BOOK REVIEWS


The vitally interesting subject matter of this publication on the theme of Passover cannot be examined in isolation, so its authors share their careful Biblical research from the Old and New Testaments. The Passover and its message become intertwined throughout Scripture with the major theme of the redemption of God through Jesus Christ. Nine chapters contain the authors' excellent readable exposition before and after the Messiah's last supper Passover.

Paul's theological explanations of Passover found in 1 Cor 5:7-8; 11:23-25 are clearly stated. John's vision from the Lord as recorded in Revelation 19, the marriage supper of the Lamb, is pictured as the eternal feast of redemption.

The Broadhurste's treatment of post-Biblical religious traditions provides scholarly summaries of Gentile Passover beginnings and endings as well as the Jewish Passover haggadah and messianic Jewish seders.

Three appendices in the book treat technical matters including such primary documents of Passover as the Elephantine documents, QL, the pseudepigraphal books, and Megillat Ta'anit; a vivid description of the manner in which the Samaritans observe Passover; and a treatment of the "So-Called 'Gospels' Passover Discrepancies." The chart picturing "Jewish Roman Days Overlap" reflects careful study. A bibliography of over 125 books and articles on Passover is included.

This book is a must for the serious student, nonreligious, Christian or Jewish.

C. S. Cadwallader, Jr.


This book is the second volume to be produced by the Faith and Church study unit of the World Evangelical Fellowship (the first being Biblical Interpretation and the Church: Text and Context). The seven papers that comprise the book emerged from a meeting held at Cambridge, England, in 1984. As is to be expected in a compilation of this nature the contributions vary in quality and significance, but I found most of them to be worthwhile reading in a doctrine (ecclesiology) on which the evangelical movement has been notoriously weak.

The book leads off with a solid study by E. P. Clowney on "The Biblical Theology of the Church." Clowney manages to achieve amazing depth at spots in a brief, chapter-length overview of Biblical teaching on the Church. Especially insightful are his discussions of the usage of the NT word ekklesia ("assembly") in relation to its OT antecedents, of the two-kingsdoms doctrine (nicely nuanced here), and of the Church as a worshiping and missionary community. P. T. O'Brien follows with a study of "The Church as a Heavenly and Eschatological Entity," which is fascinating theologically (especially the treatment of the Church "seated in the heavens"
in Ephesians) but weak on application, with a rather disappointing section on implications confining itself to general remarks about "seeking the things which are above."

R. P. Shedd contributes an essay on "Worship in the New Testament Church" that stresses the freedom of worship in the early Church, which no longer needed the obligatory set times of OT religion because "sufficient motivation to attend regularly some worship gathering ... arose from the internal compulsion of the new found joy" of those believers in worshiping the Lord (p. 126). One wonders how many contemporary churches would fit the same description. R. Y. K. Fung writes a weighty study of "Ministry in the New Testament," half of which is devoted to a careful reassessment of the evidence and arguments on the role of women. He concludes that "gift and role are to be distinguished: a woman who has received the gift of teaching ... may exercise it to the fullest extent possible—in any role which does not involve her in a position of doctrinal or ecclesiastical authority over men." His treatment seems to me one of the worthier attempts to do justice to both sides of the evidence in this vexed question.

Rounding out the volume, the editor's contribution on "Church and Mission: Contextualization and the Third Horizon" consists of a detailed critique of D. von Allmen's influential article, "The Birth of Theology: Contextualization as the Dynamic Element in the Formation of New Testament Theology" (IRM 64 [1975] 37-52). Carson concludes that contextualization is not to be feared as long as it is based on the whole Bible and that it is actually essential as all cultural groups contribute to theological dialogue within the Church universal. Finally there are lighter-weight discussions of syncretism (S. Sumithra) and persecution (D. H. Adeney).

Mechanically the book suffers from an incredible lack of editorial attention. Page 78 refers to an "attached diagram" that is nowhere to be found, several paragraphs are printed twice, and grammatical, spelling and other proofreading errors abound to a distracting degree. While such serious and abundant lapses are neither permissible nor excusable, they are perhaps appropriate in a book on the doctrine of the Church, which can be defined as treasure in earthen vessels. And there is treasure here, in Clowney and Fung particularly. Carson also, though tedious at times, comes to some wise conclusions. May their work be a harbinger of better things to come in ecclesiology from our conservative eclectics.

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Theissen is a modern-day Leonardo da Vinci. He has mastered the classical world and NT studies and can with some credibility claim to be a sociologist. Nowhere is his renaissance mentality more evident than in this ground-breaking work on the inner world of Paul and his converts. Theissen examines seven thorny texts in 1 Corinthians and Romans from the perspective of three psychological models: learning theory, psychodynamic theory, cognitive theory.

He defines learning theory as a psychological model that explains human behavior as a series of learned responses to environmental stimuli (associative learning), to the consequences of certain actions (operant learning), or to models who are observed and imitated (imitative learning). Psychodynamic approaches to psychology, he says, regard the unconscious inner world of the person as the key to under-
standing his or her experience. The shape of this inner world is determined by the basic structures or archetypes of unconscious human thinking (C. G. Jung), by the relationship between a child and his parents in early childhood (S. Freud), and by cultural models of interpreting human experience. The cognitive approach to human experience understands human psychology as an attempt to interpret individual experiences as part of a larger, coherent whole (pp. 1–39).

Each of these approaches, says Theissen, is useful for illuminating the meaning of Paul’s letters in their original setting. Theissen claims that this hermeneutical method is legitimate because both human experience and texts make use of symbols. Just as symbols are important means of interpreting our experience of the world, so symbols are also important vehicles of communicating our experience to others in texts. Six textual phenomena are useful to the psychological approach to hermeneutics (pp. 46–48): metaphors (images meant to evoke certain responses in the reader reveal much about the author’s unconscious), exegeses (interpretations of texts reveal information not only about the text interpreted but about the interpreter as well), homologies (correspondences between an objective mythical event, like the sending of God’s Son, and an inner process, like the sending of the Holy Spirit into one’s heart, also reveal much about the inner world of the author), displacements of motive (such as the substitution of God’s sacrifice of Jesus for Abraham’s binding of Isaac), contradictions between texts (such as Romans 7 where Paul says that he was unable to keep the law and Philippians 3 where he claims to have been blameless with regard to the law), and overreactions (as in, according to Theissen, 1 Cor 11:2–16 where Paul’s horror of homosexuality compels him to make unrealistic demands concerning male and female dress and hairstyles).

After explaining his method and defending its legitimacy, Theissen examines several Pauline texts that lend themselves to psychological interpretation. 1 Cor 4:1–5, Rom 2:16 and 1 Cor 14:20–25 reveal Paul’s knowledge that persons possess an unconscious dimension. If we transpose Paul’s theological vocabulary to psychological language, Christ was able to bring together both the superego and the id because he was both the one condemned by God and the one who would judge all people on the final day. Because Paul knew that he would stand acquitted on that day, he was able to reduce the tension between his unconscious and his conscious (pp. 57–114). Paul’s interpretation of Scripture, especially the ambivalence he shows toward Moses in 2 Cor 3:4–6, says Theissen, demonstrates that prior to Paul’s conversion the laws of Judaism had served as his superego and that although “his consciousness had connected with them the promise of life” they were unconsciously a destructive force (pp. 115–176). In perhaps the most important part of his book Theissen argues that the “I” in Romans 7 is not fictive but “combines personal and typical traits” (p. 201) and that “Phil. 3:4–6 reflects the consciousness of the pre-Christian Paul, while Romans 7 depicts a conflict that was unconscious at the time, one of which Paul became conscious only later” (p. 235).

Theissen interprets the glossolalia of 1 Corinthians 12–14 as “the language of the unconscious” that becomes conscious through prophecy and interpretation of tongues (p. 275). It gives expression to repressed impulses, as the occasional utterance of an anathema upon Jesus (1 Cor 12:3) demonstrates (pp. 306–312). And, because it “presupposes a reactivation of childhood abilities to learn speech” (p. 312), it probably also represents regressive behavior (pp. 312–315).

Theissen concludes his book with a brief examination of Paul’s use of the wisdom motif in 1 Cor 2:6–16. In this passage Paul faces the problem of taking a negative symbol—the cross—and restructuring it to correspond with the positive symbol of wisdom. From the perspective of learning theory he makes Christ, who triumphed through weakness, the learning model for the Corinthian congregation. From the
perspective of psychodynamic theory, Paul encourages the Corinthians to free themselves from the standards of the world and to expand their consciousness. From a cognitive perspective, Paul attempts to transform the Corinthians' interpretation of the cross from something that creates cognitive dissonance to something that fits harmoniously into the new religious world of the Christian (pp. 343-393).

Theissen's book embodies a fascinating experiment and for that reason makes compelling (although at times difficult) reading. Those interested in the interpretation of 1 Corinthians or Romans 7 will benefit from his clear exegesis. Those interested in hermeneutics will appreciate his attempt to use psychological tools and a broad knowledge of classical literature to better understand the meaning of difficult texts within their historical contexts. Theissen's specific conclusions, however, should give the interpreter pause. They are entirely anthropological and thus implicitly deny the reality of the theological world about which, after all, Paul claimed to be writing. Theissen assumes that sin, guilt and redemption are primarily symbols for events that take place within the person rather than descriptions of the concrete relationship between the Creator of the universe and his creation. Theissen's psychological approach to Pauline texts, therefore, may focus some light on Paul's historical situation, but it fails to grasp the heart of Paul's message: that no human restructuring of the unconscious will enable the individual to overcome his or her plight. God alone can remedy the human predicament.

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Forlines has tackled the arduous task of producing a detailed commentary on one of the most difficult books of the Bible in a style that could be understood by the general Christian public. The Randall House series is intended as a serious exposition that could benefit both the lay reader as well as the academic community, being neither highly technical nor merely devotional. Forlines takes the reader through problem after problem with clarity of thought and writing. He lists and discusses each view with precision and insight. A modest introduction is partly taken up with a defense against a neo-orthodox method of interpreting Scripture. Forlines concludes that "Romans is a universal epistle" in that it presents a systematic treatment of the Christian faith as well as the Jewish-Gentile problem that plagued most churches of the day (p. 2). The various views regarding Paul's intent, however, were not discussed in any detail.

The commentary itself is arranged in double columns, with an outline and the KJV text interspersed among the verse-by-verse comments. Greek words are usually found in parentheses following the English equivalent. The omission of a macron over the α and e makes it impossible to discern an omicron from an omega or an epsilon from an eta. After each section there is a summary and an application for teaching and preaching the passage. Only rarely is there a sectional analysis preceding a section, relating one discourse unit to another. When such information is provided it is usually found embedded in comments on specific verses or in the summary at the end of a section. Forlines tends to interact more with traditional conservative commentaries than with recent critical works or periodical literature. A simple form of internal notation is used that cites only the author's name and page
number. This often leads to ambiguity when the author has two or more books cited in the bibliography.

Forlines frequently inserts doctrinal discussions at appropriate places such as different views of the atonement (pp. 90–96), election (pp. 233–238, 293–295) and perseverance (p. 245). He writes from a Free Will Baptist perspective, which differs somewhat from what is commonly associated with Arminian theology. For example, he argues for the satisfaction view of the atonement rather than the governmental view as espoused by most Arminians, for conditional election based on faith in Christ, and for perseverance conditioned on faith rather than works. Forlines also argues for the Augustinian view of immediate imputation of Adam’s sin (p. 137). He does not treat Rom 7:7–25 as autobiographical. Instead he views it as describing the state of others, which Paul then transfers to himself (p. 171). As to whether the passage refers to the regenerate or unregenerate, Forlines suggests that it refers to the unregenerate person who has been awakened to his need of Christ (p. 172). He interprets the allegory of the olive tree as pertaining to Israel throughout. The olive tree does not cease being Israel when it is pruned or when the Gentiles are grafted onto it since, as Paul argues, not all Israel has been cast away. According to Forlines the Church does not replace Israel; rather, Gentile believers become members of Abraham’s family. The identity of Israel is retained in order to preserve the validity of God’s redemptive covenant (pp. 306–310).

Forlines’ work makes a positive contribution to the literature on Paul’s epistle to the Romans, especially in understanding the theological stance of the Free Will Baptists within the Arminian camp and in cataloging the various interpretative views of problem passages.

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The volume under review is the latest revision in the venerable Tyndale series. In keeping with the aim of the series Grudem does excellent work in unpacking for the general reader of the Bible the meaning of this 105-verse letter.

After showing that the Greek language was used widely in Palestine in the first century A.D. he concludes that even a Galilean fisherman could be a fluent Greek-speaker. Opting for Petrine authorship Grudem provides the reader a careful and thorough response to objections to this traditional position. He evaluates as well current trends in research and doubts that a baptismal setting provides the background of the letter, a position popular in some circles. In explaining 5:12 Grudem argues: “There is no clear evidence in the letter indicating that Silvanus had any role in the composition of the letter” (p. 24; cf. pp. 199–200). In other words Silvanus (whom Luke calls Silas) was the postman, not an amanuensis.

In the commentary itself Grudem works methodically, carefully and consistently. The reader soon learns that the author stands absolutely within Calvinist ranks. In discussing 2:8 he defends “double predestination” (pp. 106–110). The NIV reads: “They stumble because they disobey the message—which is also what they were destined for.” Grudem says, “Amazing as it may seem, even the stumbling and disobedience of unbelievers have been destined by God” (p. 106).

In other words, in Grudem’s view God has not only chosen who specifically will be saved, but he has destined “all disobedience which tragically does persist to the
end of life (and thus into eternity)” (p. 109). Yet somewhat inconsistently Grudem also says that Peter’s text “does stop short of saying that their eternal condemnation is already ordained” (p. 108). It is not clear how God can destine the ongoing disobedience of unbelievers without also ordaining their condemnation. In trying to distance God from any blame for people’s sin, Grudem lets himself off the hook too readily in retreating to Rom 9:20. In explaining 1 Pet 2:8 many readers will conclude that Grudem has not refuted the view that God determined that people stumble when they disobey the gospel of Christ. They were destined to stumble because they disobey, rather than (as Grudem argues) destined to stumble and disobey.

Grudem’s Calvinist sympathies show through elsewhere. In discussing proginósko (“foreknow”) at 1:20 he fails to distinguish between what God knows about the future and the events God actually predetermines (p. 85). Though his conclusions about Christ are probably valid, many interpreters would insist that foreknowing the future and predetermining the future are logically distinct. Later Grudem observes that “God has chosen a new race of people” (p. 111) but, sadly, he fails to draw out any implications of this corporate election or correlate it with his particularist election beliefs.

Space permits few other observations. He takes “having purified” (1:22) to refer to the readers’ post-conversion growth rather than their past conversion (pp. 87-88). This is questionable in light of the perfect tense of the verb. It is not clear why Grudem limits the “pure spiritual milk” (2:2) to the “written Word of God” (p. 95). Why not simply God’s revelation? If written only, would this not limit Peter’s readers to the OT? Grudem takes kinesis (“creature, creation”) in 2:13 to mean “institution” or “authority,” following Hort (p. 119). He rejects any weakened meaning for wives’ submission to their husbands, arguing that hypotassó (“be submissive”) “always implies a relationship of submission to an authority” (p. 136). As well, Grudem rejects that Paul teaches what is called “mutual submission” in Eph 5:21 (p. 136 n. 1). Yet he is careful to insist that “the command to wives to be subject to their husbands should never be taken to imply inferior personhood or spirituality, or lesser importance” (p. 137).

Surprisingly, when Grudem attempts to explain the difficult clause in 4:1—“whoever has suffered in the flesh has ceased from sin”—he neglects to consider a popular option. He understands Peter to mean that “physical suffering has a morally strengthening effect on our lives” (p. 167). Though this is no doubt true, Peter says the sufferer “has ceased from sin.” Why did Grudem not consider the position that views this as a corollary to Rom 6:1-12 taking “suffer” symbolically as the Christians’ identification with the death of Christ? In other words, when Christians die to sin they are freed from the power of sin. This view is not without its problems, but it is surprising that Grudem did not consider it.

The commentary ends with an extended appendix in which he tackles 3:19-20: Christ’s preaching to the spirits in prison (pp. 203-239). He entertains five alternatives and settles on Augustine’s view, although—to me, at least—not convincingly. It is not likely that “spirits in prison who formerly disobeyed” means “people who disobeyed in Noah’s time who are now (only) spirits in the prison of hell,” as Grudem alleges.

I wish Grudem or his editor had been more diligent in employing inclusive language throughout. Upon occasion he employs masculine pronouns and the generic “man” insensitively.

Overall this is a profitable commentary. Grudem is willing to champion positions because he believes the evidence of the text demands it. Several of these positions will limit the book’s currency in certain quarters, though any objectors will have to show by their exegesis that Grudem is off target. He thoughtfully engages each point
in the text. His tone is ironic. The reader encounters numerous excellent insights into Peter’s message for his readers, and frequently Grudem’s observations are startlingly fresh. At various points he suggests helpful ways in which modern Christians might profit from Peter’s teaching. We should be grateful for a fine addition to the Tyndale series.

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Like most other people of the sixteenth century, Melanchthon stands in the long shadow of Luther, even though he is (in my view) a better scholar, a better theologian, and a better man. Furthermore Melanchthon’s relative obscurity tends to feed upon itself, especially in America: Because he is less well known, his works are less likely to be brought into English; and because his works are not brought into English, he is less well known. I hope that to some extent Keen’s excellent book will help to change that.

Among this book’s many virtues are its lucid and felicitous translations, which often make reading an Anglicized Melanchthon a delight; its wise selection of hard-to-acquire texts, which shows us not only Melanchthon the theologian but also Melanchthon the Renaissance humanist and pedagogue; and its biographical introduction and various prefaces, which usefully set both Melanchthon and his works in their proper historical context. The book’s chief drawback is its price, which renders it inaccessible to all but the most avid or affluent modern Melanchthonists.

Keen’s selection of texts is designed to reflect Melanchthon the polymath, and it does. Keen has included such illustrative (and sometimes little-known) texts as Melanchthon’s On Correcting the Studies of Youth (1518), On Philosophy (1536), Eulogy for Luther (1546), Letter to Henry VIII (1540), Refutation of Servetus and the Anabaptist Errors (1548), and his three statements on the eucharist (1529 ff.), among others. A useful name index completes the text.

Surprisingly, this fine book is the work of a graduate student at the University of Chicago Divinity School. One can only hope that the volume is an indication of many good books yet to come. Dare we hope for a similar selection from the works of Bucer, Bugenhagen, Oecolampadius, or Bullinger?

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In this modern-day Pensées, Bloesch offers “the ruminations of a theological wayfarer who does not claim to have arrived but wishes to share what the Spirit of God has given him at one stage of his spiritual pilgrimage” (preface). This first of a projected seven-volume series, which he styles as “a kind of spiritual journal focusing on my thoughts rather than my activities” (ibid.), covers the years 1960–1964
when Bloesch was a young professor (age 32–36) at University of Dubuque Theological Seminary, a post he assumed in 1957 and still occupies. As early as 1962 the theological and spiritual integrity that has marked his career was evident: “I would rather be a saint than a scholar. . . . [I] would rather have the gift of holiness than academic honor or prestige” (p. 22). It is no small cause for thanks that God has blessed him, and through him us, on both counts.

The volume is arranged chronologically with subheadings before each entry (e.g. “faith,” “marriage,” “St. Mary”). Almost all the readings are short and aphoristic, with a handful extending to half a page. Name and subject indices make the book especially easy to cross-reference. The danger with such a book, as Bloesch observes in his preface, is that people might unwittingly attribute ideas to him that he has long since rejected, for he admits that his “thought has been very much on the move.” A case in point is his former attraction to mysticism, which subject is treated in at least three dozen entries but which is also one of the seven “decisive shifts” in his thinking about which he warns his readers in the preface (cf. also p. 92).

To what theological and spiritual appetites, here is a Bloesch sampler of some of my own favorites:

Secularism: “The churches that are advertised as family-type churches are often parochial in the bad sense. By overemphasizing the biological family unit, they have lost sight of the family of the Father (the true church), which includes all people—single as well as married, black as well as white, poor as well as rich, the outcast as well as the respectable” (p. 11).

Dogmatism: “Those who hold rigidly to their own theological formulations do not really believe in sola gratia, since they refuse to acknowledge that their reasoning also stands in need of divine justification” (p. 29; cf. p. 14).

Love: “If we cannot love those nearest to us, we cannot love the stranger at our door. If we cannot love our family or our colleagues, we cannot hope to love the world and therefore must not expect to see heaven” (pp. 66–67).

Mortification: “Among the animals within us [that need to be slain] are the lion (pride); the leopard (lust); the chicken (cowardice); the hog (greed); the chameleon (double-mindedness); the mule (stubbornness); the rattlesnake (viciousness); the snail (slothfulness)” (p. 71).

Heresy: “We must save the church from orthodoxy as well as from heresy” (p. 11). “A heretic is distinguished not only by the fact that he misrepresents the truth but also by the fact that he disrupts Christian unity” (p. 103).

Perversions of the faith: “We want neither the narrowness of fundamentalism nor the shallowness of liberalization but instead the depth and fullness of the historic catholic faith” (p. 182).

Influential books (pp. 29, 30, 39, 43, 92, 95, 127, 187, 206), theological ancestors (p. 59), favorite hymns (p. 61), and the themes of Christian unity, spiritual integrity, theology of the cross, and evangelical orthodoxy all find expression in the “early” Bloesch. At age 36 he observed that he sensed his vocation was “to be a guide rather than a builder, a teacher rather than a confessor or martyr. But my hope is that I will not merely be a guide, but a herald as well; not merely a teacher, but also a prophet” (p. 189). Guide, teacher, herald, prophet—on all counts, as the twenty-five years since then have proven, that hope has not been disappointed, and consequently the Christian community has been greatly enriched.

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This engaging volume may be read as a creative resolution to long-standing tensions between science and religion or as one more attempt to have one’s theological cake and eat it too. The cake is the authority of Scripture, and eating it refers to a modern penchant for devouring the historicity of the Bible. This dual interpretation does little injustice to Green because, according to his analysis, reading a text as one thing does not preclude reading it as something entirely different. The key word is “as,” which Green calls the “copula of the imagination,” and it is the religious imagination that forms the focus of this study.

Since the seventeenth century, religion and science have often been viewed as conflicting ways of viewing the world. Green demonstrates that in the twentieth century scientific methodology and theology have drawn much closer together because they share a common dependence on the imagination. Both enterprises deal with objects that transcend the visible world, and both seek to formulate models or paradigms for interpreting reality. Such paradigms are not merely deduced from facts. Rather, they are constructions of the imagination by which people interpret the world “as” conforming to a particular pattern. Because paradigms involve a holistic view of reality, they are not easily altered. Obstreperous facts are simply compelled to conform to the accepted system. Only sustained criticism of the paradigm as a whole is capable of effecting change. Thus both religious conversion and the adoption of quantum physics involve a substantial paradigm shift.

Armed with these insights, Green tackles the thorny question of the point of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt) for revelation. This he locates in the imago Dei, which he declares to be the imagination. The imagination, according to Green, is neither the picture-making faculty of the mind (a classical definition) nor unfettered creativity (a more modern conception) but the pattern-recognizing and pattern-making ability of the mind. As such it is not a single faculty (as in medieval psychology) but a combination of the basic functions of the human mind. The fall is interpreted to be the loss of man’s ability to imagine God accurately, and redemption is the restoration of the true religious paradigm. (Note that to imagine God does not mean to picture him, which would be idolatry.) All that unredeemed sinners have left is the bare capacity to imagine, without the freedom to imagine what life according to the will of God would really be like. To call the naked imagination the Anknüpfungspunkt between God and man does not imply that man is capable of seeking God on his own (as Brunner insisted). Only God can supply an accurate paradigm of himself. Nor is man naturally devoid of a capacity for receiving this revelation (as Barth contended), for people do use their imaginations before divine grace comes.

It is at this point that Green’s problem with his theological cake comes in. To read the Bible “as” Scripture means that one reads it as the normative paradigm for human life. Unfortunately the Bible can also be read “as” fiction because many of its narratives (according to Green) are not historically factual. How does the faithful but informed Christian accomplish the spiritual schizophrenia of holding to both readings? First, he accepts that the authors of the NT knew Jesus well enough not to misrepresent him in the stories they told about him. Second, he understands that this is God’s method of drawing people to himself without compromising their freedom. The Lord presents his message in a book that can be read as fiction. In so doing he does not compel the mind with facts but captures the religious imagination—an intriguing, though flawed, proposal.

I found this volume to be stimulating reading. Green’s concluding exhortations regarding the use of imagination in preaching and worship are well taken. His
suggestion that conversion be described as a paradigm shift is not new, though some of the terminology may be. J. Edwards also denied that the new sense or new sight given to a believer involves a change in the substance of the soul. He described it as a new habit or disposition of the heart produced supernaturally by the indwelling Holy Spirit. For a number of reasons this seems essentially correct. By contrast, Green's definition of "imagination" may occasion some difficulty. Its novel elements require something of a paradigm shift in the mind of the reader.

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McKim's latest work, an introduction intended for interested laypersons, theological students, and pastors, offers a selective, diachronic survey of the development of eight issues in the history of Christian thought through the Reformation era. The eight areas covered include the Trinity, Christology, ecclesiology, anthropology, soteriology, authority, sacraments (baptism and the Lord's supper), and eschatology.

Each chapter includes a summary of the Biblical material, a brief account of early theological development, a discussion of one or more important turning points—although no turning points are discussed for baptism, the Lord's supper, or eschatology—and a section on further developments. The text is helpfully divided and subtitled to facilitate finding material on a given author or time period. Although there are a few places where sources are not given, the documentation is extensive. Students in search of paper topics and bibliographical help will find this work useful. Some primary material and many standard secondary works on doctrinal history are referred to in the list of abbreviations, which doubles as a bibliography. A further brief bibliography of four works per chapter is appended.

The difficulties of deciding what to include and of constructing accurate generalizations in an introductory work are well known. McKim does not escape unscathed here. For example, there is only the briefest mention of modalism, and that occurs in the chapter on Christology, not Trinity. There is also no mention of Rom 5:12 in the section on Augustine's anthropology, no discussion of Luther's debate with Erasmus over the will, and no mention of the incompleteness of the quotation of Isa 61:1-2 in Luke 4, an important point in any discussion of the kingdom. One might further question his choice of some turning points. If the question is the nature of the Church, the contest between Zwingli and the anabaptists is probably more to the point than either the problem of the lapsed (Novatian/Cyprian) or the mystical body (Donatism). Also, though briefly noted by McKim, Luther's denial that the mass is a work of merit would seem to be worthy of discussion as a turning point.

More problematic from an evangelical point of view are some indications of McKim's general approach. While few evangelicals would argue with the view that there are turning points that place "subsequent discussions on new footings," most would say that what McKim calls turning points are also landmarks that divide truth from error, or at least orthodoxy from heresy. This second element is absent in McKim, who seems to espouse a dynamic conception of truth that is more Hegelian than evangelical.

Only two sentences in the book give any indication at all of post-Reformation development prior to the twentieth century, and yet in the final chapter McKim
discusses the state of each issue in the modern scene. Moltmann, Rahner, Whitehead, Hick, Robinson, Tillich, Küng, and Schillebeeckx, along with process, liberation and feminist theologies, are all included as equally legitimate in the discussion of what a given doctrine means today. Are these really the modern counterparts of Athanasius, Augustine and Luther? If it is fair to regard attitudes to Barth as a watershed for evangelicals, McKim’s very positive assessment of him is also telling at this point. As might be expected, McKim’s attitude to ecumenism, evident especially in the section on Luther and Trent, is very favorable.

The Scriptures are not discussed in the chapter on authority; readers are referred to The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible. One discovers here in a matter-of-fact way, however, the standard liberal view of the formation of the OT canon, a neo-orthodox view of Scripture as a record of revelation, and at least some of the conclusions of liberal higher criticism—a late date for Daniel, Deutero-Isaiah as exilic, and two creation accounts.

There are several typographical errors, none of which is serious, although readers may be surprised to find that the doctrine of justification by faith was derived from Heb 2:4. McKim seems unable to decide whether Jesus “was” or “is,” and his refusal to use pronouns for God in an attempt to avoid sexist language becomes a bit annoying.

There are parts of this work that are quite helpful and engaging, but overall it is wide of the evangelical mark. The book is a good example of a study done from a broadly Christian perspective. It is also a good example of much that conservative evangelicals oppose. Those who are interested in studying or teaching the history of doctrine from an evangelical viewpoint would probably be better served by some other work, such as H. O. J. Brown’s Heresies.

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Scholars and students of American religion will find this particular resource tool of great benefit. It is helpful to have at hand good bibliographies, but the volume under review is a collection of annotated bibliographies covering such areas as philosophy, literature and history as they relate to the study of religion in America. Areas of concern, too often overlooked, in black, Hispanic and women’s studies are also included.

The work is a compilation of annotations of 116 books and 121 articles contributed by a commissioned group of forty leading authorities from diverse academic disciplines. Regardless of one’s specific area of interest, there is something here for everyone to appreciate and find useful. Those interested in American evangelicalism will find descriptive, critical annotations of such works as A Christian America: Protestant Hopes and Historical Realities by R. T. Handy, or N. Hatch’s The Sacred Cause of Liberty, as well as the classic work by G. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture. As a complement to the area of American evangelicalism is the inclusion of renowned works in American intellectual history. These cover such authors as R. Hofstadter, H. F. May, and P. Miller, all of whom have interacted with American religious history. Helpful reviews may also be found in American civil religion, Catholicism, and Church/state relations. America has been considered the melting-pot nation, the land of opportunity for all regardless of nationality. We are
also a religious melting pot, and therefore research in American religion is an open field. The topics covered in this work demonstrate that the study of the sociological aspect of religion has come into its own in recent years. Pioneers such as P. Berger and R. Bellah are responsible to some extent for opening up religious studies to sociological research. Recent works in this area have incorporated the use of ethnography, which gives the reader a sense of first-hand experience of descriptive conversations and interviews. A recent example, although not contained here, is R. Balmer's *Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: A Journey into the Evangelical Sub-culture in America*.

This resource is by no means the only work in bibliographic research. There are other valuable publications cited. The volume is complementary to its predecessors, especially in that it addresses areas in religious studies that have not been given a great deal of attention in years past. There are other reasons why religion scholars find tools such as this beneficial. From a professional standpoint it helps to promote religious studies as a valid academic discipline, especially in the eyes of those academicians who see it as a second-class or even useless field of study.

Fraker has done the academic community a great favor in overseeing and producing her work. It is precise and clear, and it covers a wide array of subjects in the field of religious studies. Some areas could have been developed further, such as new-age religion or Islamic studies (the book does cover black Islamic studies). There is very little representation of sectarian groups like the Jehovah's Witnesses, The Way International, and the like. Mormonism is included, as is Christian Science. Some may notice the absence of important works that perhaps should have been included. E. Sandeen's *The Roots of Fundamentalism*, for example, is just such a work. Nevertheless one ought to remember that it is virtually impossible to include every book published in each discipline. Those of us involved in religious studies should be grateful for research tools like this because they greatly enhance our academic discipline.

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The title of Barrow's most recent book is rather puzzling. One would expect that this is perhaps a book about the microscopic world of quantum physics. But although Barrow does use the phrase "world within the world" in that connection (p. 162), that is not the subject of the book. In another place he uses the phrase to describe the "grand philosophical systems" that model the world in certain ways (p. 338), but his evident disdain for such systems makes it evident that these do not represent the focus of his interest. The clue to the meaning of the title comes only in the book's final paragraph. Speaking of the fundamental problems of modern cosmology and particle physics, Barrow asserts: "They are extraordinary problems, and they possess extraordinary solutions which it will require extraordinary methods to coax from the Universe. If our methods ultimately fail, then any boundary between fundamental science and metaphysical theology will become increasingly difficult to draw. Sight must give way to faith. Confronted with an emotionally satisfying mathematical scheme which is 'simple' enough to command universal assent, but esoteric enough to admit no means of experimental test and grandiose enough to
provoke no new questions then, closeted within our world within the world, we might simply have to believe it" (p. 373). Here the phrase "world within the world" refers to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics, favored by Barrow, according to which the universe splits into parallel universes every time a quantum measurement is made, so that our universe is but one of an indefinite number of universes, all of which are mysteriously equally real. There are other ways, too, of closeting us into a world with a wider world—for example, positing a spatially infinite universe of which the observable universe is an infinitesimal fraction or postulating an epoch early in the history of the universe during which our universe inflated like a bubble out of a background space that spawns other bubble universes as well—and Barrow also discusses these theories. He then employs the anthropic principle to extinguish any surprise we might feel at the fine-tuning of our universe for intelligent life.

Much of the book is just a nonmathematical rehash of Barrow and Tipler's earlier tome, *The Anthropic Cosmological Principle*. The book purports to be about a different theme—namely, to explore the origin and meaning of the idea of "laws of Nature" (p. vii)—which makes one wonder why Barrow would then pick a title so nondescriptive of the book's theme. But this avowed purpose seems only a pretext for a wide-ranging, semipopular survey of contemporary physical sciences. Indeed, the book's principal weakness is that it lacks any focus: It is a potpourri of all that fascinates Barrow. A further weakness is that the book contains no footnote references, which is extremely peculiar, because anyone informed enough to understand the book is hardly apt to be scared off by footnotes.

Although Barrow has some interesting things to say about laws of nature—such as their intrinsically mathematical character—readers of this Journal will be most interested in his theological conclusions. As the citation above indicates, one of Barrow's characteristic emphases is that the laws of nature are insufficient to explain all we see and that therefore so-called "theories of everything" are ultimately metaphysical and in any case doomed to incompleteness. "The belief that a unified Theory of Everything will explain the structure of the Universe uniquely and completely will appear unashamedly in scientific papers, but it is essentially a religious or metaphysical view, in the sense that it rests only upon an unstated axiom of faith" (p. 338). Barrow realizes that modern cosmological theories are shot through with metaphysics, and he therefore invites philosophers to involve themselves with these (he is obviously fed up with relativist philosophers of science, like Kuhn, who threaten to reduce science to sociology). Barrow accordingly speculates on what role God might play in one's theorizing and shows himself refreshingly open to God's acting miraculously in the world outside the scope of natural laws. In an amusing section, Barrow correctly points out that the recent Arkansas court decision forbidding the teaching of creation science implicitly forbids the teaching of big-bang and quantum cosmology in American state universities, so that American physicists who do so are actually in violation of the law (pp. 233–234).

Nevertheless Barrow seems reluctant to move beyond fideism. "Arguments that look to the fact of the existence and origin of the Universe as a confirmation of the existence of God are not terribly compelling to scientists" (p. 232). While undoubtedly an overgeneralization, this assertion is disconcerting nonetheless. Why are not the origin and finely-tuned structure of the universe, if not proof, at least confirmation of the existence of a Creator?

The support of this assertion is surprisingly weak. For example, Barrow says one interesting objection asks: Why did God create the particular universe and set of natural laws that he did? "If there was no reason at all for the choice, then we have found something that is not subject to the laws of Nature. If there were constraints which imposed the necessity of the actual choice, then God is subject to some higher
law of Nature” (p. 232). But how is the first horn of this dilemma supposed to present any difficulty at all to the theist? It is, in fact, an entailment of theism.

In another place Barrow mentions two problems with “well-meaning logical and scientific quests for the existence of God” (p. 365). First, the logical arguments only present one with the choice of accepting the conclusion or rejecting some of the premises. They are therefore not compelling (cf. p. 222). But this is the case with any deductive argument whatever. The real question is whether it is rational to accept the premises or whether belief in the denial of the conclusion is more rational than belief in the premises. Moreover, what about inductive, scientific-style arguments for God’s existence? Why can they not make God’s existence plausible or more probable than not?

Barrow does suggest two logical problems with the cosmological argument for a First Cause of the origin of the universe. According to Barrow the argument claims that everything must have a cause, and so the universe must have a cause. But (1) “Anyone who can live with the concept of the Deity as an uncaused cause can surely live with the Universe itself as the uncaused cause” (p. 227), and (2) “The Universe is not a ‘thing’ in the same sense. It is a collection of things” (ibid.). These sophomoric objections are unworthy of Barrow. As for (1), the cosmological argument does not claim that everything has a cause but (in this version) that whatever begins to exist has a cause. Because God and the universe differ in this respect, the causal principle applies to one but not the other. As for (2), the universe certainly is a thing in the requisite sense, as is evident from its possessing many unique physical properties such as mean density, temperature, pressure, radius, deceleration, age, and so forth. Barrow himself refers in another place to “a unique object like the Universe” (p. 291), and his own many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics presupposes that the universe is an object possessing a wave function. That the universe is a thing in the appropriate sense is especially evident when one considers it in its earliest stages prior to the differentiation of matter and energy.

Barrow also objects to using the anthropic coincidences in support of the teleological argument for God’s existence. “The wide range of remarkable coincidences between values of constants of Nature which have allowed complex living things to evolve are only conditions necessary for the existence of life. They are not sufficient to guarantee it” (p. 365). This objection rests on confused reasoning also evident in Barrow and Tipler’s earlier book. They seem to think that teleology is supported only if the evolution of complex life is inevitable given the delicately balanced initial conditions. But in fact the teleological argument is strengthened, not weakened, by the demonstration that, even given the finely-tuned initial conditions, the existence of intelligent life can still not be explained in purely natural terms but requires a supranatural, directing intelligence.

Barrow’s second major problem with theist proofs is that the faith of those who propound the arguments does not really rest on the arguments themselves but on some other ground (p. 365; cf. p. 24). So they should not honestly expect their arguments to sway anybody else either. Now this is a very peculiar objection. How does the cogency or persuasiveness of an argument depend on whether its proponent bases his belief in the truth of the conclusion or the argument itself? Does the fact that he has independent grounds for believing the conclusion mean his argument is unsound or that he is any less convinced of its cogency? Are the arguments of natural theologians (like Locke) who do believe in God’s existence on the basis of their arguments more cogent or persuasive for that fact? On the contrary, contemporary religious epistemologists like Plantinga have shown that natural theology is a legitimate and useful enterprise even for those who take belief in God as properly basic. Besides, how does Barrow’s second point even count against a theist’s taking the scientific evidence as confirmation of his belief in God?
These objections are so flimsy that one wonders if Barrow's objection is not rather that the scientific evidence is too weak to act as confirmation of God's existence. For example, he claims that the Penrose-Hawking singularity theorem does not entail that the past singularity was universal nor that it was accompanied by infinite density and pressure (p. 225), which might lead one to think that the beginning of the universe is not sufficiently established to warrant the inference of a Creator. But this impression would be false. For he admits that while the general theory of relativity permits "benign" singularities, "all the existing evidence" indicates that the big bang involved physical infinities, and the singularity is usually taken to be universal in scope (p. 309). Having found the assumptions of the theorem to hold true, "we are forced by mathematical logic to conclude that there exists a singularity in our past" (ibid.). If there is an all-encompassing singularity at some point in the finite past, "the Universe must be regarded as having been created at that moment ex nihilo" (p. 230).

Recent speculation has tried to avert the initial singularity through unknown quantum gravitational effects. But as Barrow points out, quantum cosmologists are "forced to invoke Everett's 'Many Worlds' interpretation of quantum theory in order to make any sense of quantum cosmology" (p. 232), for otherwise one is forced on the standard Copenhagen interpretation to posit a supramundane Ultimate Observer to collapse the universe's own quantum indeterminacy. Since, pace Barrow, the many-worlds interpretation is utterly fantastic and extravagant, it follows that quantum cosmology if successful would actually lend support to the hypothesis of a Creator rather than detract from it.

Barrow's refusal to allow the origin and existence of the universe to count as confirmation of God's existence is not due to the want of scientific evidence. His stumbling block seems to be the flimsy philosophical objections. As for the community of scientists, whose opinion Barrow reports, I suspect that the reason why many if not most scientists find scientific confirmation of God's existence not very compelling is due to a combination of (1) a lingering epistemological positivism that regards religious statements as unverifiable or falsifiable and therefore either meaningless or irrelevant to science, (2) ontological reductionism, which by denying mind/brain dualism makes impossible the existence of God as an unembodied Mind distinct from the world, and (3) the atheism and agnosticism typical of our secular universities, which makes it analytically impossible for any evidence to confirm God's existence. But the lesson of Barrow's book for evangelicals is that the present state of science affords a prime opportunity for Christian theologians, philosophers and scientists to become involved in the discussion of these issues and to let the theistic side of the story be boldly told.

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Perplexity in the Moral Life: Philosophical and Theological Considerations.

Santurri's work is a highly technical discussion of a question older even than Christianity—namely, "whether or not moral perplexity is ever to be interpreted as a sign of genuine moral dilemma" (p. 3). He rehearses and refers to the arguments of the moral-dilemma thesis variously stated and the established philosophical tradition (à la Kant) that takes issue with the claim that genuine moral dilemmas exist. But ultimately, says Santurri, "moral perplexity is a phenomenon that cannot be
interpreted apart from answering certain fundamental questions of moral ontology” (p. 4). This leads him into questions about the nature of God and his commands, Thomistic natural law and theological voluntarism, and those positions (usually “tied more or less systematically to basic theological notions such as the doctrine of justification sola fide and the idea of a sinful world in rebellion against the will of God”) (p. 5) that countenance the reality of irreolvable moral conflict.

Santurri’s conclusion is that a Christian view of God, the world and logic will dictate that “situations of moral perplexity are essentially problems of moral knowledge; in such situations, that is, we are unclear about what morality requires, but in principle resolutions of the conflicts are available” (p. 5).

Santurri’s acumen is evident and impressive. The scope of his argument is staggering. But in the end I find his argument unconvincing. He is working with presuppositions about the effects of sin on our moral universe that would make a moral dilemma a defect in the law of God rather than in the fallen moral agent. To risk an undefended (though not undefendable) rejoinder unworthy of Santurri’s tome, sin and its effects—including conflicts and dilemma—are man’s responsibility, not God’s. Thus unfortunately the book may be as valuable as an intellectual exercise per se as for its actual contributions and conclusions about moral dilemmas.

The practical upshot of Santurri’s work is that because moral perplexity is never to be interpreted as an instance of genuine moral dilemma, one is obligated to improve one’s moral knowledge with a view toward solving the apparent moral dilemma. An answer is theoretically available (p. 211). Research, reflection and otherwise clear thinking are the order of the day. This advice is welcome even though Santurri, in my opinion, is mistaken about there not being any genuine moral dilemmas.

But this practical upshot is overshadowed by an argument so tight and language so ponderous that the book draws conspicuous attention to itself rather than to its point. The work is graduate-level reading and is recommended with the above observations.

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Frame utilizes the “perspectival” method of presenting theology. That is, to best comprehend the richness of God’s revelation to man, the believer can distinguish three different foci (the normative, situational, and existential perspectives) as he attempts to apply Scripture to his life. The normative perspective is the focus on God’s law. As Frame puts it: “What does God’s Word say?” (p. 4). The situational perspective focuses on the ethical problem or issue at hand. Often a clear definition of the problem goes a long way toward seeing it in the proper (and Scriptural) light. The existential perspective involves an examination of the self. For example, because not all believers possess the same Christian maturity it is proper to evaluate one’s growth in the faith and how it relates to solving the ethical dilemma at hand.

It would be incorrect to see these three perspectives as disjointed viewpoints. As Frame says in his Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (p. 53), the three perspectives should be seen as an “organic unity” that is always concerned—with varying degrees of concentration—with God (and his Word), the self, and the situation. For instance, it is not as if the study of Scripture is limited solely to the normative
perspective. In the volume under review, Frame is guided—no matter what the perspective—by the Reformation principle of sola Scriptura (p. 4). It would also be incorrect to see this type of methodology as an innovation totally lacking in Reformed precedent. As Calvin says in his Institutes (1.1.1), the knowledge of God and of ourselves is “joined by many bonds, which one precedes and brings forth the other is not easy to discern.” As Frame says, “You cannot adequately understand the Word of God or your situation without understanding yourself as a sinner saved by grace” (p. 5).

Not surprisingly the book itself is divided according to the three aforementioned perspectives. In “Normative Perspective” Frame analyzes Scripture and its role as the standard for Christian ethics. He addresses such issues as whether Scripture ever gives conflicting commands and whether there are levels of priority within Scripture itself. In “Existential Perspective” Frame focuses on the moral agent. He discusses personhood from a Christian perspective and how an un-Biblical notion of autonomy is the basis for many un-Christian ethical viewpoints. In “Situational Perspective” Frame focuses on some of the controversial ethical issues that have come about due to the meteoric rise of modern medical technology. Interacting with ethicists such as J. Childress, Frame attempts to bring a Scriptural perspective to bear on issues such as medical research, the difficulty of determining relevant criteria of death, and the often cloudy business of making important distinctions in ethical language—e.g. distinguishing between ordinary and extraordinary care for a patient.

The book does have a significant limitation. Frame’s consistent use of Scripture has the unintended function of showing the great chasm that exists between a consistent Biblical ethic and the current laws and policies that inform modern medical ethics. A lot of what the book contains is what ought to be, not what is. Because this is a book on ethics, such an approach is to be expected. Problems arise, however, when one wonders how to interact with the medical field as it exists and how to put this book’s contents into broader societal practice. Whether we as Christians like it or not, modern civil and criminal laws—as well as ethical policies made by hospitals, clinics and the like—are not founded upon the Bible. As one reads the book, one tends to agree with its arguments while yet wondering what to do next. Frame has indeed recognized this dilemma (p. 25 n. 18; p. 46 n. 36) but has not attempted to solve it.

Despite its somewhat narrow context, this book fulfills its promise to give Scriptural help to evangelical Christians seeking Biblical answers to ethical questions. The book also contains two helpful appendices: one containing critiques on brain death as a criterion of death, and the other the Orthodox Presbyterian Church’s “Report on Abortion” (of which Frame was the principal author).

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A collection of fourteen essays on B. Lonergan, the Canadian Jesuit theologian, this work is a highly uncritical analysis that for the most part is written in a dense and colorless style. The authors are content merely to report on the various aspects of Lonergan’s theology, and their writing style mirrors their methodology: It lacks any real excitement or drive.
Lonergan is consistently portrayed as occupying the centrist theological ground. There he stands between the dreaded fundamentalist position (which is often derided) and the overly modernist critical school. This via media, however, is definitely slanted toward the critical position. Nearly all the authors take pains to note that Lonergan was more concerned with the “experience of faith” than with the “propositions of revelation” (pp. 67, 151).

The work is concerned with theology “from below”—that is, the book focuses on the human experience of conversion and not on the transcendent initiative “from above” (cf. p. 7). In this human experience the workings and desires of the human heart are singled out to form the foundations of Lonergan’s theology. In that vein we may look at love—both as divinely and humanly oriented—as the linchpin that holds his theology together (p. 174).

The authors also see Lonergan as the theologian for today par excellence. Whether this explains their lack of any real criticism is not clear, but they think that Lonergan’s methodology and style are a needed corrective for modern Catholic theology.

No doubt Lonergan does make a valuable contribution to the viewing of the subjective side of conversion. As we view ourselves and others we often sense the heart’s struggle and yearning for understanding the divine. Viewed from below it is often quite mysterious why some choose God and others do not—provided of course that we keep in mind who chose whom initially.

The authors are quite right to emphasize the importance of presuppositions in doing theology. In fact they even utilize this point in criticizing an overly critical theological method: Those who claim to sit in harsh judgment over the Scriptures must be reminded that they too bring presuppositional baggage to the exegesis at hand (p. 192). Of course the authors should go much further than they do at this point. Their acceptance of a great deal of the critical mindset takes much of the bite out of their own criticisms.

The focus on divine and human love they provide is a Biblical one (cf. p. 40). We need not dwell here on how much the Scriptures speak of the necessity of our love of God and love of neighbor. The Church needs always to heed the simple message of the NT in that regard.

From an evangelical perspective, the book’s critical stance takes it far afield from fidelity to the Scriptures at many points. In chap. 3 (“Desire for Transcendence”), D. Carmody brings in universalist beliefs by warning us that we should not assume that God “is limited to the significances accorded divinity in our particular religious tradition” (p. 60). In context she is saying that theologians ought to be wary of claiming unique and absolute truth. This of course is the theme of her book Ways to the Center (Wadsworth, 1989). Lonergan is seen as the champion of this lowest-common-denominator religion, the core (and only) tenet of which is “unrestricted love” (p. 65).

In his essay, V. Gregson is highly critical of those who dare to take a Biblical text at its face value. For him, people who read the Scriptures literally lack Lonergan’s “intellectual conversion” (p. 94). According to Gregson, Lonergan would be aghast at those who take their “theological foundations from propositions and not from persons” (p. 102). Because of his un-Biblical approach, Gregson can even say that it is “unfortunate” that any sort of forensic justification is still being preached in pulpits today (p. 112).

In W. Loewe’s essay (“Jesus the Son of God”) Lonergan is quoted as accepting fully the modern critical presupposition that there is an impenetrable barrier between “systematic theology and its historical religious sources” (p. 192). Thus it is useless for modern theologians to attempt to defend significant portions of the Bible
as the historical accounts of eyewitnesses. We must rely instead on the faith experience, which is mediated through the Heilsgeschichte found in the NT (p. 193). This, according to Loewe, is the "new and Biblical approach" of Lonergan. But, frankly, this approach is neither new nor Biblical.

J. Higgins' essay ("Redemption") also denies any sort of forensic justification. In fact forensic justification is seen as an eleventh-century "invention" (p. 207). Like Gregson, Higgins is horrified at any notion of redemption conceived of in terms of legal satisfaction (p. 208). But their reasoning here does not come from the Scriptures. We are asked to find the satisfaction theory "repugnant" merely because "no decent person" could countenance the idea (p. 210).

For someone who wants a broad, historically-based summary of Lonergan's teachings, this book has value. For those who desire critical interaction, or for those who desire a more Biblical and balanced presentation, it would be best to look elsewhere.

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This book, composed of a 27-page introduction by the editor and ten essays written by contributors representing various geographical regions and theological perspectives, seeks to bring Korean minjung theology "into dialogue with major theological developments of our era" (p. vii).

The word minjung is an untranslatable Korean pronunciation of two Chinese characters, min and jung. Literally these words mean "the people" and "the mass" respectively. In his introductory essay the editor explains that the minjung are the common people, "economically poor, politically weak, socially deprived, but culturally and historically rich and powerful... the custodians of the indigenous cultural and historical heritage of the Korean people" (p. 4). Minjung theology is a theology of the people, a uniquely Korean expression of the indigenous liberation theologies that have emerged in those areas of the world characterized by the exploitation of the masses for the benefit of an elite. It is a contextual theology with a sociopolitical hermeneutic, essentially "a reflection on the praxis of the minjung's struggle for liberation" (p. 15).

Key concepts include han, that cluster of experiences of innocent suffering that seeks justice, and dan, a soteriological breaking of the vicious cycle of the violence and repression that produces han.

Although the methodology of minjung theology is similar to that of the better-known Latin American varieties of liberation theologies, Lee underscores the distinctive background, themes, approaches and issues in minjung theology.

In minjung theology, in contrast to western theology, the Jesus event, described as "holistic, dynamic, and changing" (p. 11), replaces the kerygma, characterized as "ideological, static, and unchanging" (p. 4), as of central importance. The Jesus event is the liberating event of suffering, death and resurrection that is reenacted whenever a liberating event occurs. "Minjung theology," comments the editor, "attempts to identify the various past events of minjung struggle for liberation as manifestations of the Jesus-event" (p. 12). The Jesus event is carried out by the power of the Holy Spirit, viewed as the spiritual presence of God, "ever present through history" (p. 13).
Minjung theology is also “tinctured by the Shammanistic worldview” (p. 13) of the traditional folk religion of Korea. Despite the obvious dangers of syncretism, Shammanism is held in high esteem by minjung theologians because it is a religion of the oppressed.

Because minjung theology is a storytelling theology rather than a systematic theology, each essay is preceded by a brief story. The voice of the minjung themselves is heard in these stories gleaned from Korean history, folklore and literature.

The essayists, such ecumenical luminaries as J. M. Bonino, R. M. Brown, J. B. Cobb, Jr., H. Cox, K. A. Dickson, K. G. Ogle, J. D. Roberts, L. M. Russell and C. S. Song, respond from their own perspectives—not to the introductory essay, but to a previous book, Minjung Theology: People as Subject of History. While the quality of their contributions is uneven and overlap is inevitable, several essays stand out as exceedingly thought-provoking. Personally, I found those by Brown, Cox and Koyama to be the most lucid.

The book includes an appendix containing a critique of minjung theology by H. Wagner and the Theological Commission of the Evangelisches Missionwerk, the Protestant Association for World Missions based in West Germany to which A. Byung-mu and other Korean minjung theologians respond. It is here that issues swirling about minjung theology are most clearly joined. The German theologians criticize both the political messianism and inherent romanticism of minjung theology. The exchange is reminiscent of J. Moltmann’s open letter to Bonino and the latter’s response. Also, the editor concludes his introductory essay with some critical concerns that express caution concerning recent developments in minjung theology that distance it even further from classical Christian beliefs.

This book should serve as a sobering eye-opener for complacent evangelicals who think that liberation theologies are confined to Latin America, that Korean Protestantism is thoroughly evangelical, or that the economic miracle taking place on the rim of East Asia is an unmixed blessing. Readers of the book will have a deepened understanding not only of minjung theology but also of the Korean people and the Asian mind.

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Successful teachers know the inestimable value of a series of examples when attempting to explain or to validate a theory or principle. This value serves as the rationale for the volume under review, which presents more than a mere sequel to Robinson’s Biblical Preaching (Baker, 1980): It provides vivid color to what had been a clear but black-and-white picture.

As the subtitle indicates, the book offers twelve sermons that seek to apply the principles of the earlier volume. The collection comprises sermons from eleven of Robinson’s students and a sermon by Robinson himself. Following each sermon the editor analyzes the message and provides the transcript of a brief interview with each preacher.

The sermons span an impressive variety of Biblical genres. To enhance the merit of the collection, “these messages were forged out of the demanding routines of busy ministries...”. While the sermons may have received a bit more polish than usual, each smacks of the ordinary rather than the extraordinary and represents what
preaching done on a regular basis looks like" (p. 8). The extent to which each sermon utilizes Robinson's homiletical principles varies. Moreover the sermons appear in a range of forms, approach the Biblical text in diverse manners, and employ multifarious supporting materials. Thus the sermons reveal the personality and craftsmanship of the individual preacher and the specificity of his or her audience while evincing that Robinson's students suppose a homiletical philosophy rather than a cookie-cutter approach.

Robinson's analyses are Monday's films of Sunday's game. The editor highlights the strengths of each sermon and constructs an outline of the sermon's structure. The comments are directed at the aims and demands of the particular sermon, and yet they furnish the reader with general homiletical guidelines. Topics discussed include relevance, application, picturesque language, the nature of the audience, the relationship between content and form, and suggestions for explaining exegetical data.

The interviews reveal the minister's game plan. Questions probe the specific sermon's rationale, form and purpose as well as any homiletical problems the Biblical passage may have posed. Preparation—of both the present sermon and sermons in general—is the primary topic: time required, use of original languages and commentaries, means of gathering supporting materials. The interviews offer what every student of preaching has wanted countless times: the opportunity to ask a mentor "How do you do that?" or "Why did you say it that way?" The result is a list of both calculated and serendipitous morsels on the art and skill of preaching. These include Lutzer's key-word outlines (pp. 42, 48), Matthews' preaching calendar (p. 132), Litfin's echo that gives the sermon a sense of unity (p. 111) and Sunukjian's and Stowell's illustrations gathered from life that both clarify and apply Biblical truths (pp. 86-87, 175). Just as no preacher should attempt to imitate any one of these twelve expositors, no reader will find each morsel applicable. The suggestions, however, should prompt evaluation of the reader's own preaching.

Three directives for the reader may enhance the worth of this book. (1) Read and digest Biblical Preaching before reading Biblical Sermons. The terminology and philosophy of the former is essential to understanding the latter. (2) Read Robinson's introduction carefully. It provides a panorama of many of the benefits to be gleaned from the twelve sermons. (3) Read each sermon silently, then aloud. Each reading will yield distinct insights.

The merits of Robinson's newest contribution are several: concrete examples of how an approach to homiletics functions in a variety of sermons, impetus to evaluate one's preaching, and numerous morsels on the art of preaching from proven expositors. Any teacher would thrill at seeing students practice his theory as expounded in this book. Congratulations are due Robinson, both for his writing and his teaching.

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While the Scripture indices to most works of systematic theology occupy a few pages in the back of the book, the more than 9,000 Biblical references in Milton's De doctrina would require a separate volume. Thanks to Bauman that volume finally exists, and it fills a long-standing lacuna in Milton scholarship. Bauman identifies and lists this remarkable plethora of Biblical citations and allusions in Biblical
order, keying them to both the Columbia edition of the Latin text and the Yale edition for the standard English translation of the prose works. The usefulness of the volume is enhanced by a tantalizingly brief introduction, explanatory footnotes, and—perhaps most interestingly—a series of tables analyzing Milton’s citations by frequency and comparing his practice in the use of Scripture with that of Calvin in the Institutes. It will clearly facilitate, if not indeed make possible for the first time, accurate and detailed study of how the great if eccentric mind of the author of Paradise Lost read, interpreted and appropriated the Biblical text.

Bauman has already given us the definitive study of the theology of De doctrina in his Milton’s Arianism (Frankfurt, 1987). Now for a second time he has made himself indispensable to students of Milton and most useful to students of the history of doctrine.

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This book is a new look at the early Church by a Latin American historian. Its purpose is concisely described by the author: “The objective of this book is to collect and to present to non-specialists certain elements of the history of the church in the first three centuries [because] . . . these persons and movements shed some light on our current situation in Latin America” (p. xi). This is a work of legitimation, defending the existence of Latin American base communities by suggesting they are similar to the original form of Christianity found in the primitive Church.

Hoornaert’s thesis is twofold. First, original Christianity was marked by a “theology of marginality.” In other words, it was directed toward and practiced by the poor. But in the second and third centuries a break occurred. Original Christianity was “irreparably damaged” (p. 1) by the appearance of institutional Christianity. This occurred in two phases: The second-century reaction against the heresies of the time was followed by the political success of the Church in the third century. By the fourth century much of the original Christian substance was lost. From that time onward, Christian thought and life has been understood from the viewpoint of the doctrinal, the political and the powerful. The original Christian understanding of the world has been defaced. The theologian or historian must now search earnestly to find a Christianity similar to the original NT model. Fortunately, however, an authentic Christianity has not been completely lost. It remains today in the Latin American base community movement.

The second part of Hoornaert’s thesis is that in order to see the similarity between original Christianity and the base communities, history must be “reconstructed” (p. 10). This involves looking at history with an eye on the poor or “marginalized.” When this is done the image of the early Church can be clearly seen today in these communities of Latin American poor. These communities imitate the “primitive ecclesial model” (p. 18) of the early Church and are the best sociological and theological models to preserve the true Christian heritage today.

Hoornaert’s historical rereading focuses on the nonpolitical everyday life of the average Christian of the first through the third centuries. Using the historiographical methods of the French Annales school he attempts to write history or to recreate the “memory” of the past from the viewpoint of the “defeated and humbled, the marginalized and condemned” (p. 8). In this reading, for example, the anti-agnostics
writings of the second century are interpreted as defending “the faith of the simple and poor against the assaults of the powerful and intelligent” (p. 51). Justin Martyr, Irenaeus and Tertullian (as well as Marcion) appear as champions of the poor and marginalized while Eusebius, Clement of Alexandria, Origen and Augustine are chastised for defending the philosophical and powerful.

Whether or not the reader agrees with the author’s conclusions, this book is valuable because it brings out a side of early Christianity seldom seen. It is a warning against focusing on early Christianity solely from the view of the institutional and political. It is a well-organized and very readable collection of documents from the early centuries that characterize the life of the poor and would be a helpful and challenging supplementary reader for any course on early Christian life.

Several aspects of Hoornaert’s historical method are, however, ironic. In the first place, he argues that historical knowledge of authentic Christianity has not come down via traditional means—e.g. documents, archives, discourses, letters, iconography, architecture, art. Rather, the true Christian tradition has been “transmitted from generation to generation, as a popular culture, an oral tradition, a cultural resistance. Hence this Christian memory survives primarily in communities” (p. 8). But how would one know this without recourse to precisely those sources he had denied using? And in fact it is to the documents, letters, art, iconography, etc., of the early Church that Hoornaert appeals in reconstructing early Christian history.

Second, Hoornaert is adamant that the enemy of a true understanding of Christianity is philosophy because it has been a tool of the “privileged classes” (p. 128). Yet the author himself uses sophisticated historical and philosophical tools in a quest for historical understanding.

Third, Hoornaert’s attempt to write from the viewpoint of liberation theology reflects the statement of R. Alves, a Brazilian liberation theologian, who wrote that “scientific concern bores me when it invades history.” Hoornaert’s book is evidence that for liberation theologians history and theology are to be understood ideologically—i.e. in terms of class struggle. The accuracy and self-consistency of such a hermeneutic seems dubious.

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