σιγαω, λαλεω, AND υποτασσω in 1 CORINTHIANS 14:34 IN THEIR LITERARY AND RHETORICAL CONTEXT

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I. INTRODUCTION

A major crux interpretum in NT studies, 1 Cor 14:34–35 is often said to be disruptive to the logical flow of Paul’s instruction for the Corinthian assemblies in verses 26–40 and the broader context of 1 Corinthians 11–14, leading scholars to favor various marginal gloss or interpolation theories. This article challenges that claim by clarifying meanings of σιγαω, λαλεω, and υποτασσω in 1 Cor 14:34 and demonstrating that 1 Cor 14:26–40 comprises a rhetorically coherent argument in which verses 34–35 fit smoothly and logically, as may be expected at the apex of an argument that has been building over chapters 12–14. Given the contested nature of the passage, our analysis addresses the broader context of chapters 12–14, Paul’s appeal to “the law” (ὁ νόμος) and parallels between chapters 11 and 14, and the

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An alternative position is that verses 34–35 are a quotation that Paul rejects in verse 36. See David Odell-Scott, “Let the Women Speak in the Church: An Egalitarian Interpretation of 1 Cor 14:33b–36,” BTB 13 (1983) 90–93; and Robert Allison, “Let Women be Silent in the Churches (1Cor 14:33b–36): What Did Paul Really Say, and What Did it Mean?” JSNT 32 (1988) 27–60. For a critique of this alternative view, see Anthony Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000) 1151–52. The present study offers a positive account of how verses 34–35 fit the continuity of their nearer and broader contexts as Paul’s own admonition for the Corinthians.

3 Margaret Mitchell defines two broader contexts for 14:26–38. The narrower context spans chapters 12–14 and deals with “the importance and proper employment of spiritual gifts” (Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation [Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1991] 266). It is introduced in 12:1 by ἡττοὶ δὲ τῶν νομοθετικῶν [cf. 7:1, 25; 8:1; 16:1, 12], which functions as a “topic marker” in normal Greek epistolary style (Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation 191–92). The second, slightly broader context spans 11:2–14:40, which Mitchell identifies as a “Third Section of Proof” in Paul’s letter. In these chapters, “Paul turns to the specific manifestations of Corinthian factionalism when the church comes together” (Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation 258). This suggests that 12:1–14:25 is the most immediate rhetorical context to consider in analyzing 14:26–40, but that important thematic connections with chapter 11 should not be ignored. Indeed, chapters 12–14 address issues of Spirit-inspired speech in the church: chapter 12 lauds
significance of 14:35 for historical reconstruction. An excursus on the textual issue concerning 1 Cor 14:34–35 can be found at the end of the article.

As is well known, λαλέω and σιγάω refer to different kinds of speaking throughout 14:26–40. Immediate context identifies their intended subjects in verses 27–30, hence the kind of speaking to which they refer. Though sometimes assumed otherwise, there is good reason to believe that the meanings of σιγάω and λαλέω in verse 34 are likewise contextually qualified by verses 29–33. Numerous scholars argue that, although σιγάω and λαλέω denote tongues speech in verses 27–28 and general prophetic speech in verses 29–30, these terms refer to the public evaluating of prophecy in verse 34 (also λαλέω repeated in verse 35). I substantially agree, but submit that an important nuance provides the key to a better understanding of Paul’s argument and rhetoric; namely, for Paul “evaluating prophecies” is itself prophetic speech rather than a different species of speech. Paul functionally distinguishes “evaluative prophecy” from other prophetic utterances throughout these verses. He therefore prohibits the women from exercising some prophetic activity while not removing their general permission to prophesy. Moreover, this functional distinction is the logical backbone of Paul’s regulation of prophetic activity in verses 29–38, and provides these verses with their oft-underestimated rhetorical continuity. Indeed, Paul’s use of a third contextually defined term, ὑποτάσσω in verses 32 and 34, confirms the continuity of these contested verses with their immediate context, and confirms that σιγάω and λαλέω in verse 34 refer to functionally differentiated “evaluative prophetic speech.”

the Spirit’s role in distributing a multiplicity of speaking gifts in the church and urges unity; chapter 13 urges selfless love as the proper motivation for exercising such gifts; and chapter 14 deals more specifically with problems arising from the Corinthians’ misuse of tongues and prophecy. But Paul’s focus has shifted to (somewhat comparable) problems that manifest themselves in the Corinthians’ public assemblies as early as chapter 11 (especially praying and prophesying with [un]covered head).


6 Cf. Thiselton’s discussion of translation alternatives for διακρίνω: “sift,” “judge,” “weigh,” etc. (First Epistle 1140). Since these terms reflect a similar function we shall translate “evaluate” for consistency’s sake. A general discussion of NT “prophecy” exceeds the scope of this article, which is concerned specifically with the Corinthian situation. For such treatments, see, e.g., Thiselton, First Epistle 956–65, 1087–94; and Grudem, Theological Exposition.

Witherington also understands the evaluation of prophecies as a prophetic activity. But from here he goes a different direction, concluding that women were permitted to evaluate prophecies. Paul probably had some problem with the insubordinate manner in which the Corinthian women went about it, so he silenced them (Women in the Earliest Churches 95, 101). Witherington’s conclusions seem arbitrary to me, and overlook the way in which Paul’s functional distinction between prophetic utterances is rhetorically central to his argument about prophecy in verses 29–38, as I will argue.

7 Grudem and Hurley also understand σιγάω and λαλέω to be contextually qualified, offering some structural arguments in support (Grudem, Theological Exposition 21–22; Hurley, Man and Woman 190). The present article offers a detailed rhetorical explanation that further substantiates these claims.
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The major problem in identifying the referents of these key terms arises from our dependence on Paul’s side of the conversation for our view of the Corinthian situation. How would the Corinthians have understood 14:34? Suggestions for σιγάτωσαν include “let them be silent,” “let them hold their peace,” “let them stop speaking,” “let them not interrupt,” with οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτρέπεται αὐταῖς λαλεῖν taking a corresponding meaning; each possibility reflecting a different reconstruction of the problem Paul was dealing with in 14:34.

However, there are reasons to suggest that Paul does not depend entirely on the Corinthians’ familiarity with the topic under discussion to ensure their accurate understanding of σιγάτωσαν and λαλεῖν in verse 34. First, in themselves the lexemes σιγάω and λαλέω are general in meaning, and without clarifying context are open to ambiguity for Paul’s Corinthian audience. This can be readily seen in this portion of Paul’s letter where he employs both terms for demonstrably different kinds of speech in verses 27–28 and verses 29–30. In each case, Paul relies on the immediate rhetorical context to convey their sense. It should therefore not surprise us if this rhetorical strategy continued in verse 34. Second, Paul puts forth considerable effort to distinguish between tongues and prophecy for the Corinthians throughout 14:1–25, evidently recognizing their need for instruction in speech-related matters. This also suggests that Paul intended his rhetoric to be self-clarifying to a substantial extent, and that literary and rhetorical context plays an intentionally defining role regarding σιγάτωσαν and λαλεῖν in verse 34.

III. σιγάτωσαν AND λαλεῖν IN 1 CORINTHIANS 14:26–40

Any argument for the meaning of σιγάτωσαν and λαλεῖν in verse 34 must adequately account for how Paul differentiates the meanings of these terms in the verses prior to verse 34. This is important in order to avoid assigning arbitrary meanings to σιγάτωσαν and λαλεῖν that are uninformed by context in any controlled way.

1. λαλεῖν and σιγάω and rhetorical continuity in 14:26–33. In 14:26, Paul provides a brief but important description of the situation he addresses in the remainder of the chapter. In accord with his desire that the Corinthians value prophecy and not disparage tongues (verse 39), Paul does not yet openly reprimand them for their psalms, teachings, revelations, tongues, and their interpretation (that is still coming). Instead, he says that, because each one “has” these things, the ensuing confusion does not build up the church. In broad terms, the problem manifests

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8 Cf. Thiselton, First Epistle 1147.
9 That ἐρμηνεύω relates to the preceding term, γλῶσσαν, is clear from the argument in 14:1–25, in which Paul wants the Corinthians to value intelligible speech over non-intelligible tongues. Anyone praying in tongues must do so in such a way that includes interpretation: Διὸ ὁ λαλῶν γλῶσση προσευχῆσθαι ἵνα διερμηνεύῃ (v. 13).
10 Note especially Paul’s use of “each one” (ἐκκόστος) followed by the fivefold repetition of “has” (ἐχεῖ) after each speech example, stressing individual claims to possess multiple speaking gifts. The contrast Paul draws between ἀκοηστασία and εἰρήνη in 14:33 also suggests a disruption and confusion
itself as too many talkers vying for the opportunity to contribute, resulting in disorderly gatherings that do not edify the body. So Paul’s admonition begins, but it develops as he addresses different kinds of speech: tongues and their interpretation, and prophecy and its evaluation.

After verse 26, Paul addresses these different kinds of speech in turn. First, in verses 27–28 Paul restricts the number of tongue-speakers to two or at most three, and requires that someone interpret (καὶ εἰς διερμηνευόμενα); the latter requirement meeting Paul’s concern for intelligible speech (14:1–25). But if there is no interpreter, the would-be tongue-speaker is to be silent (σιγᾶτω) in the public gathering of church (ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ), and ought instead to speak (λαλείτω) to himself and to God, that is, privately rather than publically. Though otherwise general lexemes, in verse 28 the jussive terms σιγᾶτω and λαλείτω find their referent in preceding context of verse 27 (εἴτε γλώσσῃ τις λαλεῖ). Verse 28 means, “Let them refrain from or stop speaking in tongues for all to hear, and instead speak in tongues privately.” Clearly, context determines the referent of σιγᾶτω and λαλείτω.

Second, in verses 29–33 Paul restricts the number of prophets speaking to “two or three” (προφήται δὲ δύο ἢ τρεῖς λαλείτωσαν), and requires that other prophets evaluate what has been said (καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διακρινέτωσαν). In verse 30, if “it is revealed” (ἀποκαλυφθῇ) to someone sitting down (i.e. not speaking), then the first prophet is to stop speaking (σιγᾶτω). Since verse 29 makes it clear that two or three prophets may speak (λαλείτωσαν) but must stop if “another” has a “revelation” about it, then Paul’s direction in verse 30 that the “first one” (ὁ πρώτος) be “silent” (σιγᾶτω) must mean: “let the first prophet stop prophesying.” This is the only contextual possibility. As in verse 27, then, the lexemes λαλέω and σιγάω are given their meaning by what precedes, and Paul considers their clarity self-evident.

The implied subject of ἀποκαλυφθῇ is also self-evident; namely, the “it” in the translated clause “if it is revealed to another.” Theoretically, it may be asked whether this “it” refers to the subject-matter of the first prophetic speaker’s utterance or to an evaluation concerning it—a διάκρισις implied by the foregoing verb διακρινέτωσαν. But the latter seems likelier because “another” (ἄλλος) in verse 30 repeats “the others” (οἱ ἄλλοι) in verse 29, where it is the subject of

that results from competing voices. LSJ defines ἀκαταστασία as “instability, anarchy, confusion” (“ἀκαταστασία,” Greek-English Lexicon 48). Peter Artz-Grabner et al. provide the example of a second-century papyrus fragment written by a soldier, who pairs it with θόρυβος (noise/confusion) as that which “we labored at and put down” (1 Korinther: Papyrologische Kommentare zum Neuen Testament: Band 2 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006] 465). Thus ἀκαταστασία can refer to anarchy characterized especially by noise and confusion.

Grudem thinks that οἱ ἄλλοι refers to “the rest of the congregation … and not just ὁι λοιποι, ‘the rest,’ which Paul would have said if he had meant the rest of the prophets” (Theological Exposition 21). However, it is unclear how Paul’s choice of οἱ ἄλλοι rules out other prophets as Paul’s intended referent, or how οἱ λοιποὶ would make a reference to prophets any clearer. Verse 29a suggests that “other prophets” is the intended referent because it shifts the focus from tongue-speakers and their interpreters to prophets (προφήται δὲ δύο ἢ τρεῖς), thus providing a natural antecedent for οἱ ἄλλοι. Similarly, verse 31 seems to presuppose that verses 29–30 are wholly concerned with prophecy, which suggests that ἄλλος in verse 30—and by extension οἱ ἄλλοι in verse 29—refer to speaker(s) of some kind of prophecy. Finally, verse 32 reveals Paul’s explicit intention to address “prophet to prophet” conduct in the preceding verses. This confirms the identity of οἱ ἄλλοι as prophets to whom other prophets submit (see below).
Thus, “what is revealed” to the “other” speaker is an evaluation of the first speaker’s prophecy. Accordingly, the same functional differentiation between two types of prophetic activity that was introduced in verse 29 (general prophetic utterance and prophetic evaluation) is depicted in the “hypothetical” situation described in verse 30. However, even if the “it” referred to the first prophecy’s subject matter, Paul’s meaning would scarcely be any different. When the second speaker shares a revelation about a prophecy’s subject matter, that speaker invariably exercises some form of judgment over it because the first speaker must stop speaking and give the floor to him.

In verses 29–30, then, Paul both regulates prophecies and commands their evaluation. He thereby differentiates a prophetic speaking that has a special function over against other prophecies, namely, prophetic speech that evaluates other prophetic utterances. Indeed, a chiastic pattern attends these verses when viewed this way:

A: προφήτης δὲ δώ ἢ τρεῖς λαλεῖτοσαν (subject to evaluation);
B: καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διακρινέτωσαν (evaluative);
B': ἕαν δὲ ἄλλο ἀποκαλοφθῇ καθημένω, (evaluative);
A': ὁ πρῶτος σιγάτω (subject to evaluation).

That Paul should so distinguish prophetic utterances is not out of place in the larger context. In view of Paul’s efforts to differentiate speaking gifts in chapter 14—especially prophecy and tongues according to a criterion of intelligibility in 14:1–25—it is likely that the Corinthians operated with a broad (and confused) concept of prophecy. Indeed, their conception of it probably embraced most or even all of the speech examples that Paul gives in verse 26. Remarkably, “prophecy” itself is absent from that list, even though “tongues” (γλῶσσαν) and their interpretation (ἐρμηνεία)—the other categories of speech Paul specifically addresses in subsequent verses—both appear there. Given the prominence of
both kinds of speech in 14:1–25, “prophecy” must embrace at least some of the remaining speech examples that “each has” in verse 26 (i.e. “a psalm … a teaching … a revelation”). Thus, Paul seems to expect the Corinthians to recognize at least some them as forms of Christian “prophecy.” Unlike the Corinthians, however, Paul is more sensitive to functional distinctions, and verses 29–30 highlight his immediate desire that general prophecy be subject to evaluation and that the Corinthians recognize the evaluative force that some utterances exert on others. The result is orderly one-at-a-time prophetic speech with prophetic evaluation, to the end that “all may learn and be encouraged” (verse 31).\(^{16}\) Thus, in the flow of Paul’s argument the evaluation of prophecy is also important for “learning” and “encouragement,” a goal consistent with his overall desire in chapters 12–14 that the church be edified.

When it is recognized that the speech of both sets of speakers in verses 29–30 comes under the general rubric of “prophecy”—the one functionally distinguished by its evaluative relationship to the other—the relationship between verses 29–30 and 32 can be seen more clearly. Paul’s axiomatic statement in verse 32 reinforces the functional differentiation he urged in 29–30: “the spirits of prophets submit to prophets” (καὶ πνεῦμα προφητῶν προφήταις ὑποτάσσεται). In verse 32 as in verses 29–30, the one prophet/prophetic utterance is subordinate to the other: the evaluated to the evaluating.\(^{17}\) As a result, this functional differentiation between prophetic utterances remains focal right up to verse 34.

To summarize, in verses 29–30 Paul states his requirements for prophetic speech, differentiating between general prophetic contributions and prophetic evaluation of them by other prophets. He limits the former in scope and, so far, says only that the latter should take place. In verse 31 Paul underlines the edifying benefit of “one at a time” prophecy (καθ’ ἕα). Finally, in verse 32 Paul declares how true prophets behave: they submit their prophetic speech to other prophets for evaluation. He thus reaffirms the functional differentiation operative in verses 29–30.

2. The continuity of Paul’s rhetoric beyond verses 34–35. Paul employs this functional differentiation beyond verses 34–35 as well. His later challenge to “anyone who thinks he is a prophet or spiritual” (verse 37) to recognize what he writes as a
“command of the Lord” employs the same functional differentiation just described in verses 29–32. Only here Paul calls the Corinthians to submit to his own prophetic judgment on the intervening issue of women’s prophetic speech. As “word of the Lord” (verse 37), the foregoing verses are themselves an example of evaluative prophetic speech that critiques the views and practices of those who aspire to be true Christian prophets in Corinth. In fact, Paul uses precisely the same terminology in the protasis of verse 37 (Εἰ τις δοκεῖ προφήτης εἶναι ἡ πνευματικός) as in verse 32 (πνεύματα προφητῶν), and therefore connects it with his dictum about how true prophets behave. The logic runs thus: since true prophets submit to the evaluation of other prophets, the Corinthians ought to submit to Paul’s judgment if they, too, aspire to be “spiritual” or “prophets.” Thus, the nearest context of 1 Cor 14:34 (i.e. verses 29–37) is saturated with the differentiation between prophetic speech and its prophetic evaluation. This suggests that Paul intends his commands in verses 34–35 to be understood in terms of the same functional differentiation.

3. Further evidence for Paul’s functional differentiation of prophecy. Before moving onto verse 34 itself, two further observations require attention. First, it is clear from Paul’s concern for “order” (verse 40), “peace” over “contention” (verse 33), and “the building up of the body” (verses 26 and 31) that the Corinthians’ gatherings are disorderly. Indeed, from the start Paul has shown his awareness that the Corinthians’ unity is threatened (cf. 1:10–11) and in 14:26 he implies that an abundance of speaking is in some way responsible for how disunity manifests itself in their public assemblies. Given this, it is entirely plausible that the disorderliness (cf. ἀκαταστασία in 14:33) was especially manifest when speakers passed judgment on the vocal contributions of others, in addition to the other causes implied by 14:26–29 (uninterpreted tongues, multiple prophecies, etc.).

Second, Paul already identifies the evaluation or judging of spirits (διακρίσεις πνευμάτων) as one of numerous charismata distributed by the Spirit in 12:10. Within the list of the Spirit’s charismata in chapter 12, διακρίσεις πνευμάτων follows directly after προφητεία in 12:10. It would seem, then, that 12:10 already anticipates the functional differentiation that I suggest underlies Paul’s argument in 14:29–38. That is, 14:32 uses the phrase “the spirits of prophets” (πνεύματα προφητῶν) to denote those who properly subject themselves to evaluative prophecy (προφητείς υποτάσσεται), and therefore duplicates the earlier pairing of προφητεία and διακρίσεις πνευμάτων in 12:10.19 By the time Paul’s audience reaches verses 29–32, then, they are prepared for a distinction between gifts of prophecy and prophetic evaluation (among other charismata). In 14:29–38, however, it receives more

18 Wire rightly identifies this as an “argument dissociating thought from reality.” Although they believe that they speak genuine prophecy and are “spiritual,” in reality they are not if they disagree with Paul’s own prophetic judgment (The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul’s Rhetoric [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990] 14).

19 This need not exhaust the range of “spirits” that those given the gift of διακρίσεις πνευμάτων may evaluate/discern (12:10). Cf. Thiselton’s survey of the scholarly views including G. Dautzenberg, W. Grudem, A. T. Robertson and A. Plummer, etc. (First Epistle 965–69). While scholars debate the scope of this gift, all seem to agree that it at least pertains to “claims to utter prophecy,” as Thiselton puts it (First Epistle 968).
specific definition and application to the problems arising from mishandled prophetic activity in Corinth. In their first two appearances (verses 28–30), the lexemes λαλέω and σηχάω were given quite different meanings by their immediate context, referring first to tongues (verses 27–28) and then to prophecy subject to evaluation (verses 29–30). 14:27 thus begins a rhetorical pattern whereby immediate context qualifies the meaning of these core verbs. The same rhetorical pattern of clarification may reasonably be expected to extend to verse 34, where these same core verbs occur together for the third time. Thus, when Paul says “let the women in the churches be silent; for it is not permitted for them to speak,” he means “let them not…” and “it is not permitted for them to…” prophetically evaluate the prophecies of others. That is, σηχάωσαν and λαλέσαι in verse 34 refer narrowly to evaluative prophetic speech which he functionally differentiated from general prophecy in verse 29, hypothetically exemplified in verse 30, and upheld as that to which true prophets submit in verse 32. Thus qualified, the kind of prophetic activity Paul is talking about in verse 34 creates no contradiction with his earlier permission for women to “prophesy or pray” (11:5). Paul also reverses the order of these terms, beginning with σηχάωσαν and then prohibiting the women from speaking (οὐ…λαλέσαν). This reversal simply underlines the prohibitive character of the command in verse 34a (which has a positive “flipside” in verse 34b, as we shall see). Paul is not merely limiting and regulating as in verses 29–30; he is forbidding the prophetesses to evaluate prophecy publically.

Moreover, because this functionally evaluative speech is “prophetic” speech, Paul addresses the women in their capacity as prophets within the Christian community. 20

20 Against an intended functional differentiation between prophetic speech acts, it might be inferred from 12:10 that Paul sees διακρίσεις πνευμάτων as a species of speech distinct from prophecy. But this would push the evidence too far. However “technical” a term διακρίσεις πνευμάτων is, in chapter 12 Paul is not yet at the point in his argument where he makes the specific distinctions key to his treatment of the Corinthians’ problems in the public assembly. In chapter 12, his goal is to establish the Spirit-given nature of gifts, emphasizing the Spirit’s discretion in distributing them (12:11) and urging the edification of the body as the goal of all members. The “list” is therefore broad and illustrative, and does not set out to specify the precise relationship between the examples given.

21 Wire believes that σηχάωσαν and λαλέσαι refer to ecstatic responses that Paul has already differentiated from prophecy in 14:1–25. She argues that, since verses 34–38 are the “apex of the argument” and Paul has allowed women to prophesy in 11:5, Paul must mean the speech which he has differentiated from prophecy in chapter 14, namely, tongues (Corinthian Women Prophets 157–58). However, Paul’s earlier differentiation of tongues from prophecy has already given way to the functional differentiation of prophetic utterances in verses 29–32. It is most unlikely that in verse 34 Paul would return to the earlier differentiation between prophecy and tongues as Wire holds. Moreover, Paul’s challenge to prophets in verse 37 confirms his continued interest in prophecy through to that point, which suggests that he has now left the subject of tongues behind. In addition, when Paul “sums up” in 14:39 he urges zeal for prophecy (ζηλοῦτε το προφητεύειν) before telling them not to prevent tongues. This suggests that prophecy has occupied his thoughts in the previous verses, and that the subsequent remark about permitting tongues constitutes a reminder of his qualified acceptance of them in 14:27–28.

22 John Kleinig of Australian Lutheran College (personal conversation August 13, 2009) alerted me to this feature.
congregation, not as wives. More shall be said about this in connection with verse 35, but for now it shows another important way that verse 34 keeps continuity with its immediate context: Paul continues to address problems that arise from the improper conduct of prophets at Corinth, just as he was doing in verses 29–32.

In addition to ιγάτωσαν and λαλέων, Paul adds a third verb in the composite command of verse 34: ἄλλα ὑποτασσέσθωσαν. So far in 1 Corinthians, Paul has only used it in the immediate context at verse 32, where it reflects precisely the functional differentiation I have described. In verse 34, ὑποτασσέσθωσαν therefore picks up the taxonomical language of verse 32, in which the spirits of prophets submit to prophets (ὑποτάσσεται). Just as the “spirits of prophets” are subject to prophets, so now Paul commands the women to subject their prophetic speech to the evaluation of other prophets. That Paul leaves the indirect object of ὑποτασσέσθωσαν implied suggests that he expects context—specifically verse 32—to make it clear. After all, he has consistently used immediate context to define λαλέω and ιγάτω in verses 27–30, and it is no great leap for a Corinthian hearer to recognize the parallel with ὑποτάσσεται just two verses ago.

However, the connection between ὑποτάσσεται in verse 32 and ὑποτασσέσθωσαν in verse 34 and its implications for identifying the latter’s indirect object is seldom recognized. Instead, interpreters tend to accentuate the reflexive character of ὑποτασσέσθωσαν. For instance, Anthony Thiselton translates ὑποτασσέσθωσαν as “let them keep their ordered place,” stressing the notion of self-control rather than any implied indirect object.23 But although its middle voice gives ὑποτασσέσθωσαν a reflexive sense and therefore precludes a specified direct object, conceptually ὑποτασσέσθωσαν seems to expect that an indirect object be understood. “Ordered place” must be kept, but with respect to whom or what? Christian Wolff effectively supplies ὑποτασσέσθωσαν with an indirect object when he claims that verse 34 urges a general kind of “fitting into” the orderliness of the worship services: “Sich-Einfügen in die Ordnung des Gottesdienstes.”24 However, in view of the close proximity of προφήταις ὑποτάσσεται in verse 32, it seems doubtful that he intends “keeping their ordered place” in any such general or abstract sense.25 This conclusion becomes virtually unavoidable when it is recognized that προφήταις stands in emphatic position before ὑποτάσσεται in verse 32. In verse 32, then, Paul stresses the fact that such subordination is owed specifically to “prophets,” which further suggests that it is to them that Paul urges the women to submit in verse 34.

Therefore, just as Paul has done consistently throughout verses 27–30, all three verbs in verse 34—ιγάτωσαν, λαλέων, and ὑποτασσέσθωσαν—gain their sense from immediate context. Moreover, this interpretation of ὑποτασσέσθωσαν

23 Thiselton, First Epistle 1153–55.
25 Even less likely is Fitzer’s interpretation of ὑποτασσέσθωσαν in connection with “husbands” in verse 35, which overlooks this lexical connection between verses 32 and 34 (Das Weib schweige in der Gemeinde 13).
confirms the meaning of σιγάτωσαν and λαλέιν in 14:34 for which I have argued, because it indicates that the “flipside” (cf. ἀλλὰ) of the silence he commands is to speak general prophecy that is subject to evaluation. Thus, ἀλλὰ υποτάσσεσθωσαν actually commends to the women the proper conduct characteristic of πνεύματα προφητῶν in verse 32, just as σιγάτωσαν and οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτρέπεται αὕτας λαλέιν prohibit the evaluative prophetic activity implied by προφητίας in that same dictum. Ironically, then, verse 34 tacitly affirms the possibility that women may prophesy, despite some scholarly protests to the contrary.

Moreover, once Paul’s use of context to clarify λαλέω, σιγάω, and υποτάσσομαι throughout 14:26–34(35) is recognized, another well-known “problem” is reduced to a stylistic curiosity: the question of “which way” verse 33b points. This question of whether verse 33b concludes the preceding concern (“spirits of prophets submit to prophets…as in all the churches of the saints”) or qualifies the command of verse 34 (“as in all the churches of the saints, let the women be silent, etc.”) becomes inconsequential for understanding Paul’s argument because 14:29–34(35) constitute a continuous argument about the submission of prophets to the evaluation of other prophets. While appeals to church practice such as this usually conclude a statement in 1 Corinthians (e.g. 4:17; 7:17; 11:16), Paul’s call for the women to submit in verse 34 simply applies the earlier dictum in verse 32 in more concrete terms.

Translating from verse 29 with the meanings of σιγάω, λαλέω, and υποτάσσω interpreted according to our analysis (italicized), the flow of Paul’s thought progresses thus:

Let two or three prophets speak general prophecy (λαλεῖτωσαν) and let the others evaluate. And if it is revealed to another sitting down, let the first one stop speaking their prophecy (σιγάτω). One at a time you are all able to prophesy, so that all may learn and be encouraged. Spirits of prophets also subject their prophetic speech (ὑποτάσσεται) to prophets, for God is not “of contention.”

20 An interesting textual issue attends verse 33 and has small a bearing on the rhetorical flow of verses 32–34. Jeffrey Kloha provides strong evidence for a text lacking (δ) θεός. He cites Tertullian’s (AD 160–220) Adversus Marcion, which quotes 14:33 in Latin corresponding exactly to the reconstructed Greek text without (δ) θεός; et spiritus prophetarum prophetii erunt solviti non enim eversionis sunt sed paecis. Exactness of verbal correspondence rules out loose allusion, so that Tertullian’s citation offers evidence of a biblical text conceivably going back at least to the second century, easily predating the earliest extant MS including (δ) θεός; P46 (AD 200). Kloha explains that, “Had θεός been present in his text, Tertullian could not have applied 14:33a to Marcion, for the passage would be making a point about the nature of God, not, as Tertullian reads it, about correct speech in the congregations” (Jeffrey Kloha, “A Textual Commentary on Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians,” (4 vols.; Ph.D. diss., The University of Leeds, 2006) 2:494. An updated form of Kloha’s dissertation awaits publication). He also observes that “a nomen sacrum, usually θεός, is interpolated into the text of 1 Corinthians in at least two and perhaps three other passages. At 8:3 we observed P46 and Clement preserving the shorter text, and at 10:5 Marcion and again Clement do so” (“Textual Commentary” 2:495–96). Kloha argues that the text progresses more smoothly without θεός, enabling 33b to follow directly from the statement about proper prophetic behavior rather than an axiom about God. Moreover, the tenacity of a reading expressing a profound truth about God is easily explained, while the text evidenced by Tertullian is harder to account for as a scribal change. The evidence therefore seems to favor the shorter text, and the elimination of a new subject (δ) θεός yields even greater continuity between verses 32–33 and verse 34. Indeed, without (δ) θεός, the neuter plural “spirits of prophets” (verse 32) becomes the subject of a second verb, “is/are” (ἐστίν). Verses 32–33 thus read: “spirits of prophets submit to prophets, for they are not of contention.”
but “of peace,” as in all the churches of the saints. Let the women in the churches keep silence respecting public evaluation of other prophecies (συγκέντρωσαν), for it is not permitted for them to evaluate the prophetic speech of others (καλείν), but let them be subject to prophetic evaluation (υποτασσέσθωσαν) as the law also says. If they wish to learn something, then at home—their own men/husbands—let them ask/interrogate. For it is a disgrace for a woman to evaluate other prophecy (καλείν) in church/public assembly.

Several further arguments support this reading of verses 29–35. The first concerns Paul’s view of the distribution of gifts by the Spirit within the broader context of chapters 12–14, and answers a common objection concerning gender differentiation in respect to such gifts. The second addresses Paul’s appeal to “the law” (ὁ νόμος), which strengthens the tie between 14:34 and chapter 11, thus demonstrating that 14:34 fits this broader context as well. Finally, 14:35 corroborates our reading when carefully examined for what it suggests about the situation Paul was addressing.

IV. 1 CORINTHIANS 14:34
IN THE CONTEXT OF CHAPTERS 12–14

Some suggest that 14:34 conflicts with the broader context of chapters 12–14. For instance, Wolfgang Schrage contends that in chapter 12 Paul accepts in principle the availability of all gifts to all people, and that 12:7 precludes any sexual differentiation in the Spirit’s distribution of gifts. For Schrage, this constitutes an important reason to question the authenticity of verses 34–35. This objection is unsustainable, however. In 12:7–11, Paul stresses the particularity of gifts and their recipients, as is clear from the subsequent sequence of disjunctive indirect objects (ὁ…ἄλλῳ…ἐτέρῳ…ἄλλῳ…ἄλλῳ…etc.). He also credits the Spirit with their distribution; not arbitrarily, but “to each as he wills” (12:11). Thus, there are no intrinsic grounds here to rule out gender differentiation in the distribution of charismata.

On the contrary, since chapter 12 emphasizes the Spirit’s will in the distribution of charismata it arguably prepares the way for Paul’s prohibition of evaluative prophetic speech by women in 14:34. It is therefore very plausible that οὐ γάρ ἐπιτρέπεται αὕτης καλείν in 14:34 is a “divine passive”; that Paul claims the Spirit’s authority when imposing this particular limitation on the Corinthian women. Indeed, καθὼς καὶ ὁ νόμος λέγει in 14:34 and ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ in 14:36 suggest the same, since both “law” and “word of God” are authorities connected closely with but of peace as in all the churches of the saints.” Verse 34 then follows, precluding women from exercising evaluative prophetic speech and directing them to submit to prophetic evaluation; the very same concepts espoused in verses 32–33. Nevertheless, the inclusion of (ὁ) θεός does not seriously undermine this rhetorical continuity, but simply grounds the dictum about genuine prophets in the nature of God.

27 Schrage writes, “Da es nach 12,1ff in der Gemeinde primär um das Wirken des Geistes geht, der jeden Christen unterschiedslos beschenkt (vgl. das ἐκαστὸς 12,7 und zuletzt 14,26), nicht um zu delegierende bzw. zu verwehrende Ämter oder gar deren geschlechtsspezifische Aufteilungen, liegt eine Differenzierung zwischen spezifischen Funktionen des Mannes und der Frau völlig fern” (Der erste Brief 484).
the Spirit. Furthermore, Paul’s intention to deliver the Spirit’s will in this matter is reflected in his challenge to anyone who thinks he or she is a “prophet” (προφήτης) or “spiritual” (πνευματικός) in 14:37. Rhetorically, Paul claims his instruction is a “command of the Lord” (κυρίου ἐστὶν ἐντολή) and implies that those who disagree with him are not “spiritual” (πνευματικός) as they claim to be, and that their resistance to his instruction is not inspired by the Spirit. As noted earlier, Paul picks up the terminology of verse 32 (πνεύματα προφητῶν) here, challenging his opponents to submit to his own prophetic judgment in the intervening issue of female prophets or risk showing themselves to be non-genuine (i.e. non-spiritual) prophets. Thus, at stake for the Corinthians is their status as prophets who genuinely speak with the “spirit of a prophet” (cf. v. 32), and who by extension speak by the Spirit. Finally, the term πνευματικός in 14:37 also elicits Paul’s earlier discussion of the Spirit’s active role in distributing gifts (12:7–11)—even his introduction to the whole section in 12:1 (Περὶ δὲ τῶν πνευματικῶν). There are therefore numerous indicators that Paul claims to speak by the Spirit’s will when restricting the Corinthians’ speaking activities.

In chapters 12–14, Paul appears to employ a broader rhetorical strategy in which chapter 12 anticipates the more specific admonitions in 14:26–38 that place limits on the Corinthians’ speech in public assembly. Paul calls on the Corinthians to accept that the distribution of gifts is not up to them but according to the Spirit’s will (12:7–11). This is the necessary precondition if “all things” are to be “seemly” (ἐυςχημόνως) and “in order” (κατὰ τάξιν), as he later urges in 14:40. As another restriction, 14:34 is therefore perfectly consonant with both the rhetorical movement of Paul’s instruction in 14:26–40 and with the overarching trajectory of chapters 12–14. Far from making the restrictions of 14:34 seem unlikely, chapter 12’s earlier appeal to the Spirit’s will in the distribution of charismata ultimately provides the basis for it.

Another observation confirms the anticipatory function of chapter 12 for the specific admonitions in chapter 14. Paul’s description of Corinthian practice in 14:26 uses the same substantival adjective (ἐκαστὸς) as that which begins the list of gifts in 12:7–11: ἐκάστῳ δὲ δίδοται ἡ φανέρωσις τοῦ πνεύματος πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, etc. But whereas in 12:7–11 Paul used this term to highlight the particularity of gifts and the Spirit’s will in their distribution, in 14:26 his use of ἐκαστὸς reflects the very different existing situation in Corinth. “Each has a psalm, has a teaching, has a revelation, has a tongue, has an interpretation,” reflecting a self-asserting attitude and corresponding conduct. This simple comparison between the way things

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28 The variants here include differing word order (κυρίου ἐντολή ἐστὶν), the omission of ἐντολή (κυρίου ἐστὶν), the plural ἐντολαὶ instead of ἐντολή, or θεοῦ ἐστὶν ἐντολή. None of these eliminate Paul’s claim that what he writes (ἐγράφω) is of divine/dominical origin, and all variations convey the same rhetorical force of the challenge. Incidentally, verse 38 seems to be Paul’s actual estimation of those who do not “recognize” (ἐπιγινώσκεται) what he writes as the Lord’s command. Verse 38 repeats the indefinite pronoun (εἷς δὲ τίς) followed by a cognate of ἐπιγινώσκεται, i.e. ἄγνοια, and then evaluates such a person by the same verb (ἀγνοεῖται). That is, their ignorance regarding the divine/dominical origin of Paul’s commands renders them not spiritually gifted or prophetic as they claim, but “ignorant,” or, if jussive, requires that they be ignored by the rest.
“should be” in chapter 12 and the reality of the Corinthians’ public assemblies in 14:26 sets up Paul’s subsequent commands in 14:27–38. Therefore, by opening his particular criticisms of the Corinthians’ assemblies with ἐκκαστος, Paul implicitly contrasts the Corinthians’ excessive conduct with the ideal of Spirit-distributed charismata outlined earlier. Indeed, by insisting on the Spirit’s will in distribution of charismata, chapter 12 may already contain the latent criticism soon to become explicit in chapter 14: some or many at Corinth are actually contravening the Spirit’s will through their exercise of self-appointed gifts. Once again, the character of 14:34 coheres with Paul’s broader desire in chapters 12–14 that the Corinthians let the Spirit determine the distribution of gifts (12:11) rather than claim every kind of speaking gift for themselves (14:26).

Since, as noted earlier, 14:34 permits women to prophesy in general, it does not create contradictions for the broader context of chapters 11–14 either. Moreover, there is nothing in chapter 11 to suggest that Paul gives blanket permission for women to exercise all forms of prophecy without qualification. On the contrary, he imposes certain limitations to women’s prophetic activity, urging them to “cover up” (κατακαλυπτέσθω). The further functional limitation enjoined in 14:34 is therefore in character with Paul’s overall rhetorical goal of reforming the Corinthians’ prophetic practices, especially where the women are concerned.

V. PAUL’S APPEAL TO THE LAW (ὁ νόμος) AND THE BROADER CONTEXT

Paul’s appeal to the law in 1 Cor 14:34 merits our specific attention for two reasons. First, it is ostensibly the basis on which Paul calls the women to submit to evaluative prophetic speech. Second, as we shall see, it forges another important thematic and rhetorical link with chapter 11 where Paul first addresses problems manifesting themselves in the Corinthians’ public assemblies.

To what does Paul refer when he writes ηγαγεν και ὁ νόμος λέγει, and how does this support his argument in 14:34? The text contains several indications that Paul is referring to Genesis 2, the same text he alluded to in 11:8–9.

Paul’s singling out women in verse 34 suggests that the law to which he appeals must itself differentiate woman and man, as in fact the allusion to Genesis 2 did in 11:8–9. Indeed, the brevity of the appeal to law in 14:34 suggests that he expects its referent to be somehow self-evident. Since both contexts in some way regulate women’s practice of prophetic speech in public assembly, the association

29 A thorough investigation of 11:2–16 goes beyond our purposes, but here we simply note that Paul does not disqualify women from uttering prophecy, but qualifies how they may go about it.

30 Thielson correctly dismisses a common idea that “law” alludes to Gen 3:16 (The First Epistle 1153). Indeed, a reference to the curse following the Fall would not advance Paul’s argument against those claiming freedom from gender differentiation in Christ. Fitzer objects to 14:34’s authenticity in part because καθως και ὁ νόμος λέγει is unprecedented in Paul (Das Weib schweige in der Gemeinde 11–12; cf. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence 279). But this observation becomes irrelevant once it is recognized that Paul refers to an allusion previously established in 11:8–9. Accordingly, 14:34’s appeal to the law cannot be expected to conform to other citation formulae too closely, rendering comparison superficial.
of ὁ νόμος in 14:34 with the allusion in 11:8–9 is almost unavoidable. Two more points of contact between the two texts may be noted. First, Paul’s appeal to shame (ἀισχρόν) in 14:35 parallels a similar appeal to shame (ἀισχρόν) in 11:6. Second, in both cases Paul’s commands are buttressed by wider church practice (11:16 and 14:33). Indeed, the thematic structure of Paul’s letter points in the same direction. While chapter 10 discusses the Lord’s Supper in order to address issues pertaining to idolatry and idol meat (10:14–33), his instruction in chapters 11–14 relates to the public assembly of the church per se. 14:34–35 therefore represents a return to the general question of women in public assembly that first made an appearance early in chapter 11, thus forming a topical inclusio for chapters 11–14. These observations confirm that ὁ νόμος in 14:34 picks up the allusion in 11:8–9.

How does the reference to Genesis 2 serve Paul’s requirement that the women not publically evaluate the prophetic utterances of other prophets?

First, Paul does not allude to the portion of Genesis 2 that makes application to marriage (Gen 2:24), but to the account of man and woman’s creation itself. Though there is evidently a tradition of applying Genesis 2 to marriage, these examples cite verse 24, whereas 1 Cor 11:8 and 9 cites the story itself by alluding to Gen 2:22 and 18 respectively. This allusion focuses specifically on Adam and Eve’s creation and lends itself more broadly to man-woman issues, rather than exclusively to marriage. From this biblical basis Paul infers a taxonomy between man and woman that finds concrete expression in certain spheres, whether marriage (which may be in view in 11:3–16) or church (to which he applies it in 14:34–35, as I contend). In 14:34, Paul’s appeal to Genesis 2 therefore bases his command in a man-woman taxonomic order. In this way Paul’s appeal to “the law” supports his differentiation of male and female as he regulates which prophets may publically evaluate other prophecy in the Christian assembly. Correspondingly, the context indicates that Paul’s command to submit (ὑποτασσόμενοι) does not urge a general subordination of every woman to all men indiscriminately, but applies this taxonomy to the public practice of prophecy in the church. For a married woman

31 Cf. Carson, Showing the Spirit 131; Hurley, Man and Woman 191. This may also explain the καθὼς καὶ ὁ νόμος λέγει. While it is possible that καθὼς identifies “the law” as another authority besides wider church precedent (14:33b), it may in fact signal Paul’s second application of a law previously applied: “as the law also says.”
32 NA² notes the allusion to Gen 2:22 in 1 Cor 11:8, and Gen 2:18 in 1 Cor 11:9. Only later, in Gen 2:24, is the story applied to marriage. Moreover, the story is linked to its subsequent implications for marriage by the logical marker ἐν τούτῳ (MT: וְלָカラ, meaning “therefore”). This logical marker is no mere conjunction but is constructed as a complete phrase that demarks the story (vv. 1–23) clearly from the implication enunciated in verse 24.
33 E.g. Mk 10:6–8 and Mt 19:4–5 cite Gen 1:27 and 2:24 to make their point about marriage, not the story itself in Gen 2:18–23. On the other hand, 1 Tim 2:13–14, like 1 Cor 11:8–9 and by extension 14:34, alludes to the story of man and woman’s creation to address similar taxonomical issues within a worship context.
34 That Paul sees “the law” in Genesis 2 espousing a man-woman taxonomy open to application beyond marriage is confirmed by how he alludes to the creation story. For instance, Paul says that man is “through” woman (οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἄνδρος διὰ τῆς γυναῖκος), thus showing the sexes’ interdependence. But in what sense is a husband “through” his wife? Thus, the manner of Paul’s allusion to the creation story seems broader than “husband-wife” (e.g. motherhood-sonship?).
the exercise of public evaluative speech may also reflect negatively on her taxonomic station in marriage, but this consequence is incidental to the main problem Paul addresses in 14:34.  

Second, Paul’s appeal to the law indicates that he bases his argument specifically in created order. It therefore provides a biblical and theological rationale for his command in 14:34, rather than basing it purely on transient cultural sensibilities.

**VI. 14:35 AND THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT**

How 1 Cor 14:35 reflects the Corinthian context requires careful investigation. Unlike 14:26, it is not Paul’s explicit intention to describe what was happening in Corinth, but to give a subsequent provisional command following the main command of verse 34. The main rhetorical function of Paul’s command in verse 35a must govern our use in reconstruction: Paul commands what will serve as a solution to the problems at Corinth; he does not set out to describe the problems themselves.

If this is borne in mind, verse 35 contributes to our appreciation of the Corinthian context. Furthermore, it corroborates our argument that verse 34 restricts the prophetic activity of the women over against other prophets.

Paul writes: “but if they wish to learn anything, at home—their own men/husbands—let them ask” (retaining Greek word order). While it is difficult to ascertain precisely what the verb ἐπερωτάτωσαν refers to here, the compound can denote a more intense kind of questioning along the lines of “interrogate” or “cross-examine,” as opposed to an innocent asking simply to acquire information. If that is the case here, then it may indicate one way that the evaluative speech forbidden by Paul in the previous verse took shape: interrogative challenge. However, even if ἐπερωτάτωσαν does not quite bear these connotations in verse 35, the directive force inherent in this compound verb nevertheless suggests Paul’s intent to redirect the women’s speech in verse 35. 

Indeed, commentators readily note that Paul redirected the women’s speech from public (ἐν ἐκκλησία) to private (ἐν οίκῳ) spheres. More important for our purposes, however, is the question: toward whom had their speaking been directed? In verse 35, Paul not only differentiates the public from the private, but also differentiates those to whom the women ought to direct their questioning (at home)

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35 Cf. Part VI below.
36 The verb occurs extensively in the Synoptics, but only here in Paul (Rom 10:20 quotes the OT). Thielson cites Grimm-Thayer, who “note the mood of interrogation which can still apply in their first entry: to accost one with an enquiry, to put a question to...to interrogate” (First Epistle 1160 [emphasis original]). Thielson himself prefers “cross-examine” for ἐπερωτάτωσαν in 14:35 on comparison with “quasi-legal” contexts such as Mark 11:29 and 14:60–61.
37 Further to the previous note, Thielson writes that Grimm-Thayer “convincingly explain the compound ἐπιτ with having a directive force, which governs an accusative.... Thus the noun ἐπερώτημα oscillates between inquiry and demand, with overtones of earnest intensity. By contrast, without the directive compound, the simple verb ἐπιτωσ [sic] means more generally to ask, in an “open” sense” (First Epistle 1160 [emphasis original]).
from those whom they in fact were questioning (in public). While Paul places ἐν οἴκω first, in the most emphatic position with differentiating force, the object-verb word order of the remaining words τοὺς ἰδίους ἄνδρας ἐπερωτάτωσαν also places a relatively greater emphasis on τοὺς ἰδίους ἄνδρας than on the verb. This emphasis on τοὺς ἰδίους ἄνδρας indicates Paul’s intention to redirect their behavior in this respect as well.\(^{38}\) Especially noteworthy in this regard is Paul’s qualification of “husbands/men” with ἰδίους, since this adjective emphasizes the fact that the men they ought to address are their own husbands/men at home in contrast to other men in church.\(^ {39}\) This suggests that in the public sphere they were actually addressing—or cross-examining if ἐπερωτάτωσαν assumes those connotations—men other than “their own.” This coheres with our view that Paul’s basic problem with the women’s conduct in the Corinthian assemblies was that they were evaluating the prophetic speech of other male prophets (rather than specifically their husbands). Were it otherwise, a more neutral possessive adjective like αὐτῶν might be expected to qualify ἄνδρας after the verb (i.e. non-emphatic position).\(^ {40}\)


\(^{39}\) Wire translates ἄνδρας as “men” rather than “husbands,” plausibly arguing that Paul addresses women as members of a household rather than narrowly as wives (*Corinthian Women Prophets* 156). Resolving this question is, however, ultimately of minimal value for historical reconstruction, since the meaning of ἄνδρας pertains to Paul’s *solution* to the Corinthian problem rather than the problem he was addressing and what occasioned it.

\(^{40}\) LSJ indicates that meanings of ἰδίος include “private,” “personal” (opposite: κοινός), “one’s own” (opposite: ἀλλότριος), and a meaning they describe as “almost as a possessive” in later Greek (second century BC) ("ἵδιος," *Greek-English Lexicon* 818). Indeed, a perusal of the 100+ instances of ἰδίος in the NT indicates that context is important for determining whether an author intends it to differentiate the noun it governs from alternatives of the same species in view, or whether it functions as a more neutral possessive adjective. When it comes to qualifying γυνὴ or ἡ γυνὴ in a clear marriage context, two examples stand out. The first, Eph 5:22, will carry little freight for scholars who believe Ephesians to be pseudepigraphic. Ephesians 5:22 reads: Ὑποτασσόμενοι ... αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς ἰδίοις ἄνδρασιν ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ. Because the command is applied in the plural (αἱ γυναῖκες ... ἀνδράσιν) differentiation goes without saying, since it means “let each woman submit to each husband,” not “let all women submit to all husbands.” The phrase in 14:35 is also plural (τοὺς ἰδίους ἄνδρας), presenting the same possibility. Comparison with Eph 5:22 therefore proves inconclusive: it remains unclear if the *situation* demanded Paul use ἰδίος or simply the fact he addresses multiple women. Neither reason can be simply assumed.

However, a second example, 1 Cor 7:2, suggests that Paul does intend to stress the *exclusion of others* when modifying ἄνδρας with ἰδίος in 14:35 (Klauck notes the similarity between 7:2 and 14:35, but does not give it close attention [*Korintherbrief* 105]). In 7:2, Paul writes in the singular, showing clearly his intention to differentiate “one’s own husband” from the rest of the men—a differentiation essential to the purpose of his command that sexual immorality—hence a plurality of partners—be avoided. Each woman is to relate sexually to her own husband rather than other men. Several pertinent observations may be made here. First, Paul’s use of ἰδίον (qualifying ἄνδρα) finds its functional equivalent in the genitival pronoun ἴδιοντος (qualifying γυναίκα). Notably, in treating the issue from the perspectives of both genders, Paul emphasizes the particularity of each man/woman (ἐκαστὸς/ἐκαστῇ) who is to have his/her own spouse. This also shows that ἰδίος has intentional differentiating force *over against* a plurality. The differentiating function of ἰδίος in 7:2 therefore inclines us to recognize the same function of ἰδίος in 14:35, especially given the emphatic position of τοὺς ἰδίους ἄνδρας before the verb, as noted above. Second, since the Corinthian context gave Paul cause to use this differentiating phrase in matters of sexual conduct in 7:2, there must exist in Corinth actual or potential men-women relational issues that are primarily exhibited in an extramarital way. (Even if 7:1 indicates that the Corinthians aspired to overzealous abstinence, Paul nevertheless cites sexual immorality (πορνείας) as the problem he wants avoided.) If a propensity to disregard appropriate gender boundaries exists between men and women among the Corinthians, we can reasonably infer that, when it comes to public speech, such forward
Finally, it seems likely that Paul’s appeal to “shame” (σιγχρόν) in 14:35 recalls a similar appeal in 11:6, as noted above. The appeal to “shame” in 11:6, together with the possibility that Paul addresses specifically married women there, may at first seem to go against our thesis that the women’s problematic conduct concerns other prophets in 14:34–35. For example, Bruce Winter argues that in 11:6 Paul questions the propriety of women who provocatively prophesy or pray publically without wearing their marriage veils, the wearing of which signified that they were no longer “available.” Such behavior was a disgrace to the husband and community. If Winter is correct, then Paul’s appeal to “cover up” addresses a problem occasioned by their station as wives. However, it does not follow that Paul addresses women in just one capacity throughout 1 Corinthians in general or 14:34–35 in particular, and each context must be studied in its own right. As I argued above, ὑποτάσσεσθωσαν in 14:34 elicits the women’s taxonomic relationship as prophets to other prophets, rather than to their husbands. If Paul refers to them in their capacity as wives of their husbands in 14:35, it is in a secondary way, that is, to provide a “solution” to avoid a shameful situation occasioned by their misdemeanors as prophets.

Moreover, Paul’s appeal to “shame” highlights the unwanted consequence of the forbidden speech; strictly speaking it does not define the speech itself. Thus, a definitive explanation of σιγχρόν has no direct relevance for identifying the referent of σιγάτωσαν and λαλεῖν. What Paul does say, however, is that it is “shameful” for a woman “to speak in church” (λαλεῖν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ), which, when taken together with our analysis, suggests it is a direct consequence of the act of publically evaluating other prophecy. Any additional cause for shame due to the woman’s married state is incidental to Paul’s main claim. Evidently, Paul considers that a female prophet evaluating a male prophet in the public sphere of the church enters into disgrace, so he commends the household as his preferred avenue for such “questions” instead.

VII. CONCLUSION

The above analysis credits 1 Cor 14:26–40 with a coherence and rhetorical progression befitting its position at the apex of Paul’s treatment of Spirit-inspired public speech (chaps. 12–14) and public assembly issues more broadly (chaps. 11–14). It provides an explanation of how λαλεῖ, σιγάω, and ὑποτάσσω form the attitudes manifested themselves when female prophets addressed their male counterparts in the church (14:35).

In summary, the nearest social context (Corinth) and literal context (1 Corinthians) both suggest that Paul deliberately uses ἰδίους to differentiate husband from other men in 14:35. This confirms the problem he addresses as one that concerns the women’s conduct as prophets toward other prophets.

Although Paul mentions no actual covering or veil, Winter draws an interesting lexical connection between the marriage veil worn by brides and κατακαλίστηκα/κατακαλίστηκε in 1 Corinthians 11, claiming that “Paul did not use a generic term to refer to women of indeterminate marital status, but the combining of the two terms ‘veil’ and ‘woman’ indicates that she was married” (After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001] 127). Winter concludes that, though married, the women conveyed their availability by not wearing veils.
rhetorical backbone of 14:26–40, and recognizes Paul’s rhetorical pattern of using immediate context to determine their meanings.

In particular, I suggest that the key to understanding Paul’s argument lies in recognizing that evaluating prophecy is itself prophetic speech. This functional distinction between regular prophetic speech and evaluative prophetic speech remains fully in view throughout 14:29–38. Already foreshadowed in 12:10, it is first enunciated in 14:29’s command, exemplified in a hypothetical situation in verse 30, reaffirmed in the dictum of verse 32, applied to the women in verses 34–35, and, finally, undergirds Paul’s challenge to the Corinthians to accept his own prophetic judgment in verse 37. Within the broader context of chapters 11–14, Paul’s prohibition of evaluative prophetic speech in verse 34 is the exception to his general permission that women may prophesy, thus creating no contradiction with chapter 11. Paul’s appeal to the law is an appeal to a man-woman taxonomy drawn from Genesis 2, to which he has already alluded in connection with man-woman taxonomic issues in 11:8–9. As another connecting point between 14:34 and chapter 11, this is further evidence that 14:34 is in its native soil in chapters 11–14 and has not been transplanted there.

Thus, in 14:34 Paul addresses twin problems raised by the social and theological posture adopted by some women in the Corinthian assemblies. Negatively, Paul prohibits them from exercising evaluative speech themselves, calling them to be silent in this regard (σιγάτωσαν) and forbidding them from speaking (οὐ … λαλέιν) with evaluative force over against other prophets in the public assembly. Positively, Paul calls the female prophets to subject their prophetic utterances to prophetic evaluation, just as “the spirits of prophets” characteristically do (verse 32). Therefore, in 14:34 Paul addresses the women in their capacity as “prophets” rather than “wives.” While he addresses the same women in their capacity as wives/household women in verse 35, he there commends the married state/household as a solution to the problems arising from their misconduct as prophets in the church. The women are, after all, both wives/household women and Christian prophets—or claim to be.

EXCURSUS: THE TEXT-CRITICAL QUESTION
SURROUNDING 1 CORINTHIANS 34–35

The text-critical question over the authenticity of verses 34–35 merits discussion, especially in light of contributions by Gordon D. Fee and Philip B. Payne. All the witnesses contain verses 34–35, but some predominantly Western

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MSS locate verses 34–35 after verse 40. These are mostly late, and include the Greek-Latin bilinguals (D, E, F, and G), most of the non-Vulgate Latin tradition including fourth-century Ambrosiaster, and two non-Western MSS (88* and 915). On the other hand, witnesses attesting verses 34–35 after verse 33 include P46 (AD 200), A, B, 33, 88

Gordon Fee argues that the variant placement is best explained if verses 34–35 were originally a marginal note that was worked into the text at two locations. Fee primarily favors this position on the grounds of transcriptional probability, claiming, “(a) displacements of this kind do not occur elsewhere in the NT; and (b) no adequate reason can be found for such a displacement were these words originally in the text after v. 33.”

Fee also mounts several arguments based on internal evidence, but these are answered by the foregoing analysis. It remains, then, to address Fee’s two-fold transcriptional argument that verses 34–35 are an interpolation.

The evidence for verses 34–35 after verse 33 is early and strong. On the other hand, Antoinette Wire observes that MSS locating verses 34–35 after verse 40 are restricted to bilinguals and the Latin tradition, and of the former, D, E, F, and G almost certainly witness a common archetype. Furthermore, Jeffrey Kloha presented a paper based on his doctoral work at the 2006 meeting of SBL in Washington, DC that identifies several displacements in these bilingual MSS and a core of Latin MSS in the Pauline corpus. Significantly, these displacements involve references to the phrase “all the churches” and reflect a particular interest in women, especially Priscilla. He observes that although 1 Cor 14:34–35 does not address Priscilla’s role in the church, these verses’ location after verse 33 may have raised concerns that her conduct was at odds with universal church practice.

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43 Fee, First Epistle 700 (emphasis original).

44 E.g. Fee insists that the “silence” in verse 34 is absolute, causing a contradiction with 11:2–16 (First Epistle 702, 706; God’s Empowering Presence 275, 280). But as we have seen, Paul uses immediate context to qualify the key terms σιγή and λαλία: Paul’s emphatic command to silence refers to prophetic speech characterized by its evaluative function. Fee also claims that verses 34–35 “interrupt a tight argument between Paul and the Corinthians over the character and quality of what it means to be πνευματικός” (God’s Empowering Presence 275; cf. First Epistle 701). However, even if one can read this portion of Paul’s letter sensibly without verses 34–35, this does not itself make them an “interruption.” On the contrary, our analysis demonstrates their rhetorical continuity and coherence within 14:26–38 and the broader context of chapters 11–14. Finally, Fee’s specific objections to the view that σιγή and λαλία apply restrictively to evaluating prophecies are misdirected. (1) “The ‘discerning’ of prophecies” is not “some form of inspired speech other than prophecy” as Fee assumes (The First Epistle 703 [emphasis original]), but is itself prophetic judgment. (2) Fee’s objection that verse 35 “implies not ‘judging’ their husbands’ prophecies but failing to understand what is going on at all” does not do sufficient justice to the fact that in verse 35 Paul offers a solution to a problem, not a full description of the problem itself (First Epistle 704).

45 Wire, Corinthian Women Prophets 149. Two exceptions are MSS 88 and 915, which Niccum observes are “representative of the Byzantine text-type” (“The Voice of the Manuscripts 251).

The displacement of verses 34–35 to the end of the chapter dissociates them from verse 33b and instead connects them with verse 40’s general call to seemliness and order. Thus, Kloha provides a very plausible explanation for verses 34–35’s displacement to the end of chapter 14 on the basis of the very manuscript tradition that occasions this textual issue in the first place. By pointing out the other similar displacements in the western tradition, Kloha also disproves Fee’s first claim: that displacements like the one proposed for 1 Cor 14:34–35 “do not occur elsewhere in the NT.” In light of this, Fee’s arguments from transcriptional probability lose their basis and must be rejected.

For his part, Philip Payne rejects the authenticity of verses 34–35 via appeal to scribal markings in Codex Vaticanus (4th century AD), Codex Fuldensis (6th century), and 88 (12th century), which he believes show that their copyists or correctors knew MSS lacking verses 34–35 altogether. In this way he attempts to overcome the lack of textual evidence for these verses’ omission. However, other contributors reveal weaknesses in Payne’s account of these phenomena and offer more compelling arguments.

Regarding Codex Vaticanus, Payne discovered “distigmai” (or “Umlauts”) in its margins that are generally agreed to indicate variants. But Payne argues that they occasionally function with horizontal “bars” to “highlight them as interpolations or particularly significant variants,” suggesting that 1 Cor 14:34–35 is an example of the former. This places a heavy burden of proof on Payne to show that the scribal markings adjacent to 1 Cor 14:33 were intended to mark verses 34–35 as an interpolation rather than indicate variant placement—especially since the MSS only offer the latter option. Indeed, Payne’s claim that 1 Cor 14:34–35 is an interpolation is, in the final analysis, arbitrary.

In any case, all—including Payne—

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47 Kloha identifies three displacements in Romans 16 affecting verses 3 and 5, 16 and 21, and 20 and 24. Displacements involving the phrase “all the churches” in some way include Rom 16:5 (cf. verse 4’s πᾶσαι αἱ ἐκκλησίαι τῶν ἐθνῶν) and 16:16 (αἱ ἐκκλησίαι πᾶσαι). The first of these displacements also associates the phrase καὶ τὴν κατ’ εἶκον αὐτῶν ἐκκλησίαν more closely with Prisc(illa) and Aquila in verse 3 among those to be greeted. Kloha further observes an explanatory gloss in the Western MSS at 1 Cor 16:19 that again involves Prisc(illa) (“Textual Commentary” 2:547–56).

48 Payne, “Distigmai” 201.

49 Payne argues that “[i]f this umlaut had indicated awareness of the Western reading that puts 14:34-35 after 14:40, there should also have been an umlaut after 14:40, but there is not one there” (“Originality” 113). However, arguments based on what a scribe “should” have done are tenuous. He also claims that a distigme + bar occurs with “some of the passages most widely regarded as interpolations, including Ioḥ. 7,53–8,11, ‘for the Son of Man has come to seek and to save the lost’ after Matth. 18,10, ‘blessed are you among women’ after Luc. 1,28, ‘many are called but few are chosen’ after Luc. 14,24, ‘in the church. In those days’ after Act. 2,47, and 1 Cor. 14,34-35.” Payne goes on to claim: “Each of the passages above where the bar extends toward a distigme extends approximately 3 mm into the margin. Virtually all such long bars that extend toward adjacent distigmas occur by widely recognized interpolations” (“Distigmai” 201). Interestingly, Payne cites Rom 16:5 as one of two “possible exceptions” in a footnote to this last claim (“Distigmai” 201, n. 6; cf. “Fuldensis” 253). However, we earlier noted that Kloha identifies Rom 16:5 as a characteristic displacement in western MSS in the Pauline corpus like the better-known example of 1 Cor 14:34–35 (see n. 47). Again, this suggests displacement rather than interpolation. On the other hand, Payne’s “widely recognized interpolations” are from the Gospels and Acts rather than the Pauline corpus.
agree that the bars function to mark paragraphs, and Niccum appears to be justified in his criticism that Payne “confused two separate markings” when claiming that the bars and distigmai function together in some cases.\(^{50}\) Moreover, Niccum and Peter Head offer a serious challenge to Payne’s fourth-century dating of the distigmai, dating them more than a millennium later.\(^{51}\)

Payne’s other arguments also suffer serious deficiencies. In the case of Codex Fuldensis, Curt Niccum argues conclusively that Victor, Bishop of Capua, “corrected” the text to an ancestor of Codex Reginensis that locates verses 34–35 after verse 40, not to a MS lacking them as Payne suggests.\(^{52}\) Regarding non-western MS 88, which reads verses 34–35 after verse 40, Payne agrees that its correctional markings\(^ {53}\) reflect the scribe’s intention to locate these verses in their normal (“eastern”) place after verse 33. However, he concludes that the scribe must have copied a MS lacking verses 34–35 altogether and supplied them at the end of the chapter when he realized his exemplar’s error too late in the copying process.\(^ {54}\) Yet his conclusion comes as the result of a tenuous process of elimination of

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\(^{50}\) Niccum agrees that the distigmai indicate textual variation, but since the bars “divide the text into sense units,” they “have no value for determining readings of other MSS” (“The Voice of the Manuscripts on the Silence of Women: The External Evidence for 1 Cor 14.34–5,” \textit{NTS} 43 [1997] 242–55, here 244–45). Indeed, as Payne recognizes, “Codex Vaticanus … clearly distinguishes 1 Cor 14.34–5 as a separate paragraph” (“Fuldensis” 250–51). This would appear to account for the presence of the bar.

\(^{51}\) Payne appeals to the color of the ink, which he claims matches the color of unreinforced text in 51 instances (out of a total of approximately 765). He nevertheless agrees that they were added some time after the initial copying process (Payne and Canart, “Distigmai” 203–13; “Originality” 105–13; Payne, \textit{Man and Woman} 232–40), which prompts the question: how long after? In vast contrast to Payne, Niccum dates the distigmai between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, observing that “Vaticanus’ fourth-century vellum survives only to Heb 9.14 (\(\tau θεω κοσμ\)). A fifteenth-century scribe supplied the remaining text of the NT, and these ‘umlauts’ continue into this minuscule text through Heb 10.1!” He goes on to say that, “the textual character changes immediately to the Byzantine text-type. One can only conclude that some scholar after 1400 compared Vaticanus with another text, noting places of variation and/or agreement in the margin.” In a footnote to this explanation, Niccum suggests that Juan Ginés de Sepulveda (1490–1574)—known for trying to convince Erasmus to revise his NT text by appealing to 365 instances where Vaticanus agreed with the Vulgate against Erasmus’ favored Byzantine text—“inserted these umlauts” (“Voice of the Manuscripts” 245 and 245, n. 20). At his presentation at the 2009 SBL meeting in New Orleans, Peter Head gave further evidence for Niccum’s view. From his comparison of Vaticanus’ distigmai with Erasmus’ text, Head reported a 92% level of correspondence to these variations—98% if Erasmus’ notes are included. (Peter Head, “The Marginalia of Codex Vaticanus: Putting the Distigmai [Formerly known as ‘Umlauts’] in Their Place” [paper presented at the annual meeting of the SBL in New Orleans, November 21, 2009]).

\(^{52}\) According to Payne, Victor’s correctional abbreviations in the margins of Fuldensis indicate that verses 36–40 replace verses 34–40, thus omitting verses 34–35. This supposedly implies the existence of a MS lacking these verses, which Victor used to correct Fuldensis (“Distigmai” 241–45). But if the marginal verses 36–40 are an insertion, the corrected text of Fuldensis witnesses the western placement of verses 34–35 after verse 40. Indeed, Niccum observes that 90% of the corrections in Fuldensis agree with Reginensis, and that “the marginal reading of 14.36–40 in Fuldensis exactly matches the text of Reginensis which has these verses preceding vv. 34–5,” proving that Victor made the correction on the basis of an ancestor of Reginensis (“Voice of the Manuscripts” 247). Payne’s response to Niccum skirts this second point. Indeed, Payne’s claim that Niccum’s view “far exceeds the evidence” seems better applied to his own argument, which advocates a Vorlage not attested in any MS at all (\textit{Man and Woman} 248, n. 149).

\(^{53}\) Double slashes appear before verse 36 (which follows directly from v. 33) and its corresponding margin, and after verse 40, whereupon verses 34–35 follow.

\(^{54}\) Payne, “Ms. 88 as Evidence” 152–58.
possibilities. After eliminating the unlikely explanations of intentional or unintentional omission, or that the scribe used a western MS (and immediately corrected it), Payne rejects the possibility that 88’s non-western exemplar had verses 34–35 after 40. Indeed, David C. Parker finds Payne’s argument inadequate, and concludes that it is “probably safest to posit that the exemplar of 88 had vv. 34–5 after v. 40.” Furthermore, Kloha observes that thirteenth-century Greek MS 915—which includes verses 34–35 after verse 40—is closely related to 88, and demonstrates that the corrector’s exemplar was an ancestor of 915. Finally, Payne argues that some early Fathers were probably unaware of verses 34–35 based on their failure to cite it in their surviving works. However, Payne’s arguments from silence are hardly compelling evidence, and Niccum points out the problems with Payne’s use of patristic evidence in this regard.

In conclusion, Fee’s arguments from transcriptional probability and Payne’s arguments for a MS that lacked verses 34–35 are unsustainable. The textual evidence instead indicates that verses 34–35 are authentic in their normal place after verse 33, and that their displacement to the end of chapter 14 at some point in the early centuries reflects scribal concerns in the Western tradition. Our analysis of Paul’s argument confirms this.

55 Payne indicates that the double slash between verses 40 and 34–35 are written in a larger gap, suggesting the original copyist made room for them as his own corrective markings (“Ms. 88 as Evidence” 152).

56 Parker describes Payne’s argument as “weak, indeed part of it seems hopelessly confused” (Introduction 276).


58 E.g. Payne finds it significant that Clement of Alexandria “does not cite 1 Cor 14.34–5 even though he discusses the behaviour of women in church” (“Fuldensis” 247).

59 Cf. Niccum’s criticism of Payne’s use of patristic evidence (“Voice of the Manuscripts” 244, n. 11).