REASONABLE DAMNATION: HOW JONATHAN EDWARDS ARGUED FOR THE RATIONALITY OF HELL

BRUCE W. DAVIDSON*

Controversy about the existence and nature of hell is not new, but recent years have seen a revival of it, such that even *U.S. News and World Report* carried a cover story on the topic.1 It is especially surprising to see some prominent evangelicals coming forward to dispute the traditional, orthodox understanding of this doctrine, among them J. R. W. Stott and C. Pinnock. Accordingly various popular volumes have appeared, some of which *Christianity Today* reviewed under the title “A Kinder, Gentler Damnation.”2 Encountering these discussions, the student of theological history experiences something like déjà vu. He has heard it all before. As in many great theological controversies, including the free-will/predestination debate, opponents have once again appeared to wage the same ideological battles, making use of many of the same arguments. Modern controversialists may have little new to add to a very old debate. That becomes clear when we examine the thorough treatment of the doctrine of damnation by the American theologian Jonathan Edwards, whose incisive defense of the traditional view has perhaps never been successfully answered.

New England pastor, theologian, and a leader of the great awakening, Edwards (1703–1758) is probably best known for his sermon *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God*. An excerpt from this sermon is often found in American literature textbooks and anthologies, the selected passage usually being his comparison of the sinner to a spider being held precariously over the flames of hell.3 As a result, most people who know Edwards probably think of him as a crude fanatic trying to terrify his poor parishioners with lurid images of eternal fire. Nothing, however, could be farther from the truth.4 Edwards is considered by many to be one of the greatest philosophical minds that the English-speaking world has ever produced. Paul Ramsey and Perry Miller concur in describing him as “the greatest

* Bruce Davidson is a lecturer at Hokusei Gakuen University, 2-3-1 Oyachi-nishi, Atsubetsu-ku, Sapporo, Japan 004.
4 In recent years Edwards’ reputation and even his Enfield hell-sermon have been somewhat rehabilitated among scholars of American literature. Many have brought forward evidence that
philosopher-theologian yet to grace the American scene.” Calm and analytical, he delivered his sermons without any oratorical flourishes. What impressed his listeners was the power of the ideas themselves. He never sought to manipulate people by appealing only to their fears. Rather, Edwards presented eternal punishment as a reasonable inference from the nature of the God revealed in the Bible.

In general Edwards took a very rational approach to the Christian faith. In that respect he was a true child of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. But unlike some Enlightenment thinkers he never elevated reason above revelation. On the other hand, in contrast to some twentieth-century theologians he never saw any inherent contradiction between reason and revelation. John Gerstner notes that the modern credo that faith is somehow irrational in its essence would have struck Edwards as a strange view to hold: “Emil Brunner takes the ultimate anti-orthodox position that contradiction is the very test of religious truth: ‘The hallmark of logical inconsistency clings to all genuine pronouncements of faith.’ Edwards is orthodox, not neo-orthodox. For him, contradiction is the hallmark of nonsense.”

Edwards had planned to write a comprehensive systematic theological work, which he intended to call the Rational Account of the Main Doctrines of the Christian Religion Attempted. But he died soon after becoming president of Princeton College. Edwards’ sermons and theological works are masterpieces of logical reasoning and careful thought. The more controversial or sensational the subject, the more Edwards was inclined to analyze it philosophically. The doctrine of eternal punishment he approached in the same spirit. In doing so he based his arguments on natural reason as well as Scriptural revelation and never asked his listeners to accept the doctrine of hell with unthinking faith.

In this study I will first of all summarize and analyze Edwards’ arguments that the doctrine of hell is consistent with God’s mercy and justice, since the crux of the issue is always the nature of God himself. Edwards saw hell not just as a place of punishment or as a means of frightening people into goodness but as one expression of God’s awesome character. Just as the joy of heaven will consist in the experience of the love of God, the misery of

Edwards was not obsessed with dark themes and that his ultimate end was to prepare his listeners to receive the comforting words of salvation. While that certainly was Edwards’ ultimate goal, these literary analysts sometimes seem fundamentally to misunderstand Edwards, whose primary concern was not for emotional balance but for logical force (R. L. Stuart, “Jonathan Edwards at Enfield: ‘And Oh the Cheerfulness and Pleasantness . . .’,” American Literature 68/1 [1976] 46–59). Stuart asserts that Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God was simply pulling the emotional strings of hearers by creating “tension” and then “release.” Thus even in defending Edwards, twentieth-century interpreters have at times evaluated him by psychological, emotional criteria rather than the philosophical ones that Edwards himself would have employed.

hell will mainly consist in the experience of God’s wrath, according to Edwards.\(^9\) I will then examine Edwards’ response to various objections to and reinterpretations of the doctrine of hell, such as that hell does not really exist and that it is only a place of temporary suffering. He effectively demonstrates that all such notions are inherently illogical and self-contradictory, besides being contrary to the plain words of Scripture.

I. HELL VERSUS THE MERCY AND JUSTICE OF GOD

Such an eternal destiny as hell would be unimaginably horrible. Many wonder how a kind and merciful God could allow such suffering. To these people Edwards responds with several arguments. For one thing, supposing that God’s mercy would not permit his creatures to experience great degrees of suffering leads us into a problem. Obviously human misery is not unbearable for God to behold, because the plain fact is that God does allow plenty of it to exist in the world. As Gerstner paraphrases Edwards: “Empirical facts settle one point indisputably: God and creature-pain are not mutually exclusive.”\(^10\) If a merciful God cannot bear eternal misery, then the same characteristic would surely argue against lesser degrees of misery as well.\(^11\)

Secondly, Edwards says that God’s mercy should not be construed as a passion or an emotion that overcomes his determination as a judge to see penal justice carried out. If God’s mercy were that kind of characteristic it would be a defect in God, not a praiseworthy characteristic. It would show him as weak and inconsistent with himself, not fit to be a judge. Finally Edwards points out that the idea of mercy presupposes the prerogative to display it or not to display it. A judge is in no case obligated to show mercy to criminals. Behind the idea that hell is contrary to mercy and kindness is the premise that mercy would force God not to punish to such a degree. But mercy that is forced is not free. It is therefore not mercy at all, but obligation or compulsion.\(^12\) As Shakespeare said, “The quality of mercy is not strained.”\(^13\) Edwards would certainly agree.

Thus Edwards shows that, far from establishing God’s mercy, such reasoning against hell actually robs God of the attribute of mercy. In fact by obligating God not to punish according to justice, men in reality show a profound contempt for God because they put God under greater restraints than they do themselves. They will allow themselves the right to dispose of what they own, but they will not allow God the right to freely dispose of what he owns: his own mercy.\(^14\) In characteristic fashion Edwards turns the tables

---

9 Edwards, Works 2.11.
11 Edwards, Works 2.84.
12 Ibid. 83.
13 The word here means “constrained” or “forced” and is in answer to Shylock’s question in The Merchant of Venice about a suggestion that he forgive Antonio’s debt: “On what compulsion must I? Tell me that” (W. Shakespeare, Shakespeare: Complete Poems and Plays [Cambridge: Riverside, 1942] 139).
on these objectors. Rather than their being defenders of God's merciful character, he shows them to be eliminators of it.

So in the end, for Edwards the only real issue is justice. Is eternal misery just punishment? If it is, men cannot object to it being applied. Edwards makes one basic argument in support of the eternity of the punishment: The heinousness of any crime must be gauged according to the worth or dignity of the person it is committed against.\(^\text{15}\) As a result the murder of a president or a pope shocks us more than the murder of a Mafia don. But God is infinitely wonderful and glorious. Therefore a sin against God is infinitely evil and merits an infinite punishment. An infinite, unending punishment is consistent with an infinitely great God. Instead of "eternal punishment" we could just as easily call it "infinite punishment," since that is what it amounts to.\(^\text{16}\)

Edwards comprehends the enormity of unending misery by the calculus of God's infinite worth and finds the punishment not to be excessive. Thus he establishes the reasonableness of hell in a mathematical sort of way. But he knows that such abstract reasoning can never really establish the justice of hell in the minds and consciences of most people. So his next task is to establish concretely the extreme dimensions of human depravity that will show hell to be something that people really do deserve.

Edwards traces our unwillingness to accept the existence of hell to two main causes: (1) It is against our personal preferences to believe in it, and (2) we have no real conception of how evil sin is and what it deserves.\(^\text{17}\) For Edwards, the torturers of the Inquisition—and for the modern person, perhaps those of a Hitler or a Pol Pot—seem horrible enough to deserve an extreme punishment because we have a keen sense of the horror of their crimes. Unfortunately we are not as keen as when it comes to perceiving the ugliness of most sins. Edwards notes that we are more shocked by the idea of hell than we are by the disregard and contempt men regularly show toward the majesty of God: "Doth it seem to thee incredible, that God should be so utterly regardless of the sinner's welfare, as to sink him into an infinite abyss of misery? Is this shocking to thee? And is it not at all shocking to thee, that thou shouldst be so utterly regardless as thou hast been of the honour and glory of the infinite God?"\(^\text{18}\) In other words our rejection of the idea of

---

\(^{15}\) Previously framed by Anselm, this argument is repeated in Edwards' answer to John Taylor's attack on the doctrine of original sin. The same line of reasoning also furnished a critique of schemes in which cumulative merit or worth is assigned to human moral acts. Obviously infinite demerit could never be counterbalanced by finite good deeds. But Edwards recognized possible philosophical objections to this concept of the infinite demerit of sin. For one thing it is difficult to conceive of how to ascribe infinite guilt to finite humans. Furthermore the concept might imply to some that there are no degrees of sinfulness. All evil acts might be morally equal if they are all infinitely bad. Edwards dealt with these issues in "Miscellanies" 44 and 713. In 713 he likened the comparative magnitudes of various sins to the sizes of hypothetical cylinders, which might all be infinitely long but differ in other dimensions such as width (J. Edwards, \textit{Original Sin} [ed. C. Holbrook; New Haven: Yale University, 1970] 39–42, 130–133).

\(^{16}\) Edwards, \textit{Works} 2.83.

\(^{17}\) Ibid. 84.

\(^{18}\) Ibid. 82.
hell is in itself a symptom of our hardness of heart toward our own sins and
toward God himself. If we had a spiritual apprehension of the true nature
of things we would not be amazed at hell’s severity but only that we our-
selves have not fallen into it before now. 19

And if only one sin deserves this kind of punishment, how much more a
multitude of daily sins in thought, word and deed? Such guilt is compounded
by our countless particular debts to God’s generosity and care in our lives,
which we barely recognize or thank him for. It is compounded by the fact
that we refuse to embrace Christ as a free pardon from such immense guilt.
It is compounded by our resentment of the blessings that others receive,
including salvation. It is compounded by our negligence and foolishness
about the condition of our own souls, which can be seen in the refusal to do
very much at all to prepare for eternity. This guilt is not at all mitigated by
our religious activities. Not arising out of real love of God or genuine faith,
they are either empty formalities or else self-centered attempts to procure
benefits. In the light of such immense and compounded guilt, Edwards asks,
how can people like us claim that eternal punishment is cruel and unjust?
Citing scores of examples of human guilt and depravity, Edwards builds an
unanswerable case like a prosecuting lawyer enumerating a list of horrible
crimes that deserve a severe verdict from the court. Especially in the light
of God’s character and gifts he demonstrates effectively that human evil is
not a small thing meriting only a small, temporal punishment. In addition
every objection to the doctrine of hell he turns into the basis for a new
charge. Man’s readiness to find fault with the ways of his Creator, Edwards
argues, is proof enough of the depraved propensities of his heart. 20

In the end Edwards concludes that considerations of God’s character not
only make the existence of hell reasonable and just but also necessary. This
is because a just and holy God ought to have an infinite hatred of sin if it is
a thing infinitely horrible. And if he has such infinite hatred, he should also
express that hatred in his actions toward sinners. Only an everlasting sen-
tence could adequately manifest the infinite extent of God’s hatred for sin.
“Thus we see not only the great objection against this doctrine answered but
the truth of the doctrine established by reason.” 21

II. EDWARDS VERSUS OTHER COMMON OBJECTIONS AND REINTERPRETATIONS

Further speculations and objections basically fall into two categories: ob-
jections that concern possible negative results of hell, and speculations
that the true nature of hell is something other than endless suffering. One
category consists of doubts about what possible good could come from the
existence of a place of eternal unhappiness, both from God’s point of view
and mankind’s. In other words, does hell have any value other than as a
place to satisfy divine justice? Furthermore, how can those who are saved

20 Ibid. 670–678.
21 Edwards, Works 2.84.
look on such a place with anything but pain, knowing that some of their own family or friends may go there? The other category consists of speculations (1) that God has no real intention of punishing people eternally but only threatens to, (2) that hell denotes annihilation and not conscious suffering, and (3) that hell is for the purpose of reforming and saving men and fallen angels, not eternally punishing them, and that therefore persons in hell will one day be released from it. Edwards makes a number of inferences based both on the Bible and on reason to disprove these theories. Though Edwards marshals an impressive number of Scripture texts to prove how untenable these concepts are I will touch on only a few, since my main purpose is to show how Edwards appealed to reason in his exposition of the doctrine of hell.

In regard to the value of hell, Edwards sees more than just the satisfaction of divine justice in it. Hell not only satisfies the justice of God but also glorifies it by showing how great and fearful a standard it is. "The vindictive justice of God will appear strict, exact, awful, and terrible, and therefore glorious." 22 For Edwards, the more horrific and severe the punishment the brighter the sheen on the sword of divine recompense shines. The unimaginable awesomeness of the punishment suits the awesome majesty of an offended king as great as God. Thus the same people who during life made light of God and did not honor his majesty will be instruments in the exaltation of that majesty in the end. By a majestic display of wrath, God gets back the majesty he has been refused. Edwards sees a kind of poetic justice in God's using an awesome punishment in the afterlife to inspire the awe that men refused to show in life.

It is indeed the only way for them to be useful at all to God, since they give no glory to him by choice in life—a point Edwards develops at length in his sermon Wicked Men Useful in Their Destruction Only. As the rational creatures closest to God himself in the hierarchy of creation, our "business is with God." A man who does not give any glory to God by serving him in life is not good for anything but to be passively useful in death. Edwards reasons that there are only two possibilities: to be actively useful, or to be passively useful. Just as a barren tree can be used only for firewood, disobedient men can only be fuel for a fire. 23 Moreover, evil men have no enjoyment or interest in actively pleasing God, so why would they want to go to heaven, where the worship of God is the principal activity? Therefore since ungodly men spend their lives on earth not in serving God but in serving the devil and his angels, Edwards argues cogently that they would certainly continue their service to the devil in the afterlife in hell, the devil's eternal abode. 24 In short, since men prefer in the present world to keep God at a distance, why should they not expect their chosen state to continue into eternity? In hell only can they be of any use to anyone.

22 Ibid. 87.
23 Ibid. 126.
24 Ibid. 88.
For those in heaven, God's mercy and grace will be highlighted in their experience by contrast, since they will see the alternative to salvation clearly before them. They will feel a profound gratitude and joy at being spared the same fate and know even more deeply that "there but for the grace of God go I." In fact their happiness and joy in heaven will be increased, since "a sense of the opposite misery, in all cases, greatly increases any joy or pleasure."  

Of course this idea presupposes that both the saved and the damned will be somehow able to perceive their respective destinies, how the other half lives—an inference Edwards draws from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, who could see each other from heaven and hell (Luke 16:19—31). To those who wonder how the saved could stand such a sight of hell, Edwards responds that those in heaven will be so transformed and similar to God in their attitudes and feelings that they will love only what God loves and hate what he hates. Since God himself is not miserable at the sight of hell, neither will they be—even in the case of people they loved in life. Edwards devoted a whole sermon to expounding this point about the after-life: The End of the Wicked Contemplated by the Righteous. The spiritual perceptions of the saved will be much clearer than they are now, so they will see human sin as the infinitely evil thing it is. In Gerstner's digest, "it will seem in no way cruel in God to inflict such extreme suffering on such extremely wicked creatures."  

As for the creative glosses and reinterpretations that people often advance in order to blunt the horror of this doctrine, Edwards thoroughly refutes them also, once again employing both reason and revelation. Perhaps the idea that hell is only a ruse by God he considers the most ridiculous. Some propose that the threatening of eternal damnation itself serves to frighten people away from sinning and that God will not really carry out the threat in the end. To begin with, Edwards remarks that it is blasphemy to maintain that a God of truth uses deliberate lies to govern men in the world. Such a notion, if it were true, would undermine every statement that God has ever made. Furthermore the idea implies that those who think hell is a deception have managed to outwit God himself by uncovering it: "They suppose that they have been so cunning as to find out that it is not certain; and so that God had not laid his design so deep, but that such cunning men as they can discern the cheat and defeat the design."  

Edwards humorously exposes the absurdity and arrogance of the claim to have uncovered the stratagem of God himself. Edwards demonstrates also that hell is not annihilation but sensible misery with Scripture texts that express conscious misery in hell, such as that there will be "weeping and gnashing of teeth" (Matt 8:12).  

25 Ibid. 87.
26 Ibid. 209.
27 Gerstner, Jonathan Edwards on Heaven and Hell 90.
28 Edwards, Works 2.86.
29 Ibid. 516.
persons are not conscious of pain, obviously. Furthermore, if men were not conscious that they were being punished, death would be no punishment at all but only release. In fact, since Job preferred annihilation to his own suffering, Edwards reasons that if a good man can suffer something worse than annihilation in his life, then the punishment of the wicked in the afterlife would have to be something much greater. Otherwise it would be a pathetic demonstration of justice for God to do less to the wicked than he allows his own saints to suffer in life. Also, Jesus speaks of various degrees of punishment in texts such as Matt 5:22. But there are no degrees in annihilation, which is the same for everyone. An eternal fire, however, can be made hotter for some than for others. Edwards was adept not only at finding suitable texts but at making logical inferences from other texts that perhaps do not speak directly to the issue he is considering.

Nor can hell mean only a limited time of very long duration, Edwards argues. Sometimes the word “forever” in the Bible does not denote a proper eternity but only a very long period of time. On this thin sliver of Biblical truth the “hell-as-long-imprisonment” interpreters based their understanding of hell. Edwards, however, points out that some texts referring to hell use not just the word “forever” but the emphatic expression “for ever and ever,” the same expression used to describe heaven and the eternity of God himself (Rev 14:11; 20:10). If this expression does not mean a proper eternity, he remarks, “there is none that does.” He leaves his opponents little ground to stand on and still claim the Bible as their guide.

This temporary hell would administer a kind of medicinal suffering leading to the ultimate repentance of those who go there, according to some speculations. Edwards debunks this view first of all by noting that people who gnash their teeth are obviously not arriving at a more godly, reformed disposition but are filled with hate and frustration. Indeed there will be more grounds for their continuing punishment after they have been in hell a long time, feeling hatred and vexation toward the God who sent them there. And if the suffering of hell is really a reformatory blessing in disguise, why does Jesus pronounce woes upon the towns that rejected him and were headed for hell (Matt 11:21–24)? In fact a host of Biblical passages becomes nonsensical if there is no eternal hell: the unforgivable sin spoken of in 12:31–32, and the statement that it would have been better for Judas if he had never been born (26:24). If salvation is the eventual end of everyone, then such statements become meaningless. The unforgivable sin will be forgiven, and Judas will be blessed. Moreover the extreme degree of suffering experienced in hell would seem to belie any merciful intent on the part of God in inflicting such suffering. As previously noted by other critics of the doctrine of hell, a place of torture and agony obviously has no mercy in it.

30 Ibid. 85.
31 Ibid. 86.
32 Ibid. 517.
33 Ibid. 522.
In addition Edwards notes that the hell-as-rehabilitation theory does not explain exactly how the torments of hell will accomplish what nothing in the world was able to do: change the disposition of the hearts of wicked men. There will be no Bible, church, or gospel of Christ in hell—in other words, no means of grace, only suffering. If indeed hell can accomplish for sinners a reformation of their depraved characters, then they will be saved without Christ, who is the sole means God has appointed for salvation. 34 As a student of human religious psychology as well as the Bible, Edwards effectively argues that suffering has no tendency in itself to soften a hard heart but rather has the opposite effect of aggravating a disposition antagonistic to God and righteousness. If Edwards had caught a glimpse of modern prisons with their recidivism and hardened criminality he would perhaps have found another piece of evidence to illustrate how the confinement and torment of the wicked does not produce their rehabilitation.

III. CONCLUSION

Though Edwards saw no hope in the afterlife for repentance, he believed there was still hope in this world. Therefore he used the doctrine of hell to shake people out of their complacency and apathy toward God and eternity. In doing so he did not try to frighten them like children but appealed to them as reasoning adults. The result was that Edwards' treatment of hell was much more terrifying. After all, it is easy to dismiss what seems to be nothing more than a manipulative religious fable. It is much more difficult to dismiss an idea that can be rationally argued as a plausible reality. If scientists convince us that the greenhouse effect is indeed taking place, we fear it more than if we receive the impression that the idea is perhaps only someone’s paranoid fantasy.

Edwards did often draw appalling word pictures about the horror of hell and made emotional appeals to his listeners, but he was at bottom making his main appeal to their reason. Responding to those who think that God has no right to be so angry or to punish forever, Edwards argued that God has every right to be angry and to punish eternally. He argued that hell is perfectly consistent with God’s mercy, justice and infinite greatness. He also listened to the speculations and questions that people tend to have on this subject and thoroughly dealt with them, not insulting anyone’s intelligence by dismissing them out of hand with a trite exhortation to stop thinking and “have faith.”

In Edwards’ view, sin and hardness of heart lead people to unthinking foolishness, whereas faith in Christ sets a man on the path of true reason. If hell is a reality, then Edwards thought it only reasonable to pursue all available means to escape it. Furthermore he said it would be insanity to think one could avoid it or endure it or expect somehow to escape it in any way other than by sincerely embracing Christ as Savior. 35 Hell is the only

34 Ibid. 520.
logical destiny for the unrepentant soul, and denying that is only an illogical exercise in self-delusion. He urged people to escape that fate, which if true certainly outweighs any other possible cause for concern. Assuming that the opposite is true and that there is no eternal punishment, Jonathan Edwards contemplated the ultimately irrational situation that would result:

It is a most unreasonable thing to suppose that there should be no future punishment, to suppose that God, who had made man a rational creature, able to know his duty, and sensible that he is deserving punishment when he does it not; should let man alone, and let him live as he will, and never punish him for his sins, and never make any difference between the good and the bad; that he should make the world of mankind and then let it alone, and let men live all their days in wickedness, in adultery, murder, robbery, and persecution, and the like, and suffer them to live in prosperity, and never punish them; that he should suffer them to prosper in the world far beyond many good men, and never punish them hereafter. How unreasonable is it to suppose, that he who made the world, should leave things in such confusion, and never take any care of the government of his creatures, and that he should never judge his reasonable creatures!36

36 Edwards, Works 2.884.