.

At the outset I want to praise the author for his willingness to confront a broad selection of difficult issues in the general area of OT Biblical theology. He is not afraid to tackle the knottiest problems, and that is all to the good. Moreover he consistently arrives at solutions that are helpful, reasonable and thoroughly orthodox (if not always conventional).

Furthermore Kaiser demonstrates up-to-date knowledge of a large number of topics of contemporary interest in OT studies. He reads and ranges widely in his
chosen field(s) of expertise. One therefore gets the impression that he is at least moderately conversant with the most important themes in the current debate.

In addition Kaiser attempts to discuss topics with a fair degree of thoroughness. His sense of proportion is admirable, and he strives to strike a balance on the one hand between matters of special interest to him and on the other hand matters that he senses the need of addressing whether or not they particularly interest him. Moreover he is usually eminently fair in his treatment of opposing points of view.

Finally, no one can accuse Kaiser of being less than excitedly enthusiastic about his subject matter. He has had a long-standing love affair with the OT (indeed, with the entire Bible), and his unstinting devotion to it and its teachings suffuses every line that he writes about it. Kaiser clearly enjoys what he is doing, and this is an admirable quality in any worthwhile endeavor.

But, alas, this latter kind of strength can also provide elements of weakness. This is especially the case when an author’s enthusiasm causes him to blur the distinction between research and sermonizing, when he confuses academic presentation with hortatory preaching, when he substitutes the pulpit (and sometimes, unfortunately, the bully pulpit) for the lectern, when spontaneous oral style replaces a more thoughtful written style. Various dangers in such a procedure are not far to seek.

(1) Grammatical barbarisms and inconsistencies, to be studiously avoided in serious writing, often abound in oral presentation, especially in the heat of the argument. For Kaiser, “minutia” is a plural noun (Rediscovering 96), while “phenaomena” is singular (156; Theology 36)—but not because he is unaware of the fact that the proper singular form is “phenomenon” (Rediscovering 171). For those whom Kaiser quotes, “ethics” is this or that, but for Kaiser himself “ethics” both “is” (Ethics 3, 18, etc.) and “are” (5, 7, 10, 11, etc.). Other examples of subject-verb inconcinnities, as well as pronominal antecedent problems, are painfully frequent in his writings: “On these three questions hang [sic] the whole possibility of an ethics of the Old Testament. Each of these need [sic] to be examined in turn” (24). “Yet, many of the biblical laws differ markedly from these parallel law codes—especially in its [sic] use of the apodictic laws in the Ten Commandments” (97). While it may perhaps be legitimately argued that many if not most of such errors (as well as those described in succeeding sections of this review) should have been caught by Kaiser’s publisher and editor(s), all of us who write need to be reminded that the proofreading buck stops ultimately at the author’s desk.

(2) “Haste makes waste” and its companion, “The right hand knows not what the left hand is doing,” tend to be more common in oral style than in written style. Kaiser (Rediscovering 30) apparently confuses Greek elegmos (“conviction”) with elegchos (“correction,” n. 30; better elenchos, of course) without being aware of the fact that the latter is an inferior textual variant in the verse being discussed (2 Tim 3:16). I assume that instead of “composition” in Ethics 298 Kaiser means “compensation,” but who can say for sure? According to Theology 252 n. 1, Hag 2:7 “is not a reference to the Messiah” but “could be messianic”—a distinction that I doubt Kaiser wants to make there (and if he does, his reason for so doing will probably be as obscure to others as it is to me). When boiled down to its essentials, Ethics 99 n. 6 informs us—unhelpfully—that the term “Hebrew” is “Hebrew.” And Ethics 154 reminds us that Eve was Adam’s “helpmate,” while p. 204 tells us that she was his “helpeeme (not ‘helpmate’).”

(3) Oral style, more than written style, tends to rely on (often faulty) memory, which in turn leads to countless spelling and similar errors: “Friederick” Delitzsch (Rediscovering 15), “paidea” (31), “Tanaim” (42), “germaine” (99), “prefixial” (122),
“predominate” used as an adjective, the claim that “El Shaddai” is found frequently in Job (Theology 97) and that wisdom Psalms employ “numerical sayings, e.g., ‘three yea four’” (Theology 165–166—unaccountably repeated almost ten years later in Rediscovering 179), reference to the Supreme Court’s Roe v(s). Wade abortion decision as “Wade-Roe” (twice: Rediscovering 162, 184), “Anna” listed among OT women (Ethics 285). That faulty memory can be a hard taskmaster is painfully demonstrated by Kaiser’s misspelling of three names—those of Jephthah, Rizpah and Manasseh—in a single sentence (Ethics 262).

(4) Neologisms are more likely to make their appearance in the heady freedom of oral style than in the more exacting discipline of writing. Among Kaiser’s: “Christoexclusivism” (Rediscovering 18), “genra” (172; apparently intended as a plural of “genre,” or perhaps simply a misspelling of “genera,” the plural of “genus”—but again, who can say?), “principialized” (183; a coinage, or a misspelled “principalized”?), “prescriptivity.”

(5) Given as it often is to flights of hyperbole, oral style is more likely to be characterized by overstatement than is its written counterpart. Despite Kaiser’s careful marshaling of formidable authorities to concur with his thesis, how many would really agree that the OT is “the Christian problem” (Rediscovering 13)—whether of theology or of Bible study or of anything else? Was gnosticism really the “single most precarious crisis precipitated . . . in any age” (21)? While it is surely correct to say that “for Jesus . . . the canon began with Genesis and ended with 2 Chronicles” (46), does this justify the sweeping conclusion that “Jesus, with all his divine authority, placed his stamp of approval on the exact number of books as are now in our thirty-nine book canon” (ibid.)? How can we possibly know that? Is “holiness” really “the central organizing feature of Old Testament ethics” (Ethics 139)? Important though it surely is, why not more cautiously declare it to be one of the most significant organizing features?

A brief digression: Although his “promise theology” is not a result of hortatory enthusiasm, and although he has worked it out carefully over a period of many years, and although he unabashedly and generously and frequently declares his indebtedness to W. J. Beecher, “the father of promise theology” (cf. e.g. Rediscovering 98), Kaiser’s tendency toward overstatement surfaces here as well: “Do we not, therefore, have more than adequate basis for viewing ‘the promise’ as the Bible’s own center for the whole plan of God? It would appear that this is the only fair way to proceed” (93; italics mine). What shall we say then, e.g., of W. Eichrodt’s “covenant” or J. Hänel’s “holiness of God” or L. Köhler’s “commanding Lord” or J. Heller’s “will-imposing Lord” or B. Hessler’s “kingdom of God” or H. Wildberger’s “election” or Th. C. Vriezen’s “communion between God and man” or M. Noth’s “Israel” or of numerous attempts to focus on a literary unit or book of the OT as its center? Are all such attempts, as compared to Kaiser’s, to be deemed unfair? I think not. Fair is fair, and the elusive theological “center” of Scripture remains just as elusive for Kaiser as it does for others who have sought it. Whether the words of the old chorus asserting that “every promise in the Book is mine” can be substantiated in Scriptural context, that all Biblical themes can be subsumed under the general theme of promise remains unproven. Though very important indeed—and Kaiser is to be thanked for continually reminding us of its importance—“promise” is not the single unifying theme of Scripture, despite its usefulness in summarizing many of the Bible’s main teachings. G. Hasel, D. L. Baker, and others who share their viewpoint are surely right: The richness and inexhaustibility of Scripture strongly urge us to admit that the “center” of the Bible is multiplex and that most (if not all) of the scholars (including Kaiser) who have
sought a single, unitive center, however futile their attempt, have made a valuable contribution to Biblical theology as a whole. The Bible—OT and NT—has a way of spilling out over the edges of any attempt to impose a theological framework on it, no matter how clever and all-encompassing the grid of that framework may at first appear to be and no matter how loudly or indignantly this or that scholar might protest that he or she is practicing sheer induction/exegesis rather than deduction/eisegesis. Nor should those who recognize a multiplicity of centers be accused of epistemological fuzziness or of having “bought into another system, one which is antithetical to their own” (Rediscovering 87). One might just as well accuse Kaiser himself of departing from evangelicalism when he asserts that in Biblical narrative a frequent literary device is to “put a key speech in the mouth of one of the leading characters” (178)—but I will not so accuse him, because I know what he intends to say by that statement (at least I think I do).

(6) Finally—and this has not so much to do with oral versus literary style as it does with the ordinarily admirable energy and enthusiasm Kaiser brings to all his endeavors, literary and otherwise—a word is in order concerning his methodology in dealing with those who disagree with him on this or that point. I choose to concern myself here with but one example: his treatment of the Abrahamic covenant (since this happens to be a topic with which I am moderately familiar). My negative comments concerning the way in which Kaiser deals with this subject, however, will obviously have ramifications for the way(s) he treats a host of other emphases (and their proponents/opponents) as well.

Kaiser has consistently reaffirmed his view that, for Abraham, obedience was not a “condition” of the covenant that God established with him (Theology 62) but rather was a “duty” intimately tied up with promise as a desired sequel (Theology 92-94; Rediscovering 152-153). Without getting into the separate question of his insistence that the Genesis 15 land promise to Abraham has been fulfilled only in principle, never in actuality (Rediscovering 49-50)—an excellent example of the kind of minimalistic, noncontextual exegesis that Kaiser elsewhere deplores—I shall deal here only with the methodology he uses in opposing my view with respect to the conditionality of the Abrahamic covenant.

I wish first of all to thank Kaiser for calling attention—totally justified—to a weakness in my original paper on the subject. My quotation of G. Shama (cited by Kaiser in Rediscovering 152) was intended only to demonstrate a relationship between the Abrahamic covenant on the one hand and the lengthy curses section of Deut 28:15-68 on the other, not to affirm any belief on my part in the revocation or annulment of the Abrahamic covenant (which I do not in fact believe). That Kaiser should have assumed otherwise, however, is completely understandable. Shama’s voice was not the right one for me to select to cry out in this particular wilderness.

But at the same time I can only wish that Kaiser had read my paper a bit more thoroughly and carefully (especially since, ironically, he was the ETS program chairman who originally asked me to write it for presentation at an annual meeting). Had he done so, he would have realized immediately how very close (if not identical) are his conclusions and mine with respect to the conditionality/unconditionality of the Abrahamic covenant. His: “The ‘breaking’ or conditionality [of the Abrahamic covenant] can only refer to personal and individual invalidation of the benefits of the covenant, but it cannot affect the transmission of the promise to the lineal descendants” (Theology 157 [italics his], cited in Rediscovering 154). Mine: “[The Abrahamic covenant] is... not completely conditional[,]... nor is that what I am arguing for in this paper. I would prefer to say that whereas the
conditional elements in the Abrahamic covenant preponderate over its unconditional elements, the fulfillment of its promises for a believing remnant (Lev 26:40–45) is guaranteed by its quality of everlastingness (Gen 17:7, 13) which, in turn, springs from its divine establishment (15:18; 17:2, 7). As O. Palmer Robertson helpfully suggested to me in a private communication, one can hold to the conditionality of the Abrahamic covenant while still affirming the certainty of its fulfillment” (R. Youngblood, “The Abrahamic Covenant: Conditional or Unconditional?” in The Living and Active Word of God [ed. M. Inch and R. Youngblood; Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1983] 36 n. 23). Unless I am badly mistaken, the difference between Kaiser’s view and mine on this major point is overwhelmingly one of degree rather than of substance. In any case, the question of elements of conditionality/unconditionality in the various OT covenants has recently become a matter of further debate in a way that threatens to open up the entire discussion once again (cf. especially B. K. Waltke, “The Phenomenon of Conditionality within Unconditional Covenants,” in Israel’s Apostasy and Restoration [ed. A. Gileadi; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988] 123–139, esp. 127–130; W. J. Dumbrell, “The Prospect of Unconditionality in the Sinaic Covenant,” in ibid. 141–155).

Is all of this to suggest that I would not recommend the reading of Kaiser’s OT “Toward” trilogy (or, for that matter, his other volumes)? By no means. Whenever and wherever I teach courses in OT theology I invariably require students to read one of Kaiser’s books. They are current, informative, stimulating, heuristic, and—last but not least—fun. He sometimes writes too soon and seems driven to write too much and too often, but he has a lot to teach all of us. Walter Kaiser is my longtime friend and former colleague, and I want his readers to hear what he has to say and not be turned off by careless error and enthusiastic overstatement. He is too good a scholar to be dismissed as a shouting pulpiteer in scholar’s clothing. Kaiser’s colorful characterization of certain aspects of OT wisdom literature (Rediscovering 179) may well serve as a positive description of his own approach: “One might call this type of teaching ‘bumper-sticker theology,’ for it tries to get the most teaching across in the briefest, most memorable, and most ear and eye attention-getting manner possible.”

Ronald Youngblood
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Books on the gospel of Mark continue to flow from the press. Even professional scholars find it difficult to keep up with the latest theories. Matera has tried to bring some order to the chaotic state of Markan studies by summarizing for the student the present situation.

He has organized his book into five sections, each dealing with a main concern in the study of Mark. Chapter 1 discusses the various theories about the setting of the gospel. Is it a Roman, Galilean or Syrian gospel? Each position is succinctly stated, and then the author states his own view. Mark, according to him, writes to a “predominantly Gentile community, threatened by persecution, excited by apocalyptic expectation, and forgetful of the cross.” The Roman church of the late 60s seems to fit that description best.
The Christology of Mark’s gospel has been a real battleground during this century. It was W. Wrede’s *The Messianic Secret* that inaugurated the great debate, but it has gone far beyond Wrede. Most popular are the various views that find Mark’s gospel to be written to correct a defective Christology such as the *theios anēr* (divine man) Christology. Matera, quite rightly in my view, although appreciative of the contribution that corrective Christology approaches have made to the gospel of Mark—especially in directing attention to the importance of the suffering and death of Jesus—is reluctant to understand Mark’s Christology in those terms. He rather sees it in terms of narrative. “No heresy needs to be posited within the Markan community beyond the heresy which affects Christians of every age—flight from the cross.”

Next to Jesus in Mark’s gospel the disciples are the most prominent characters. What is one to make of Mark’s description of them? He presents them as committed to Jesus and his mission but also as very slow to understand who Jesus is and what his mission is all about. Does Mark have certain polemical purposes in mind in his negative portrayal of the disciples? Is he reacting against the historical disciples and/or the leadership of the Jerusalem church? Or is it more likely that Mark has a pastoral concern? By showing the failure of the disciples he is warning all disciples of Jesus that to follow in the way of the cross is not easy.

Chapter 4 takes up the knotty question of the composition of Mark’s gospel. Here again there is no real consensus. Was Mark a creative redactor who significantly changed the traditions he received about Jesus, or was he a conservative reactor and theologian who respected the historicity of the tradition and served only to arrange and perhaps emphasize certain parts of it? Matera thinks that these questions are far from being solved and perhaps never will be.

Finally, the author turns to the question of the narrative of Mark’s gospel. Most recent criticism concerns itself with literary and rhetorical criticism. Matera believes that this is the proper place to begin, and “when that agenda has been fulfilled, perhaps we can return to the question raised by the nineteenth century: Who is Jesus of Nazareth?”

I found Matera’s book to be a helpful summary of current Markan studies and his own views on the issues raised to be basically sound.

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Every generation needs a fresh understanding and application of a “theology of the cross.” This is McGrath’s expressed purpose as he places Martin Luther’s theology of the cross in a contemporary idiom. It is the cross that challenges the complacency of the Church and marks a dead end for much thinking about God. It is only through the cross of Jesus Christ that the relevance of the Christian gospel to contemporary society and the distinctive identity of the Christian faith can be established.

Unlike many theologians who seek to apply the relevance of the cross narrowly, either to political concerns or for its existential impact, McGrath stresses the centrality of the cross according to the Biblical tradition. The meaning of the cross is not abstracted from the clear teaching of the NT. “Christianity’s relevance,”
insists McGrath, “depends upon maintaining its identity” (21). All who seek a specifically Christian outlook on existence, “embracing matters of doctrine, ethics, and spirituality,” must grasp the meaning of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The distinctive element in McGrath’s work is his stress on the meaning of the cross as opposed to the example of the cross. By no means denying the ethic of the cross, McGrath emphasizes its foundational theological truths.

The inescapability of the cross lies not in a moving display of human suffering but in God’s revealed Word. For McGrath, only God could explain the enigma of the cross. We need to be told what to believe and understand about God. Our comprehension of the cross comes through the reading of Scripture, through being confronted with the Christian proclamation and through our experience of Christian worship (42). McGrath argues that the revelational meaning of the cross has been obscured or denied by the profound impact of Enlightenment rationalism. The current intellectual bias against the wisdom of the cross is due to a misguided dependency upon empirical reasoning and the myth of objectivity.

McGrath does not interpret the cross primarily in terms of “principles, concepts or ideas.” He has no intention of reducing the meaning of the cross to theological “statements.” “To behave in this way is to assume that the cross is some sort of sophisticated divine educational technique for ensuring that we learn things about God” (82). Nor does he believe that a theological statement is capable of fully comprehending the mystery of the cross. Through the Word of God we may comprehend the meaning of the cross as an historical event with absolutely crucial theological consequence, but we can never exhaust that meaning and “domesticate God by reducing him to some set of manageable formulas” (81).

For McGrath the reality of the crucified and hidden God has eternal significance for the immediate human situation. The cross of Jesus Christ, in all of its historical particularity and revealed theological meaning, has profound existential and ethical impact. The true identity of the cross has relevance for us “as we exist here and now, as we struggle to make sense of our own situation and our ultimate destiny.” “Through faith we are assured,” writes McGrath, “that the destiny of the one who was crucified and raised is our destiny—we learn to read our personal history into the story of the cross” (107). The difference between modern theologians who draw out this existential dimension and McGrath is that the latter defines the “word of the cross” for those who hear Christian proclamation as “a direct and immediate challenge . . . to reorientate their hearts and minds towards the person of Jesus Christ” (125).

The whole of life comes under the profound truth of the cross. “The cross is not just about one chapter of the Christian faith,” affirms the author. It embraces “every aspect of our existence as Christians” (187). It would have been helpful for McGrath to articulate specific reasons why he is optimistic that the cross “is emerging from its shadowy existence as a symbol to assume its rightful place as the foundation and criterion of Christian faith” (150). If what McGrath believes is true—namely, that “the cross stands as the final contradiction of those who proclaim that becoming a Christian involves an easy passage through life” (163)—then current talk of the cross in popular evangelicalism appears to be missing the point. Perhaps we are more attracted to triumphalism than we are compelled by the cross.

Throughout his book the author reminds us of the critical importance of a theology of the cross. He takes us beyond the “theories of the atonement” and presents the cross as a life challenge. According to McGrath, churchmen and academic theologians need “to be forced to return to Calvary.” Echoes of Luther can be heard in McGrath’s challenge: “Their perspective upon life and their calling
might be improved by rubbing their collective noses in the blood and gore of the cross, in order to remind them of the full seriousness and cost of redemption of humanity, with whose proclamation they are entrusted" (178).

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The volume here reviewed is part of the Wadsworth Basic Issues in Philosophy series. The book addresses issues in philosophical theology, reflecting recent developments in the field. While dealing with the traditional problems in philosophy of religion, Wainwright also addresses nonwestern religions and the epistemic status of religious beliefs.

Wainwright establishes a case for a maximally perfect reality. Various worldviews differ on the nature of maximal perfection (e.g. personal or impersonal). For theists, God's impassibility and foreknowledge can create difficulties. But theists can still develop a relatively coherent concept of God.

While the concept of God may be conceivable, evidences support the plausibility of God's existence. Wainwright examines three classical arguments for the existence of God: ontological, cosmological, design. The premises are plausible, and the arguments may be sound. Although theists have employed miracles to support their case, miracles require the appropriate presuppositions. This makes them less convincing.

Evil poses the main challenge for the theist. This challenge, however, can be diffused by the strength of the theistic argument, the support of the theory of sufficient reason, and the plausibility of the reasons behind God's permission of evil. Evil is less serious if immortality can be supported. The belief in immortality depends more on a religious worldview than on a philosophy of mind.

The case for theism continues with an affirmation of the validity of mysticism and religious experience. While mystical experiences are veridical, interpretations of those experiences conflict. Nevertheless the experiences *per se* are valid. Wainwright bases the case for mysticism on the controversial principle of credulity.

Assessment of evidence for and against religious claims is affected by experiences and "passional factors." As a result, philosophers have employed nonevidential approaches in dealing with the problem of faith and reason. Wainwright examines the nonevidential approaches of B. Pascal, S. Kierkegaard, D. Z. Phillips, W. James and A. Plantinga. Nonevidential approaches rightly insist that faith does not totally depend on reason. Nevertheless, Wainwright concludes, faith cannot be unreasonable.

Competing worldviews are assessed using twelve main criteria. Briefly, a good worldview explains real facts, is consistent with other knowledge, meets formal criteria, possesses explanatory power, and satisfies a pragmatic criterion. The author applies these criteria by examining rival worldviews.

Wainwright concludes that the criteria require careful judgment on numerous complex issues. Religious beliefs are, at best, strongly rational and, at least, weakly rational but not irrational.

*Philosophy of Religion* successfully presents a cumulative case for a religious worldview. Arguments are presented with sufficient detail. Helpful bibliographies
list further reading both for and against the stated position. It is controversial to argue from conceivability to plausibility to necessity on key issues. But Wainwright correctly concedes that "the evidence is too complex and ambiguous to compel assent" (190). He offers a balanced position on faith and reason in assessing rival worldviews. This book makes a valuable contribution to classical theists engaged in philosophical theology.

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Both books describe themselves as introductions to Christianity. As such they differ in virtually every way, including effectiveness. Cantelon, a pastor, offers an introduction to Christian belief and practice for people normally put off by theology; he succeeds admirably. McKenzie, an academic, offers what he calls a phenomenological study of Christian beliefs and practices; it is mistitled.

Cantelon thinks we need to be more aware of our theology. He says we all are theologians, but some of us are good and others bad. He wants bad theologians to become good and good ones to become better. He bases his claim on the intuitive knowledge of God every human has. Using anecdotes, illustrations and reason, Cantelon expands on this fundamental premise before offering an introduction to Christian theology. The book is not a complete theology in that it focuses on prolegomena and the doctrine of God. It is theology directed at the theologically uninitiated. That is one reason why Cantelon has not dotted all the i’s or crossed all the t’s evangelical scholars might desire. Nonetheless he offers a sound, conservative statement of the gospel for modern readers.

Possibly the most attractive aspect of Cantelon’s book is its style. He writes clearly, uses many illustrations from life, and shows a good sense of humor. He makes it clear that he stands squarely within historic Christianity and does so in an irenic manner. Where he believes criticism is warranted, however, he offers it. Academics may not learn a lot of theology from this book, but they can learn how to communicate better in writing and in the classroom.

Cantelon begins with a discussion of the existence of God. He uses the traditional arguments, recognizing that they are insufficient in themselves but pointing out that they give us something to think about. He then considers modern unbelief. This is an important matter for prolegomena. My only criticism is that Cantelon should have said more.

Building on this he discusses the nature of God, the problem of evil, creation, providence, predestination, revelation, and the Bible. Cantelon’s high view of Biblical authority is unmistakable. His stance on inerrancy is less clear, but that may derive more from how he approaches his audience than from his own convictions. He offers a good theology but too quickly relaxes the tension in the problem of divine sovereignty and human freedom.

Cantelon considers revelation the basis for all good theology. Because the Bible is the fundamental Christian revelation—he is open to modern miraculous gifts—
Cantelon offers a brief impression of each of the Biblical books. This is intended for those who have not read the Bible and is too brief for anyone else.

In concluding, Cantelon offers some sharp criticisms and warnings. He is troubled by the inconsistency and hypocrisy of those who consider themselves doctrinally orthodox but refuse to live sanctified lives. This seems to be a reference to the recent scandals in what may be his denomination. Cantelon is also concerned about gnostic tendencies in the Church today. He sees this in a spiritu- alizing of Jesus, an understanding of the world (not worldliness) as evil, and increasing use of private religious language by "insider" groups.

Cantelon's is a readable and useful book. He has written a pastoral systematic theology. I recommend it to all theologians, trained and untrained, and look forward to his next volume.

McKenzie, a phenomenologist of religion, applies his phenomenology (adapted from F. Heiler) to Christianity. Reflecting his method, his book devotes four times as much space to religious practices as to religious beliefs. The operative word is "religious" because McKenzie approaches his subject in terms of the history of religions. Thus he talks more about the practices and beliefs of various other religions than he does about Christianity. Less than half of the book deals with Christianity, and this always in comparison to other religions ancient and modern. McKenzie treats religions as a human product. This flattens not only Christianity but all revelatory religions he discusses.

It is understandable that a phenomenologist would concentrate on practice, but it is not as understandable that he shows no discrimination between accepted and condemned practice or common and fringe practice. When he finds a practice or belief in Christianity similar to one in an earlier religion he concludes that Christianity derived it from the other religion. He never makes a convincing argument in favor of causality, however. If Christianity and another religion use similar language and perform similar actions, McKenzie appears to believe these have similar meanings in each religion.

When he deals specifically with Christianity, McKenzie takes a Biblical-critical approach drawn from the work of Bultmann, Käsemann and Perrin (all cited in the text). Texts that do not support his conclusions are either late or interpolated (217). He often interprets Biblical passages to show Christian or OT practice as a variant of general religious practice. McKenzie makes several serious mistakes in the history of Christian doctrine and defines some key concepts (e.g. deification, inspiration) in ways sharply different from traditional theology.

This book will not teach one much about Christian beliefs or practices. It will introduce one particular approach to phenomenology. There is much of use about non-Christian religions in the book: I found material for my world religions classes. Possibly of greatest value is the way McKenzie inadvertently shows how God has made the essence of his revelation available to all people. McKenzie unfortunately concludes a universal salvation from this.

I can offer no reason to recommend this book. It presents a warped view of Christian belief and practice. It also lacks Cantelon's pleasing writing style. Furthermore most evangelicals would find the contents irrelevant to their theological study, and rightly so. The book does, however, have a useful bibliography and index.

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In 1973 Placher published A History of Christian Theology, to which this book of readings is a companion volume. It contains excerpts from sixty-seven primary sources ranging from Luther to contemporary liberation theologians and feminist religious authors. The sequence is mainly chronological, and each section is a grouping of documents from a significant era in the development of Christian thought. Placher has provided a very brief and often superficial introduction to each author cited, and there is a topically arranged bibliography at the end of the volume.

Placher's liberal theological bias is evident in his introductions as, for example, when he says that the Arminians at the Synod of Dort were "seeking to modify the extremes of Calvinism" (66, italics mine) and when he refers to J. Locke as a moderate who employed reason to "establish the authenticity of Jesus' mission from God" (82). The excerpt from Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity is inadequate and misleading in that it does not relate clearly Locke's hostility toward orthodoxy.

It is evident that Placher has used the concept of Christian theology with considerable elasticity, for this book contains selections from M. B. Eddy, R. W. Emerson, Joseph Smith, L. Feuerbach, and others whose teachings deviated widely from historic Christianity. This reviewer wonders just what was the editor's principle of selection in choosing items to be included. Some of the excerpts seem to be unintelligible without reference to the author's larger work. Those from D. F. Strauss, A. Schweitzer and R. Bultmann seem especially obscure.

The section on the twentieth century contains material from D. Bonhoeffer, Reinhold Niebuhr, P. Tillich, M. L. King, and other thinkers of liberal or neo-orthodox persuasion. Only one author speaks for Biblical Christianity: C. Hodge. This reflects the overwhelming imbalance evident in the selections. Could Placher find no room for J. G. Machen, C. F. W. Walther, G. C. Berkouwer, or C. F. H. Henry?

This book will be of value mainly to readers of Placher's textbook and who use it in conjunction with that work to illustrate his coverage by referring to the primary documents. By itself it is of minimal worth.

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This book is the second volume of a two-volume set. A considerable number of books aimed at helping Christians to formulate a worldview have come from evangelical presses in recent years. One of the distinctive characteristics of this project is that it stems from and is directed toward the college classroom.

Both volumes are edited by, and all but one of the twenty-nine chapters are written or co-written by, members of the faculty of Grove City College in Pennsylvania and are the fruit of curriculum restructuring and course development at the college. Because they issue from this process the two books are marked by a higher
degree of continuity and interrelatedness within and between volumes than is often the case with multi-author, multi-volume works.

In order to understand and appreciate the volume reviewed here, one must have some acquaintance with the design of the two-volume project. The editors suggest that the ideas that make up a worldview are best organized under six categories: theology, anthropology, epistemology, cosmology, society and ethics. The first three constitute the “presuppositions” of one’s worldview and are the subjects of volume 1. Volume 2 then explores the way in which these presuppositions influence one’s understanding of the cosmos, the society in which one lives, and the way in which one makes ethical decisions.

The editors consider worldviews to be “pretheoretical,” consisting of “ideas (presuppositions), convictions, and commitments that shape our outlook on life” (2. xi). Their intent is to “describe a Reformed and evangelical exposition of the biblical world view and compare and contrast it with other Christian and prominent non-Christian perspectives” (1. xiii). This is accomplished through an “historical approach” (1. xiii). With the exception of the section on ethics, each section surveys the history of Christian and non-Christian perspectives on the category being examined (theology, anthropology, etc.).

Volume 2 surveys perspectives on the universe, society, and ethics. In part 1 ancient Near Eastern (chap. 1), Greek (chap. 2) and modern (chap. 4) cosmologies are described and contrasted with “The Biblical World View: A Cosmology of History” (chap. 3). The descriptive, nonargumentative style that characterizes the book is evident here. For example, having described three approaches to the Genesis creation accounts (literal, day-age, literary framework), the authors of this chapter conclude: “Christians can hold any of the three and still maintain a high regard for the authority of Scripture” (48).

It is in the second part, “Society,” that the periodization of western intellectual history as outlined by Hoffercker in volume 1 (5-8) clearly, if not always consistently, comes to bear upon volume 2. According to this periodization, western thought began with “a sharp antithesis between” the Biblical worldview and the Greek worldview (1. 5). This was followed by the “Medieval synthesis” (1. 6), which in turn has been followed by “various post-synthesis positions” (1. 8). Here in volume 2 Plato’s Republic (chap. 5) is juxtaposed with “Biblical Society: A Covenantal Society” (chap. 6). Next Augustine’s trinitarian vision and Aquinas’ view of a universal Christendom are examined (chap. 7). Aquinas, the major architect of the medieval “synthesis,” replaced Augustine’s “understanding of church and state as separate yet cooperative institutions with a belief that Medieval society was an organized unity” (119). Finally, several “post-synthesis” visions of society are examined, including those of the various branches of the Protestant Reformation (chap. 8), early American theorists (chap. 9), Marxism (chap. 10), and dystopian authors, represented by A. Huxley (chap. 11).

The third and final part, “Ethics,” is the only section of the two-volume set that is not structured as a chronological survey. Rather, it is structured around the contrast between “biblical” ethics, being “Ethics Revealed by God” (chap. 12), and “naturalistic” ethics, being “Ethics of Human Autonomy” (chap. 13). This part concludes with the application of these two types of ethical thought to three contemporary ethical issues: abortion, euthanasia and homosexuality (chap. 14).

Specialists may occasionally find fault with the presentation of various historical figures and movements. Yet this book is not written for specialists, and there is no attempt to advance novel theses. Rather, the intent is to provide basic introductions to influential thinkers and their thought. For the most part, standard interpretations are adopted (e.g. C. N. Cochrane on Augustine’s trinitarian thought).
This book and its companion volume are intended primarily to serve as undergraduate or seminary textbooks. As such the volume under review will serve well. The style is descriptive, not argumentative. The book is marked by clarity of thought and structure. It is written largely in nontechnical language, and when technical terms are used they are defined in simple language. Hoffecker provides a brief introduction to each section, and a reading list of basic texts accompanies each chapter.

The editors’ purpose is to provide students with the basic components of a distinctively Christian worldview and to help them take their first steps toward building their own. This the editors do very well. Others will see that much building needs yet to be done, and this two-volume project can provide a stimulating impetus to further reflection.

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Because they cover the subject of work from such radically differing viewpoints these books are best read together, for they jointly represent a survey of some of the best evangelical thought to appear on the subject of work in recent years. Ryken’s volume aspires to become a fully developed Christian theology of work and leisure and is thus best treated first. He summarizes the problem of work and leisure as it presents itself in contemporary society: “Much of [work] is inherently unsatisfying” (47). The forces that bring alienation into the work place (thereby generating the dissatisfaction that Ryken alludes to) are “powerlessness (inability to control the work process), meaninglessness (inability to develop a sense of purpose connecting the job to the overall productive process), isolation (inability to belong to integrated industrial communities), and self-estrangement (failure to become involved in the activity of work as a mode of self-expression)” (as summarized from R. Blaumer, *Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and His Industry* [Chicago, 1964]).

After thus summarizing the problem Ryken surveys the history of attitudes toward work and leisure, including a correction for the much misunderstood “Protestant work ethic.” He poses several questions: Is work (1) simply a means of earning our livelihoods, (2) a curse, (3) a means of production for a consumerist society, (4) an avenue for human achievement, (5) a means of attaining psychological satisfaction, or (6) a service to others? How do industry and self-reliance fit into the scale of Christian moral values? Self-fulfillment? Sacrifice? Servanthood? How does leisure interface with work?

Ryken begins with an appeal to a theology of the created order. God worked; he placed man in the garden to work; work therefore is a part of God’s image that man bears and is not a part of the curse (120–128). The fall changed the nature of work, introducing frustration and dissatisfaction in acquiring goods, but did not alter its identity as a duty to be performed by mankind. Instead it falls to the Christian’s lot to see it as the calling of God and therefore sacred. Even “secular” work assumes a role in the “reclamation of work in a fallen world” if the “earth is the Lord’s.” Noting that one’s “job” and one’s “vocation” (= “calling”) are not necessarily synonyms, Ryken attempts to distinguish them. One’s vocation is
where one really fits, a matter to be determined by aptitude tests and career counseling. But something he adds is certain to raise objections from some: "Personally I am skeptical when I hear people say with an aura of piety that they came to their current occupation because they 'felt called by God,' with the implication that it was not a reasoned or deliberate choice" (150). Does he mean to suggest that ordinary Christians are not "led of the Lord" in their choices? What about ministers? Do they enter the lowest-paid profession by "a reasoned or deliberate choice" without some personal leading from the Lord? Certainly many do so, but I would submit that a glance at the history of missions should be enough to suggest that many entered the ministry because they felt led or even compelled to do so.

The ethics of work embrace work as a moral duty, but the morality of such endeavor is conditioned by the type of work involved. "The Bible is hostile to the success ethic in which people worship success" in a consumerist society (167). Work should provide some useful service to society, provide "meaning and self-fulfillment for human life" and glorify God. There should be joy in work—something one lives to do, not merely something one does to live. Moreover provision for our own needs is something we owe the society of which we are a part. The industrious Christian becomes a witness to the world by being a model for them. When those goods we have acquired by our labors reach a level of superfluity, instead of indulging to excess the Christian becomes the avenue by which these surplus monies, goods and services reach the poor. Work should be pursued with a goal toward excellence, with a zest for it, yet without "making an idol of it" (174–175).

Noting that time is a closed system, Ryken places work and leisure on a sliding scale: The more one does of one activity, the less he can do of another (21). But there is value in nonutilitarian activities. This is reflected in God's resting, the command for Israel to rest one day in seven, the "God-centered hedonism" found in Ecclesiastes, the religious feasts, etc.—all of which exemplify the tension in which work and leisure are held throughout the Bible (207–228). But just as work should serve some moral purpose, so one's leisure must be used constructively. Stewardship of one's time is the general principle (238). Together work and leisure form a balance for our activities that adds to our lives as human beings.

Up to this point Ryken's analysis has been very helpful. But there are two aspects of the work/worker relationship most Christian writers have skimmed over or omitted altogether, and here Ryken is no exception. The first of these is the question of the responsibility assumed by the employer for the employed and what sort of relationship should be cultivated between them. The second aspect that must be a part of any Biblical doctrine of work is the development of an eschatology. Certainly if the New Jerusalem is Eden restored, there will be work there. But what of the meantime? How does our work effect the arrival of the eschaton? Does it hasten it or delay it? Does it develop the kingdom, or does it simply meet material needs?

The first of these questions is the target of the second book under review. While neither author makes any pretense of being a theologian, their treatment of the relationship between employer/employee/work must certainly assume a theological dimension if work itself is to be viewed theologically. As a sociologist, Redekop has at his disposal the appropriate questions to ask as well as a useful method for pursuing an answer to them. As a person trained in communications and public relations, Bender has the kind of "hands on" background that allows him to ferret out the difficulties involved in labor/management problems that would escape a person trained only in academic analysis. The result, as far as it goes, is one of the most satisfying treatments I have ever read on the subject.
The authors first ask several questions: How does society view itself? Does it espouse an evolutionary, idealist, or moral perspective on itself? Moreover are the efforts exerted by society to humanize itself adequate? The authors think not, and thus is born the reason for the book (26). With the machine age there came the problem of placing a value on a person's time and thus on the person himself. But in this age of technology the problem becomes radicalized: Are humans becoming redundant? Has the quest for computerized efficiency set in motion forces that will eventually destroy man's humanness? Is meaningful work an obsolete quest? Is the workplace destined to become a "graveyard of ideals and creativity," or can it be redeemed? These questions and others like them provide the issues on which the book focuses (26-28).

Less than a century ago, work was not evaluated as to whether it was "necessary for the maintenance of a family" or whether it was "a spiritual activity" that benefitted the individual or community at large. Work was work, and the type of specialization that has beset the modern workplace was unknown. But today's wage earner works at jobs that separate him spatially from his family, who frequently do not understand precisely what he does. "Work," say the authors, "has become specialized and abstracted to become that which one does in a job" (34). The western conceptualization of work by contract has resulted in work that is unitized and that can be bought and sold to the highest bidder. Because one's work is a principal determiner of who he is, any such evolution in the nature of the workplace will inevitably affect how the worker views himself (35). Drawing heavily on the works of Durkheim, Tönnies, Weber and occasionally Marx, the authors attempt to analyze the workplace from a sociological perspective. Accordingly they have found that work functions to provide (1) a means of survival, (2) social identity and status, (3) a means of self-acceptance, (4) a means of creativity, and (5) a means of achieving life goals (51-52). Thus much more than physical survival depends on making peace with one's work.

How then is the Christian to respond to changes that have transpired in the workplace? Drawing on the sermon on the mount, the authors point out that happiness comes in doing—i.e., in work: "Happiness is the result of satisfying and important human activity; happiness derives literally from what we do" (59). But the modern worker is faced with a two-headed crisis: He must find work that has meaning, and work that "fits" his personality and abilities. While these two factors are related, they are not identical. And finding meaningful work "is the most pressing and urgent" crisis that one faces (61). Moreover the way to happiness is mined with "booby traps." The first of these is laid by society, with the values imposed on us and the definitions of success that we unthinkingly accept. The second ("the internal booby trap") we lay for ourselves by misreading who we are and what will make us happy. The third is the discovery that we are spiritual beings and that the definitions of happiness set forth by society or ourselves may not, in the end, result in happiness if the spiritual aspect of our being is not addressed.

The problem of a Christian response to the workplace is formulated along several lines that serve as definers for the problem: (1) Organizations are by definition bureaucracies and tend to become "impersonal, rigid, routine, inhumane and restrictive"; (2) power is unevenly distributed throughout a company and is often improperly used; (3) peer-group pressure may be either helpful or destructive; and (4) there are tensions between the goals of the organization and those of the individual. In response to the first, the authors urge that the Christian's duty is to humanize the workplace by whatever means he may find available and compatible with Christian values. In the case of abusive power, a courteous confrontation in
the manner prescribed by Jesus (Matt 18:15) is the best way. The response of force to force is not a Christian option. Instead it is worth remembering that good people can make a bad system work, and bad people can render a good system ineffective. As for peer groups, the Christian must be certain that they are directed toward goals compatible with Biblical teaching. When organizational and personal goals collide, the Christian is brought face to face with the truth that he cannot work in any or every sort of organization. But where problems exist in an organization that would normally be compatible to a Christian worker’s goals, both employer and employee need jointly to sort out what the problems are and work together to rectify them. The Christian employer is not to exploit his employees for his own purposes but should seek their welfare, often going the “second mile” (81–93).

With the more general problems and principles now defined, the authors turn to some of the troublesome areas that beset the age of technology within which we all live. Chapters 7–11 address the problems of alienation from one’s work, survival in a professionalized work world, male-female relationships in the workplace, the changing marketplace with its demand for adaptation on the part of the worker, and reentry into the workplace. Each of these areas is worthy of individual review, but space constrictions would then forfeit comment on chaps. 13 and 14, which may be the most important in the book from a theological perspective. Chapter 13 attempts to develop a Christian theology of work that, in spite of the fact that some work can be evil, destructive and dehumanizing, sees work generally as (1) instituted by God, (2) able to be good and honorable, (3) capable of being a loving act, (4) a definer of one’s creatureliness (and not merely of his fallen nature), (5) a means for human fulfillment, (6) a benefit to the community, (7) done for the glory of God, and (8) giving structure to interpersonal relationships. But chap. 14 brings the book to its real point: Work bears some sort of relationship to the kingdom of God, and in addressing this point the authors come closer than any this reviewer has seen in speaking to the eschatological aspects of work. Work, in the manner and to the degree that it serves humanity, in some way also serves the kingdom of God. “This argument forces upon us the sharp and painful conclusion that Christians have an awesome responsibility. . . . It means that as we fill work positions we must understand the consequences of our work—not only directly, but also its more total and far-reaching effects. And if we believe the ecologists’ creed that ‘we cannot touch a flower without troubling a star’ we are indeed profoundly responsible” (251). Thus if we are the kingdom of God, whether “as employers or employees, we are called to limit and even downgrade the self-interest dimension of work and work instead for the welfare of the community. . . . [This means] a confrontation of the system in which we live from top to bottom as it were. Instead of simply giving in to the demands of a given system, we hear the call of Christ to serve others and to be compassionate to them; thus, we subordinate the demands of any system—including competition—to the higher purpose of work” (254–255).

Perhaps one reason for my gratitude to Redkop and Bender is that they have voiced so well some of my personal thoughts on these issues in the manner that I believe such issues should be raised. For anyone who has emerged into professional life from a background of hard, blue-collar labor, the anecdotes and insights in this book will raise provocative issues that will trigger memories of one’s own experience somewhere in the past or present, reminding us by them of how far we have yet to go. I strongly recommend this book, whether the prospective reader be a Christian employer or employee. It is an excellent introduction to the issues at stake.

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This fascinating study of the structure of religion represents a minority view. As such it is going to receive criticism from those who disagree with its conclusions as well as from those who simply cannot countenance having their paradigms violated. But it is a very interesting contribution to our understanding of religion and one from which we can learn much.

The prevailing view in religion departments across the nation is that religion stands on a nonrational basis. R. Otto, M. Eliade, C. G. Jung, etc., represent various versions of this notion, for which a strong case can be made. They share the idea that at the core of human religiosity lies something not accessible to reason, whether it be the experience of the holy, hierophanies, or unconscious archetypes. Green disagrees and argues that "religion has its basis in a process of moral and religious reasoning common to all human beings."

The kind of reasoning to which Green refers is a moral depth structure with certain religious accommodations. Specifically Green gives us a tripartite analysis of how this pattern works out. First, there is a sense of moral obligation that stresses the need to sacrifice one's own self-interest for the benefit of others. At this point Green relies heavily on Kant's categorical imperative, according to which we must be willing to allow all of our moral choices to become universal law and which is based on reason. Of course Green does not believe that all of humanity has read Kant, but he maintains that Kant expresses something universal to humanity.

The second element in this universal religious structure is a sense of retribution. Whether it be expressed in terms of heaven and hell, karma, or benefits in one's present existence, all religions believe that whether one adheres to the moral code or not carries serious consequences. But of course no human being totally lives up to all of his moral obligations. Hence we have Green's third element: some sort of provision to overcome our moral shortcomings. This provision could be divine grace, moksha, or magic power. Somehow, according to Green, all religions have a way of moving beyond moral failure.

Green already announced this system in an earlier work (Religious Reason, Oxford, 1978). He offers this book in further support of his thesis by measuring it against what appear to be some of the strongest counter-examples. The chapters constitute carefully documented studies on African traditional religion, Chinese religion, Genesis 22 (from the Jewish and Christian points of view), religious ritual, social justice, and popular religious literature. In each case he shows how, with all due recognition given to important differences, the same rational moral structure plays an important role.

The Christian theologian not particularly interested in comparative religion will still be interested in Green's study of Genesis 22, the account of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac. Green contends that we have been preoccupied with Kierkegaard's understanding of this passage, according to which God's command represents the teleological suspension of morality. But Green argues that, to the contrary, for Abraham to obey God in this instance represents the highest instantiation of Biblical morality.

Further, the evangelical theologian will find Green's study helpful. We believe, in line with Romans 2, that all human beings have a "law written on their hearts." It should be of no surprise to us that all religions give evidence of a basic sense of right and wrong along with a notion of moral guilt. We can be thankful to Green for providing empirical evidence for this theological datum.
Most readers, even supportive ones, will not be able to shed the feeling that one is witness to a very well executed study in reductionism. To be sure, however, Green does not say that the moral structure is the only important element in religion. In his chapter on Chinese religion he even shows how irrational elements have swallowed up the rational moral side. This fact by itself ought to temper the charge of reductionism. Nonetheless Green still makes a very strong claim to the effect that the moral structure is at the basis of all religion. It is not clear that showing the universal presence of the structure demonstrates that it is truly basic to the nature of religion. But Green has certainly pulled together a lot of evidence to consider in evaluating this more theoretical thesis.

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Cord severely and critically challenges the unhistorical and superficial post-1947 decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the establishment clause of the first amendment of the Constitution. Noting that the “Supreme Court has appealed almost solely to U.S. history to legitimize its Establishment Clause decisions,” he concludes that the “Court’s decisions involving separation of Church and State are not in accord with American historical fact. Since this is the case, the Court has failed to provide adequate reasons as to why nondiscriminatory aid to religion or religiously-affiliated institutions, in pursuit of a constitutionally valid public goal, violates the Constitution of the United States.”

These are not idle words. His documentation is thorough and his appeal to the historical facts appears irrefutable. Cord’s primary argumentation is twofold: first, the activities of the first Congress, which wrote the first amendment; and second, the actions, decisions and policies of Jefferson and Madison while in positions of authority and leadership. The Pfeffer-Rutledge thesis that Jefferson and Madison held to complete and absolute separation of Church and state simply does not follow from their actions. Justice Douglas’ claim in *Engel v. Vitale* that the first Congress was guilty of unconstitutional practices demonstrates that either those first members of Congress were absolutely inconsistent and did not know what they meant by the establishment clause or that what they practiced demands a very different interpretation of the first amendment than that provided by the Warren-Burger Courts, especially Justices Black and Douglas.

What historical practices and actions are at issue here? Madison, for instance, was a member of the committee that recommended a Congressional chaplain system, an action he gave no hint of opposing. Similarly he issued four Thanksgiving Day proclamations while president, though he thought better of it as a retired statesman in the *Detached Memoranda*. Which is to be accepted—his behavior as President, or his reminiscences in retirement? Cord chooses the former. He buttresses this by demonstrating that Madison in 1785 sponsored in the Virginia Assembly “A Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath Breakers.”

The case for Jefferson rejecting such absolutistic separation is equally as strong if not stronger. Though Jefferson did not offer Thanksgiving Day proclamations while president, he did sign a bill for tax exemptions for churches and other
religious organizations in 1802 and signed the Kaskaskia Indian Treaty of 1803 that provided federal funds for the support of a Catholic priest as well as the building of a church. Similarly Jefferson did not veto the last three extensions of an act of the first Congress that provided land grants and funds to the Moravian Brethren for "propagating the gospel among the heathen." Neither Congress nor the third president saw this as contrary to the establishment clause regarding the separation of Church and state. Later, after his presidency, Jefferson provided for sectarian education and services on the campus of the University of Virginia, though such schools were to be independent of the university. In the Regulations of October 4, 1824, for the university, Jefferson wrote that students who have a religious school of their sect adjacent to the university "will be free and expected to attend religious worship at the establishment of their respective sects." Like Madison this does not reflect a "complete and absolute" wall of separation between the state and the Church.

Cord removes the myth from around Jefferson and Madison, demonstrating clearly that throughout the first century of the Court's life the establishment clause was interpreted in very narrow lines. The litany of absolute separation of Church and state is laid to rest by his investigation. The most important case in American constitutional law for establishment issues, Everson v. Board of Education (1947), is analyzed extensively and shown to be "completely out of harmony with the clear testimony of the primary historical documents and recorded events of American history." But this case becomes the foundation for subsequent cases interpreted by the Warren-Burger Courts—even though, as Cord writes, "there is no historical evidence to suggest that the establishment clause in any way constitutionally precludes non-discriminatory governmental aid to religion. In fact, the converse is confirmed historically."

Cord's conclusion as to the intended scope of the establishment clause by its original authors is threefold. It was (1) intended to prevent the establishment of a national church or religion, or the giving of any religious sect or denomination a preferred status; (2) designed to safeguard the right of freedom of conscience in religious beliefs against invasions solely by the national government; and (3) constructed in order to allow the states, unimpeded, to deal with religious establishments and aid to religious institutions as they saw fit. This third intention was greatly restricted by the fourteenth amendment, which extended due process to the states and thus guaranteed the same limitations on state government that had originally only been put on the federal government.

This does not mean that Cord is in favor of religious establishment. He agrees with the decision if not the rationale of the Court in Murray v. Curlett, which prohibits the Lord's prayer for public-school recitation as preferring one religion over another. Similarly the Burger Court's approval of Sunday-closing laws would appear to be unconstitutionally preferring one religious tradition above another. These cases, along with many others, illustrate the current problem, however. The present Court has failed "to settle on a clear test as to what the Clause precludes, a test which faithfully commands a constant majority of the Court's personnel."

This book is a valuable resource for those embattled in the Church/state issue. It provides reference to nearly every establishment case that has appeared before the United States Supreme Court. Its historical work is impeccable. It is must reading for lawyers, pastors and politicians as well as jurisprudence and constitutional scholars and American historians. Certainly the establishment clause was never intended to be a charter for a totally secularized society. Many issues taken to be constitutional are really issues of public policy. Constitutional laws are not
necessarily wise laws, as Justice Frankfurter noted some time ago. As Cord argues in the final chapter, judicial preemption must not usurp democratic decision-making. If legislators today wish to use sectarian means to accomplish secular ends (e.g. education), free of preferring one religion over another, they—not unelected judges—must decide such issues rather than be “protected” from them by the Court, as Justice Brennan has argued in Meek v. Pittenger.

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