THE IMAGO DEI AS FAMILITAS

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A characteristic mark of the present situation of the spirit and its activity in science is the turn to man, to *humanum* as the real and realizable."1 Amid the research that has been carried out on the question of man in Marxism, existentialism, rationalistic humanism, and the natural sciences, the Judeo-Christian tradition has historically viewed itself as having a unique perspective on the nature of man. "Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness'" (Gen 1:26).

The precise meaning of this Biblical testimony has, however, been a perennial source of debate. No one in recent times has influenced the debate as much as Karl Barth. "After the Second World War, there is hardly a single scholar who has been cited as often in the imago Dei debate as the systematic theologian Karl Barth."2 Although OT research and systematic work since 1961 have largely overridden the Barthian approach in favor of a functional view of the imago as dominion over creation,3 "the only interpretation which can claim to be a rival to the dominant functional interpretation is the relational or Barthian interpretation."4 This study will seek to defend a relational view of the imago Dei in a way that overcomes some of the pitfalls of Barth's approach.

Genesis 1:26–28 is clearly the *locus classicus* for discussion of the imago Dei. The hortatory "let us" of 1:26 has occasioned vigorous discussion throughout history. The older notion that the plural has to do with a plural of majesty was dismissed by Barth as "quite foreign to the linguistic usage of the Old Testament."5 Barth also dismissed the prevalent view

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3 Ibid. 219–225. W. Fannenberg *Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive* [Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1983] 76) speaks of *Sohnhafte Herrschaft* as the trustee-like perception of the lordship of the Creator under which man should rule responsibly in all his relations to the world. E. Jüngel ("Der Gott entsprechende Mensch," *Entsprechungen: Gott-Wahrheit-Mensch* [Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1980] 303) combines the Barthian relational view with the lordship view, saying that man "corresponds to this Lord as man with man in common lordship over the world."
5 K. Barth, *Church Dogmatics* III/1 (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1958) 191 (hereafter CD). GKC §124g, however, does include the plural of majesty as an aspect of Hebrew grammar; nonetheless, Gesenius sees the plural here as that of self-deliberation. This may be applied from the Christian view to the threefold "I" of God.
of OT scholars that the "us" refers to a heavenly court: "Those addressed here are not merely consulted by the one who speaks but are summoned to an act . . ., i.e., an act of creation."\(^6\) Historic Jewish exegesis had had, however, no real concern over Barth's objection that the heavenly court idea means that man is made in the image of God and the angels (\(\text{?} \\text{thym}\)).\(^7\) "The divine image could thus be conceived as a likeness to the angels, the more easily as in Bible story angels always appear in the form of men."\(^8\)

While Jewish exegesis may not have been much concerned with man being made in the image of the heavenly court of God and angels, several problems nonetheless persist with this position. There is the striking problem of the conflict between the plural ("our image") in v. 26 and the singular ("his own image") in v. 27. The equation of angels with God in a singular image seems to lead ineluctably to the attribution of deity to these nondivine beings.\(^9\) What is more, there is, as Clines points out, no previous mention of a heavenly court in Genesis 1 or the so-called "P" document, rendering the position more suspect.\(^10\)

Contrary to Gerhard von Rad and other proponents of the heavenly court idea, Barth saw in this plural an intimation of the Trinity: "The saga undoubtedly speaks of a genuine plurality in the divine being, but it does not actually say that it is a Trinity."\(^11\) Barth saw divine plurality as alone sufficient to the demands of the text, contrary to "modern exegesis in its arrogant rejection of the exegesis of the Early Church." While Barth does not stand fully with the initial attempts of the early Churchmen in their efforts to distill the doctrine of the Trinity from the plural,\(^12\) he clearly thinks that "what is here said about the Creator can finally and properly be understood only against the background of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity."\(^13\) Stamm acknowledges that one must concede the possibility and even the correctness of Barth's explanation. It cannot be rejected out of hand that the NT doctrine of the triune nature of God is hinted at in the OT.\(^14\)

\(^6\) Barth, CD III/1 192.

\(^7\) It is by no means universally acknowledged that \(\text{?} \\text{thym}\) can legitimately mean "angels." In Theology of the Old Testament ([New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1883] 90), e.g., G. F. Oehler categorically asserted: "This use of the word can nowhere be shown; certainly not in Ps. viii. 6, xcvi. 7, cxxxviii. 1, where the LXX. have translated it by \textit{angeloi}; also not in Ps. lxxxi., where . . . \(\text{?} \\text{thym}\) does not designate angels, but the bearers of the judicial power in the theocracy."

\(^8\) G. F. Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1927) 1.447.

\(^9\) Barth, CD III/1 192. O. Loretz argues that the inclusion of angels in "us" is a later interpretation, basing his critique on Ugaritic texts which have the main God surrounded by beings that are "gods of the same quality" (\textit{vollwertige Götter}), though of a second order ("Der Mensch als Ebenbild Gottes [Gen. 1, 26ff.]," Mensch (ed. Scheffczyk) 116–117).


\(^11\) Barth, CD III/1 192.

\(^12\) Barn. 6:12 made the first foray into a trinitarian interpretation of these verses, followed by Justin. Subsequently Irenaeus and Theophilus made more elaborate trinitarian proposals. For an elucidation of the imago Dei doctrine of the early Churchmen see e.g. A.-G. Hamman, L'homme, image de dieu (Paris: Desclée, 1987).

\(^13\) Barth, CD III/1 192.

\(^14\) J. J. Stamm, "Die Imago-Lehre von Karl Barth und die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft," Mensch (ed. Scheffczyk) 60–61. Clines ("Image" 66) follows Barth in seeing duality within the
Is it possible to do justice to early Jewish exegesis of this text (and its later preservation in the school of Hermann Gunkel) as having to do with a heavenly court while at the same time conceding the criticisms of this position as advanced by Barth? It is only possible, it would seem, if one is willing to grant that the divine archetype of the *imago* is a *familia*. The rabbis understood the various ranks of angels as constituting a *familia* ("household," "family") on high with whom God regularly conferred about all matters (*Sanh. 38b*). If the Angel of Yahweh is understood as the preincarnate Son to whom the Father speaks in Gen 1:26, one may maintain the familial relation of Father to Son as the divine archetype of which man is the image. While this viewpoint was obviously not in the mind of the Jewish exegesis of the text, it does mediate the tensions that exist between the heavenly court notion and the Barthian position. As Edmund Schlink noted, Christ was already God's image in his preexistence from eternity. Because he was already God's image before he became man, he is God's image as man. Hence "God's image is actually the eternal self-distinction of God in his persons, namely as God the Father and God the Son."  

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15 Latin *familia* was the word usually employed; cf. e.g. *Ber. 16b–17a; Sanh. 98b, 99b; Hag. 13b.*  
16 The relation of the Angel of the Lord to God is an extremely difficult topic that, in the words of J. Michl, "up to today has never been satisfactorily explained" ("Angel," *Sacramentum Verbi* 1.21). Several theories have been advanced to explain how on the one hand God reveals himself through the Angel in such a way that the text speaks directly of God and on the other how the Angel can nonetheless appear quite distinct from God. The "representation theory," held by Jerome and Augustine, sees the Angel as a creature acting on the authority of God. The "identity theory" sees the Angel as an anthropomorphic manifestation of the invisible God. The "Logos theory," held by many early Christian writers, sees the Angel as a revelation of the preexisting Son of God. The "interpolation theory," held by many modern exegetes, sees the Angel as a development from later theological convictions, wherein direct intercourse with the transcendent God was seen as objectionable, the Angel thus taking God's place. Although Michl boldly declares the "Logos theory" "obsolete" (ibid.), the prevailing opinion now being the "representation theory" or the "interpolation theory" (R. Ficker seeks rapprochement between "representation" and "interpolation"; cf. "mal'ak," *Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament* 1.907), there is much to be said for the older views. In fact many scholars continue to argue cogently for the identification of the Angel with the Son of God. H. F. Vos and W. R. Hearn ("Angel of the Lord," *Baker Encyclopedia of the Bible* 1.90) have recently corroborated the judgment of R. M. Wilson ("Angel," *ISBE* 1.125) that "the appearances of the angel of the Lord, with his special redemptive relation to God's people, show the working of that divine mode of self-revelation which culminated in the coming of the Savior, and are thus a foreshadowing of, and a preparation for, the full revelation of God in Jesus Christ." D. Slager ("Who Is the 'Angel of the Lord'?", *BT* 39 [1988] 436–438) has asserted that "on the whole Scripture makes it clear that the angel of the Lord is a manifestation of the Lord himself," seeing reflections of the Trinity in those verses (e.g. *Zech 1:12*) where the Angel of the Lord addresses the Lord (here showing rapprochement between the "identity" and "Logos" views). For an extensive treatment of the theme cf. J. E. Fossom, *The Name of God and the Angel of the Lord* (WUNT 36; Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1985), who shows that the Logos (or Wisdom) doctrine of the early Christians (including the identification of the Angel with the Son) goes back into perhaps the first century in the *Prayer of Joseph* fragment (itself reminiscent of Paul's Christ-hymn in Col 1:15–20). The older view actually has Jewish origins in the Samaritan identification of the Angel (or Logos) with Yahweh (cf. 223–237, 314–315).  
Is this emphasis on the Father-Son relation as the divine archetype of the image in mankind a constructive interpretation of the OT in light of Christian theology? Not necessarily. Throughout the utterances of the Talmudic sages, the relationship between Creator and creature is expressed by the image of Father and son. God is regularly addressed as “Father in heaven.” God is seen as the Father of Israel, his firstborn son (Exod 4:22; Deut 14:1; Isa 1:2; 63:16; 64:8; Jer 3:19; Mal 1:6). “Have we not all one father? Has not one God created us?” (Mal 2:10). While Israel was the firstborn son having the special privileges of covenantal relation to God its Father, the doctrine of fatherhood was not restricted to this one people but was extended to all human beings.

The Fatherhood of God is synonymous with His love for the human family. Every creature is living proof that the Father of all is a God of love. The best expression of this idea is found in the apophism of R. Akiba: “Beloved is man, for he was created in the image of God; but it was by a special love that it was made known to him that he was created in the image of God; as it is said, ‘For in the image of God made He man’” (Aboth III.18).18

It was universal Jewish doctrine that all the races of humankind are descended from a single pair, to whom with their posterity God gave the generic name “Man” (adam; Gen 5:2).19 The universal fatherhood of God, concretely realized in the propagation of the species by the fathering of sons—as for example Adam’s fathering of Seth “in his own likeness, after his image” (Gen 5:3)—had important ethical significance. All men and women, whatever their distinguishing features, were stamped by God with one seal, the seal of Adam. Each man and woman had a common divine Father and a common human father. Consequently each was to act and speak as if the whole human race depended on his or her conduct. The common humanity inherent in their common relation to God and Adam formed the foundation for the most comprehensive principle of ethical conduct. According to Akiba’s younger contemporary, Simeon ben Azzai, the image of God must be reverenced in their common humanity (Sipra 4.12). To injure another man, therefore, was to do harm to shared humanity, the image, and the One reflected in that image. Consequently after the flood the Noahic covenant specifies the brotherly care of each for the other (as over against Cain’s retort after killing Abel: “Am I my brother’s keeper?” [Gen 4:9]). This familial care equally involved executing the punishment of death upon a brother who takes the life of another, “for God made man in his own image” (9:6).20 An affront to another man is ipso

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19 Curiously, the LXX has in Gen 5:2 “and he named the name of them Adam,” this despite taking twldt Šdm in 5:1 as geneseōs anthropōn [sic].
20 Barth is far from the historic Jewish view of corporate responsibility when he says that man “does not possess the power of life and death; the right of capital punishment” (CD III/1 187). According to the rabbis “one man is equal to the whole of Creation” (Abot R. Nat. 31). “Man was first created a single individual to teach the lesson that whoever destroys one life, Scripture ascribes it to him as though he had destroyed a whole world; and whoever saves one life, Scripture ascribes it to him as though he had saved a whole world” (Sanh. 4.5).
facto an affront to the world and to God. Akiba declared the text “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Lev 19:18) to be fundamental to the Torah, deducing from it this principle: “You should not say that inasmuch as I am despised let my fellow-man be despised with me; inasmuch as I am cursed, let my fellow-man be cursed with me. Rabbi Tanchuma said, If you act in this manner, know Who it is you despise, for ‘in the image of God made He man’” (Gen. Rab. 24.7).

“In the ‘Let us make man’ we have to do with a concert of mind and act and action in the divine being itself,”21 inchoately revelatory of the Father-Son relationship within the divine being that is the archetype of the vertical and horizontal relationship of all humanity to its respective divine and human sources. Mankind is a family of sons and daughters springing from the divine Father and the father of the race (Adam). This *analogia relationis* is, contrary to Barth, necessarily based on an *analogia entis*.22 Here we take issue with Barth’s invocation of the dialogical personalism of Martin Buber. Utilization of the I-Thou schema by Barth entails an intrusion of Greek thought into his theology.23 As Jüngel says, “ontologically, man is not at all grounded in himself as an essence. He cannot come to himself without already being in an Other”24 (cf. Acts 17:28).

Barth stood in opposition to an *analogia entis* because he understood it to be a means of justification apart from the revelation of God in Christ. Barth’s opposition to the *analogia entis* was, however, based on a misunderstanding. The intent of the *analogia entis* was not to lay the foundation for a right relation to God apart from Scripture but to accentuate the inaccessibility of God via the “greater dissimilarity in so great a likeness” between Creator and creature. “Analogy thus understood has doubtless the advantage of being the most thoroughgoing hindrance to a closed system which forces together God, man, and the world.”25

Barth’s “surgical” temperament—and also his genuinely “medical” insight into the seriousness of a disease—drives him not only to cut out the malignant growth but also a great deal of healthy tissue as well, in order to be

21 Barth, *CD III/1* 192.

22 G. C. Berkouwer says, “One cannot, in my opinion, place an *analogia relationis* over against the older *analogia entis*, as Barth wishes to do” (*Man: The Image of God* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962] 100). Setting these analogies in opposition leads to a “false dilemma”: (1) One will thus seek the image in the ontic structure of man, e.g. as defined by personality, reason, or freedom, against which Berkouwer asserts that “it is undeniable that Scripture does not support such an interpretation” (ibid. 59), or (2) one will seek the image in simple relation, against which Berkouwer rightly says, “Scripture does not deal with a ‘relation,’ but with a relation as it becomes visible in and through the reality of salvation” (ibid. 101).

23 A. Peters criticizes Barth’s use of dialogical personalism as “platonizing” (*Der Mensch* [Gütersloh: Gütersloher Gerd Mohn, 1979] 100; cf. also 127–137).


quite sure that the evil has been eliminated. Thus Barth rejects not only the Catholic—or, to be more exact, the Neo-platonic—element in this doctrine, but he also rejects the Biblical principle of analogy, and indeed every kind of possible analogy in created existence; in so doing he not only contradicts his own theology, which, like every other theology which is not satisfied with mere negations, lives on the principle of Analogy.26

Emil Brunner, Barth's opponent in their famous debate, was in much greater accord with historic Judeo-Christian thought on the question of the imprint of God in all of creation. Brunner held that all the differences within created existence are insignificant in comparison to those between the uncreated being of God and created being, which are absolute. God is revealed generally in nature (Ps 19:1–4) and particularly in man as the *imago Dei*. Natural theology is not in question, however, since "the natural 'knowledge' of God is actually no knowledge of the True God, but it is always inevitably a mixture of true knowledge and the deification of the creature."27 While this viewpoint aptly summarizes the central tenets of the Reformation on the question of natural knowledge of God, it does not fully accord with the Pauline perspective. For Paul, divine wrath is revealed from heaven against unrighteous men who by means of their unrighteousness suppress "the knowledge of [the, i.e. one true] God manifest in them" (to gnōston tou Theou phaneron estin en autois, Rom 1:19). Although the one true God had manifested himself in such men ever since creation and they clearly understood (nooumena kathoratai, 1:20) and knew him who is the one true God (1:21), they suppressed that knowledge of the true God innate in them and chose instead to fashion false gods.28 Hence, as historic Jewish thought has taught, there is no need for proofs of the existence of God, since he is "clearly perceived in the things that are made." All things, but particularly man, bear his impress. Hence atheism is for historic Jewish thought not a theoretical possibility but only a practical possibility for the fool, the morally corrupt, who despises the knowledge of the true God inherent in himself. The problem involved in natural theology, therefore, is not one of knowledge but of volition, as manifested in man's willful suppression of the truth in order foolishly to pursue false gods. Scripture is not needed so much to reveal the true God as to reveal to man the means that God has provided to enter into right relation with him.

The problem of the knowledge and nature of the true God is central to the dialogical personalism of Buber. According to Buber, God is imageless since for him an image means a human fixing to one manifestation in an effort to bar God from hiding himself and appearing as he wills.29 Religion is distinguished from philosophy in having no object for thought, being

27 Ibid. 22–23.
28 It is remarkable to observe how the early Barth derives precisely the opposite meaning from these verses: "And what does this mean but that we can know nothing of God?" (The *Epistle to the Romans* [6th ed.; London: Oxford University, 1933] 47).
rather mutual contact, meeting in the fullness of life between one active existence and another, bound in a relationship that is unknowable, the meaning of which is living action and suffering itself in the unreduced immediacy of the moment. Any attempt to speak conceptually of God or the encounter fails the essence of religion and becomes philosophy instead. "When Thou is spoken, the speaker has no thing; he has indeed nothing. But he takes his stand in relation." This relation is not experience of anything from which he has gained knowledge, for the experience is not part of the world but rather "in him." The natural world, human being, or spiritual being that becomes a "Thou" is not experienced and is not a nature to be described but rather a relation that fills the heavens, beyond the space-time continuum of I-It (i.e. conceptual) relations. In grace the Eternal Thou encounters the I in the moment of I-Thou. There is thus no seeking of God, for there is nothing in which he could not be found. God cannot be inferred in anything; he cannot be expressed but only addressed. The Eternal Thou "cannot be experienced, or thought." He is, however, met in all true relationality, manifesting no specific content but rather presence in mutual action. Hence whoever hallows this life hallows God.

Buber's exit from the causal continuum of I-It relations to the freedom of I-Thou relations clearly shows the influence of the Kantian phenomenal-noumenal scheme. Despite his assertions against objectification in the realm of I-Thou and against the possibility of translating that encounter into language, Buber nonetheless provides a considerable amount of description of the encounter. While this clearly subverts key aspects of his program, it is necessary that some objectification occur in order to recognize the other as a Thou. There need to be grounds that the I-Thou is immediate. It cannot be guaranteed merely by assertion. Notwithstanding, it is largely assertion that founds Buber's philosophy. How can the address be recognized without objective requirements? How can the resultant dialogue be true meeting and yet be aspatial and atemporal? How can one know who is addressing him in the encounter if no attributions can be made of the Eternal Thou? These and other questions plague Buber's philosophy, rendering it at least intuitional if not absurd.

The invocation of Buber's dialogical personalism in theology has had a profound impact on the imago Dei discussion. Relationality has become the all-consuming interest, apart from the question of what is related to what and how. This has resulted in some very imprecise thinking. Ray S. Anderson, for example, rightly says, "To abandon any ontological basis for the imago in favor of an existentialist or sociological function is not only unbiblical but ethically impotent." Notwithstanding, Anderson would seem

32 Ibid. 112.
to abandon this ontological stress in the prominence he gives to the I-Thou encounter: "It is through encounter that the self exists 'in the image and likeness of God.' . . . Encounter is more fundamental to the imago than relation." Buber's I-Thou relation dispels distinctions of nature and quality, making the relationality of mutual encounter the basis for a unity of being.

Thus human being is not He or She, bounded from every other He and She, a specific point in space and time within the net of the world; nor is he a nature able to be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities. But with no neighbour, and whole in himself, he is Thou and fills the heavens. This does not mean that nothing exists except himself. But all else lives in his light.

In the I-Thou relation, a unity of being is attained in which all is in God and God is in the I. The worst fears of the Barthian neo-Platonic conception of analogia entis are thereby realized.

The Biblical emphasis is on relationality based in a common nature issuing from a common fatherhood. Encounter is neither prior to relationality in the triune God, the archetype of which is reflected in his image, nor in humanity. Rather, a common ontological essence forms the basis for the trinitarian relationality. Eastern theology, reflecting the highly personalist Hebrew categories in the Bible and the functional rather than metaphysical character of revelation, spoke of the Son and Spirit as a team under the captaincy of the Father, from whom they derive their ontic unity. Contrary to the west, where differentiation in the Godhead was overshadowed by the more prominent concerns of substantial identity, the east emphasized that there is one Unoriginated (agennêtos, anarchos), the Father, who eternally begets the Son. As a human son receives exactly the same nature from his father and is bound to obey him, so the Son received the same nature as the Father and obeyed him. But whereas the human father is also a son and begotten, the Father alone is Unbegotten. Hence Cyril of Jerusalem in his Catechetical Lectures (11:8) says:

When God the Father begets, there is neither ignorance nor intervening deliberation; for to say that He did not know what was begotten is the greatest impiety, and to say that He became a Father after deliberating in time is like impiety. For He was not first God without a Son, but afterwards, in time became a Father; but He has the Son eternally, having begot Him not as men, but as He Himself alone knows who begot Him before all ages, Very God.

The subsequent Cappadocian trinitarian formulation emphasized "the triality of objective presentation rather than the unity of essential being," though of course assuming the latter. Each of the divine hypostases was conceived as the ousia or essence of Godhead determined by its idiotêtes, its distinctive characteristics and relationship within the Godhead, with the Father as the logical though not temporal source (e.g. paternity, sonship, sanctifying power, or ingenerateness, generateness, and procession).

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35 Ibid. 74.
36 Buber, I and Thou 8.
The trinitarian formulation standardized by the Cappadocians sees the Godhead essentially as *familitas*. This becomes especially poignant when it is remembered that the Spirit has often been viewed in Church history in feminine or maternal imagery. The divine family of God the Father, Son and Spirit forms the archetype, then, for what is to be understood by the *imago Dei*. Just as the Father would not be who he is without the Son, nor the Spirit without Father and Son, so, as noted from the Jewish sages above, no man is truly Man apart from another. No individual bears in himself the *imago Dei*. It is mankind, generically understood and comprised of male and female, son and daughter, that constitutes the image of God. Mankind is a family, deriving from a common father (Adam) and having the same nature. The *familitas* of humanity, then, is God's image on the earth. Moreover, as Creator of all humankind through the Son, "the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation" (Col 1:16), God is the Father of all people and they are his sons and daughters. The *imago Dei* involves, therefore, a vertical and horizontal relation and responsibility stemming from the concept of common sonship. The tendency of sinful humanity to disavow its common responsibilities to God and Man (*dm*), though a breach of the greatest commandments and the essence of the law (Matt 22:37–40), does not mean a loss of the *imago Dei*. In fact all sin and fall short of the glory of God (Rom 3:23). Sin is therefore lawlessness—that is, a breach in relations (1 John 3:4)—and "the essential nature of death is relationlessness." Autonomous individualism, most strikingly illustrated in Jean-Paul Sartre's dictum "my neighbor is hell," is indeed a horrible denial of the familial nature of humanity but not its eradication. Whether they acknowledge it or not, all people remain related to God and to each other throughout this life. Their denial of the *imago* in withdrawing into themselves or in seeking their own glory primarily disturbs their own lives, though of course it affects to varying degrees the lives of others. Because it is, however, inherent within the very nature of man to seek an other and an Other, truly autonomous individualism is indeed rare if not in fact impossible. Humanity by its very nature is social and is meant to reflect the community of relations (*perichoresis*) within the triune God.

38 Jüngel notes that *doxa* is parallel to *eikón* in Paul, in accord with rabbinic tradition ("Der Gott" 305 n.).


40 Even the autistic (*autós* ["self"] plus -ism) and idiotic (from *idios*, "peculiar to oneself"), though aberrant forms of behavior, are clearly capable of some basic relations.

41 The motif of *perichoresis*, in which each Person participates in the life of the Other without forsaking his own identity, and as the life of the Trinity into which every man is taken up in history, has been central to the trinitarian formulation of J. Moltmann (e.g. *The Trinity and the Kingdom* [San Francisco: Harper, 1981] 174–177). "The three divine Persons have everything in common, except for their personal characteristics. So the Trinity corresponds to a community in which people are defined though [sic] their relations with one another and in their significance for one another, not in terms of opposition to one another, in terms of power and possession" (ibid. 198). The stimulating nature of Moltmann’s reception of eastern theology is, however, vitiated by the importation into his theology of E. Bloch’s ontology of the "not-yet" and certain Heideggerian existential motifs, the foundation for both being Hegelian philosophy (with its Greek influence).
Contrary to Weber, who says man’s “humanity’ is his sinfulness,” it is rather man’s inhumanity, his autonomous efforts to seek his own glory instead of God’s in community, that constitutes his sinfulness. Christ came in order to turn individuals from the lordly imposition of their autonomous images onto others, to turn them from glorifying (imaging) themselves to glorifying God among humanity in community. People can only do this as they submit to the call of the gospel and attain to the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto “a perfect Man” (Eph 4:13) in Christ, the head of the body, the Second Adam. Having “put on the new nature, created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness” (4:24), each is to be kind, generous and forgiving to the other, “for we are members of one another” (4:25), members together of the same body whose head is the Second Adam. The Church, as the body of Christ, is thus to display before a world of prodigal, wayward and lost sons the way of true sonship, true humanity and true community, in Christ reflecting as sons the Son who is the imago Dei.

The Son, through whom God has made the world and who reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of his nature, once having made purification for sins, sat down at the Father’s right hand as one much superior to the angels (Heb 1:2–4). By his Spirit he draws men and women to the Father and into the “household of Faith” (Gal 6:10) to share in the privileges and responsibilities of the family of God. In Christ “you are no longer strangers and sojourners, but you are fellow citizens with the saints and members of the household of God” (Eph 2:19). The Church as the redeemed family of God is to be a place of comfort, hope and healing for all who have gone astray or been away.

Home is where no one ever forgets your name. Home is where no matter what you have done, you will be confronted, forgiven, and accepted. Home is where there is always a place for you at the table and where you can be certain that what is on the table will be shared. To be a part of a home or a household is to have access to life.

As M. Douglas Meeks says, the heart of justice is participation in God’s household. The Church, as the household or family of God, reflects the im-

43 “Perfect” seems a better translation of teleios than “mature” since it is a final, eschatological restoration that is in view in the Second Adam (cf. 1 Cor 15:49). Contra Barth, who says “the biblical saga knows nothing of an original ideal man either in Gen. 1, Gen. 2 or elsewhere” (CD III/1 200), Jewish and Christian reflection on Genesis 1–2 has historically concurred in seeing sin in the garden as “the direct cause of death which is the fate of every creature” (Cohen, Everyman’s Talmud 96).
44 Weber (Foundations 560, 571) rightly notes that the special qualities of holiness and righteousness, singled out (with knowledge) in the older dogmatic tradition as comprising the imago, are relational concepts. This comes strikingly to the fore in M. J. Erickson (Christian Theology [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984] 2.513) who, after asserting that the imago is personality, capability of thought, volition and reflection, lists as manifestations of the imago three clearly relational propositions: “Jesus had perfect fellowship with the Father,” “Jesus obeyed the Father’s will perfectly,” and “Jesus always displayed a strong love for humans.”
age (glory) of Christ in providing a home for the sojourner, a place where he is accepted for who he is in the beloved, a place where all distinctions and barriers are broken down and he may enjoy the life of true community and engage in its promotion among all people. "Women and men are directed towards one another, and only together are they the whole image of God on earth. Human community is to be like God, and it is to be made like God by women and men, parents and children."^46